This morning, The Washington Times ran an op-ed on cyberwar I co-wrote with my friend (and former boss) Jim Hendler. Much has been written about cyber-war, but very little of it is grounded in reality. Many over-hype the issue while others discount it completely. Much of the misinformation about cyberwar revolves around denial of services attacks, which are serious criminal activity but not much of a national security concern - we've written on this topic in the wake of Russian conflicts with Estonia and Georgia.
Here we try to inject a bit of sober and informed reason into the discussion.
Wednesday, August 5, 2009
Profile of a real cyberwar
Aaron Mannes and James Hendler
The denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that started on July 4 garnered typical headlines about cyberwar, but in fact, from a technical standpoint, those "attacks" may be the opposite of real cyberwar. A much less noticed report in Israel's leading daily, Ha'aretz, on Israel's operations against Iran's nuclear program may give greater insight into how cyberwar actually will work.
It is no secret that several countries, including the United States, China, Russia and Israel, have examined cyberwar capabilities. What those capabilities might be or how a cyberwar might look are shrouded in mystery. The denial-of-service attacks that made headlines are not it.
Those attacks are nothing more than the sending of enormous numbers of requests to servers, preventing Web sites from responding to legitimate traffic and interfering with e-mail. Competent information-technology professionals usually can mitigate these attacks, and even when successful, their impact -- from a national security standpoint -- is marginal.
The DoS attacks are carried out by botnets, thousands of compromised computers that can be commanded to simultaneously send e-mails or visit a Web site. The botnets are built using malware that attacks individual computers, often simply taking advantage of software that has not downloaded current security patches. Computers linked to government agencies have been compromised and have become part of botnets -- but this does not necessarily have tremendous security implications. Real cyberwar may require the opposite of the skills required for the DoS attacks that make headlines.
According to the article in Ha'aretz, Israeli intelligence has sought to systematically insert malware that can damage information systems within the Iranian nuclear program. It is believed those systems are not connected to the broader Internet and that the malware is inserted into equipment sold to the Iranian government.
This is the probable future cyberwar. Modern societies are complex networks of people, information systems and equipment. Enormous advantages will be obtained by powers that can quickly identify and neutralize critical nodes within the systems.
Critical government systems are run on Intranets, networks that are separate from the Internet. The most crucial systems, such as the command-and-control system for nuclear weapons, are believed to be air-gapped -- that is, they do not link to other systems. Most government Intranets do have points at which they interface with the Internet, and Intranets have been infected with malware from the Internet. However, Intranets are relatively controlled environments, so anomalous activity (at least theoretically) can be controlled and isolated quickly.
Because compromising those networks may be crucial in a military conflict, nation-states with serious cyberwar ambitions will carefully tailor malware for specific systems. This is the opposite of the malware that builds botnets by seeking low-hanging fruit.
The most serious cases of identity theft usually involve social engineering, tricking the target to reveal crucial information that facilitates the crime. The same may be true in tailoring attacks to critical networks. Most advanced nation-states have extensive infrastructures of contractors and academics that have both public roles and contacts with the security establishment. Social-network analysis could be used to identify individuals who are likely to have contacts within the security establishment and attempt to insert malware through them.
Imagine the now ubiquitous phishing attacks masquerading as e-mail from banks and credit card companies but instead designed by sophisticated intelligence agencies and carefully targeted at small communities.
What the malware might do when it gets into a system is an open question. Chinese hackers reportedly have infiltrated computers and manipulated them to remove sensitive documents, log keystrokes and trigger Web cameras. Whether these capabilities could operate for a substantial length of time on a secure Intranet is an open question. Any malware that entered a sensitive system might have a short life span and its designers would need to consider carefully how best to use this window. Alternatively, this malware may be embedded for long periods of time and activated when needed. Options might include relaying valuable information, manipulating information, damaging the network or providing information on the real-world location of crucial network nodes so that they can be destroyed physically.
However, cyberwar capabilities cannot be used lightly. Once malware is detected, the defenders can counter it and make their system stronger and more resistant to further infiltration.
In the heat of battle, the ability to penetrate an enemy information network could be crucial. However, in the long-term dialectic of war, in which sides continually respond to one another's innovations, cyberwar will become another facet of conflict -- at times decisive and at other times peripheral. The nations that first master cyberwar could obtain a fundamental advantage at the beginning stages of a conflict. Nations that ignore cyberwar will do so at their own peril.
Aaron Mannes is a researcher at the University of Maryland. James Hendler is a professor of computer science at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
Showing posts with label Published Articles. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Published Articles. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 5, 2009
Friday, August 22, 2008
Aaron Mannes in the Guardian: Russia-Georgia CyberWar Assessment
The Guardian Online just posted an assessment I co-wrote with my friend Jim Hendler (computer science professor at RPI) about the Georgia-Russia Cyberwar.
The first modern cyberwar?
Aaron Mannes and James Hendler
Friday August 22 2008
The Russian-Georgian conflict is being described as the first time cyber-attacks have accompanied an actual war. Last year, the Russian-Estonian spat was described as the first modern cyber-war. These descriptions over dramatise events and are a distraction from the more prosaic, but more serious, danger these illicit cyber-actions represent. The technology used in these cyber-conflicts has only limited strategic impact, but represents a major threat to one of the most successful engines of human freedom and opportunity – the World Wide Web itself.
The strikes against Georgian government websites, along with last April's attacks against Estonian websites, were distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) where many computers simultaneously send messages to a website, preventing legitimate traffic from reaching the site. These attacks are relatively easy to launch, but taking a website down does not affect real world infrastructure and competent IT professionals can counter or at least mitigate DDoS attacks. The increasing volume and sophistication of these attacks is a subject much discussed among IT professionals, but its impact is to create an inconvenience.
Theoretically taking down Georgian government sites could have prevented Georgia from publicising its side of the conflict. However, some Georgian sites were migrated to new locations. More importantly, the Georgian government's message was getting out to the world. The problem was that the United States and Nato had limited options for supporting Georgia. In short, the cyber component had no significant known impact.
Advanced economies and militaries rely on sophisticated information networks. Damaging or infiltrating these networks will probably be an important component of future wars. The ability to listen in on or disable an enemy's military communications net could be the difference between victory and defeat. It is also conceivable that information inside these networks could be influenced, or that the networks running critical infrastructure - military or civilian - could be infiltrated and used to cause real-world damage. However the skills and technologies needed for these attacks will be highly specialised, and not akin to the DDoS attacks which a relative amateur can launch.
Russia, home to a sophisticated core of cyber-criminals, undoubtedly possesses some of these capabilities. But, considering Russia's massive military advantage over tiny Georgia, it is unlikely that Russia would have turned to advanced cyber war to guarantee victory, particularly when deploying it would provide potential future adversaries with valuable intelligence about Russia's cyber war strategies and tactics. In addition, much of Georgia's infrastructure is old and consequently not online and therefore invulnerable to a cyber strike. (The Georgians claim that Russia has targeted their phone system, and while that is possible, it is more likely that Georgian phone systems were overwhelmed in the general crisis accompanying the Russian attacks.)
The Russian government may have instigated the DDoS attacks, although the evidence is unclear, and it is difficult to identify the origins of a DDoS attack. It appears that the DDoS attacks were in fact a mass action by regular Russian citizens. For the future of the Web, this is even more worrisome.
DDoS attacks typically use botnets, networks of thousands of compromised computers that, unbeknownst to their owners, are used to disseminate spam. Five years ago DDoS attacks and botnets were the domain of highly skilled cyber-criminals. Now, botnets can be rented online, and rentals come with tech support. The massive DDoS attacks on Georgia included botnets, but ordinary citizens joined in, using simple tools distributed online to join in the attacks. The tools of cybercrime are becoming progressively easier to use.
The Web was established as an open environment, with minimal governance, that puts a premium on individual liberty and initiative. This openness has been essential to the Web's success as a tremendous engine of creativity, opportunity, and liberty. DDoS attacks that take down websites are bad manners and one threat to the open spirit that underpins the Web. But the technology behind these attacks represents even greater threats.
The primary use of botnets is not DDoS attacks, but to perpetrate an ever expanding repertoire of online frauds and distribute malicious software. These activities undermine the physical and moral integrity of the Web. Some estimates are that more than 75% of the emails sent worldwide are spam. With botnets becoming easier and easier to create and manage, the rate of spam is increasing faster than new internet capacity. Spam also represents a moral threat to the Web, as online fraud undermines trust in e-commerce and online communications in general.
Governments can better prepare for specific events, such as international cyberspats. There are a number of improvements that could be made in coordination and in developing early warning systems. But the systemic issues also need to be addressed. Software designs need to be improved to reduce the vulnerabilities that cyber-criminals exploit and the public needs to be better educated about safer online behaviour. Major Web users such as governments, ISPs, universities, and corporations need incentives to better secure their networks, and educate their users. Finally, serious efforts must be made to develop international laws that can prevent increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks and to prosecute cyber-criminals. All of these steps are costly, but without them more draconian efforts that impinge on individual privacy may be needed to keep the Web viable.
The cyber-component of the Russian-Georgian conflict was only a sideshow, but it highlighted the threats facing one of history's great promoters of freedom and innovation - the World Wide Web.
The first modern cyberwar?
Aaron Mannes and James Hendler
Friday August 22 2008
The Russian-Georgian conflict is being described as the first time cyber-attacks have accompanied an actual war. Last year, the Russian-Estonian spat was described as the first modern cyber-war. These descriptions over dramatise events and are a distraction from the more prosaic, but more serious, danger these illicit cyber-actions represent. The technology used in these cyber-conflicts has only limited strategic impact, but represents a major threat to one of the most successful engines of human freedom and opportunity – the World Wide Web itself.
The strikes against Georgian government websites, along with last April's attacks against Estonian websites, were distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) where many computers simultaneously send messages to a website, preventing legitimate traffic from reaching the site. These attacks are relatively easy to launch, but taking a website down does not affect real world infrastructure and competent IT professionals can counter or at least mitigate DDoS attacks. The increasing volume and sophistication of these attacks is a subject much discussed among IT professionals, but its impact is to create an inconvenience.
Theoretically taking down Georgian government sites could have prevented Georgia from publicising its side of the conflict. However, some Georgian sites were migrated to new locations. More importantly, the Georgian government's message was getting out to the world. The problem was that the United States and Nato had limited options for supporting Georgia. In short, the cyber component had no significant known impact.
Advanced economies and militaries rely on sophisticated information networks. Damaging or infiltrating these networks will probably be an important component of future wars. The ability to listen in on or disable an enemy's military communications net could be the difference between victory and defeat. It is also conceivable that information inside these networks could be influenced, or that the networks running critical infrastructure - military or civilian - could be infiltrated and used to cause real-world damage. However the skills and technologies needed for these attacks will be highly specialised, and not akin to the DDoS attacks which a relative amateur can launch.
Russia, home to a sophisticated core of cyber-criminals, undoubtedly possesses some of these capabilities. But, considering Russia's massive military advantage over tiny Georgia, it is unlikely that Russia would have turned to advanced cyber war to guarantee victory, particularly when deploying it would provide potential future adversaries with valuable intelligence about Russia's cyber war strategies and tactics. In addition, much of Georgia's infrastructure is old and consequently not online and therefore invulnerable to a cyber strike. (The Georgians claim that Russia has targeted their phone system, and while that is possible, it is more likely that Georgian phone systems were overwhelmed in the general crisis accompanying the Russian attacks.)
The Russian government may have instigated the DDoS attacks, although the evidence is unclear, and it is difficult to identify the origins of a DDoS attack. It appears that the DDoS attacks were in fact a mass action by regular Russian citizens. For the future of the Web, this is even more worrisome.
DDoS attacks typically use botnets, networks of thousands of compromised computers that, unbeknownst to their owners, are used to disseminate spam. Five years ago DDoS attacks and botnets were the domain of highly skilled cyber-criminals. Now, botnets can be rented online, and rentals come with tech support. The massive DDoS attacks on Georgia included botnets, but ordinary citizens joined in, using simple tools distributed online to join in the attacks. The tools of cybercrime are becoming progressively easier to use.
The Web was established as an open environment, with minimal governance, that puts a premium on individual liberty and initiative. This openness has been essential to the Web's success as a tremendous engine of creativity, opportunity, and liberty. DDoS attacks that take down websites are bad manners and one threat to the open spirit that underpins the Web. But the technology behind these attacks represents even greater threats.
The primary use of botnets is not DDoS attacks, but to perpetrate an ever expanding repertoire of online frauds and distribute malicious software. These activities undermine the physical and moral integrity of the Web. Some estimates are that more than 75% of the emails sent worldwide are spam. With botnets becoming easier and easier to create and manage, the rate of spam is increasing faster than new internet capacity. Spam also represents a moral threat to the Web, as online fraud undermines trust in e-commerce and online communications in general.
Governments can better prepare for specific events, such as international cyberspats. There are a number of improvements that could be made in coordination and in developing early warning systems. But the systemic issues also need to be addressed. Software designs need to be improved to reduce the vulnerabilities that cyber-criminals exploit and the public needs to be better educated about safer online behaviour. Major Web users such as governments, ISPs, universities, and corporations need incentives to better secure their networks, and educate their users. Finally, serious efforts must be made to develop international laws that can prevent increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks and to prosecute cyber-criminals. All of these steps are costly, but without them more draconian efforts that impinge on individual privacy may be needed to keep the Web viable.
The cyber-component of the Russian-Georgian conflict was only a sideshow, but it highlighted the threats facing one of history's great promoters of freedom and innovation - the World Wide Web.
Friday, August 15, 2008
Golden Oldie: Russian-Estonian Cyberwar Overview
Spring 2007, a spat between Russia and Estonia was accompanied by a "cyberwar." With my friend, and former boss, Jim Hendler (now a professor at RPI) I wrote an overview. The story is now relevant again for assessing the cyber component of the Georgian-Russian conflict. This difference is that this time, for all of the hype about cyberwar, there is real world fighting that is having a more permanent impact.
At the same time the growing level of illicit activity on the web is a concern in its own right.
June 5, 2007
COMMENTARY
Net Attack
By AARON MANNES and JAMES HENDLER
June 5, 2007
The age of cyberwar has arrived. The attacks on Estonian government and commercial Web sites following the relocation of a Soviet World War II memorial in Tallinn in late April made news around the world. Yet these were not the only, or even the most significant, such assaults this year.
In February, hackers laid siege to six of the 13 "root servers" that form the backbone of the Internet. Had they succeeded in disabling these servers, the Internet would have ceased to function. Fortunately, only two of the root servers were severely affected, causing only some localized slowdowns. The emerging threat of cyberattacks against vital parts of the global economy highlights the urgent need to protect the Net from criminals.
The attack on Estonia was perhaps more akin to a riot than a military strike. Just as a mob might wreck storefronts, cyberattacks defaced or knocked prominent commercial and government Web sites offline. Similar attacks have accompanied other international political spats. Arab and Israeli hackers attack each other's Web sites, as do Pakistani and Indian hackers. After a South Korean speed skater was disqualified for bumping an American rival during the 2002 Winter Olympics, several strikes apparently originating from South Korea hit U.S. servers.
In all these cases, the hackers can cause email delays and fetter access to targeted Web sites. In Estonia, they prevented the national government from explaining the situation, hampered financial transactions and interfered with telephone systems, which rely in part on the Internet to function.
The strikes against the Estonian sites and the Internet root servers are of a type known as Distributed Denial of Service attacks, or DDoS. The assailants begin by installing a virus or other malicious software on a computer, directing it to send messages without its owner's knowledge. These compromised computers, known as bots, are bound together into large networks called botnets. They then simultaneously send messages to the targeted system, overwhelming it and leaving it unable to respond to queries. Low-end estimates indicate that there are tens of millions of bots in the world, and experts have identified some botnets that included more than 100,000 compromised computers.
One reason for the increasing frequency of these attacks is that they don't require high-level skills. In chat rooms where cybercriminals congregate, botnet builders offer their "products" for rent, their real identities obscured behind aliases. There are even online help desks to assist users. Because botnets consist of computers from all over the world, it is difficult to trace the origin of an attack, making it particularly attractive to governments who can deny any responsibility.
Consider the Estonian case. Tallinn accuses Russian state officials of involvement in the recent attacks. But even if that is true, it is difficult prove that this was state policy instead of the actions of sympathetic individuals. State computers may have been part of botnets, but so were other computers around the world. Russia is also a major center for cybercriminals, many of whom happen to be staunch Russian patriots. In this recent cyber levée en masse, many ordinary Russians participated in the attacks against Estonia; at its peak over one million computers were involved.
Because of their ease of use, DDoS attacks have proved attractive to various malevolent actors. According to a report by the Middle East Media Research Institute, Islamist chat rooms have included discussions of attack techniques and work to coordinate attacks on Web sites that oppose their cause. DDoS attacks may favor the assailant, but skilled IT professionals can counter them. More important, they have limited efficacy: Knocking out the power company's Web site is not the same as taking down the power grid. Breaking into a system to gather information, or launching an attack that damages real-world infrastructure, requires more extensive skills. So far, the few publicly known incidents involving real-world infrastructure -- most famously an April 2000 case in Australia in which raw sewage was released into rivers and streams -- have involved disgruntled insiders.
DDoS is also of limited utility in economic warfare. Knocking out the Web site of an online business is obviously bad for that business, but it has a negligible overall economic effect: Frustrated customers can simply purchase from competitors.
Little is known about the people behind the February attacks on the Internet root servers. The investigation into the incident suggested that the attack was by cybercriminals who wanted to advertise their sophisticated botnet. Criminals have used DDoS to blackmail online businesses, particularly gambling sites. But botnets are used more profitably to disseminate spam and malware. While the botnets cannot yet destroy the Web technically, they are undermining its vital trust and openness.
There are no simple ways to prevent the World Wide Web from becoming a zone where powerful criminals operate unfettered and large players can push around small ones. Software makers can work to make systems more secure, but many computers are compromised by user error rather than technical flaws. The public can be better educated in computer security, but human nature is imperfect.
International standards for addressing the problem, such as the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime, are evolving. Setting international standards to counter cybercrime, while still protecting civil liberties, will be a continuing challenge. But the greater challenge will be pressing nation-states to adhere to these standards by enacting and enforcing laws against cybercrime.
Yet as the attacks against Estonia show, the task cannot be delayed -- the increasing sophistication and accessibility of malware means these problems will only become worse. The future of the Web is at stake.
Mr. Mannes is a researcher in international security affairs and Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland. Mr. Hendler is a professor of computer science at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
At the same time the growing level of illicit activity on the web is a concern in its own right.
June 5, 2007
COMMENTARY
Net Attack
By AARON MANNES and JAMES HENDLER
June 5, 2007
The age of cyberwar has arrived. The attacks on Estonian government and commercial Web sites following the relocation of a Soviet World War II memorial in Tallinn in late April made news around the world. Yet these were not the only, or even the most significant, such assaults this year.
In February, hackers laid siege to six of the 13 "root servers" that form the backbone of the Internet. Had they succeeded in disabling these servers, the Internet would have ceased to function. Fortunately, only two of the root servers were severely affected, causing only some localized slowdowns. The emerging threat of cyberattacks against vital parts of the global economy highlights the urgent need to protect the Net from criminals.
The attack on Estonia was perhaps more akin to a riot than a military strike. Just as a mob might wreck storefronts, cyberattacks defaced or knocked prominent commercial and government Web sites offline. Similar attacks have accompanied other international political spats. Arab and Israeli hackers attack each other's Web sites, as do Pakistani and Indian hackers. After a South Korean speed skater was disqualified for bumping an American rival during the 2002 Winter Olympics, several strikes apparently originating from South Korea hit U.S. servers.
In all these cases, the hackers can cause email delays and fetter access to targeted Web sites. In Estonia, they prevented the national government from explaining the situation, hampered financial transactions and interfered with telephone systems, which rely in part on the Internet to function.
The strikes against the Estonian sites and the Internet root servers are of a type known as Distributed Denial of Service attacks, or DDoS. The assailants begin by installing a virus or other malicious software on a computer, directing it to send messages without its owner's knowledge. These compromised computers, known as bots, are bound together into large networks called botnets. They then simultaneously send messages to the targeted system, overwhelming it and leaving it unable to respond to queries. Low-end estimates indicate that there are tens of millions of bots in the world, and experts have identified some botnets that included more than 100,000 compromised computers.
One reason for the increasing frequency of these attacks is that they don't require high-level skills. In chat rooms where cybercriminals congregate, botnet builders offer their "products" for rent, their real identities obscured behind aliases. There are even online help desks to assist users. Because botnets consist of computers from all over the world, it is difficult to trace the origin of an attack, making it particularly attractive to governments who can deny any responsibility.
Consider the Estonian case. Tallinn accuses Russian state officials of involvement in the recent attacks. But even if that is true, it is difficult prove that this was state policy instead of the actions of sympathetic individuals. State computers may have been part of botnets, but so were other computers around the world. Russia is also a major center for cybercriminals, many of whom happen to be staunch Russian patriots. In this recent cyber levée en masse, many ordinary Russians participated in the attacks against Estonia; at its peak over one million computers were involved.
Because of their ease of use, DDoS attacks have proved attractive to various malevolent actors. According to a report by the Middle East Media Research Institute, Islamist chat rooms have included discussions of attack techniques and work to coordinate attacks on Web sites that oppose their cause. DDoS attacks may favor the assailant, but skilled IT professionals can counter them. More important, they have limited efficacy: Knocking out the power company's Web site is not the same as taking down the power grid. Breaking into a system to gather information, or launching an attack that damages real-world infrastructure, requires more extensive skills. So far, the few publicly known incidents involving real-world infrastructure -- most famously an April 2000 case in Australia in which raw sewage was released into rivers and streams -- have involved disgruntled insiders.
DDoS is also of limited utility in economic warfare. Knocking out the Web site of an online business is obviously bad for that business, but it has a negligible overall economic effect: Frustrated customers can simply purchase from competitors.
Little is known about the people behind the February attacks on the Internet root servers. The investigation into the incident suggested that the attack was by cybercriminals who wanted to advertise their sophisticated botnet. Criminals have used DDoS to blackmail online businesses, particularly gambling sites. But botnets are used more profitably to disseminate spam and malware. While the botnets cannot yet destroy the Web technically, they are undermining its vital trust and openness.
There are no simple ways to prevent the World Wide Web from becoming a zone where powerful criminals operate unfettered and large players can push around small ones. Software makers can work to make systems more secure, but many computers are compromised by user error rather than technical flaws. The public can be better educated in computer security, but human nature is imperfect.
International standards for addressing the problem, such as the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime, are evolving. Setting international standards to counter cybercrime, while still protecting civil liberties, will be a continuing challenge. But the greater challenge will be pressing nation-states to adhere to these standards by enacting and enforcing laws against cybercrime.
Yet as the attacks against Estonia show, the task cannot be delayed -- the increasing sophistication and accessibility of malware means these problems will only become worse. The future of the Web is at stake.
Mr. Mannes is a researcher in international security affairs and Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland. Mr. Hendler is a professor of computer science at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
Friday, May 30, 2008
Statistical Analysis of Decapitation as a Counter-Terror Strategy
The most recent edition of The Journal of International Policy Solutions published a statistical analysis I wrote on the efficacy of killing or capturing the top leaders of a terrorist organizations. Entitled "Testing The Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group's Activity?" the article can be read in its entirety here a summary of the method and findings follows.
It is conventional wisdom that removing an organization's leaders is an effective counter-terror strategy, but the quantitative analysis is less clear on the issue. Most of the successes focus on specific instances, such as the collapse of Sendero Luminoso in Peru after its leaders were removed. There are also examples on the other side, such as Hezbollah's increased deadliness and effectiveness after Israel's 1992 assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Abbas Musawi.
This study was an attempt to shed some light on the issue, focusing strictly on removing top leaders (#1 or #2 - so OBL or Zawahiri would count, but Khalid Sheikh Mohammed did not.) Sixty cases of terrorist leaders being killed, dying, or being captured and imprisoned for lengthy periods were identified. Using the Terrorism Knowledge Base, which is now sadly not available to the public anymore, I gathered data on incidents and fatalities in the two and five year periods before and after the organization lost its leader. Because there are lots of reasons why a terrorist group's level of activity might change I tested these results against a comparison group of 21 terrorist groups that did not lose a leader.
The Results
The data-set was relatively small so most of the results were not statistically significant. There was a trend of lower numbers of incidents after a group lost its leader, a trend that increased when a group lost its leader more than once. On the other hand there was an indication that the number of fatalities by Islamist groups increase after they lose a leader. Building on that when an Islamist leader is killed, rather than arrested, the increase is even greater.
None of these findings are rock solid and there are many other factors that could effect a terrorist group's activity. In particular, the increase in killings by Islamist groups after their leader is killed could reflect that the killing occurred i n the midst of a large-scale war (such as Chechnya or Algeria which were included in this study.) Still it is a potential cause for concern. Iraq was not included in this study, in great part because the data was too complicated to work with.
This is another key point the paper discusses, the data problems and other challenges (for example what should be measured - 9/11 was nearly 3000 deaths, but 4 incidents) in doing any quantitative analysis of terrorist activity. The paper also reviews other statistical studies of decapitation as a counter-terror strategy. At this point, my overall conclusions are the old academic fallback, "More study is needed." The paper ends:
It is conventional wisdom that removing an organization's leaders is an effective counter-terror strategy, but the quantitative analysis is less clear on the issue. Most of the successes focus on specific instances, such as the collapse of Sendero Luminoso in Peru after its leaders were removed. There are also examples on the other side, such as Hezbollah's increased deadliness and effectiveness after Israel's 1992 assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Abbas Musawi.
This study was an attempt to shed some light on the issue, focusing strictly on removing top leaders (#1 or #2 - so OBL or Zawahiri would count, but Khalid Sheikh Mohammed did not.) Sixty cases of terrorist leaders being killed, dying, or being captured and imprisoned for lengthy periods were identified. Using the Terrorism Knowledge Base, which is now sadly not available to the public anymore, I gathered data on incidents and fatalities in the two and five year periods before and after the organization lost its leader. Because there are lots of reasons why a terrorist group's level of activity might change I tested these results against a comparison group of 21 terrorist groups that did not lose a leader.
The Results
The data-set was relatively small so most of the results were not statistically significant. There was a trend of lower numbers of incidents after a group lost its leader, a trend that increased when a group lost its leader more than once. On the other hand there was an indication that the number of fatalities by Islamist groups increase after they lose a leader. Building on that when an Islamist leader is killed, rather than arrested, the increase is even greater.
None of these findings are rock solid and there are many other factors that could effect a terrorist group's activity. In particular, the increase in killings by Islamist groups after their leader is killed could reflect that the killing occurred i n the midst of a large-scale war (such as Chechnya or Algeria which were included in this study.) Still it is a potential cause for concern. Iraq was not included in this study, in great part because the data was too complicated to work with.
This is another key point the paper discusses, the data problems and other challenges (for example what should be measured - 9/11 was nearly 3000 deaths, but 4 incidents) in doing any quantitative analysis of terrorist activity. The paper also reviews other statistical studies of decapitation as a counter-terror strategy. At this point, my overall conclusions are the old academic fallback, "More study is needed." The paper ends:
Tolstoy began Anna Karenina by noting, "Happy families are all alike, every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." Like unhappy families, terrorist groups differ from each other and finding universally applicable rules to understand them may not be realistic. Regardless of the quantitative results, decapitation will remain a counter-terror strategy. If a quantitative test can help indicate where and when it is most likely to be effective or have deleterious results, it can help conserve scarce counter-terror resources and avoid exacerbating situations where the decapitation strategy may be counter-productive."
Tuesday, March 4, 2008
Aaron Mannes in NRO on FARC, Chavez, & Colombia
National Review Online ran my article Finding FARC on the fallout from Colombia's killing of FARC #2 Raul Reyes and Hugo Chavez's reaction.
March 4, 2008
Finding FARC
An important victory for Columbia sparks a major diplomatic spat.
By Aaron Mannes
The Colombian government’s successful killing of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) number-two Raul Reyes is an important victory in Colombia’s 44-year war with the narco-terrorists. Perhaps more significantly, the Colombian government’s ability to target the FARC will be substantially augmented by the computers captured from Reyes’s base. Advantages aside, however, the killing of Reyes and the contents of his hard drives have sparked a major diplomatic spat that has important regional implications.
The attack took place on March 1 about a mile and a half inside of Ecuadorian territory. Ecuador’s government was perturbed by this violation of their sovereignty, but the Colombian government apologized and the official Ecuadorian government reaction was subdued.
It was Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez who loudly and undiplomatically condemned Colombia’s President Uribe calling him a mafia chief, a criminal, and — the most offensive insult Chavez can level — an oligarch. He also called Colombia the Israel of Latin America (such sentiments are de rigueur for Chavistas). Chavez stated that similar attacks in Venezuela would be an act of war, and ordered ten battalions to the Colombian border. After its initially mild reaction, Ecuador followed suit, mobilizing troops and, in like fashion, expelling Colombian diplomats. But if it was Ecuadorian sovereignty that was violated, why is Chavez taking the lead in bashing Colombia?
There are several possibilities:
First, the hard drives captured from the FARC camp are absolute dynamite. So far the documents reveal that the FARC was negotiating with the Ecuadorian government at a very high level, that the FARC had given Chavez $150,000 while he was imprisoned after his 1992 coup attempt, and received $300 million from Chavez in return. And the revelations have only begun; it is likely that over time more will become lucid. Having declared that the FARC is a legitimate army, Chavez may not be concerned about the elucidation of his connections to the FARC. But his ally, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa, having claimed that he was not dealing with the FARC, is now embarrassed. By fomenting a diplomatic crisis, Chavez shifts the heated attention away from his ally.
Second, Chavez is deterring possible Colombian attacks on FARC leaders in Venezuela. It has long been an open secret that the Venezuelan frontier regions were open territory to the FARC. But the level of FARC activity in Venezuela has been increasing and at the same time Chavez has endorsed the FARC more vocally, insisting (contrary to most other countries in the world) that they are not terrorists. In deploying his forces he is sending a message to the Colombians that they must not target FARC in Venezuela.
Third, Chavez is looking for an international crisis to distract the Venezuelans from their domestic crisis. This is the oldest play in the book for dictators the world over. An article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs by the former chief economist for the Venezuelan National Assembly explains that for all of Chavez’s rhetoric about aiding Venezuela’s poor, actual improvements have been minimal. Venezuela’s economy has been booming due to high oil prices, but there has been little trickle down. At the same time many of Chavez’s polices — particularly price controls on staples — have led to the predictable shortages and to popular discontent. From Nasser to Fidel to Sukarno, third world dictators thrive on diplomatic spats and saber rattling.
Fourth: Hugo es loco. There have been many rumors about Hugo’s mental health and some of his recent acts (such as calling for the exhumation of his hero Simon Bolivar’s remains for tests to see if he was assassinated by the oligarchs) are increasingly loopy. It is possible, though not too likely, that Chavez actually wants this fight. Nonetheless, the history books are full of wars that should not have happened. Once an escalation begins, it can be difficult to bring it to an end.
If it comes to shooting, the odds would be on Colombia. The Venezuelan military will probably not show much enthusiasm for this adventure — and might rebel. Hugo’s high-priced weapons platforms take time to integrate, and the more sophisticated the equipment the more training is required. The United States would share satellite and electronic intelligence — just as it has in battling the FARC. In modern warfare the electronic advantage is crucial and for Venezuela will probably be insurmountable. A war would probably result in a catastrophic defeat for Chavez and his fall from power. It would also be an expensive bloody disaster for both Colombia and Venezuela.
Fortunately, it will probably not come to war. The other nations of Latin America are rushing to negotiate a settlement. The United States is wisely staying in the background (open confrontations with Chavez only play to his advantage). But as more intelligence about the FARC emerges from the late Raul Reyes’s hard drive, the nations of Latin America may be forced to make some tough decisions. Ecuador’s President Correa will have to decide if he wants to play Syria to Chavez’s Iran. But more broadly, the nations of Latin America, many of which have suffered from violence linked to the FARC, will have to decide if they can tolerate a state sponsor of terrorism in their midst or if that state should suffer the consequences of supporting terror.
— Aaron Mannes, editor of TheTerrorWonk, researches international security affairs at the University of Maryland’s Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics, and is a Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland.
March 4, 2008
Finding FARC
An important victory for Columbia sparks a major diplomatic spat.
By Aaron Mannes
The Colombian government’s successful killing of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) number-two Raul Reyes is an important victory in Colombia’s 44-year war with the narco-terrorists. Perhaps more significantly, the Colombian government’s ability to target the FARC will be substantially augmented by the computers captured from Reyes’s base. Advantages aside, however, the killing of Reyes and the contents of his hard drives have sparked a major diplomatic spat that has important regional implications.
The attack took place on March 1 about a mile and a half inside of Ecuadorian territory. Ecuador’s government was perturbed by this violation of their sovereignty, but the Colombian government apologized and the official Ecuadorian government reaction was subdued.
It was Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez who loudly and undiplomatically condemned Colombia’s President Uribe calling him a mafia chief, a criminal, and — the most offensive insult Chavez can level — an oligarch. He also called Colombia the Israel of Latin America (such sentiments are de rigueur for Chavistas). Chavez stated that similar attacks in Venezuela would be an act of war, and ordered ten battalions to the Colombian border. After its initially mild reaction, Ecuador followed suit, mobilizing troops and, in like fashion, expelling Colombian diplomats. But if it was Ecuadorian sovereignty that was violated, why is Chavez taking the lead in bashing Colombia?
There are several possibilities:
First, the hard drives captured from the FARC camp are absolute dynamite. So far the documents reveal that the FARC was negotiating with the Ecuadorian government at a very high level, that the FARC had given Chavez $150,000 while he was imprisoned after his 1992 coup attempt, and received $300 million from Chavez in return. And the revelations have only begun; it is likely that over time more will become lucid. Having declared that the FARC is a legitimate army, Chavez may not be concerned about the elucidation of his connections to the FARC. But his ally, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa, having claimed that he was not dealing with the FARC, is now embarrassed. By fomenting a diplomatic crisis, Chavez shifts the heated attention away from his ally.
Second, Chavez is deterring possible Colombian attacks on FARC leaders in Venezuela. It has long been an open secret that the Venezuelan frontier regions were open territory to the FARC. But the level of FARC activity in Venezuela has been increasing and at the same time Chavez has endorsed the FARC more vocally, insisting (contrary to most other countries in the world) that they are not terrorists. In deploying his forces he is sending a message to the Colombians that they must not target FARC in Venezuela.
Third, Chavez is looking for an international crisis to distract the Venezuelans from their domestic crisis. This is the oldest play in the book for dictators the world over. An article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs by the former chief economist for the Venezuelan National Assembly explains that for all of Chavez’s rhetoric about aiding Venezuela’s poor, actual improvements have been minimal. Venezuela’s economy has been booming due to high oil prices, but there has been little trickle down. At the same time many of Chavez’s polices — particularly price controls on staples — have led to the predictable shortages and to popular discontent. From Nasser to Fidel to Sukarno, third world dictators thrive on diplomatic spats and saber rattling.
Fourth: Hugo es loco. There have been many rumors about Hugo’s mental health and some of his recent acts (such as calling for the exhumation of his hero Simon Bolivar’s remains for tests to see if he was assassinated by the oligarchs) are increasingly loopy. It is possible, though not too likely, that Chavez actually wants this fight. Nonetheless, the history books are full of wars that should not have happened. Once an escalation begins, it can be difficult to bring it to an end.
If it comes to shooting, the odds would be on Colombia. The Venezuelan military will probably not show much enthusiasm for this adventure — and might rebel. Hugo’s high-priced weapons platforms take time to integrate, and the more sophisticated the equipment the more training is required. The United States would share satellite and electronic intelligence — just as it has in battling the FARC. In modern warfare the electronic advantage is crucial and for Venezuela will probably be insurmountable. A war would probably result in a catastrophic defeat for Chavez and his fall from power. It would also be an expensive bloody disaster for both Colombia and Venezuela.
Fortunately, it will probably not come to war. The other nations of Latin America are rushing to negotiate a settlement. The United States is wisely staying in the background (open confrontations with Chavez only play to his advantage). But as more intelligence about the FARC emerges from the late Raul Reyes’s hard drive, the nations of Latin America may be forced to make some tough decisions. Ecuador’s President Correa will have to decide if he wants to play Syria to Chavez’s Iran. But more broadly, the nations of Latin America, many of which have suffered from violence linked to the FARC, will have to decide if they can tolerate a state sponsor of terrorism in their midst or if that state should suffer the consequences of supporting terror.
— Aaron Mannes, editor of TheTerrorWonk, researches international security affairs at the University of Maryland’s Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics, and is a Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland.
Wednesday, February 27, 2008
Proof of Mughniyah's Evil
So I just found a terrific blog ...Or Does it Explode? Inside the struggle for civil rights in the Middle East. Good stuff all around, but what particularly caught my eye was learning that Imad Mughniyeh's son Jihad appears to be a Yankees fan. Bronx Bombers suddenly takes on a sinister meaning.
I'll leave it to some aspiring comparative lit prof to deconstruct the meaning of this in terms of cultural hegemony, post-modern irony, and globalization. My own interpretation is simpler.
I've written before that the New York Yankees are evil. This seals it.
Now to get cracking on a network graph linking Mughniyeh to George Steinbrenner.
I'll leave it to some aspiring comparative lit prof to deconstruct the meaning of this in terms of cultural hegemony, post-modern irony, and globalization. My own interpretation is simpler.
I've written before that the New York Yankees are evil. This seals it.
Now to get cracking on a network graph linking Mughniyeh to George Steinbrenner.
Wednesday, November 28, 2007
Aaron Mannes in Policy Review: Tribalism, Islamism & Women
The October-November issue of Policy Review published an article I wrote reviewing a pair of impressive books: Infidel by Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Now They Call Me Infidel: Why I Renounced Jihad for America, Israel, and the War on Terror by Nonie Darwish.
They are a pair of impressive books which shed important light not only on the nature of radical Islam, but also the way it along with tribalism pervade the societies of the greater Middle East and stifle freedom for women, but also for men.
My review is below.
Policy Review
October & November 2007, No. 145
BOOKS: Infidel Tales
by AARON MANNES
From sources as diverse as Bernard Lewis and the un’s Arab Human Development Report we hear the argument that improving the status of women is essential to reform in the Muslim world. But understanding what this entails demands more than statistics about female literacy rates. The memoirs of two exceptional women, born into very different circumstances in the Muslim world, provide a glimpse into the scale of this problem. Chief among the many virtues of Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s Infidel and Nonie Darwish’s Now They Call Me Infidel, is that they show the cruelty and banal petty oppression that encircles Muslim women.
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, now a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has become a figure on the international stage and an outspoken critic of radical Islam. In Infidel she tells the dramatic, almost unbelievable, story of her life so far. She was born into a prominent Somali clan, the daughter of a leader in the opposition to Somali dictator Siad Barre and something of a modernizer. Her father instructed that his family break with tradition and not excise the genitals of his daughters. While he was imprisoned his children were in the care of their maternal grandmother, who arranged the procedure. The Islam practiced by the Somalis was relaxed and combined with local traditions, but it remained central to the Somali identity. When political pressure forced the family to leave Somalia, Hirsi Ali’s mother refused at first to go to Ethiopia, both because it was Somalia’s longstanding enemy and because it was a predominantly Christian country. Instead they relocated to Saudi Arabia, where Hirsi Ali endured the difficulties of functioning in a country where women are not permitted out of the home without a male escort. They then moved briefly to Ethiopia, where she saw, first-hand, the impact of clan loyalties on the Somali opposition. Hirsi Ali’s mother, unhappy with barracks life, eventually took her three children to Nairobi, where the family survived on aid from wealthier Somali exiles.
Hirsi Ali grew to adulthood in Nairobi, where she was educated at a Western school and swept up in the rising Islamist tide. As a teenager she was an adherent of the rapidly expanding Muslim Brotherhood. She wore a hijab and attended prayers. But she could not reconcile the internal contradictions of the Muslim Brotherhood’s interpretation of Islam, particularly the inequality between men and women and the vilification of the West and non-Muslims. At the same time, she was going to films, reading English literature and Harlequin romance novels, and even dating surreptitiously. Her friends began to enter arranged marriages. Their descriptions of married life, particularly the passionless sex, horrified her. She put off her own suitors, but her father, though in many ways a liberal modernizer, had three wives himself and ignored his daughter’s objections to an arranged marriage with a prominent clan member. Her prospective husband was in Canada, and in 1992 Hirsi Ali was sent to live with relatives in Germany while she waited for a Canadian visa. Stunned by the order and cleanliness of the West, she also found herself quite able to navigate it. She began plotting her escape: She traveled to the Netherlands under the guise of visiting a family member, hoping to make her way to England. On learning of the lax asylum standards in the Netherlands, she decided to stay there instead. She was accepted as a refugee under false pretenses, having claimed that she was fleeing from Somalia’s civil war and given a false name and birth date.
If the book had ended with Hirsi Ali’s building a new life in the Netherlands, it would have been a fitting end to an amazing story. But the story does not end there. Seeking to discover why some places had governments that worked well and others did not, she obtained a university degree in politics. She also worked as a translator for Dutch police and social services agencies with Somali immigrants, and here she saw the ills of her native society — particularly the abuse of women — being imported into her adopted country. She was disturbed to find the Dutch acquiescing to immigrant demands to establish enclaves, rather than assimilating the immigrants into Dutch society.
Hirsi Ali entered politics as a researcher with a think tank. In the wake of 9/11, as Dutch elites insisted that terrorism was an aberration from Islam, Hirsi Ali argued the opposite — that Islam justified terrorism. As her criticisms of Islam became more pointed, Dutch elites recoiled from her message and Muslims began threatening her life; but she had touched a popular chord. She was elected to the Dutch parliament, where she pressed for Dutch police to track honor killings. With Theo Van Gogh she made the short film, Submission, about the treatment of women under Islam, which scandalized Muslims. In November 2004, Van Gogh was stabbed to death in broad daylight by a young Muslim. Dutch authorities, unprepared for this kind of terrorist threat, whisked Hirsi Ali out of the country and kept her confined under harsh and occasionally surreal conditions in rural locations in the United States and Germany. At the same time, as part of a political power play, there was an effort to strip her of her Dutch citizenship based on the false information she had provided when applying for asylum. Ultimately, seeking time to write and think, and finding the security requirements and constant moving in the Netherlands too onerous, Hirsi Ali resigned from the Dutch parliament and accepted a position at the American Enterprise Institute.
This bare summary does no justice Hirsi Ali’s page-turning memoir. From her harrowing description of her excision, to the details of life in Saudi Arabia, where little boys can turn off their mothers’ television programs, Hirsi Ali’s book illustrates the world of her origin, the values and principles that drive it, and the astounding level of violence that permeates it. Her wide-eyed descriptions of her first encounters with Western life are touching: police who are courteous and helpful, a religion that emphasizes dialogue and love rather than fear and submission, and marriages that are entered voluntarily and consist of two equal partners.
The life of Nonie Darwish, as she chronicles it in Now They Call Me Infidel: Why I Renounced Jihad for America, Israel, and the War on Terror, lacks the drama of Hirsi Ali’s experience, though there are many parallels. Darwish’s father was a highly regarded Egyptian military officer who was killed in Gaza by the Israelis just before the 1956 Suez War. (She describes growing up singing songs praising martyrdom in the battle with Israel as the state-controlled press churned out anti-Semitic diatribes.) Born into Egypt’s elite, Darwish was not directly touched by the worst aspects of the oppression of women, but she was not unaware of it. Honor killings were a regular theme in Egyptian literature and cinema, and the family’s maids told terrible stories of being raped by previous employers. A raped woman is considered to have dishonored the family; the only way for the family to restore its honor is to kill her. Darwish’s widowed mother could not remarry — it would have been dishonoring the memory of the shahid (martyr). At the same time, not having a male head of the household left the family vulnerable to rumor. The outgoing Darwish was warned by her mother to watch her behavior; otherwise the family might be suspected of improprieties. Dating and normal mixing between the sexes was simply impossible for young Egyptians, and marriages were arranged. Darwish relates the poignant sight of her mother walking, fully clothed, along the shoreline during beach vacations. Her mother joked about being young again and donning a bathing suit and swimming, but actually doing so would have been scandalous.
What is remarkable about Darwish’s narrative is that by the 1950s Egypt had been attempting to modernize for nearly a century and a half, and Nasser, who crushed the Muslim Brotherhood, was supposedly a great progressive figure. Yet, even at the very apex of Egypt’s secular elite society, the heavy hand of tradition trapped women. At the same time, while few Egyptians were devout, no one would criticize Islam. Darwish gives a sense of the extent to which Islam and tribal traditions saturate Muslim societies with most of the region’s ostensibly secular political movements and politicians, including Fatah, the Baath Party, and Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, emerging from this milieu.
Like Hirsi Ali, Darwish possessed an innate sense that allowed her to see through her society’s shibboleths. As a young woman she found Egyptian bravado prior to the Six Day War unbelievable and was unsurprised when Nasser’s adventure ended in a tragic defeat. And she realized early that she needed to leave Egypt, though her exodus in 1978 was more prosaic: She followed her Copt boyfriend, who had family in Los Angeles, to the United States. She was impressed by the general order and cleanliness she found there, and equally so in the message of love and tolerance she heard in Christianity. Still, like Hirsi Ali in the Netherlands, Darwish found that the Middle East had followed her to the West. Not a regular mosque-goer, when she did attend she was surprised by the vitriol and dogmatism. She noticed more and more Muslim women at malls and on campuses in full hijab.
On a visit to Egypt more than two decades later, Darwish was shocked by the poverty and anger (particularly at the United States), and the growing religious extremism. She was grateful when her plane landed in Los Angeles. It was September 10, 2001.
She was doubly shocked when the responses of her friends and relatives in Egypt vacillated between denying that Arabs had perpetrated 9/11 and assertions that the United States had had it coming. She began writing and speaking, trying to warn Americans of the nature of the terrorist threat and providing a different Arab perspective. She was even moved to defend Israel, and came to understand that it was Nasser and the mad ideologies that dominated the Muslim world that took her father’s life, not Israel.
While Hirsi Ali hews closely to her life story, Darwish addresses the broader impact of the traditions and restrictions that bind Muslim women. She explains how the tradition of polygamy reduces the status of Muslim women, by making husbands masters over their wives. A husband can easily, under the law, take a second wife if his first one displeases him, and she will have no legal recourse. This creates unhealthy alliances between mothers and sons, as mothers rely on their sons to protect them and advance their fortunes. Darwish points out that Arab men also suffer under this system. They are deprived of the joys and emotional depth of the voluntary monogamous marriage, which has been a cornerstone of western civilization. Of course, many Muslim couples love each other and remain monogamous, but this is not a central value of many of the societies of the greater Middle East.
Many of the worst customs prevailing in the Muslim world (honor killings, female genital mutilation, polygamy), as well as the general practice of restricting the sphere of activity of women, existed before Islam and are characteristics of tribalism. Although this social structure evolved as a response to the requirements of desert life, aspects of it have remained strong and it continues to define settled life in towns and rural areas throughout the greater Middle East and parts of Africa. The overwhelming centrality of extended family in daily life defines politics and has stifled the growth of civil society and entrepreneurial commerce. Hirsi Ali describes her relief at life in the Netherlands, where clan affiliation does not matter.
Westernized Muslims may reach into Muslim tradition and craft a modern Islam that is in accord with liberal democratic values. Alternately, tribal societies may develop mechanisms to change in the face of modernity. But Islam fused with tribalism creates an all-encompassing worldview and provides a theological framework reinforcing ancient customs. Islam permits, but does not require, female circumcision. Nevertheless, in communities where it is prevalent, most people, including local religious authorities, believe the procedure is required. This presumed fusion of Islam and tribalism was exemplified during a parliamentary debate in Jordan over establishing harsher sentences for men who killed female relatives who had violated family honor, when one Senator argued, “whether we like it or not, women are not equal to men in Islam. Adulterous women are much worse than adulterous men because women determine the lineage.”
In What Went Wrong Bernard Lewis writes that when buying Western weapons was insufficient to reverse Middle Eastern military decline, Middle Eastern nations adopted Western uniforms and martial music. But the systems and principles underpinning Western success were not imported. Women’s rights may follow a similar path. Some Muslim nations may be adopting reforms on behalf of women’s rights, but without changing the underlying value system. Egypt has made strides against female genital mutilation, and polygamy has been outlawed in several Muslim nations and is being redefined as socially unacceptable in others. Some states, responding to international pressure against them over egregious acts against women in the name of family honor, have begun to take steps against honor killings. These reforms, welcome though they are, are enacted under Western pressure and to maintain a veneer of modernity. It is not clear that the underlying principles of equality and personal liberty are also being adopted. Efforts to expand women’s education in the Muslim world appear more promising, although considering the generally poor quality of education in the region this initiative may also have a limited impact.
Muslim societies, trapped between religion and culture, have changed only slowly over centuries. But the lives of Darwish and Hirsi Ali offer a few possibilities for change. Both women were educated at Western schools, giving them the skills, particularly fluency in English, they needed to fend for themselves in a modern society. Darwish worked for a U.S. company, helping her achieve a certain measure of financial independence. Improving the educational and economic opportunities open to women, along with the attendant legal reforms, would give women greater autonomy. But the economies of the greater Middle East have been essentially stagnant for decades, and deeper changes will be necessary.
Other possibilities lie in the realm of ideas. Western literature and films, and even romance novels, inspired both women. These stories fostered a longing for romance and planted the seeds of individualism. In discussing reform, Hirsi Ali claims that Islam needs a Voltaire, and Darwish observes that creating the freedom to leave Islam is essential — only then, she says, will Islam be forced to compete equally for adherents. Today an individual who openly leaves Islam is an apostate and, as Hirsi Ali can attest, marked for death.
Fostering reform in the Muslim world is the great challenge of this century. But it is a challenge that cannot be evaded. Both Darwish and Hirsi Ali give warning that radical Islam is on the rise within the West itself and that immigrant communities are bringing tribal social structures with them. But their books are more than jeremiads. They are both also love stories of a sort: Two impressive, able women from backgrounds that squelched their talents came to the West and fell in love with the values espoused by Western societies and the opportunities and freedoms they provide. This message is also vital. If the West is to aid efforts to reform the Muslim world, it will need to believe in itself first. Darwish and Hirsi Ali provide a timely reminder, from people intimately familiar with the alternative, that Western societies and liberal democratic values are good and worth defending.
Aaron Mannes (www.aaronmannes.com), author of Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations (Rowman & Littlefield 2004), is a researcher at the University of Maryland’s Laboratory of Computational Cultural Dynamics and a doctoral student at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy.
They are a pair of impressive books which shed important light not only on the nature of radical Islam, but also the way it along with tribalism pervade the societies of the greater Middle East and stifle freedom for women, but also for men.
My review is below.
Policy Review
October & November 2007, No. 145
BOOKS: Infidel Tales
by AARON MANNES
From sources as diverse as Bernard Lewis and the un’s Arab Human Development Report we hear the argument that improving the status of women is essential to reform in the Muslim world. But understanding what this entails demands more than statistics about female literacy rates. The memoirs of two exceptional women, born into very different circumstances in the Muslim world, provide a glimpse into the scale of this problem. Chief among the many virtues of Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s Infidel and Nonie Darwish’s Now They Call Me Infidel, is that they show the cruelty and banal petty oppression that encircles Muslim women.
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, now a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has become a figure on the international stage and an outspoken critic of radical Islam. In Infidel she tells the dramatic, almost unbelievable, story of her life so far. She was born into a prominent Somali clan, the daughter of a leader in the opposition to Somali dictator Siad Barre and something of a modernizer. Her father instructed that his family break with tradition and not excise the genitals of his daughters. While he was imprisoned his children were in the care of their maternal grandmother, who arranged the procedure. The Islam practiced by the Somalis was relaxed and combined with local traditions, but it remained central to the Somali identity. When political pressure forced the family to leave Somalia, Hirsi Ali’s mother refused at first to go to Ethiopia, both because it was Somalia’s longstanding enemy and because it was a predominantly Christian country. Instead they relocated to Saudi Arabia, where Hirsi Ali endured the difficulties of functioning in a country where women are not permitted out of the home without a male escort. They then moved briefly to Ethiopia, where she saw, first-hand, the impact of clan loyalties on the Somali opposition. Hirsi Ali’s mother, unhappy with barracks life, eventually took her three children to Nairobi, where the family survived on aid from wealthier Somali exiles.
Hirsi Ali grew to adulthood in Nairobi, where she was educated at a Western school and swept up in the rising Islamist tide. As a teenager she was an adherent of the rapidly expanding Muslim Brotherhood. She wore a hijab and attended prayers. But she could not reconcile the internal contradictions of the Muslim Brotherhood’s interpretation of Islam, particularly the inequality between men and women and the vilification of the West and non-Muslims. At the same time, she was going to films, reading English literature and Harlequin romance novels, and even dating surreptitiously. Her friends began to enter arranged marriages. Their descriptions of married life, particularly the passionless sex, horrified her. She put off her own suitors, but her father, though in many ways a liberal modernizer, had three wives himself and ignored his daughter’s objections to an arranged marriage with a prominent clan member. Her prospective husband was in Canada, and in 1992 Hirsi Ali was sent to live with relatives in Germany while she waited for a Canadian visa. Stunned by the order and cleanliness of the West, she also found herself quite able to navigate it. She began plotting her escape: She traveled to the Netherlands under the guise of visiting a family member, hoping to make her way to England. On learning of the lax asylum standards in the Netherlands, she decided to stay there instead. She was accepted as a refugee under false pretenses, having claimed that she was fleeing from Somalia’s civil war and given a false name and birth date.
If the book had ended with Hirsi Ali’s building a new life in the Netherlands, it would have been a fitting end to an amazing story. But the story does not end there. Seeking to discover why some places had governments that worked well and others did not, she obtained a university degree in politics. She also worked as a translator for Dutch police and social services agencies with Somali immigrants, and here she saw the ills of her native society — particularly the abuse of women — being imported into her adopted country. She was disturbed to find the Dutch acquiescing to immigrant demands to establish enclaves, rather than assimilating the immigrants into Dutch society.
Hirsi Ali entered politics as a researcher with a think tank. In the wake of 9/11, as Dutch elites insisted that terrorism was an aberration from Islam, Hirsi Ali argued the opposite — that Islam justified terrorism. As her criticisms of Islam became more pointed, Dutch elites recoiled from her message and Muslims began threatening her life; but she had touched a popular chord. She was elected to the Dutch parliament, where she pressed for Dutch police to track honor killings. With Theo Van Gogh she made the short film, Submission, about the treatment of women under Islam, which scandalized Muslims. In November 2004, Van Gogh was stabbed to death in broad daylight by a young Muslim. Dutch authorities, unprepared for this kind of terrorist threat, whisked Hirsi Ali out of the country and kept her confined under harsh and occasionally surreal conditions in rural locations in the United States and Germany. At the same time, as part of a political power play, there was an effort to strip her of her Dutch citizenship based on the false information she had provided when applying for asylum. Ultimately, seeking time to write and think, and finding the security requirements and constant moving in the Netherlands too onerous, Hirsi Ali resigned from the Dutch parliament and accepted a position at the American Enterprise Institute.
This bare summary does no justice Hirsi Ali’s page-turning memoir. From her harrowing description of her excision, to the details of life in Saudi Arabia, where little boys can turn off their mothers’ television programs, Hirsi Ali’s book illustrates the world of her origin, the values and principles that drive it, and the astounding level of violence that permeates it. Her wide-eyed descriptions of her first encounters with Western life are touching: police who are courteous and helpful, a religion that emphasizes dialogue and love rather than fear and submission, and marriages that are entered voluntarily and consist of two equal partners.
The life of Nonie Darwish, as she chronicles it in Now They Call Me Infidel: Why I Renounced Jihad for America, Israel, and the War on Terror, lacks the drama of Hirsi Ali’s experience, though there are many parallels. Darwish’s father was a highly regarded Egyptian military officer who was killed in Gaza by the Israelis just before the 1956 Suez War. (She describes growing up singing songs praising martyrdom in the battle with Israel as the state-controlled press churned out anti-Semitic diatribes.) Born into Egypt’s elite, Darwish was not directly touched by the worst aspects of the oppression of women, but she was not unaware of it. Honor killings were a regular theme in Egyptian literature and cinema, and the family’s maids told terrible stories of being raped by previous employers. A raped woman is considered to have dishonored the family; the only way for the family to restore its honor is to kill her. Darwish’s widowed mother could not remarry — it would have been dishonoring the memory of the shahid (martyr). At the same time, not having a male head of the household left the family vulnerable to rumor. The outgoing Darwish was warned by her mother to watch her behavior; otherwise the family might be suspected of improprieties. Dating and normal mixing between the sexes was simply impossible for young Egyptians, and marriages were arranged. Darwish relates the poignant sight of her mother walking, fully clothed, along the shoreline during beach vacations. Her mother joked about being young again and donning a bathing suit and swimming, but actually doing so would have been scandalous.
What is remarkable about Darwish’s narrative is that by the 1950s Egypt had been attempting to modernize for nearly a century and a half, and Nasser, who crushed the Muslim Brotherhood, was supposedly a great progressive figure. Yet, even at the very apex of Egypt’s secular elite society, the heavy hand of tradition trapped women. At the same time, while few Egyptians were devout, no one would criticize Islam. Darwish gives a sense of the extent to which Islam and tribal traditions saturate Muslim societies with most of the region’s ostensibly secular political movements and politicians, including Fatah, the Baath Party, and Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, emerging from this milieu.
Like Hirsi Ali, Darwish possessed an innate sense that allowed her to see through her society’s shibboleths. As a young woman she found Egyptian bravado prior to the Six Day War unbelievable and was unsurprised when Nasser’s adventure ended in a tragic defeat. And she realized early that she needed to leave Egypt, though her exodus in 1978 was more prosaic: She followed her Copt boyfriend, who had family in Los Angeles, to the United States. She was impressed by the general order and cleanliness she found there, and equally so in the message of love and tolerance she heard in Christianity. Still, like Hirsi Ali in the Netherlands, Darwish found that the Middle East had followed her to the West. Not a regular mosque-goer, when she did attend she was surprised by the vitriol and dogmatism. She noticed more and more Muslim women at malls and on campuses in full hijab.
On a visit to Egypt more than two decades later, Darwish was shocked by the poverty and anger (particularly at the United States), and the growing religious extremism. She was grateful when her plane landed in Los Angeles. It was September 10, 2001.
She was doubly shocked when the responses of her friends and relatives in Egypt vacillated between denying that Arabs had perpetrated 9/11 and assertions that the United States had had it coming. She began writing and speaking, trying to warn Americans of the nature of the terrorist threat and providing a different Arab perspective. She was even moved to defend Israel, and came to understand that it was Nasser and the mad ideologies that dominated the Muslim world that took her father’s life, not Israel.
While Hirsi Ali hews closely to her life story, Darwish addresses the broader impact of the traditions and restrictions that bind Muslim women. She explains how the tradition of polygamy reduces the status of Muslim women, by making husbands masters over their wives. A husband can easily, under the law, take a second wife if his first one displeases him, and she will have no legal recourse. This creates unhealthy alliances between mothers and sons, as mothers rely on their sons to protect them and advance their fortunes. Darwish points out that Arab men also suffer under this system. They are deprived of the joys and emotional depth of the voluntary monogamous marriage, which has been a cornerstone of western civilization. Of course, many Muslim couples love each other and remain monogamous, but this is not a central value of many of the societies of the greater Middle East.
Many of the worst customs prevailing in the Muslim world (honor killings, female genital mutilation, polygamy), as well as the general practice of restricting the sphere of activity of women, existed before Islam and are characteristics of tribalism. Although this social structure evolved as a response to the requirements of desert life, aspects of it have remained strong and it continues to define settled life in towns and rural areas throughout the greater Middle East and parts of Africa. The overwhelming centrality of extended family in daily life defines politics and has stifled the growth of civil society and entrepreneurial commerce. Hirsi Ali describes her relief at life in the Netherlands, where clan affiliation does not matter.
Westernized Muslims may reach into Muslim tradition and craft a modern Islam that is in accord with liberal democratic values. Alternately, tribal societies may develop mechanisms to change in the face of modernity. But Islam fused with tribalism creates an all-encompassing worldview and provides a theological framework reinforcing ancient customs. Islam permits, but does not require, female circumcision. Nevertheless, in communities where it is prevalent, most people, including local religious authorities, believe the procedure is required. This presumed fusion of Islam and tribalism was exemplified during a parliamentary debate in Jordan over establishing harsher sentences for men who killed female relatives who had violated family honor, when one Senator argued, “whether we like it or not, women are not equal to men in Islam. Adulterous women are much worse than adulterous men because women determine the lineage.”
In What Went Wrong Bernard Lewis writes that when buying Western weapons was insufficient to reverse Middle Eastern military decline, Middle Eastern nations adopted Western uniforms and martial music. But the systems and principles underpinning Western success were not imported. Women’s rights may follow a similar path. Some Muslim nations may be adopting reforms on behalf of women’s rights, but without changing the underlying value system. Egypt has made strides against female genital mutilation, and polygamy has been outlawed in several Muslim nations and is being redefined as socially unacceptable in others. Some states, responding to international pressure against them over egregious acts against women in the name of family honor, have begun to take steps against honor killings. These reforms, welcome though they are, are enacted under Western pressure and to maintain a veneer of modernity. It is not clear that the underlying principles of equality and personal liberty are also being adopted. Efforts to expand women’s education in the Muslim world appear more promising, although considering the generally poor quality of education in the region this initiative may also have a limited impact.
Muslim societies, trapped between religion and culture, have changed only slowly over centuries. But the lives of Darwish and Hirsi Ali offer a few possibilities for change. Both women were educated at Western schools, giving them the skills, particularly fluency in English, they needed to fend for themselves in a modern society. Darwish worked for a U.S. company, helping her achieve a certain measure of financial independence. Improving the educational and economic opportunities open to women, along with the attendant legal reforms, would give women greater autonomy. But the economies of the greater Middle East have been essentially stagnant for decades, and deeper changes will be necessary.
Other possibilities lie in the realm of ideas. Western literature and films, and even romance novels, inspired both women. These stories fostered a longing for romance and planted the seeds of individualism. In discussing reform, Hirsi Ali claims that Islam needs a Voltaire, and Darwish observes that creating the freedom to leave Islam is essential — only then, she says, will Islam be forced to compete equally for adherents. Today an individual who openly leaves Islam is an apostate and, as Hirsi Ali can attest, marked for death.
Fostering reform in the Muslim world is the great challenge of this century. But it is a challenge that cannot be evaded. Both Darwish and Hirsi Ali give warning that radical Islam is on the rise within the West itself and that immigrant communities are bringing tribal social structures with them. But their books are more than jeremiads. They are both also love stories of a sort: Two impressive, able women from backgrounds that squelched their talents came to the West and fell in love with the values espoused by Western societies and the opportunities and freedoms they provide. This message is also vital. If the West is to aid efforts to reform the Muslim world, it will need to believe in itself first. Darwish and Hirsi Ali provide a timely reminder, from people intimately familiar with the alternative, that Western societies and liberal democratic values are good and worth defending.
Aaron Mannes (www.aaronmannes.com), author of Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations (Rowman & Littlefield 2004), is a researcher at the University of Maryland’s Laboratory of Computational Cultural Dynamics and a doctoral student at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy.
Wednesday, November 14, 2007
Video-Games & Public Diplomacy: Aaron Mannes in the NY Sun
Today's New York Sun has an op-ed I co-authored with my boss, University of Maryland Institute for Advanced Computer Studies director, V.S. Subrahmanian on incorporating video games into the war of ideas against Islamist extremism.
Gaming: Tactical Advantage
BY AARON MANNES AND VENKATRAMANAN SUBRAHMANIAN
November 14, 2007
When Hezbollah released the second version of its video game "Special Force" in August, it demonstrated, yet again, how quickly terrorist groups have taken advantage of technology in order to propagate their worldview. While America dominates the fastgrowing multi-billion dollar video game industry, there has not yet been an effort to develop video games that counter Islamist extremism.
"Special Force 2" updates the 2002 video game with scenarios based on last summer's war between Israel and Hezbollah: players kidnap Israeli soldiers, fire missiles at an Israeli gunboat, and launch Katyusha rockets into Israel. When the game was released a Hezbollah press official, Sheikh Ali Dahir, described it as a recruiting tool stating, "The Lebanese child has the right to know what happened in the south so as to imitate the jihadist action and the act of liberating the land."
Mr. Dahir also showed Hezbollah's sophisticated understanding of communications when he described "Special Force" as "an alternative to the Western patterns that are presented to us in names, language, and tones that are sometimes devoid of content and at other times for not so innocent aims."
Hezbollah is not the only organization using video games as a strategic communications tool. There is a growing movement to develop video games to educate the public on various issues. The U.S. military has long used electronic simulations for training. In 2005, the Army released an online game, "America's Army," as a recruiting tool. But this understanding of the power of video games has not penetrated American efforts to reach out to moderate Muslims.
True, Hezbollah's game designers have the easier task. Hezbollah's anti-Israel message resonates throughout the greater Middle East and last summer's war provides a ready-made narrative. Games that are blatantly pro-American will only come off as ham-handed propaganda.
The point of waging a war of ideas is not to make America more popular. It is to foster attitudes and ideas that marginalize extremists. Increasingly sophisticated and supporting complex narratives, video games could be an ideal platform for the subtle transmission of values and an essential component in the war of ideas.
The best propaganda doesn't look like propaganda, and for video games to be successful they must be fun. Fun is a worthwhile value in and of itself, particularly for people caught in the midst of terrible circumstances, but it can also be a tactical asset.
Nations have come to virtual standstills for crucial episodes of beloved television shows. Violence in Baghdad dipped during Saddam Hussein's trial, as Iraqis were glued to their televisions to watch their former tormentor face justice. In particular, video games could be a crucial tool for reaching young men, the same demographic targeted for recruitment by terrorists.
The possibilities for video games targeted at Muslims throughout the world that marginalize extremist ideologies are limitless. Shoot-em-up games that give players the chance to rescue their countrymen from bloodthirsty terrorists could reinforce the message that Muslims themselves are the primary victims of Islamic extremists.
Other values can be fostered in more complex games modeled on popular strategy games like "Civilization." These games can help introduce players to the workings of open political systems and modern economies, and even make the subtle case for the education of women. Different games could be developed for different regions. A soccer game based on the venerated Iraqi national soccer team could help foster national consciousness among Iraqis, whereas a different game could be designed for cricket-mad Pakistan. Battery powered handheld games could be developed for areas where computers are scarce or electricity is inconsistent.
Video games can be funny as well. Popular sitcoms like "The Simpsons" have inspired video game spin-offs. Humor is an essential communications tool for building bridges and for ridiculing shared enemies.
Since September 11, policy-makers have been calling for a war of ideas. Terrorists have consistently and quickly adapted their message to the most popular and accessible media. To win the war of ideas, America must adapt to the new forms of spreading their message as well. Video games are one of the great communications tools of this century; it is time to take them seriously. The extremists already do.
Mr. Mannes, a researcher at the University of Maryland's Laboratory of Computational Cultural Dynamics, is a doctoral student at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy. Mr. Subrahmanian, a professor of computer science, is the director of the University of Maryland Institute for Advanced Computer Studies.
Gaming: Tactical Advantage
BY AARON MANNES AND VENKATRAMANAN SUBRAHMANIAN
November 14, 2007
When Hezbollah released the second version of its video game "Special Force" in August, it demonstrated, yet again, how quickly terrorist groups have taken advantage of technology in order to propagate their worldview. While America dominates the fastgrowing multi-billion dollar video game industry, there has not yet been an effort to develop video games that counter Islamist extremism.
"Special Force 2" updates the 2002 video game with scenarios based on last summer's war between Israel and Hezbollah: players kidnap Israeli soldiers, fire missiles at an Israeli gunboat, and launch Katyusha rockets into Israel. When the game was released a Hezbollah press official, Sheikh Ali Dahir, described it as a recruiting tool stating, "The Lebanese child has the right to know what happened in the south so as to imitate the jihadist action and the act of liberating the land."
Mr. Dahir also showed Hezbollah's sophisticated understanding of communications when he described "Special Force" as "an alternative to the Western patterns that are presented to us in names, language, and tones that are sometimes devoid of content and at other times for not so innocent aims."
Hezbollah is not the only organization using video games as a strategic communications tool. There is a growing movement to develop video games to educate the public on various issues. The U.S. military has long used electronic simulations for training. In 2005, the Army released an online game, "America's Army," as a recruiting tool. But this understanding of the power of video games has not penetrated American efforts to reach out to moderate Muslims.
True, Hezbollah's game designers have the easier task. Hezbollah's anti-Israel message resonates throughout the greater Middle East and last summer's war provides a ready-made narrative. Games that are blatantly pro-American will only come off as ham-handed propaganda.
The point of waging a war of ideas is not to make America more popular. It is to foster attitudes and ideas that marginalize extremists. Increasingly sophisticated and supporting complex narratives, video games could be an ideal platform for the subtle transmission of values and an essential component in the war of ideas.
The best propaganda doesn't look like propaganda, and for video games to be successful they must be fun. Fun is a worthwhile value in and of itself, particularly for people caught in the midst of terrible circumstances, but it can also be a tactical asset.
Nations have come to virtual standstills for crucial episodes of beloved television shows. Violence in Baghdad dipped during Saddam Hussein's trial, as Iraqis were glued to their televisions to watch their former tormentor face justice. In particular, video games could be a crucial tool for reaching young men, the same demographic targeted for recruitment by terrorists.
The possibilities for video games targeted at Muslims throughout the world that marginalize extremist ideologies are limitless. Shoot-em-up games that give players the chance to rescue their countrymen from bloodthirsty terrorists could reinforce the message that Muslims themselves are the primary victims of Islamic extremists.
Other values can be fostered in more complex games modeled on popular strategy games like "Civilization." These games can help introduce players to the workings of open political systems and modern economies, and even make the subtle case for the education of women. Different games could be developed for different regions. A soccer game based on the venerated Iraqi national soccer team could help foster national consciousness among Iraqis, whereas a different game could be designed for cricket-mad Pakistan. Battery powered handheld games could be developed for areas where computers are scarce or electricity is inconsistent.
Video games can be funny as well. Popular sitcoms like "The Simpsons" have inspired video game spin-offs. Humor is an essential communications tool for building bridges and for ridiculing shared enemies.
Since September 11, policy-makers have been calling for a war of ideas. Terrorists have consistently and quickly adapted their message to the most popular and accessible media. To win the war of ideas, America must adapt to the new forms of spreading their message as well. Video games are one of the great communications tools of this century; it is time to take them seriously. The extremists already do.
Mr. Mannes, a researcher at the University of Maryland's Laboratory of Computational Cultural Dynamics, is a doctoral student at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy. Mr. Subrahmanian, a professor of computer science, is the director of the University of Maryland Institute for Advanced Computer Studies.
Tuesday, October 23, 2007
Aaron Mannes in NRO on the Attack on Bhutto
This morning NRO ran my article on the suicide bombing attack on Benazir Bhutto.
October 23, 2007, 9:50 a.m.
The Bhutto Attacks
Cold comfort is the best we can hope for.
By Aaron Mannes
The question of who was behind Friday’s assassination attempt on Benazir Bhutto is the whodunit from hell and, instead of a pistol, the drawing room dénouement will feature Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.
Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s October 18 return from a decade of exile was bound to be a pivotal moment in Pakistani politics, and thus, also will likely to be a violent one. Frustrated with President Musharraf’s unending military dictatorship and stagnating living conditions, the people of Karachi turned out in huge numbers to greet Bhutto as their potential savior.
The attack, which struck as Bhutto’s convoy slowly made its way through the city of Karachi, did not injure Bhutto. It did, however, kill 140 people, half of whom were members of Bhutto’s security detail. So far details remain unclear, although security services claim to have identified the heads of two suicide bombers.
At the best of times Pakistan is a society with a penchant for conspiracy theories, and the circumstances of the attack can only fuel this speculation. Despite ample warning that an attack on Bhutto was likely, security was inadequate to control the massive crowds that formed to meet Bhutto. Because of these crowds Bhutto’s convoy took about ten hours to travel about ten miles, while Karachi became a giant street party — and a perfect target for terror. Oddly, streetlights along the convoy’s route were turned off, complicating security efforts to spot possible attackers. In fairness however, Pakistani infrastructure is spotty at best, and these failings may have been due to raw incompetence. The government’s response to Bhutto’s accusations is that Bhutto ignored their security advice and insisted on a massive rally — of course such rallies are central to Pakistani politics.
Bhutto has vowed to fight Pakistan’s Islamists. Reportedly, a Taliban leader in South Waziristan, Baitullah Mehsud, who has been linked to the bombing attacks that were a response to the government’s storming of the Red Mosque earlier this summer, promised to greet Bhutto with suicide bombs. Mehsud has since denied making this statement. Even if this particular band of Islamists had nothing to do with the attacks, there is a vast constellation of Pakistani Islamist groups — most with at least tangential links to al Qaeda - that would object to Bhutto taking power and many would be savvy enough not to advertise their intentions.
However, many Pakistanis, including Bhutto herself, believe that if the Islamists were involved, they did so as cat’s paws for Pakistani intelligence. Pakistani intelligence has supported various Islamist groups to further its interests in Aghanistan, Kashmir, and Pakistan. Bhutto goes further and has stated that while she does not hold Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf responsible; there are three officials, whom she will not name, linked to former President Zia ul-Haq (who overthrew and executed her father), behind the attack. Not surprisingly, there is a great deal of speculation about these individuals. Topping the list is retired General Ejaz Shah, the head of the Intelligence Bureau (and consequently ultimately responsible for Bhutto’s security). Shah was reportedly the intelligence community’s liaison to the Taliban, al Qaeda, and to Omar Sheikh who is in prison for the murder of Daniel Pearl.
Also suspected are Chaudhru Pervez Ellahi and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain. When Musharraf deposed the last elected Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, the intelligence services engineered a split of Sharif’s party, the Pakistani Muslim League (PML). The Chaudhry cousins head the faction loyal to Musharraf. Bhutto, head of the other major national party, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), has been in ongoing negotiations with Musharraf about entering a power-sharing arrangement. Few in Pakistan think much of the Chaudhry faction of the PML, while the PPP (as seen in the turnout to Bhutto’s homecoming) commands a substantial following. With Bhutto providing civilian legitimacy to Musharraf’s regime, the Chaudhry brothers would be out of the equation. Another possible candidate for Bhutto’s list is Ejaz ul-Haq, currently Musharraf’s Minister for Religious Affairs and the son of Zia ul-Haq, who executed Bhutto’s father.
Although Bhutto’s charges are a fascinating window into Pakistani politics, their veracity is uncertain. It is possible that as Bhutto moves closer to Musharraf, these are rivals that will need to be removed. She had previously called on Musharraf to fire General Shah because of his Islamist links. PML chief Hussain has responded that there was in fact a conspiracy, engineered by Bhutto’s husband (nicknamed Mr. 10% for his “deal-making” activities when Bhutto was in office) in order to garner sympathy for Bhutto.
There are other, more harrowing potential motives behind the attempt on Bhutto’s life. In courting Western support for her return to Pakistan, Bhutto promised that the International Atomic Energy Agency would receive access to A. Q. Khan, father of the Pakistani nuclear program and head of an international clandestine nuclear proliferation ring, who is currently under house arrest. The full extent of Khan’s network remains unknown. It is inconceivable that Khan carried out his operations without substantial assistance from figures in Pakistan’s military and intelligence services. This is information that the intelligence services would not like to see revealed. Another player that would prefer that the IAEA not have access to A. Q. Khan would be his leading customer. Khan may be able to reveal critical details about Iran’s nuclear program that would galvanize the international community against the Iranian nuclear program. Iran has launched suicide terror attacks around the world in support of their strategic interests, and there are militant Shia organizations in Pakistan with links to Iran.
Because of the long links between Pakistani intelligence and the Islamists, none of these scenarios are mutually exclusive. The government has refused Bhutto’s request for international participation in the investigation, which will only foster conspiracy theorists. But, in all likelihood, the attack on Bhutto was linked to a Pakistani Islamist organization. However, it is a cold comfort that attributing a massive terror attack to the Islamist “usual suspects” is the least disturbing scenario.
— Aaron Mannes, editor of TheTerrorWonk, researches international security affairs at the University of Maryland’s Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics and is a Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland.
October 23, 2007, 9:50 a.m.
The Bhutto Attacks
Cold comfort is the best we can hope for.
By Aaron Mannes
The question of who was behind Friday’s assassination attempt on Benazir Bhutto is the whodunit from hell and, instead of a pistol, the drawing room dénouement will feature Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.
Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s October 18 return from a decade of exile was bound to be a pivotal moment in Pakistani politics, and thus, also will likely to be a violent one. Frustrated with President Musharraf’s unending military dictatorship and stagnating living conditions, the people of Karachi turned out in huge numbers to greet Bhutto as their potential savior.
The attack, which struck as Bhutto’s convoy slowly made its way through the city of Karachi, did not injure Bhutto. It did, however, kill 140 people, half of whom were members of Bhutto’s security detail. So far details remain unclear, although security services claim to have identified the heads of two suicide bombers.
At the best of times Pakistan is a society with a penchant for conspiracy theories, and the circumstances of the attack can only fuel this speculation. Despite ample warning that an attack on Bhutto was likely, security was inadequate to control the massive crowds that formed to meet Bhutto. Because of these crowds Bhutto’s convoy took about ten hours to travel about ten miles, while Karachi became a giant street party — and a perfect target for terror. Oddly, streetlights along the convoy’s route were turned off, complicating security efforts to spot possible attackers. In fairness however, Pakistani infrastructure is spotty at best, and these failings may have been due to raw incompetence. The government’s response to Bhutto’s accusations is that Bhutto ignored their security advice and insisted on a massive rally — of course such rallies are central to Pakistani politics.
Bhutto has vowed to fight Pakistan’s Islamists. Reportedly, a Taliban leader in South Waziristan, Baitullah Mehsud, who has been linked to the bombing attacks that were a response to the government’s storming of the Red Mosque earlier this summer, promised to greet Bhutto with suicide bombs. Mehsud has since denied making this statement. Even if this particular band of Islamists had nothing to do with the attacks, there is a vast constellation of Pakistani Islamist groups — most with at least tangential links to al Qaeda - that would object to Bhutto taking power and many would be savvy enough not to advertise their intentions.
However, many Pakistanis, including Bhutto herself, believe that if the Islamists were involved, they did so as cat’s paws for Pakistani intelligence. Pakistani intelligence has supported various Islamist groups to further its interests in Aghanistan, Kashmir, and Pakistan. Bhutto goes further and has stated that while she does not hold Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf responsible; there are three officials, whom she will not name, linked to former President Zia ul-Haq (who overthrew and executed her father), behind the attack. Not surprisingly, there is a great deal of speculation about these individuals. Topping the list is retired General Ejaz Shah, the head of the Intelligence Bureau (and consequently ultimately responsible for Bhutto’s security). Shah was reportedly the intelligence community’s liaison to the Taliban, al Qaeda, and to Omar Sheikh who is in prison for the murder of Daniel Pearl.
Also suspected are Chaudhru Pervez Ellahi and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain. When Musharraf deposed the last elected Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, the intelligence services engineered a split of Sharif’s party, the Pakistani Muslim League (PML). The Chaudhry cousins head the faction loyal to Musharraf. Bhutto, head of the other major national party, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), has been in ongoing negotiations with Musharraf about entering a power-sharing arrangement. Few in Pakistan think much of the Chaudhry faction of the PML, while the PPP (as seen in the turnout to Bhutto’s homecoming) commands a substantial following. With Bhutto providing civilian legitimacy to Musharraf’s regime, the Chaudhry brothers would be out of the equation. Another possible candidate for Bhutto’s list is Ejaz ul-Haq, currently Musharraf’s Minister for Religious Affairs and the son of Zia ul-Haq, who executed Bhutto’s father.
Although Bhutto’s charges are a fascinating window into Pakistani politics, their veracity is uncertain. It is possible that as Bhutto moves closer to Musharraf, these are rivals that will need to be removed. She had previously called on Musharraf to fire General Shah because of his Islamist links. PML chief Hussain has responded that there was in fact a conspiracy, engineered by Bhutto’s husband (nicknamed Mr. 10% for his “deal-making” activities when Bhutto was in office) in order to garner sympathy for Bhutto.
There are other, more harrowing potential motives behind the attempt on Bhutto’s life. In courting Western support for her return to Pakistan, Bhutto promised that the International Atomic Energy Agency would receive access to A. Q. Khan, father of the Pakistani nuclear program and head of an international clandestine nuclear proliferation ring, who is currently under house arrest. The full extent of Khan’s network remains unknown. It is inconceivable that Khan carried out his operations without substantial assistance from figures in Pakistan’s military and intelligence services. This is information that the intelligence services would not like to see revealed. Another player that would prefer that the IAEA not have access to A. Q. Khan would be his leading customer. Khan may be able to reveal critical details about Iran’s nuclear program that would galvanize the international community against the Iranian nuclear program. Iran has launched suicide terror attacks around the world in support of their strategic interests, and there are militant Shia organizations in Pakistan with links to Iran.
Because of the long links between Pakistani intelligence and the Islamists, none of these scenarios are mutually exclusive. The government has refused Bhutto’s request for international participation in the investigation, which will only foster conspiracy theorists. But, in all likelihood, the attack on Bhutto was linked to a Pakistani Islamist organization. However, it is a cold comfort that attributing a massive terror attack to the Islamist “usual suspects” is the least disturbing scenario.
— Aaron Mannes, editor of TheTerrorWonk, researches international security affairs at the University of Maryland’s Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics and is a Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland.
Monday, October 22, 2007
Aaron Mannes in Jane's on Science in the Muslim World
Last spring, Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst ran this article I wrote on science in the Muslim world, looking at the reasons why a society that was once at the pinnacle of scientific achievement now lags behind even other under-developed countries in conducting research. (Jane's is a British publication so some of the language follows their style, not my Americanisms.)
JANE'S ISLAMIC AFFAIRS ANALYST - MARCH 01, 2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Science in Islamic societies
At its intellectual peak, Islamic civilization was the world's most sophisticated and scientifically advanced.
In modern times, Muslim countries have suffered a deficit in scientific research and development, in comparison to non-Muslim states.
Two obstacles to development in this field are a lack of funding from governments and a determinist worldview, whereby life is guided by religious, not scientific principles.
Although science flourished during Islam's Golden Age (850CE to 1250CE), the current level of scientific research in the Muslim world is very low. Competing in the modern world requires mastery not only of technology, but also of scientific principles. While there are many structural and institutional barriers to scientific development in the Muslim world, the greatest obstacles may be cultural.
Viewed from nearly every perspective, the state of scientific research in the Muslim world looks bleak. The key indicators of the level of research in a country are its per capita publication of science and engineering articles. By this and most other indices, Muslim nations rank behind other comparable states. According to the National Science Foundation, between 2000 and 2003 the world average publication of science and engineering articles per million inhabitants was 137; the nations belonging to the Organisation of Islamic Conferences have an average of just 13.
While the limited scientific achievements of impoverished African Muslim countries are less surprising, oil rich middle-income Muslim states rarely conduct as much scientific research as comparable non-Muslim nations, with a few exceptions. The Middle East's traditional leaders in this field, Egypt (described by the World Bank as a lower-middle income economy) and Saudi Arabia both produce about 25 articles per million inhabitants. Brazil, also a lower-middle income economy, produces 45 articles per million inhabitants. Malaysia, although home to a high-tech economy, publishes less than 21 articles per million inhabitants, higher than China (which produces 19 papers per inhabitant).
Pakistan, a low-income country and home to the 1979 Nobel Laureate in Physics, Abdus Salam, as well as the only Muslim country to develop a nuclear weapon, has been a leader in scientific achievement in the Muslim world. Yet, it produces less than three scientific articles per million people, whereas its similarly situated rival India produces over 11.
Even more crucial than raw production of articles is how frequently the articles are cited, which shows their importance to international science. Judged by this measure, most Muslim states have a marginal role in international science. In 2003, science and engineering articles produced by the Arab world were cited 12,182 times, representing 0.28 per cent of the world's total. Articles from Brazil alone were cited approximately twice as often. Articles from Pakistan represented 0.02 per cent of international citations, compared to India, which accounts for 0.73 per cent.
The cause of this low level of scientific achievement is under-investment in research and development throughout the Muslim world. According to World Bank figures, with a few exceptions, Muslim countries invest less in research and development than non-Muslim countries with similar income levels. Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia spent only 0.2 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on research and development. The international average for high-income countries is ten times that level, but between 1997 and 2002 Pakistan's rival India, also a low-income country, spent over 0.7 per cent of its GDP on research and development. Non-Muslim middle-income states usually invest an average of nearly one per cent of GDP on research.
The reasons for this lack of investment in research and development are linked to the broader malaise facing much of the Muslim world. Muslim states top the indices of the most corrupt and least free nations. This means that the application of resources is at the discretion of a small ruling elite. Governments across the region have chosen not to focus o scientific research. Particularly in the Middle East and in Pakistan, governments have chosen to spend disproportionately on armaments, at the expense of scientific research.
In addition to problematic policies, the government and social systems are not conducive to scientific research. Endemic corruption means resources that are applied to research needs are not well spent. The education systems in most of the Muslim world are low quality and do not prepare students for university-level scientific study.
In most countries, substantial research and development is conducted in the private sector that operates in parallel to, and is sustained by, dynamic civil societies. However, these sectors are weak throughout the Islamic world. Inadequate bureaucracies and legal frameworks hamper the functioning of large institutions, particularly universities and corporations, essential for productive scientific research. In much of the Muslim world, the business sector is formally (through direct ownership) or informally (through ties among the elites) linked with the government and consequently their actions reflect the government's priorities.
Scientific associations reflect the general weakness of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Muslim world and are narrowly focused and poorly funded. Finally, modern science is an international affair, but there are minimal systematic exchanges of ideas between scientists both within the Muslim world and with the international scientific community as a whole, very often because of inter-state rivalries.
These failings have not been limited to Islamist regimes such as Saudi Arabia. Ostensibly secular regimes have allowed research and development to stagnate. Some countries, particularly secular Baathist-ruled Syria, have persecuted their scientific communities. At the same time, very few Muslim regimes are opposed to technology. Enormous sums have been spent by wealthy and impoverished Muslim regimes on technology transfers from the West. These turn-key projects, in which the technology is operated but not truly mastered, have been detrimental to developing local capabilities.
Radical Islamists are also comfortable with technology. Substantial numbers of engineers have been recruited by Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations, including 11 September 2001 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his nephew, 1993 World Trade Centre bomber, Ramzi Yousef. In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood is sometimes lightheartedly referred to as the Al-ikwhan al-muhandisun (Engineer Brothers).
An insight into this paradox can be seen in the efforts, particularly in Pakistan, to develop Islamic science. Prominent Pakistani scientists claim that the principles of science can be gleaned from the Quran. While these scientists readily embrace technology and have demonstrated substantial technical competence, seeking explanations from the Quran rather than through experimentation does little to develop the necessary scientific base. This situation encapsulates the position of science in the Muslim world. It is seen as a strictly instrumental means of achieving certain goals, but not as a means of understanding the world. However, without the study of scientific principles and the attendant pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, science stagnates.
These attitudes are in stark contrast with the ideals of Islam's Golden Age. During its intellectual peak, Islamic civilization was the world's most sophisticated and highly conducive to scientific inquiry. Muslim civilization built on a rich heritage of ancient knowledge of the Greeks, which Arab scholars translated and commented on. The Middle East-based Muslim civilizations absorbed learning from other centres worldwide, most notably India and China. This project of preservation and combination was substantial in its own right (later Western advances would have been impossible without the groundwork laid during this time), but the great scholars of this period also engaged in research, making discoveries in numerous fields including chemistry, mathematics, astronomy and medicine. Among the outstanding achievements of this period were the development of algebra, the beginnings of analytic geometry and important advances in trigonometry. In astronomy, Muslim scientists improved upon the work of the ancients and developed star maps that were used worldwide for centuries.
This Golden Age stagnated. Although Muslim civilization recovered, science did not. The Ottoman Empire rose to become one of the great powers of the world, its armies ranging deep into Europe. However, Ottoman attitudes towards science paralleled those of modern Muslim states. Heavily centralised, with little in the way of civil society, research was entirely dependent on the discretion of the Sultan. The Sultans generally preferred to purchase Western devices and import Western technicians than to finance their own.
One factor in the stagnation of Muslim science could be in the realm of philosophy and theology. Like the other monotheistic religions, Islam wrestles with the conflict between free will and determinism. An all-powerful deity reduces the scope for human initiative and reason. Muslim philosophers adopted Aristotelian philosophy and posited a universe set in motion by a radical deity and governed by laws that could be grasped by human reason.
The great Muslim philosophers such as Al-Farabi (d. 950), Avicenna (980-1037), and Averroes (1126-1198), had a profound impact on Western philosophy and ultimately this worldview entered into a creative tension with determinism in the West. In the Muslim world, however, this worldview was marginalised. The greatest anti-philosopher Al-Ghazali (1059-1111) argued for revelation over reason and that a universe governed by physical laws placed unacceptable limits on divine power.
Al-Ghazali and later thinkers posited a universe continually recreated at the deity's discretion. Although Ghazali later inspired radical theoreticians such as Ibn Taymiya (1263-1328) and Ibn Wahhab (1703-1791) who argued for purifying Islam through strict adherence to the precepts of early Islam, it would be simplistic to characterise the Muslim world as simply being gripped by radical orthodoxy.
The Ottomans offered, by the standards of the time, minority protection and opportunities for advancement to all inhabitants of the empire. For centuries there was a greater flow of dissidents from Europe to the Ottoman Empire than vice versa. A more determinist worldview also had advantages for maintaining social harmony and avoiding political disruptions. For individuals, the determinist worldview that many tragedies are out of an individual's hands can be a great source of comfort and is central to Islam's appeal to hundreds of millions of people.
However, this view reduces the scope of human endeavor and curiosity. If phenomena occur according to divine whim, then there is less incentive for studying how phenomena occur. This dearth of curiosity in the Muslim world extended to areas outside of science. The 2002 Arab Human Development Report notes that the entire Arab world translates 330 books annually, one-fifth the number translated in Greece alone.
Further, the report notes that in the past millennia the Arab world has translated as many books (about 100,000) as Spain translates in a single year. This curiosity deficit extends into history. Even Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), one of the last great Muslim scholars, writing about a reported revival of philosophy in Europe, wrote dismissively: "But God knows what goes on over there!" Over the next few centuries there was minimal Middle Eastern exploration of Europe, while Europeans traveled
to the Middle East, studied the languages and translated the literature and established university departments to study the region.
There are a few exceptions to the overall weak state of science in the Muslim world. Turkey, which in per capita production of scientific papers and rates of international citation compares favourably to similarly situated Latin American countries, embarked on an extensive process of Westernisation under its national founder, Attaturk.
Jordan, a lower-middle income nation, also compares favorably with similarly situated non-Muslim states. The Jordanian royal family is committed to Westernisation, has generously sponsored the Royal Scientific Society and, unlike most Arab states, been willing to engage in scientific research programmes with Israel. Several of the wealthy Gulf states have begun developing national science programmes. Malaysia, the only Muslim state to be a major exporter of high tech products, had embarked on a national programme to develop these industries.
In recent years, Iran has increased its research output, having started from a very low base. The reformist governments of the 1990s encouraged scientific research and increased investment in higher education, which had been devastated by the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the Iran-Ira War of the 1980s. It is worth noting that many of the leading scholars of Islam's Golden Age were Iranian and that although Iran is under an Islamic regime, it remains proud of its distinct pre-Islamic culture. Clearly, political leadership willing to invest the resources is essential to developing effective research and development programmes, but the willingness to diverge from mainstream Muslim thinking also appears to be crucial.
The adoption and expansion of scientific research in the Muslim world will be an important indicator of how Islam is coming to terms with modernity. Although Muslims may choose not to Westernise, it is not feasible for a society to compete in the modern world without substantial mastery of modern technology. However, the spread of modern science in the Muslim world may be more than an indicator of modernisation, it may also be the catalyst.
Country Number of publications in journals 1995-2004
Turkey 82,407
Egypt 27,723
Iran 19,114
Saudi Arabia 17,472
Malaysia 10,674
Morocco 10,113
Pakistan 7,832
Indonesia 5,118
Bangladesh 4,745
Source: Thomson Scientific Web of Science database
PULL QUOTE: "Seeking explanations from the Quran rather than through experimentation does little to develop the necessary scientific base"
RELATED ARTICLE:'Understanding Arab media analysis' in Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst, 24-Jul-2006.
JANE'S ISLAMIC AFFAIRS ANALYST - MARCH 01, 2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Science in Islamic societies
At its intellectual peak, Islamic civilization was the world's most sophisticated and scientifically advanced.
In modern times, Muslim countries have suffered a deficit in scientific research and development, in comparison to non-Muslim states.
Two obstacles to development in this field are a lack of funding from governments and a determinist worldview, whereby life is guided by religious, not scientific principles.
Although science flourished during Islam's Golden Age (850CE to 1250CE), the current level of scientific research in the Muslim world is very low. Competing in the modern world requires mastery not only of technology, but also of scientific principles. While there are many structural and institutional barriers to scientific development in the Muslim world, the greatest obstacles may be cultural.
Viewed from nearly every perspective, the state of scientific research in the Muslim world looks bleak. The key indicators of the level of research in a country are its per capita publication of science and engineering articles. By this and most other indices, Muslim nations rank behind other comparable states. According to the National Science Foundation, between 2000 and 2003 the world average publication of science and engineering articles per million inhabitants was 137; the nations belonging to the Organisation of Islamic Conferences have an average of just 13.
While the limited scientific achievements of impoverished African Muslim countries are less surprising, oil rich middle-income Muslim states rarely conduct as much scientific research as comparable non-Muslim nations, with a few exceptions. The Middle East's traditional leaders in this field, Egypt (described by the World Bank as a lower-middle income economy) and Saudi Arabia both produce about 25 articles per million inhabitants. Brazil, also a lower-middle income economy, produces 45 articles per million inhabitants. Malaysia, although home to a high-tech economy, publishes less than 21 articles per million inhabitants, higher than China (which produces 19 papers per inhabitant).
Pakistan, a low-income country and home to the 1979 Nobel Laureate in Physics, Abdus Salam, as well as the only Muslim country to develop a nuclear weapon, has been a leader in scientific achievement in the Muslim world. Yet, it produces less than three scientific articles per million people, whereas its similarly situated rival India produces over 11.
Even more crucial than raw production of articles is how frequently the articles are cited, which shows their importance to international science. Judged by this measure, most Muslim states have a marginal role in international science. In 2003, science and engineering articles produced by the Arab world were cited 12,182 times, representing 0.28 per cent of the world's total. Articles from Brazil alone were cited approximately twice as often. Articles from Pakistan represented 0.02 per cent of international citations, compared to India, which accounts for 0.73 per cent.
The cause of this low level of scientific achievement is under-investment in research and development throughout the Muslim world. According to World Bank figures, with a few exceptions, Muslim countries invest less in research and development than non-Muslim countries with similar income levels. Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia spent only 0.2 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on research and development. The international average for high-income countries is ten times that level, but between 1997 and 2002 Pakistan's rival India, also a low-income country, spent over 0.7 per cent of its GDP on research and development. Non-Muslim middle-income states usually invest an average of nearly one per cent of GDP on research.
The reasons for this lack of investment in research and development are linked to the broader malaise facing much of the Muslim world. Muslim states top the indices of the most corrupt and least free nations. This means that the application of resources is at the discretion of a small ruling elite. Governments across the region have chosen not to focus o scientific research. Particularly in the Middle East and in Pakistan, governments have chosen to spend disproportionately on armaments, at the expense of scientific research.
In addition to problematic policies, the government and social systems are not conducive to scientific research. Endemic corruption means resources that are applied to research needs are not well spent. The education systems in most of the Muslim world are low quality and do not prepare students for university-level scientific study.
In most countries, substantial research and development is conducted in the private sector that operates in parallel to, and is sustained by, dynamic civil societies. However, these sectors are weak throughout the Islamic world. Inadequate bureaucracies and legal frameworks hamper the functioning of large institutions, particularly universities and corporations, essential for productive scientific research. In much of the Muslim world, the business sector is formally (through direct ownership) or informally (through ties among the elites) linked with the government and consequently their actions reflect the government's priorities.
Scientific associations reflect the general weakness of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Muslim world and are narrowly focused and poorly funded. Finally, modern science is an international affair, but there are minimal systematic exchanges of ideas between scientists both within the Muslim world and with the international scientific community as a whole, very often because of inter-state rivalries.
These failings have not been limited to Islamist regimes such as Saudi Arabia. Ostensibly secular regimes have allowed research and development to stagnate. Some countries, particularly secular Baathist-ruled Syria, have persecuted their scientific communities. At the same time, very few Muslim regimes are opposed to technology. Enormous sums have been spent by wealthy and impoverished Muslim regimes on technology transfers from the West. These turn-key projects, in which the technology is operated but not truly mastered, have been detrimental to developing local capabilities.
Radical Islamists are also comfortable with technology. Substantial numbers of engineers have been recruited by Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations, including 11 September 2001 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his nephew, 1993 World Trade Centre bomber, Ramzi Yousef. In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood is sometimes lightheartedly referred to as the Al-ikwhan al-muhandisun (Engineer Brothers).
An insight into this paradox can be seen in the efforts, particularly in Pakistan, to develop Islamic science. Prominent Pakistani scientists claim that the principles of science can be gleaned from the Quran. While these scientists readily embrace technology and have demonstrated substantial technical competence, seeking explanations from the Quran rather than through experimentation does little to develop the necessary scientific base. This situation encapsulates the position of science in the Muslim world. It is seen as a strictly instrumental means of achieving certain goals, but not as a means of understanding the world. However, without the study of scientific principles and the attendant pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, science stagnates.
These attitudes are in stark contrast with the ideals of Islam's Golden Age. During its intellectual peak, Islamic civilization was the world's most sophisticated and highly conducive to scientific inquiry. Muslim civilization built on a rich heritage of ancient knowledge of the Greeks, which Arab scholars translated and commented on. The Middle East-based Muslim civilizations absorbed learning from other centres worldwide, most notably India and China. This project of preservation and combination was substantial in its own right (later Western advances would have been impossible without the groundwork laid during this time), but the great scholars of this period also engaged in research, making discoveries in numerous fields including chemistry, mathematics, astronomy and medicine. Among the outstanding achievements of this period were the development of algebra, the beginnings of analytic geometry and important advances in trigonometry. In astronomy, Muslim scientists improved upon the work of the ancients and developed star maps that were used worldwide for centuries.
This Golden Age stagnated. Although Muslim civilization recovered, science did not. The Ottoman Empire rose to become one of the great powers of the world, its armies ranging deep into Europe. However, Ottoman attitudes towards science paralleled those of modern Muslim states. Heavily centralised, with little in the way of civil society, research was entirely dependent on the discretion of the Sultan. The Sultans generally preferred to purchase Western devices and import Western technicians than to finance their own.
One factor in the stagnation of Muslim science could be in the realm of philosophy and theology. Like the other monotheistic religions, Islam wrestles with the conflict between free will and determinism. An all-powerful deity reduces the scope for human initiative and reason. Muslim philosophers adopted Aristotelian philosophy and posited a universe set in motion by a radical deity and governed by laws that could be grasped by human reason.
The great Muslim philosophers such as Al-Farabi (d. 950), Avicenna (980-1037), and Averroes (1126-1198), had a profound impact on Western philosophy and ultimately this worldview entered into a creative tension with determinism in the West. In the Muslim world, however, this worldview was marginalised. The greatest anti-philosopher Al-Ghazali (1059-1111) argued for revelation over reason and that a universe governed by physical laws placed unacceptable limits on divine power.
Al-Ghazali and later thinkers posited a universe continually recreated at the deity's discretion. Although Ghazali later inspired radical theoreticians such as Ibn Taymiya (1263-1328) and Ibn Wahhab (1703-1791) who argued for purifying Islam through strict adherence to the precepts of early Islam, it would be simplistic to characterise the Muslim world as simply being gripped by radical orthodoxy.
The Ottomans offered, by the standards of the time, minority protection and opportunities for advancement to all inhabitants of the empire. For centuries there was a greater flow of dissidents from Europe to the Ottoman Empire than vice versa. A more determinist worldview also had advantages for maintaining social harmony and avoiding political disruptions. For individuals, the determinist worldview that many tragedies are out of an individual's hands can be a great source of comfort and is central to Islam's appeal to hundreds of millions of people.
However, this view reduces the scope of human endeavor and curiosity. If phenomena occur according to divine whim, then there is less incentive for studying how phenomena occur. This dearth of curiosity in the Muslim world extended to areas outside of science. The 2002 Arab Human Development Report notes that the entire Arab world translates 330 books annually, one-fifth the number translated in Greece alone.
Further, the report notes that in the past millennia the Arab world has translated as many books (about 100,000) as Spain translates in a single year. This curiosity deficit extends into history. Even Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), one of the last great Muslim scholars, writing about a reported revival of philosophy in Europe, wrote dismissively: "But God knows what goes on over there!" Over the next few centuries there was minimal Middle Eastern exploration of Europe, while Europeans traveled
to the Middle East, studied the languages and translated the literature and established university departments to study the region.
There are a few exceptions to the overall weak state of science in the Muslim world. Turkey, which in per capita production of scientific papers and rates of international citation compares favourably to similarly situated Latin American countries, embarked on an extensive process of Westernisation under its national founder, Attaturk.
Jordan, a lower-middle income nation, also compares favorably with similarly situated non-Muslim states. The Jordanian royal family is committed to Westernisation, has generously sponsored the Royal Scientific Society and, unlike most Arab states, been willing to engage in scientific research programmes with Israel. Several of the wealthy Gulf states have begun developing national science programmes. Malaysia, the only Muslim state to be a major exporter of high tech products, had embarked on a national programme to develop these industries.
In recent years, Iran has increased its research output, having started from a very low base. The reformist governments of the 1990s encouraged scientific research and increased investment in higher education, which had been devastated by the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the Iran-Ira War of the 1980s. It is worth noting that many of the leading scholars of Islam's Golden Age were Iranian and that although Iran is under an Islamic regime, it remains proud of its distinct pre-Islamic culture. Clearly, political leadership willing to invest the resources is essential to developing effective research and development programmes, but the willingness to diverge from mainstream Muslim thinking also appears to be crucial.
The adoption and expansion of scientific research in the Muslim world will be an important indicator of how Islam is coming to terms with modernity. Although Muslims may choose not to Westernise, it is not feasible for a society to compete in the modern world without substantial mastery of modern technology. However, the spread of modern science in the Muslim world may be more than an indicator of modernisation, it may also be the catalyst.
Country Number of publications in journals 1995-2004
Turkey 82,407
Egypt 27,723
Iran 19,114
Saudi Arabia 17,472
Malaysia 10,674
Morocco 10,113
Pakistan 7,832
Indonesia 5,118
Bangladesh 4,745
Source: Thomson Scientific Web of Science database
PULL QUOTE: "Seeking explanations from the Quran rather than through experimentation does little to develop the necessary scientific base"
RELATED ARTICLE:'Understanding Arab media analysis' in Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst, 24-Jul-2006.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)