Covert Radio just posted a podcast where we discuss a number of topics. My perennials, FARC, Chavez, and Hezbollah, but also the implications of Russian moves in Georgia.
We also spent a lot of time discussing my new hobby-horse, the Vice President and the national security process - for more see my other blog - Veep Critique.
Showing posts with label FARC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FARC. Show all posts
Friday, August 29, 2008
Friday, July 25, 2008
DEA as Counter-Terror Agency
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has, quietly, become a very effective counter-terror agency. The arrest of international arms dealers Victor Bout and Monzar al-Kasser (in operations worthy of movie scripts) were only one example. The agency had at least a peripheral role in the Betancourt rescue – a DEA operation inserted bugged satellite phones into the FARC, a crucial tactic that has made a tremendous contribution to the FARC’s overall breakdown. In general the agency seems to have adapted well overall to the counter-terror mission, among other things doing a competent job at building up its analytical capabilities.
Last Friday, the DEA’s chief of operations Michael Braun gave a presentation at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (hosted by co-CT Blogger and Washington Institute Fellow Michael Jacobson) that provided important insight into the DEA’s adaptation to the counter-terror mission.
Organizational Analysis
While many pundits give lip-service to “changing organizational culture” it is an issue that is generally not given its due. Policy and political issues are "sexier." But organizational issues are in fact central to any complex problem of governance. In their classic Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow argue that one conceptual model useful for understanding government behavior is:
Because of the international scope of drug trafficking, the DEA has the largest international law enforcement presence of any U.S. agency (87 foreign offices in 63 countries) and these offices are staffed by agents who are operationally active with their international partners. (Braun stated that there was one office where the DEA was not operationally active, but wouldn’t say which – I am guessing Venezuela.)
Braun explained the international world of illicit activity, which relies heavily on ungoverned spaces, where both organized crime and terrorists can flourish. Here the DEA had to adapt. All illicit activity is united by money. Previously agents followed the drug trail – Braun urged them to follow the money trail instead because it allowed them to peer into multiple sectors of illicit activity.
While the issues surrounding organizational adaptation were interesting, Braun had many other points to make. He discussed how the FARC is the case study for the evolution and (hopefully) dissolution of a hybrid terrorist-criminal organization that can be adapted to the Taliban. He mentioned the Madrid bombing as an example of low level drug dealing supporting terrorism, and the DEA’s efforts to take on this new threat.
Normative Issues
When asked about legalization, Braun explained that this will lead to massive levels of addiction. After the Civil War opiates and cocaine were legal and about 1/200 Americans was an addict. But, like pretty much everyone who has looked at the issue, Braun stated that more treatment for drug users would be helpful.
Braun certainly did not say this, but there are reasons to be skeptical of whether law enforcement response to drug trafficking is effective at reducing the drug supply. But it is, in some regards, a moot argument. First, because drug cartels have a deleterious effect on lawful government and therefore are a serious problem in their own right and secondly, as a moral issue, because people engaged in illegal activity should be punished.
DEA as Diplomatic Back-Channel
Finally, Braun was asked about collaboration between the DEA and the Iranian counter-narcotics organizations. Iran shares a border with Afghanistan and has a growing epidemic of drug use. Because of the ongoing dispute between the U.S. and Iran direct cooperation is impossible, but Braun noted that they have third party interlocutors that can relay valuable information. This raises an interesting possibility of the DEA serving as an alternate channel to regimes with which the U.S. has estranged relations.
There is some talk in Washington of engaging Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez by trying to restore DEA operations there. Back in 2005 Chavez revoked diplomatic immunity for DEA agents in Venezuela (he accused them of spying, plus the U.S. had revoked the visas of Venezuelan officials in DC.) This effectively shut down the agency’s operations. Since then Venezuela has become a leading conduit for drugs to Europe. Chavez is beginning to take pressure from the Europeans about this and – on occasion – turned drug dealers over to other countries. Reinstating the DEA could be useful to everyone and create a pragmatic alternate channel to Caracas.
Last Friday, the DEA’s chief of operations Michael Braun gave a presentation at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (hosted by co-CT Blogger and Washington Institute Fellow Michael Jacobson) that provided important insight into the DEA’s adaptation to the counter-terror mission.
Organizational Analysis
While many pundits give lip-service to “changing organizational culture” it is an issue that is generally not given its due. Policy and political issues are "sexier." But organizational issues are in fact central to any complex problem of governance. In their classic Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow argue that one conceptual model useful for understanding government behavior is:
…less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior…. To perform complex tasks, the behavior of large numbers of individuals must be coordinated. Coordination requires standard operating procedures: rules according to which things are done….Chief Braun’s presentation hit many of these points. First, in the decades prior to 9/11 the DEA had gained extensive experience targeting complex, adaptive international organizations that were skilled in using technology and had extensive resources (i.e. drug cartels and – what Braun describes as the wave of the future – terrorist/drug cartel hybrids such as the FARC.) The DEA turned some of its weaknesses - its relatively small size and low profile and the limitations of being a law enforcement agency – into strengths. Because it was small and low-profile it could practice patience in its investigations and develop appropriate (and creative) techniques. The DEA didn’t have the budget to develop or access to the top intelligence systems (satellites etc.) and it learned that HUMINT (infiltration) was the best way to get into the drug cartels. Here, counter-intuitively, the DEA’s status as a law enforcement agency served it well. Informants (usually lower-level criminals who were given a choice between being charged or turning informant) were carefully vetted, because the DEA agents knew that the informant would eventually have to testify in a U.S. court.
At any given time, a government consists of existing organizations, each with a fixed set of standard operating procedures and programs. The behavior of these organizations-and relevant to an issue in any particular instance is, therefore, determined primarily by routines established prior to that instance….
Because of the international scope of drug trafficking, the DEA has the largest international law enforcement presence of any U.S. agency (87 foreign offices in 63 countries) and these offices are staffed by agents who are operationally active with their international partners. (Braun stated that there was one office where the DEA was not operationally active, but wouldn’t say which – I am guessing Venezuela.)
Braun explained the international world of illicit activity, which relies heavily on ungoverned spaces, where both organized crime and terrorists can flourish. Here the DEA had to adapt. All illicit activity is united by money. Previously agents followed the drug trail – Braun urged them to follow the money trail instead because it allowed them to peer into multiple sectors of illicit activity.
While the issues surrounding organizational adaptation were interesting, Braun had many other points to make. He discussed how the FARC is the case study for the evolution and (hopefully) dissolution of a hybrid terrorist-criminal organization that can be adapted to the Taliban. He mentioned the Madrid bombing as an example of low level drug dealing supporting terrorism, and the DEA’s efforts to take on this new threat.
Normative Issues
When asked about legalization, Braun explained that this will lead to massive levels of addiction. After the Civil War opiates and cocaine were legal and about 1/200 Americans was an addict. But, like pretty much everyone who has looked at the issue, Braun stated that more treatment for drug users would be helpful.
Braun certainly did not say this, but there are reasons to be skeptical of whether law enforcement response to drug trafficking is effective at reducing the drug supply. But it is, in some regards, a moot argument. First, because drug cartels have a deleterious effect on lawful government and therefore are a serious problem in their own right and secondly, as a moral issue, because people engaged in illegal activity should be punished.
DEA as Diplomatic Back-Channel
Finally, Braun was asked about collaboration between the DEA and the Iranian counter-narcotics organizations. Iran shares a border with Afghanistan and has a growing epidemic of drug use. Because of the ongoing dispute between the U.S. and Iran direct cooperation is impossible, but Braun noted that they have third party interlocutors that can relay valuable information. This raises an interesting possibility of the DEA serving as an alternate channel to regimes with which the U.S. has estranged relations.
There is some talk in Washington of engaging Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez by trying to restore DEA operations there. Back in 2005 Chavez revoked diplomatic immunity for DEA agents in Venezuela (he accused them of spying, plus the U.S. had revoked the visas of Venezuelan officials in DC.) This effectively shut down the agency’s operations. Since then Venezuela has become a leading conduit for drugs to Europe. Chavez is beginning to take pressure from the Europeans about this and – on occasion – turned drug dealers over to other countries. Reinstating the DEA could be useful to everyone and create a pragmatic alternate channel to Caracas.
Friday, July 11, 2008
Force vs. FARC: Israel's Contribution
On being rescued, Ingrid Betancourt stated: "This is a miracle, a miracle. We have an amazing military. I think only the Israelis can possibly pull off something like this."
Her comment set off immediate speculation that there had been an Israeli hand in the dramatic operation. It is high praise for Israeli special forces that so many would readily assume that an effective commando operation was their handiwork. From a practical standpoint, the Israeli contribution to Betancourt’s rescue was modest (dwarfed by the U.S. contribution). But Israel’s philosophical contribution was enormous.
Technical Support
Yossi Melman of Haaretz (a leading Israeli daily) reported:
The American contribution, reported in The Washington Post was far more extensive involving a 100 person team of analysts and operatives. The operation received vetting from the Secretary of State and the Vice President. Overall Colombian capabilities benefited from a decade of extensive U.S. aid. Beyond helping to build a professional military, the U.S. contributed with its unparalleled electronic intelligence capabilities.
Israeli Counter-Terror: Setting the Stage
The real Israeli contribution occurred nearly forty years ago, with the dawn of modern international terrorism. On July 23, 1968 an El Al plane was hijacked by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and forced to land in Algeria. The Israelis had no response and after three weeks were forced to hand over a dozen Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the passengers and crew. It was the first and last successful hijacking of an Israeli airliner.
For a time the terrorists had the initiative, carrying out a wave of bombings and hijackings around the world. It seemed unstoppable. Then, as now, there were voices calling for negotiations, capitulation, and “addressing the root causes.”
But the Israelis developed counter-measures and responses. Secure check-in and armed sky marshals drawn from elite army units were only a few of the procedures the Israelis adopted. At the same time, Israel developed responses, training commando teams for hostage rescue operations. Entebbe is, deservedly the most famous, but not the only example. Other countries followed suit, in 1977 German commandos carried out a daring rescue of a hijacked Luthansa jet in Mogadishu. Like the Israelis, the Germans had been caught flat-footed in a previous terror attack – this time with the world watching at the 1972 Olympics. Perhaps the most significant of these rescues was in 1994 when French commandos stormed a hijacked Air France plane in Marseilles. The Algerian terrorists were believed to be planning to fly the plane into the Eiffel Tower.
Effective responses to terrorism are not limited to airborne terror. Capable strategy and tactics can marginalize terrorists and insurgents. Israel has brought Palestinian suicide attacks down from a weekly event at the height of the al-Aqsa Intifada to a few times a year.
That force can be useful against terrorists does not mean brute force is the right path. Almost every country that encounters terrorists and guerillas has turned to harsh brute force crackdowns. In and of themselves, these crackdowns are not always effective over the long term and often bring human rights violations in their wake. But creative thinking, rigorous intelligence gathering, analysis, and planning, and quality training can defeat terrorism.
At the same time, counter-terror is not only a task for commandos. In Colombia, the regular army played an essential role in setting the stage for the dramatic rescue. First, by re-claiming large parts of Colombian territory, which limited the FARC’s freedom of movement. Then, before the operation itself, the army played a long painstaking cat and mouse game with the FARC unit that held the hostages (getting so close that they actually saw the U.S. hostages) to learn its operations.
Not every terror attack can be prevented, but Israel has stood in the forefront of reminding the world that force – properly and intelligently applied - can be used to neutralize terrorism, thereby setting the stage for last week’s dramatic events in Colombia.
Her comment set off immediate speculation that there had been an Israeli hand in the dramatic operation. It is high praise for Israeli special forces that so many would readily assume that an effective commando operation was their handiwork. From a practical standpoint, the Israeli contribution to Betancourt’s rescue was modest (dwarfed by the U.S. contribution). But Israel’s philosophical contribution was enormous.
Technical Support
Yossi Melman of Haaretz (a leading Israeli daily) reported:
The Israeli activity, involving dozens of Israeli security experts, was coordinated by Global CST, owned by former General Staff operations chief, Brigadier General (res.) Israel Ziv, and Brigadier (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser…..Another article discussing the Israeli role (and this less flattering cases of ex-IDF personnel training Colombia's vicious paramilitaries) is here.
"It's a Colombian Entebbe operation," Ziv said Thursday when he returned from Bogota. "Both regarding its national and international importance. Betancourt has become a symbol of the struggle against international terror. This is an amazing operation that wouldn't shame any army or special forces anywhere in the world."
Asked about the Israeli involvement in it Ziv said there is "no need to exaggerate."
"We don't want to take credit for something we didn't do," a company source said. "We helped them prepare themselves to fight terror. We helped them to plan operations and strategies and develop intelligence sources. That's quite a bit, but shouldn't be taken too far."
The American contribution, reported in The Washington Post was far more extensive involving a 100 person team of analysts and operatives. The operation received vetting from the Secretary of State and the Vice President. Overall Colombian capabilities benefited from a decade of extensive U.S. aid. Beyond helping to build a professional military, the U.S. contributed with its unparalleled electronic intelligence capabilities.
Israeli Counter-Terror: Setting the Stage
The real Israeli contribution occurred nearly forty years ago, with the dawn of modern international terrorism. On July 23, 1968 an El Al plane was hijacked by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and forced to land in Algeria. The Israelis had no response and after three weeks were forced to hand over a dozen Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the passengers and crew. It was the first and last successful hijacking of an Israeli airliner.
For a time the terrorists had the initiative, carrying out a wave of bombings and hijackings around the world. It seemed unstoppable. Then, as now, there were voices calling for negotiations, capitulation, and “addressing the root causes.”
But the Israelis developed counter-measures and responses. Secure check-in and armed sky marshals drawn from elite army units were only a few of the procedures the Israelis adopted. At the same time, Israel developed responses, training commando teams for hostage rescue operations. Entebbe is, deservedly the most famous, but not the only example. Other countries followed suit, in 1977 German commandos carried out a daring rescue of a hijacked Luthansa jet in Mogadishu. Like the Israelis, the Germans had been caught flat-footed in a previous terror attack – this time with the world watching at the 1972 Olympics. Perhaps the most significant of these rescues was in 1994 when French commandos stormed a hijacked Air France plane in Marseilles. The Algerian terrorists were believed to be planning to fly the plane into the Eiffel Tower.
Effective responses to terrorism are not limited to airborne terror. Capable strategy and tactics can marginalize terrorists and insurgents. Israel has brought Palestinian suicide attacks down from a weekly event at the height of the al-Aqsa Intifada to a few times a year.
That force can be useful against terrorists does not mean brute force is the right path. Almost every country that encounters terrorists and guerillas has turned to harsh brute force crackdowns. In and of themselves, these crackdowns are not always effective over the long term and often bring human rights violations in their wake. But creative thinking, rigorous intelligence gathering, analysis, and planning, and quality training can defeat terrorism.
At the same time, counter-terror is not only a task for commandos. In Colombia, the regular army played an essential role in setting the stage for the dramatic rescue. First, by re-claiming large parts of Colombian territory, which limited the FARC’s freedom of movement. Then, before the operation itself, the army played a long painstaking cat and mouse game with the FARC unit that held the hostages (getting so close that they actually saw the U.S. hostages) to learn its operations.
Not every terror attack can be prevented, but Israel has stood in the forefront of reminding the world that force – properly and intelligently applied - can be used to neutralize terrorism, thereby setting the stage for last week’s dramatic events in Colombia.
Friday, July 4, 2008
Aaron Mannes on France24 discussing Betancourt Rescue
Gore Vidal once said, "I never miss a chance to have sex or appear on television."
There are many, many things I would not follow his advice on (and also I am a rapidly aging and happily married man) but I did accept an invitation to appear on France24 to discuss the implications of the dramatic rescue of the FARC hostages - and I had a great time.
It was a discussion format with three other guests, part two of the discussion can be seen here, I'll post part one as soon as the folks at France24 do.
For those less familiar with the mechanics of appearing on TV, the show is taped in Paris and, alas, they did not offer to fly me there for the appearance. Instead I sat in a small room with nothing but a table and a camera, and a TV screen displaying the camera's feed of my giant talking head. I could not see the host and the two Paris-based guests (although they could apparently see me.) The other guest, Julia Sweig of the Council on Foreign Relations, was in a similar room next door - and again, we had no contact during the show.
There was also a second and a half delay between Washington and Paris, but the host handled this with aplomb and the discussion was actually very smooth.
The first half of the discussion focused on the future and status of the FARC. The second half discussed the impact of the rescue on Colombian and regional politics. Not to give away too much, but I managed a pair of good (funny) lines towards the end.
There are many, many things I would not follow his advice on (and also I am a rapidly aging and happily married man) but I did accept an invitation to appear on France24 to discuss the implications of the dramatic rescue of the FARC hostages - and I had a great time.
It was a discussion format with three other guests, part two of the discussion can be seen here, I'll post part one as soon as the folks at France24 do.
For those less familiar with the mechanics of appearing on TV, the show is taped in Paris and, alas, they did not offer to fly me there for the appearance. Instead I sat in a small room with nothing but a table and a camera, and a TV screen displaying the camera's feed of my giant talking head. I could not see the host and the two Paris-based guests (although they could apparently see me.) The other guest, Julia Sweig of the Council on Foreign Relations, was in a similar room next door - and again, we had no contact during the show.
There was also a second and a half delay between Washington and Paris, but the host handled this with aplomb and the discussion was actually very smooth.
The first half of the discussion focused on the future and status of the FARC. The second half discussed the impact of the rescue on Colombian and regional politics. Not to give away too much, but I managed a pair of good (funny) lines towards the end.
Thursday, July 3, 2008
Me Discussing FARC on Covert Radio
Covert Radio a terrific podcast series has done a number of interviews with yours truly on FARC and other issues I track.
Here is today's discussion on the FARC hostage rescue. A fun, lively interview.
Here is an interview I did with them a few weeks ago, but it still has some good background on the FARC.
FYI - I appeared today on the France24 show Debate. I'll post the link as soon as it is up.
Here is today's discussion on the FARC hostage rescue. A fun, lively interview.
Here is an interview I did with them a few weeks ago, but it still has some good background on the FARC.
FYI - I appeared today on the France24 show Debate. I'll post the link as soon as it is up.
Questions About the Rescue in Colombia
The dramatic rescue of the FARC hostages raises a host of important questions, here are a few, with short answers following and lengthy answers below:
Was the rescue the cover for an arrangement with the FARC?
Probably not.
What effect will this have on future hostage releases?
It will probably lead to more units dissolving and possibly releasing their hostages.
Colombian security used a ruse claiming to be an NGO, could such ploys undermine the legitimate role of NGOs?
Possibly, it’s complicated.
Staged Rescue
Cesar, the commander of the FARC front holding the hostages put them on a helicopter after receiving an order he believed came from the FARC jefe Alfonso Cano. Consider the implications of this: it would be as if someone tricked a General into believing he had just received an order from the President. Such communications are not handled casually. The fact that Colombian intelligence could deliver this fake message probably indicates a very high-level of human and electronic penetration into the FARC’s communications networks. A few specialists have quietly speculated that this was an inside job – perhaps Cano wanted to arrange this to set the stage for a peaceful surrender. While anything is possible, the correspondence unearthed from Raul Reyes’ laptop – such as the talk of selling uranium – has a certain clueless quality. The blog of the Center for International Policy’s Colombia Program cites a FARC assessment of the U.S. elections as another example of strange assertions and gross inaccuracies in the FARC’s perception of the world. Based on the FARC’s seeming poor information about and ability to assess the outside world, it does seem conceivable that the organization has simply become dysfunctional and that its organizational nervous system has in fact been deeply compromised.
The fate of the hundreds of remaining hostages
The FARC holds many more hostages, possibly as many as 700, about 40 of whom are prominent. It is possible that the rescue operation will make it harder to negotiate for the release of the remaining hostages. Without their most valuable chits, the FARC cannot hope to obtain any of the concessions it demands – consequently the remaining hostages may languish. But, as the FARC breaks down, it is more and more likely that fronts will abandon the fight altogether, particularly as they become isolated from the central command (or mistrust its instructions). The rescue was a huge blow and FARC morale will sink even further. Expect the Colombian campaign to encourage FARC members to desert to expand and include incentives to bring in hostages as well.
NGO Quandaries
Finally, in my previous post I noted that there may be a cost in using ruses involving NGOs. Several people with a lot of background on the issue told me that many Colombian NGOs are effectively FARC fronts. The mere fact that the hostages’ guards fell for a ruse that an NGO was aiding in a FARC operation lends some credence to this argument. It is not an unfamiliar phenomenon, the Israelis complain deeply (and with much justice) about NGOs acting as fronts and agents for terrorist groups as well.
However, NGOs in principle are expressions of the fundamental right of association aka civil society – a right and value that is essential for the liberal democratic polity. That some become fronts for loathsome causes is not new, Stalin too had his useful idiots and front groups. One of the great challenges of asymmetric warfare (whether it is terrorism, counter-insurgency or something else) is distinguishing between groups exercising this right – even if their views are controversial – and groups that are fronts for organizations undermining legitimate authority.
This is a tricky problem, one faced here in the United States as well, as our law enforcement agencies attempt to determine if Islamic charities and other organizations are operating legitimately or are linked to Hamas, al-Qaeda or Hezbollah.
That being said, I am not questioning the Colombian use of the NGO ruse in this case – the benefits outweighed the cost. But, similar operations, if done too often could undermine the rightful place of legitimate NGOs. This could have pragmatic consequences such as hurting the ability of NGOs to deliver aid, to broader philosophical consequences of undermining freedom of association.
There is a parallel with the Colombian strike that killed Raul Reyes in Ecuador. As a matter of principle, military attacks that cross national borders are not a good idea. But, there are times and places where such strikes necessary. However, when done too often violating the national sovereignty of other states will exact a cost in legitimacy.
Was the rescue the cover for an arrangement with the FARC?
Probably not.
What effect will this have on future hostage releases?
It will probably lead to more units dissolving and possibly releasing their hostages.
Colombian security used a ruse claiming to be an NGO, could such ploys undermine the legitimate role of NGOs?
Possibly, it’s complicated.
Staged Rescue
Cesar, the commander of the FARC front holding the hostages put them on a helicopter after receiving an order he believed came from the FARC jefe Alfonso Cano. Consider the implications of this: it would be as if someone tricked a General into believing he had just received an order from the President. Such communications are not handled casually. The fact that Colombian intelligence could deliver this fake message probably indicates a very high-level of human and electronic penetration into the FARC’s communications networks. A few specialists have quietly speculated that this was an inside job – perhaps Cano wanted to arrange this to set the stage for a peaceful surrender. While anything is possible, the correspondence unearthed from Raul Reyes’ laptop – such as the talk of selling uranium – has a certain clueless quality. The blog of the Center for International Policy’s Colombia Program cites a FARC assessment of the U.S. elections as another example of strange assertions and gross inaccuracies in the FARC’s perception of the world. Based on the FARC’s seeming poor information about and ability to assess the outside world, it does seem conceivable that the organization has simply become dysfunctional and that its organizational nervous system has in fact been deeply compromised.
The fate of the hundreds of remaining hostages
The FARC holds many more hostages, possibly as many as 700, about 40 of whom are prominent. It is possible that the rescue operation will make it harder to negotiate for the release of the remaining hostages. Without their most valuable chits, the FARC cannot hope to obtain any of the concessions it demands – consequently the remaining hostages may languish. But, as the FARC breaks down, it is more and more likely that fronts will abandon the fight altogether, particularly as they become isolated from the central command (or mistrust its instructions). The rescue was a huge blow and FARC morale will sink even further. Expect the Colombian campaign to encourage FARC members to desert to expand and include incentives to bring in hostages as well.
NGO Quandaries
Finally, in my previous post I noted that there may be a cost in using ruses involving NGOs. Several people with a lot of background on the issue told me that many Colombian NGOs are effectively FARC fronts. The mere fact that the hostages’ guards fell for a ruse that an NGO was aiding in a FARC operation lends some credence to this argument. It is not an unfamiliar phenomenon, the Israelis complain deeply (and with much justice) about NGOs acting as fronts and agents for terrorist groups as well.
However, NGOs in principle are expressions of the fundamental right of association aka civil society – a right and value that is essential for the liberal democratic polity. That some become fronts for loathsome causes is not new, Stalin too had his useful idiots and front groups. One of the great challenges of asymmetric warfare (whether it is terrorism, counter-insurgency or something else) is distinguishing between groups exercising this right – even if their views are controversial – and groups that are fronts for organizations undermining legitimate authority.
This is a tricky problem, one faced here in the United States as well, as our law enforcement agencies attempt to determine if Islamic charities and other organizations are operating legitimately or are linked to Hamas, al-Qaeda or Hezbollah.
That being said, I am not questioning the Colombian use of the NGO ruse in this case – the benefits outweighed the cost. But, similar operations, if done too often could undermine the rightful place of legitimate NGOs. This could have pragmatic consequences such as hurting the ability of NGOs to deliver aid, to broader philosophical consequences of undermining freedom of association.
There is a parallel with the Colombian strike that killed Raul Reyes in Ecuador. As a matter of principle, military attacks that cross national borders are not a good idea. But, there are times and places where such strikes necessary. However, when done too often violating the national sovereignty of other states will exact a cost in legitimacy.
Wednesday, July 2, 2008
FARC is FARC'd: Assessing the Hostage Rescue
The first reports about the Colombian military’s rescue of the 15 hostages held by FARC (in Spanish) indicate an impressive intelligence operation. The hostages were held in three separate locations. Colombian intelligence had infiltrated one of the FARC fronts holding the hostages as well as the FARC Secretariat. They told the front commander “Cesar” that the hostages were being transferred on the orders of FARC chief Alfonso Cano. After gathering the hostages in one location the FARC unit was met by a helicopter, ostensibly from an NGO (that doesn’t actually exist). Then the hostages were loaded onto the helicopter and the FARC commander and his deputy were taken captive to be handed over to judicial authorities. The other members of the FARC front were permitted to escape.
The fifteen hostages were rescued without firing a shot. The long nightmare of the hostages and their families is finally over.
There are many implications to this tremendous success. It indicates both the FARC’s rot and impressive Colombian capabilities. That Colombian intelligence could manage this elaborate ruse shows how much information they have gathered about the FARC’s internal workings. The computer files seized, both from Raul Reyes, but also from the computer of FARC leader Ivan Rios – who was killed by his own men, were no doubt invaluable. That FARC would fall for this ruse indicates increasing fragmentation and decay. The loss of several top leaders, and the reported serious illness of FARC’s top military commander Mono Jojoy have all contributed to FARC's weakness.
Communications has long been an Achilles heel for the FARC, which is spread out in Colombia’s vast hinterland. The hostage rescue operation is the most dramatic capitalization of this weakness so far and it will also exacerbate it. FARC leaders will now doubt the origin of their orders – leading to further fragmentation.
It is an impressive operation – imagine if Iraqi forces could carry out operations like this. (Colombia’s security forces have benefited tremendously from U.S. support under Plan Colombia – hopefully some of the lessons learned will be transferable to the global counter-insurgency against radical Islamist terrorists.)
The escape of the rest of the FARC front was probably a wise operational move. Engaging them could have resulted in a firefight in which hostages could have been hurt or killed. The unit will probably dissolve and its members may join the chorus of former FARC members broadcasting calls for active FARC members to turn themselves in. (The program has been successful – over 1000 FARC fighters desert per year according to some reports and has included top commanders.)
One dark spot: the use of the NGO ruse may have consequences – not just in Colombia – but worldwide. Future efforts to negotiate these kinds of releases may be effected – and the FARC is believed to hold an additional 700 hostages. The NGO role of serving as interlocutors between states and terrorist groups – while easy to criticize – is often useful and necessary. Their neutrality in these conflicts worldwide does allow them to deliver humanitarian aid and facilitate communications. If terrorist groups are more hesitant to engage with NGOs because of this incident it may block these useful channels.
However, this kind of ruse may only work with a particularly isolated group. Less fragmented groups, like Hezbollah, would probably restrict their dealings to well-established NGOs - so that the impact may be limited.
Update
The invaluable Bloggings By Boz a leading stop for LatAm news reports the fascinating detail that the Colombian rescuers were wearing Che T-shirts.
The fifteen hostages were rescued without firing a shot. The long nightmare of the hostages and their families is finally over.
There are many implications to this tremendous success. It indicates both the FARC’s rot and impressive Colombian capabilities. That Colombian intelligence could manage this elaborate ruse shows how much information they have gathered about the FARC’s internal workings. The computer files seized, both from Raul Reyes, but also from the computer of FARC leader Ivan Rios – who was killed by his own men, were no doubt invaluable. That FARC would fall for this ruse indicates increasing fragmentation and decay. The loss of several top leaders, and the reported serious illness of FARC’s top military commander Mono Jojoy have all contributed to FARC's weakness.
Communications has long been an Achilles heel for the FARC, which is spread out in Colombia’s vast hinterland. The hostage rescue operation is the most dramatic capitalization of this weakness so far and it will also exacerbate it. FARC leaders will now doubt the origin of their orders – leading to further fragmentation.
It is an impressive operation – imagine if Iraqi forces could carry out operations like this. (Colombia’s security forces have benefited tremendously from U.S. support under Plan Colombia – hopefully some of the lessons learned will be transferable to the global counter-insurgency against radical Islamist terrorists.)
The escape of the rest of the FARC front was probably a wise operational move. Engaging them could have resulted in a firefight in which hostages could have been hurt or killed. The unit will probably dissolve and its members may join the chorus of former FARC members broadcasting calls for active FARC members to turn themselves in. (The program has been successful – over 1000 FARC fighters desert per year according to some reports and has included top commanders.)
One dark spot: the use of the NGO ruse may have consequences – not just in Colombia – but worldwide. Future efforts to negotiate these kinds of releases may be effected – and the FARC is believed to hold an additional 700 hostages. The NGO role of serving as interlocutors between states and terrorist groups – while easy to criticize – is often useful and necessary. Their neutrality in these conflicts worldwide does allow them to deliver humanitarian aid and facilitate communications. If terrorist groups are more hesitant to engage with NGOs because of this incident it may block these useful channels.
However, this kind of ruse may only work with a particularly isolated group. Less fragmented groups, like Hezbollah, would probably restrict their dealings to well-established NGOs - so that the impact may be limited.
Update
The invaluable Bloggings By Boz a leading stop for LatAm news reports the fascinating detail that the Colombian rescuers were wearing Che T-shirts.
Tuesday, May 20, 2008
Feared FARC Commander Surrenders
Another FARC commander has surrendered to Colombian authorities. Nelly Avila Moreno, aka Karina, turned herself in (along with her daughter andher partner, known as Michin.) Karina was commander of the 47th Front. (She was also one of the top-ranked women in the FARC – here is some background on the women in the FARC.) This would be roughly equivalent to a Captain surrendering. At a news conference, she stated the FARC was “crumbling.” She had been out of communications with the FARC leadership for two years. Her once feared unit of 350 was down to about 50 fighters.
A few notes about Karina’s surrender and the FARC’s collapse:
The FARC’s collapse is good news for everyone except perhaps the several hundred hostages still held by the FARC (including Ingrid Betancourt and three American contractors.) Their daily life is an absolute hell. Unfortunately, as the FARC disintegrates it is increasingly likely that the hostages may be executed or die in the process of constant movement. The Colombian government has shown a great deal of creativity in battling the FARC, perhaps it can do the same in developing strategies for the hostages’ release.
Karina had been shaken by the death of Ivan Rios at the hands of his own men. She had a $900,000 reward on her head. She told reporters, "You may have a lot of fighters at your side, but you never have an idea of what they are really thinking,"
The bounty strategy has worked well against the FARC. But it is no silver bullet. It has not been successful against al-Qaeda. Every terrorist group is different. Also, the rewards program has only worked against the FARC after years of hard fought counter-insurgency.
There is extensive discussion of the role of the Internet and terrorism. But against the FARC low-tech radio has been a key part of a successful information campaign. The Colombian government regularly broadcasts appeals for FARC members to surrender (over 2000 have defected over the past two years – the FARC’s peak strength was about 18,000 in 2002.) In the case of Karina, President Uribe made a personal appeal for her to surrender.
Karina is suspected of a role in the 1983 murder of Uribe’s father. It is unclear what deal was negotiated regarding the charges against her. Colombia has an ongoing, but problematic “Justice and Peace” process to demobilize, prosecute and re-integrate former paramilitaries (groups that formed to fight the FARC and committed innumerable bloody massacres in their own right.) For the many thousands of low-level figures the process seems to work well – but for the commanders, with real blood on their hands (and often links to important political figures) it is not clear that justice is always being served. As more and more high-level FARC figures surrender these issues will surface in that context as well.
A few notes about Karina’s surrender and the FARC’s collapse:
The bounty strategy has worked well against the FARC. But it is no silver bullet. It has not been successful against al-Qaeda. Every terrorist group is different. Also, the rewards program has only worked against the FARC after years of hard fought counter-insurgency.
Friday, May 16, 2008
FARC Eats it Own
Reporting on Interpol’s assertion that the files on the captured FARC computers are authentic has focused on potential Chavez-FARC ties. But another bit of FARC news should be noted. Six of FARC commander Mono Jojoy’s bodyguards had plotted kill him, probably to collect the $5 million reward. The plot was discovered and three of the six were killed, the other three escaped and are now aiding the Colombian authorities. This plot was no doubt inspired by the death of another member of the FARC Secretariat, Ivan Rios – again at the hands of his bodyguards. The Colombian government’s decision to pay Rios’ bodyguards the reward no doubt encouraged Mono Jojoy’s bodyguards. This is roughly equivalent to Generals being shot by their own troops.
There is probably no better counter-terror strategy than to get a group to turn on itself. The campaign against the notorious Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) in the late 1980s was successful because the paranoid leader, the eponymous Abu Nidal (real name Sabri al-Banna) became convinced that his organization had been infiltrated by the CIA and his subordinates were plotting against him. He became unhinged and began burying them in wet cement. Reportedly, on one night he killed 150 ANO members.
In addition, FARC is losing its mid-level leaders to arrest or death and experienced cadres are deserting at increasing rates. Whatever international, regional, or public support the FARC ever had has evaporated.
The capture of the computer equipment from Raul Reyes’ camp will accelerate all of these trends. Their public image will be further decimated as their own records of their violence are exposed. Colombian intelligence will receive a terrific insight into the FARC modus operandi. Also, as I’ve written before the metadata associated with the documents may be a treasure trove in its own right. Photograph files on laptops often reveal information about the cameras that took them (possibly leading to information about where they were purchased.) Emails may include information about their origin and receipt that could reveal patterns of movement and usage. Combined with Colombia (and American) electronic intelligence capabilities this is sure to be an intelligence bonanza.
The FARC is in a state of rapid decline. Unfortunately it will probably not be vanquished soon – and there is the concern that a smaller, more violence and ideological successor group could emerge. Nonetheless, the FARC's decline is good news. In the 1990s when Plan Colombia was initiated, there was a very real concern that the government of Colombia could "lose" and the FARC could win. Now this possibility is increasingly remote.
There is probably no better counter-terror strategy than to get a group to turn on itself. The campaign against the notorious Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) in the late 1980s was successful because the paranoid leader, the eponymous Abu Nidal (real name Sabri al-Banna) became convinced that his organization had been infiltrated by the CIA and his subordinates were plotting against him. He became unhinged and began burying them in wet cement. Reportedly, on one night he killed 150 ANO members.
In addition, FARC is losing its mid-level leaders to arrest or death and experienced cadres are deserting at increasing rates. Whatever international, regional, or public support the FARC ever had has evaporated.
The capture of the computer equipment from Raul Reyes’ camp will accelerate all of these trends. Their public image will be further decimated as their own records of their violence are exposed. Colombian intelligence will receive a terrific insight into the FARC modus operandi. Also, as I’ve written before the metadata associated with the documents may be a treasure trove in its own right. Photograph files on laptops often reveal information about the cameras that took them (possibly leading to information about where they were purchased.) Emails may include information about their origin and receipt that could reveal patterns of movement and usage. Combined with Colombia (and American) electronic intelligence capabilities this is sure to be an intelligence bonanza.
The FARC is in a state of rapid decline. Unfortunately it will probably not be vanquished soon – and there is the concern that a smaller, more violence and ideological successor group could emerge. Nonetheless, the FARC's decline is good news. In the 1990s when Plan Colombia was initiated, there was a very real concern that the government of Colombia could "lose" and the FARC could win. Now this possibility is increasingly remote.
Friday, May 9, 2008
About Bout & the DEA
The recently unsealed indictment of arms-trafficker extraordinaire Victor Bout is an interesting read. Perhaps the most notable line is on page 10, when Bout told the DEA operatives (who he believed represented the FARC) that America was also his enemy and their fight was his fight. Another international arms dealer, Monzar al-Kasser, who was arrested in a DEA sting, promised the informants to raise an army for the FARC in order to fight the Americans. Are these heartfelt sentiments, or just salesmen trying to ingratiate themselves to a wealthy client and close a lucrative deal?
The truth is probably a combination of both. Many criminals seek to justify their actions as somehow contributing to a greater good by empowering the powerless. But intentions aside, Bout’s capabilities are the real cause for worry. He promised to airlift hundreds of Igla portable surface-to-air missiles (known as MANPADS – man portable self-defense systems) along with UAVs, ultra-light planes, explosives, and millions of rounds of ammunition to the FARC. Bout wasn’t just a dealer, he also could provide training (nothing like good customer service to bring in repeat business.) He also mentioned that he could sell the FARC airplanes if they were interested. Regardless of intent, individuals with the connections and capabilities to acquire and transport large quantities of deadly weapons like MANPADS outside of regulated channels are as dangerous to international security as terrorists.
(As a side-note, the FARC keeps appearing in the headlines on Bout’s capture, but in fact had nothing to do with it – DEA operatives were portraying themselves as FARC representatives. The FARC, which has a terribly long list of vicious misdeeds of its own, does not apparently need Bout, as the latest documents from the captured FARC computers indicate that FARC believed that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez would supply them with everything they might need.)
About the DEA
Bout’s capture, besides being good news in and of itself, highlights the Drug Enforcement Agency as a competent law enforcement/intelligence agency capable of carrying out a complex international operation. On a related note, a recent Justice Department Inspector-General report, the Drug Enforcement Agency has been fairly successful at building its analytical capabilities. Most analysts are satisfied with their work and analyst turnover is much lower than at the FBI. Although the report was mostly positive, it also highlighted the many challenges to building an effective analytical capability. To often analysts are also given administrative tasks and hiring is complicated by the long clearance process (many prime candidates find other jobs while waiting to be cleared.) The DEA’s reports are well regarded by other intelligence agencies, but they apparently are slow to share information. The DEA response to this complaint was particularly interesting – they noted that information was quickly shared through informal channels. But, there is a demanding review process for formal reports and the DEA wants to make sure its analyses are high quality.
The report gives a sense of the nuts and bolts issues of building an intelligence analysis component and is food for thought as the FBI is criticized, yet again, for not building its analytical capabilities. In fairness, the DEA is a much smaller agency with a specific focus and is not being called on to re-invent itself on the fly. Too often these detailed issues regarding organizational capabilities and culture are ignored in favor of grand pronouncements and declarations.
The truth is probably a combination of both. Many criminals seek to justify their actions as somehow contributing to a greater good by empowering the powerless. But intentions aside, Bout’s capabilities are the real cause for worry. He promised to airlift hundreds of Igla portable surface-to-air missiles (known as MANPADS – man portable self-defense systems) along with UAVs, ultra-light planes, explosives, and millions of rounds of ammunition to the FARC. Bout wasn’t just a dealer, he also could provide training (nothing like good customer service to bring in repeat business.) He also mentioned that he could sell the FARC airplanes if they were interested. Regardless of intent, individuals with the connections and capabilities to acquire and transport large quantities of deadly weapons like MANPADS outside of regulated channels are as dangerous to international security as terrorists.
(As a side-note, the FARC keeps appearing in the headlines on Bout’s capture, but in fact had nothing to do with it – DEA operatives were portraying themselves as FARC representatives. The FARC, which has a terribly long list of vicious misdeeds of its own, does not apparently need Bout, as the latest documents from the captured FARC computers indicate that FARC believed that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez would supply them with everything they might need.)
About the DEA
Bout’s capture, besides being good news in and of itself, highlights the Drug Enforcement Agency as a competent law enforcement/intelligence agency capable of carrying out a complex international operation. On a related note, a recent Justice Department Inspector-General report, the Drug Enforcement Agency has been fairly successful at building its analytical capabilities. Most analysts are satisfied with their work and analyst turnover is much lower than at the FBI. Although the report was mostly positive, it also highlighted the many challenges to building an effective analytical capability. To often analysts are also given administrative tasks and hiring is complicated by the long clearance process (many prime candidates find other jobs while waiting to be cleared.) The DEA’s reports are well regarded by other intelligence agencies, but they apparently are slow to share information. The DEA response to this complaint was particularly interesting – they noted that information was quickly shared through informal channels. But, there is a demanding review process for formal reports and the DEA wants to make sure its analyses are high quality.
The report gives a sense of the nuts and bolts issues of building an intelligence analysis component and is food for thought as the FBI is criticized, yet again, for not building its analytical capabilities. In fairness, the DEA is a much smaller agency with a specific focus and is not being called on to re-invent itself on the fly. Too often these detailed issues regarding organizational capabilities and culture are ignored in favor of grand pronouncements and declarations.
Friday, March 28, 2008
DU Dud: The Silver Lining to FARC’s Uranium
Colombian police have found 30 kilos (65 lbs.) of depleted uranium (DU). DU is what is left over after natural uranium is enriched. It is less radioactive than natural uranium and consequently useless for building dirty bombs (let alone nuclear weapons.) Tons of the stuff is around and there is virtually no market for DU (certainly not to the tune of $2.5 million a kilo).
While the Hollywood scenarios of terrorists dealing in WMD appear to be false, this incident raises interesting questions about the motivations and quality of the FARC’s leadership.
Here is a video from the site of Colombia’s El Tiempo of investigators examining the uranium. A close-up of the Geiger counter shows that it barely registers the radiation and the investigators clean off the bars and the words “depleted uranium” are clearly visible.
It seems likely that the FARC was involved in a scam. The question is were they the scammer or the scammed (or a bit of both)? Whatever the answer, the FARC is exposed as both vicious and incompetent.
If the FARC was the victim of a scam, it shows how they have fallen. First that the FARC would fall for a scam shows a decline in their intelligence and analytical capabilities. Also, the FARC is a heavily armed and vicious. If some hustler was willing to scam them it indicates that the FARC are less feared than in the past. A terrorist group that does not generate fear is a terrorist group in decline.
If the FARC was knowingly committing a scam, they have sacrificed their credibility for a short-term profit. Between this possible scam and the fact that several international arms dealers (including the notorious Victor Bout) have been snagged with FARC bait, other major players in international illicit networks will be much more cautious about dealing with the FARC. If the FARC, in turn, becomes more desperate to purchase weapons and other needed equipment then it will be more vulnerable to law enforcement efforts to infiltrate it – expanding an existing vulnerability.
More than likely, the FARC was aware that this was a scam – but was possibly scammed in being misled about how lucrative and easy this sort of scam would be.
In addition, this incident raises deeper questions about the FARC. While some terrorists (such as al-Qaeda) would readily resort to WMD – there is no political advantage to selling it, besides as a source of income. Whatever the radioactivity of the materials, how could the FARC high command not know that being associated with selling uranium would be politically radioactive? Or did they not care when the chance of a multi-million dollar windfall came their way? But the FARC already has a solid cash flow from the drug trade and other illicit activities. Did they need this extra income, or did they just want it? Either answer shows that the FARC leadership is at an advanced state of decay.
While the Hollywood scenarios of terrorists dealing in WMD appear to be false, this incident raises interesting questions about the motivations and quality of the FARC’s leadership.
Here is a video from the site of Colombia’s El Tiempo of investigators examining the uranium. A close-up of the Geiger counter shows that it barely registers the radiation and the investigators clean off the bars and the words “depleted uranium” are clearly visible.
It seems likely that the FARC was involved in a scam. The question is were they the scammer or the scammed (or a bit of both)? Whatever the answer, the FARC is exposed as both vicious and incompetent.
If the FARC was the victim of a scam, it shows how they have fallen. First that the FARC would fall for a scam shows a decline in their intelligence and analytical capabilities. Also, the FARC is a heavily armed and vicious. If some hustler was willing to scam them it indicates that the FARC are less feared than in the past. A terrorist group that does not generate fear is a terrorist group in decline.
If the FARC was knowingly committing a scam, they have sacrificed their credibility for a short-term profit. Between this possible scam and the fact that several international arms dealers (including the notorious Victor Bout) have been snagged with FARC bait, other major players in international illicit networks will be much more cautious about dealing with the FARC. If the FARC, in turn, becomes more desperate to purchase weapons and other needed equipment then it will be more vulnerable to law enforcement efforts to infiltrate it – expanding an existing vulnerability.
More than likely, the FARC was aware that this was a scam – but was possibly scammed in being misled about how lucrative and easy this sort of scam would be.
In addition, this incident raises deeper questions about the FARC. While some terrorists (such as al-Qaeda) would readily resort to WMD – there is no political advantage to selling it, besides as a source of income. Whatever the radioactivity of the materials, how could the FARC high command not know that being associated with selling uranium would be politically radioactive? Or did they not care when the chance of a multi-million dollar windfall came their way? But the FARC already has a solid cash flow from the drug trade and other illicit activities. Did they need this extra income, or did they just want it? Either answer shows that the FARC leadership is at an advanced state of decay.
Tuesday, March 11, 2008
Update: No FARC Leader in Venezuela
Looks like a false alarm. The man hospitalized in Rubia is not FARC leader Joaquín Gómez. The other story, that Colombia was closing in on another secret FARC leader Alfonso Cano is also unknown, although there are also reports that he was wounded in a helicopter attack on February 21.
Venezuela and Colombia collaborated carefully to bring the matter to a close. This is a positive sign. Also, something (perhaps the heavy guard around the patient) sparked these rumors. Something odd is up and is probably worth keeping an eye on.
Venezuela and Colombia collaborated carefully to bring the matter to a close. This is a positive sign. Also, something (perhaps the heavy guard around the patient) sparked these rumors. Something odd is up and is probably worth keeping an eye on.
Tipping Point? More FARC Leaders Under Pressure
There are unconfirmed reports that Raul Reyes replacement on the FARC Secretariat, Joaquin Gomez, aka Milton de Jesús Toncel Redondo, is being hospitalized in Venezuela having been shot in the face in fighting in Colombia. Reportedly he is under heavy guard. Another report states that the Colombian military shelled the base of another FARC Secretariat member, Alfonso Cano, aka Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas.
If these reports are true - and it should be emphasized that at this point the Colombians are denying any knowledge of Gomez being injured - it only further highlights the extent to which the FARC has been penetrated by Colombian security. The description of Gomez's wounds certainly raise the possibility that, like Rios, he was attacked by his own men. Supposedly Gomez is hospitalized near the Colombian border, which will again raise questions about whether or not Chavez is providing a safe haven for the FARC. The only way to prove he is not would be to extradite - to Colombia - not the U.S. (which would only give Chavez the chance to start an unpleasant row over Luis Posada.*) Chavez may fight this issue, but then the U.S. would have very strong grounds to declare Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism.
This could be a tipping point. Simply removing one leader does not always break a terrorist organization. But systematically removing the entire high command is a tougher blow for even the robust terrorist group. FARC was once very robust, but no longer.
If these reports are true then this weeks earlier counter-terror successes were not simply good luck, but the product of nearly a decade of effectively conceived and implemented strategy.
My ongoing warning still stands - the FARC may remain capable of retaliation.
*For an in-depth story on Luis Posada Carriles, who the Cuban and Venezuelan government accuse of master-minding a 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner with 73 people on board see this story from the Atlantic Monthly. Posada had been a CIA informant, he was part of a cadre of Cuban exiles that worked with the CIA against Castro - many of whom went on to a range of unseemly activities throughout Latin America. Nothing new about blowback.
The article concludes that Posada and the CIA didn't have anything to do with the airline bombing - but that the Cuban and Venezuelan governments love the obvious propaganda value.
If these reports are true - and it should be emphasized that at this point the Colombians are denying any knowledge of Gomez being injured - it only further highlights the extent to which the FARC has been penetrated by Colombian security. The description of Gomez's wounds certainly raise the possibility that, like Rios, he was attacked by his own men. Supposedly Gomez is hospitalized near the Colombian border, which will again raise questions about whether or not Chavez is providing a safe haven for the FARC. The only way to prove he is not would be to extradite - to Colombia - not the U.S. (which would only give Chavez the chance to start an unpleasant row over Luis Posada.*) Chavez may fight this issue, but then the U.S. would have very strong grounds to declare Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism.
This could be a tipping point. Simply removing one leader does not always break a terrorist organization. But systematically removing the entire high command is a tougher blow for even the robust terrorist group. FARC was once very robust, but no longer.
If these reports are true then this weeks earlier counter-terror successes were not simply good luck, but the product of nearly a decade of effectively conceived and implemented strategy.
My ongoing warning still stands - the FARC may remain capable of retaliation.
*For an in-depth story on Luis Posada Carriles, who the Cuban and Venezuelan government accuse of master-minding a 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner with 73 people on board see this story from the Atlantic Monthly. Posada had been a CIA informant, he was part of a cadre of Cuban exiles that worked with the CIA against Castro - many of whom went on to a range of unseemly activities throughout Latin America. Nothing new about blowback.
The article concludes that Posada and the CIA didn't have anything to do with the airline bombing - but that the Cuban and Venezuelan governments love the obvious propaganda value.
Monday, March 10, 2008
Venezuela & The Terror Supporters List: Pros & Cons
An anonymous State Department source told the Miami Herald that they are exploring the possibility of placing Venezuela on the list of state sponsors of terrorism for their relationship with the FARC - as revealed in the laptops captured from FARC leaders.
Being declared a state sponsor of terrorism brings a host of sanctions down on a regime, however the administration has flexibility about how they are enforced (I'll leave it to some of my co-bloggers, who are among the leading experts on U.S. law and state sponsorship of terrorism, to flesh this out.)
More than likely, this leak is just a shot across the bow. Declaring Venezuela a state sponsor of terror is a complicated issue in which many factors have to be carefully weighed including the quality of the evidence, the effect on the U.S. economy, the declaration's regional impact, and whether it furthers U.S. goals.
The laptops seized from Raul Reyes' camp in Ecuador appear to confirm a high-level relationship between FARC and Chavez that is over 15 years old. But, there is the argument, made credibly at the Center for International Policy's Colombia Program that this is only seeing the FARC's perception of the events - not necessarily what actually transpired. The sudden escalation of a single unclear paragraph into a FARC conspiracy to build dirty bombs is but one example of taking the text too far. I for one don't doubt that when the evidence is weighed, Chavez and the FARC will be revealed as political bedfellows in a deep embrace. But the evidence has to be carefully examined first.
It is impossible to discuss sanctions on Venezuela without considering its role as the supplier of about 15% of U.S. oil. Doing business with state sponsors of terror is complicated and U.S.-Venezuela trade is over $40 billion annually. Closing down this relationship would be complicated and expensive. In some ways Venezuela needs the U.S. more than the U.S. need them. Venezuelan oil is heavy and requires special refineries - which exist in the U.S. but not elsewhere. Simply selling their oil to another customer is possible, but between increased transport and the need for new infrastructure Chavez would make a smaller profit. At the same time, the oil market is tight and it is difficult to imagine a U.S. administration causing a disruption that would quickly be felt at the pump - particularly during an election season.
The sanctions component of being declared a state sponsor of terror could be structured to let the oil continue to flow, but that risks making a mockery of the U.S. sanctions regime. Alternately, it could provide the next administration with some useful tools for curbing Chavez' behavior.
There is also the question of how it would play regionally and if it truly advances U.S. goals. Chavez taps a deep vein of anti-Americanism in Latin America (and around the world.) The U.S. has refused to take the bait, toning down its anti-Chavez rhetoric in order to avoid playing into his hands. Declaring Venezuela a state sponsor of terror would grant Chavez an endless issue to exploit. His message would resonate throughout the region and other leaders would have to at least pay him lip service. But it is worth remembering that during the Falklands War the United States (much to British consternation) started off trying to play honest broker in order not to side against Argentina and inflame Latin American public opinion. It turned out the Argentina's war made everyone else in the region extremely nervous and few were upset to see the Argentine junta lose its war. Chavez is also making others in the region nervous, and in his Washington Post column Jackson Diehl argued that many Latin American leaders would like to see the U.S. take a harder line against Chavez.
Finally, would the declaration help the U.S. achieve its long-term goals. Ultimately, the U.S. wants to see Chavez leave power and be replaced by a democratically elected leader. On the one hand the declaration might give him a cause to rally the cadres. On the other, it might embarrass the Venezuelan people (who are probably less anti-American than most in the region) and give them an increased impetus to boot out Chavez.
In sum, declaring Venezuela as a state terrorism supporter is a potentially useful tool in the context of a larger strategy. But first, let all the evidence be unearthed and evaluated. Declaring a state to be a sponsor of terror is a powerful tool - best not to dull it unnecessarily.
Being declared a state sponsor of terrorism brings a host of sanctions down on a regime, however the administration has flexibility about how they are enforced (I'll leave it to some of my co-bloggers, who are among the leading experts on U.S. law and state sponsorship of terrorism, to flesh this out.)
More than likely, this leak is just a shot across the bow. Declaring Venezuela a state sponsor of terror is a complicated issue in which many factors have to be carefully weighed including the quality of the evidence, the effect on the U.S. economy, the declaration's regional impact, and whether it furthers U.S. goals.
The laptops seized from Raul Reyes' camp in Ecuador appear to confirm a high-level relationship between FARC and Chavez that is over 15 years old. But, there is the argument, made credibly at the Center for International Policy's Colombia Program that this is only seeing the FARC's perception of the events - not necessarily what actually transpired. The sudden escalation of a single unclear paragraph into a FARC conspiracy to build dirty bombs is but one example of taking the text too far. I for one don't doubt that when the evidence is weighed, Chavez and the FARC will be revealed as political bedfellows in a deep embrace. But the evidence has to be carefully examined first.
It is impossible to discuss sanctions on Venezuela without considering its role as the supplier of about 15% of U.S. oil. Doing business with state sponsors of terror is complicated and U.S.-Venezuela trade is over $40 billion annually. Closing down this relationship would be complicated and expensive. In some ways Venezuela needs the U.S. more than the U.S. need them. Venezuelan oil is heavy and requires special refineries - which exist in the U.S. but not elsewhere. Simply selling their oil to another customer is possible, but between increased transport and the need for new infrastructure Chavez would make a smaller profit. At the same time, the oil market is tight and it is difficult to imagine a U.S. administration causing a disruption that would quickly be felt at the pump - particularly during an election season.
The sanctions component of being declared a state sponsor of terror could be structured to let the oil continue to flow, but that risks making a mockery of the U.S. sanctions regime. Alternately, it could provide the next administration with some useful tools for curbing Chavez' behavior.
There is also the question of how it would play regionally and if it truly advances U.S. goals. Chavez taps a deep vein of anti-Americanism in Latin America (and around the world.) The U.S. has refused to take the bait, toning down its anti-Chavez rhetoric in order to avoid playing into his hands. Declaring Venezuela a state sponsor of terror would grant Chavez an endless issue to exploit. His message would resonate throughout the region and other leaders would have to at least pay him lip service. But it is worth remembering that during the Falklands War the United States (much to British consternation) started off trying to play honest broker in order not to side against Argentina and inflame Latin American public opinion. It turned out the Argentina's war made everyone else in the region extremely nervous and few were upset to see the Argentine junta lose its war. Chavez is also making others in the region nervous, and in his Washington Post column Jackson Diehl argued that many Latin American leaders would like to see the U.S. take a harder line against Chavez.
Finally, would the declaration help the U.S. achieve its long-term goals. Ultimately, the U.S. wants to see Chavez leave power and be replaced by a democratically elected leader. On the one hand the declaration might give him a cause to rally the cadres. On the other, it might embarrass the Venezuelan people (who are probably less anti-American than most in the region) and give them an increased impetus to boot out Chavez.
In sum, declaring Venezuela as a state terrorism supporter is a potentially useful tool in the context of a larger strategy. But first, let all the evidence be unearthed and evaluated. Declaring a state to be a sponsor of terror is a powerful tool - best not to dull it unnecessarily.
Friday, March 7, 2008
Rios Killed by his own Men & Other Updates
The story behind the killing of FARC leader Ivan Rios has become more interesting - and even more indicative that the FARC is on the verge of collapes. Colombia's Defense Minister now states that Rios was killed by his unit's security chief. Closely pursued by Colombian Security Forces, the security chief, "Rojas" killed Rios and gave his hand, his ID papers, and his computer to the Colombian military.
Wow! The FARC is beginning to turn on itself. The FARC may in fact be on the verge of dissolution.
It is difficult to believe that the assassination of Reyes did not influence these events (they may also get to collect a $5 million reward from the U.S. Department of Justice.) Now the Colombian government has the computer of another top commander. More dominoes will fall.
Other Updates
Initial rumors are apparently false. Ecuador's Correa denies that Betancourt is about to be released.
Also, the OAS hearings on the Colombia-Venezuela spat has ended amicably. Uribe was subject to harsh criticism but gave as good as he got. It ended with a handshake between Correa, Chavez, and Uribe. This might be a good moment for the United States to make an offer to Ecuador (cutting back on aerial spraying of drug fields near the Ecuador-Colombia border might be a good opening gambit) - the disclosures about Correa's links to the FARC are certainly embarrassing.
Meanwhile, a Venezuelan National Guard vehicle crossed into Colombian territory and shots were fired. It was probably just a dumb accident - but these are the sorts of things that happen when leaders looking for a distraction from other troubles take diplomatic spats and turn them into full-scale donnybrooks.
Wow! The FARC is beginning to turn on itself. The FARC may in fact be on the verge of dissolution.
It is difficult to believe that the assassination of Reyes did not influence these events (they may also get to collect a $5 million reward from the U.S. Department of Justice.) Now the Colombian government has the computer of another top commander. More dominoes will fall.
Other Updates
Initial rumors are apparently false. Ecuador's Correa denies that Betancourt is about to be released.
Also, the OAS hearings on the Colombia-Venezuela spat has ended amicably. Uribe was subject to harsh criticism but gave as good as he got. It ended with a handshake between Correa, Chavez, and Uribe. This might be a good moment for the United States to make an offer to Ecuador (cutting back on aerial spraying of drug fields near the Ecuador-Colombia border might be a good opening gambit) - the disclosures about Correa's links to the FARC are certainly embarrassing.
Meanwhile, a Venezuelan National Guard vehicle crossed into Colombian territory and shots were fired. It was probably just a dumb accident - but these are the sorts of things that happen when leaders looking for a distraction from other troubles take diplomatic spats and turn them into full-scale donnybrooks.
Another FARC Leader Killed
News from Colombia keeps coming. This afternoon Colombian security killed Ivan Rios, another member of the FARC Estado Mayor Central (Central High Command.) This is the body that governs the organization. Raul Reyes, one of its members was killed last week, touching off a diplomatic spat. This latest strike took place within Colombian territory.
It is also rumored that the founder and top commander, Manual Marulanda is ill. This is an organization that could be entering a severe leadership crisis.
Overall this is good news - but there are potential dangers.
It is impossible for an outsider to know if intelligence collected from the laptops captured with Reyes contributed to this strike. It is worth noting that Colombia has, with U.S. aid, developed some impressive cyber-forensic capabilities. In the Colombian paper El Pais the operation was joint between the military and el Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación de la Fiscalía. Although there was also a humint component, demobilized FARC members provided intelligence as well.
Quick note about cyber-forensics - it may go beyond reading correspondence. I've heard intelligence analysts say that amateurs study content, professionals study traffic. It is possible that operational patterns were detected by studying the origin and destination of electronic traffic on these computers as well and then combining them with the human intelligence. An effective and professional operation all around.
Decapitation strategies (that is targeting the leaders of terrorist organizations) have a mixed record. More robust organizations (such as the FARC or Hezbollah) can readily replace their leaders - and worse carry out revenge strikes. Israel learned this lesson in 1992 after assassinated Hezbollah Secretary-General Abbas Musawi. Only a month later Hezbollah responded by blowing up Israel's Embassy in Buenos Aires. For its credibility the FARC will almost certainly have to carry out a counter-strike and its still formidable resources mean that it could be deadly.
Nonetheless, the FARC is showing signs of being systematically neutralized. Colombia security has clearly penetrated FARC security. The ability of Fronts to coordinate is certain to be devastated since the FARC will need to be wary of using any communications system. In addition the organization has a high desertion rate and has lost any shred of credibility with the Colombian people. Finally, Ecuador arrested a FARC unit. It is possible that Correa was both embarrassed at the exposure of links between himself and the FARC (including Colombia's allegation that the FARC financed his election) and has looked long and hard at the consequences of being Hugo's puppy.
While this is overall good news, as the organization fractures a small component that is still ideologically devoted could turn to deadly high profile terror (or even decide to take its revenge on the United States.)
To paraphrase Churchill, this is not the end - but it might be the beginning of the end. Unfortunately, the FARC could go down fighting.
It is also rumored that the founder and top commander, Manual Marulanda is ill. This is an organization that could be entering a severe leadership crisis.
Overall this is good news - but there are potential dangers.
It is impossible for an outsider to know if intelligence collected from the laptops captured with Reyes contributed to this strike. It is worth noting that Colombia has, with U.S. aid, developed some impressive cyber-forensic capabilities. In the Colombian paper El Pais the operation was joint between the military and el Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación de la Fiscalía. Although there was also a humint component, demobilized FARC members provided intelligence as well.
Quick note about cyber-forensics - it may go beyond reading correspondence. I've heard intelligence analysts say that amateurs study content, professionals study traffic. It is possible that operational patterns were detected by studying the origin and destination of electronic traffic on these computers as well and then combining them with the human intelligence. An effective and professional operation all around.
Decapitation strategies (that is targeting the leaders of terrorist organizations) have a mixed record. More robust organizations (such as the FARC or Hezbollah) can readily replace their leaders - and worse carry out revenge strikes. Israel learned this lesson in 1992 after assassinated Hezbollah Secretary-General Abbas Musawi. Only a month later Hezbollah responded by blowing up Israel's Embassy in Buenos Aires. For its credibility the FARC will almost certainly have to carry out a counter-strike and its still formidable resources mean that it could be deadly.
Nonetheless, the FARC is showing signs of being systematically neutralized. Colombia security has clearly penetrated FARC security. The ability of Fronts to coordinate is certain to be devastated since the FARC will need to be wary of using any communications system. In addition the organization has a high desertion rate and has lost any shred of credibility with the Colombian people. Finally, Ecuador arrested a FARC unit. It is possible that Correa was both embarrassed at the exposure of links between himself and the FARC (including Colombia's allegation that the FARC financed his election) and has looked long and hard at the consequences of being Hugo's puppy.
While this is overall good news, as the organization fractures a small component that is still ideologically devoted could turn to deadly high profile terror (or even decide to take its revenge on the United States.)
To paraphrase Churchill, this is not the end - but it might be the beginning of the end. Unfortunately, the FARC could go down fighting.
FARC Bait for Bout
According to the Drug Enforcement Agency’s press release, international arms-trafficker extraordinaire Victor Bout was arrested for plotting to sell weapons to the FARC – not knowing that the reputed FARC representatives were in fact working for the DEA. Only nine months ago another notorious international arms dealer, Monzer al-Kasser was arrested for conspiring to sell weapons (and trainers) to the FARC, when in fact the FARC buyers were in fact DEA operatives. For al-Kasser, who has been linked to the Palestine Liberation Front (the group responsible for the Achille Lauro hijacking) as well as leading Baathist figures from Syria and Iraq, it was more than just business. He offered to raise an army to assist the FARC. Al-Kasser seems to have had a passion for his work.
Illicit items with large supply and large demand, such as drugs, are Sisyphean challenges for law enforcement. But goods with more limited supply and demand that require more care in their transport – such as heavy weapons – may be an important counter-terror opportunity. Reversing the play that nabbed Bout and al-Kasser, by having law enforcement agents offer to sell weapons to terrorists can also be effective. The Tamil Tiger’s arms purchasing network has been caught in a few of these operations.
It is also interesting that in the potential FARC uranium deal, the FARC was entering this world of complicated illicit goods – as opposed to their usual easy-to-move product line. Although exactly what the uranium scheme was is unclear. They were hoping to sell a kilo of uranium for $2.5 million. The going rate for unprocessed uranium is about $100 per kilo. While the FARC has some formidable capabilities, uranium enrichment – the problem stymieing Iran - is probably not among them.
Rich on the drug trade and always hungry for arms, the FARC was a perfect ploy for ensnaring arms traffickers. But, having landed two big fish, the FARC gambit may have been played out. Hopefully law enforcement can identify other clients for future schemes against terrorists and arms traffickers. It is a just policy, and perhaps it will also prove to be an effective one as well.
Illicit items with large supply and large demand, such as drugs, are Sisyphean challenges for law enforcement. But goods with more limited supply and demand that require more care in their transport – such as heavy weapons – may be an important counter-terror opportunity. Reversing the play that nabbed Bout and al-Kasser, by having law enforcement agents offer to sell weapons to terrorists can also be effective. The Tamil Tiger’s arms purchasing network has been caught in a few of these operations.
It is also interesting that in the potential FARC uranium deal, the FARC was entering this world of complicated illicit goods – as opposed to their usual easy-to-move product line. Although exactly what the uranium scheme was is unclear. They were hoping to sell a kilo of uranium for $2.5 million. The going rate for unprocessed uranium is about $100 per kilo. While the FARC has some formidable capabilities, uranium enrichment – the problem stymieing Iran - is probably not among them.
Rich on the drug trade and always hungry for arms, the FARC was a perfect ploy for ensnaring arms traffickers. But, having landed two big fish, the FARC gambit may have been played out. Hopefully law enforcement can identify other clients for future schemes against terrorists and arms traffickers. It is a just policy, and perhaps it will also prove to be an effective one as well.
Wednesday, March 5, 2008
FARC Fallout: Assessing Dirty Bomb Claims
Among the more explosive revelations from the laptops of the late FARC leader Raul Reyes is the allegation that the FARC was trafficking in radioactive materials and according to Colombia’s Vice President was planning to build a “dirty bomb.” A dirty bomb (or a radiological dispersal device) is an explosive packed with radioactive materials that are dispersed with the explosion (for more details see below.)
No one should question the fundamental viciousness of the FARC. But the dirty bomb accusation should be investigated carefully, particularly considering the FARC’s access to international smuggling networks (they help smuggle tons of illegal drugs to the United States around the world).
From the documents released by the Colombian government (36 page pdf in Spanish), the sole reference to uranium is point number six in a memo dated February 16, 2008 to Reyes from Edgar Tovar. The other contents of the memo deal with FARC finances, operations, and possible informants. It has to be emphasized that the writing is not terribly clear (although when it is examined by experienced analysts and put into context it will undoubtedly prove to be a wealth of information about FARC operations.) Here is a translation of the paragraph about uranium:
The Dirt on Dirty Bombs
But this doesn’t get us to the dirty bomb accusation. Uranium, apparently, is a terrible material for building a dirty bomb - in and of itself it is not radioactive. An excellent primer on dirty bombs is this CRS report from April 1, 2004 (a 6 page pdf).
In a nutshell, in all but the least developed societies there are substantial amounts of radioactive material used for innumerable medical, industrial, and mundane capacities. Acquiring the material for a dirty bomb is not that hard, but all radioactive material is not equal. Most of the material that can be readily acquired is not that radioactive and unless truly enormous quantities were obtained, would probably just raise background radiation level by a small amount. There are specific materials that could do much worse than that, however there is another problem. The radioactive material has to be converted into a form that is easily dispersed (say a fine powder.) Milling down a highly radioactive metal bar would be difficult (probably killing the workers in the process.)
The FARC could easily build a low level dirty bomb. But it is a problematic tactic, in that all it would do is raise the background radiation level and possibly causing slight long-term increases in health risks. (There is a debate among experts about the efficacy of dirty bombs – an ongoing issue for consequence management in the U.S. is that strict EPA standards might force the closure of areas hit by a dirty bomb when the practical impact on health is minimal.) In general, an unsophisticated dirty bomb would amount to a big, expensive hassle. Some experts argue that a dirty bomb, regardless of the real effects, would cause a massive panic – hopefully this proposition will never be tested, but in many stressful disaster situations social networks prove to be surprisingly resilient. For the FARC a dirty bomb might not be an attractive weapon since it would do minimal damage, while making the FARC politically radioactive.
Nonetheless, news that the FARC is entering the uranium trade is interesting and worrisome. More than any other terrorist group the FARC sits on the nexus of international crime and terrorism. This was epitomized by the deal with the IRA – drugs for weapons training – that was disrupted in August 2001. The extent of these links should be one of the many valuable things gleaned from the laptops of Raul Reyes.
*Full disclosure, my own Spanish is terrible but I work closely with a very diligent Spanish-speaking researcher.
No one should question the fundamental viciousness of the FARC. But the dirty bomb accusation should be investigated carefully, particularly considering the FARC’s access to international smuggling networks (they help smuggle tons of illegal drugs to the United States around the world).
From the documents released by the Colombian government (36 page pdf in Spanish), the sole reference to uranium is point number six in a memo dated February 16, 2008 to Reyes from Edgar Tovar. The other contents of the memo deal with FARC finances, operations, and possible informants. It has to be emphasized that the writing is not terribly clear (although when it is examined by experienced analysts and put into context it will undoubtedly prove to be a wealth of information about FARC operations.) Here is a translation of the paragraph about uranium:
Another topic is about uranium. There is a gentleman who supplies me with material for the explosive that we prepare and his name is Belisario and he lives in Bogota. He is a friend of Jon 40 [possibly Jon 40 a commander of the 27th Front, which is based in the Meta Department, and is part of the FARC’s Eastern Bloc], eastern Efren [possibly the other commander of the 27th Front], Caliche of Jacobo [possibly a commander of the 9th Front, based In the Antioquia Department and part of the Northwest Bloc or someone associated with the Jacobo Arenas Urban Front, based in the Medellin region], he sent me samples and specifications and they propose to sell each kilo for 2.5 million dollars and they handle delivery and we handle who we sell to and that it be a business with a government to sell to. Arto [possibly plural] have 50 kilos ready and they can sell much more, he has direct contact with those who have the product.Much of this is unclear.* There is minimal punctuation. The verb after Arto is plural indicating it may be a group. The original Spanish is here:
Otros de los temas es lo de el Uranio hay un señor que me surte de material para el explosivo que preparamos y se llama Belisario y vive en Bogotá es amigo de Jon 40, Efrén oriental, Caliche de la Jacobo, el me mando el muestrario y las especificaciones y proponen vender cada kilo a 2 millones y medios de dólares y que ellos entregan y nosotros miramos a quien le vendemos y que sea el negocio con un gobierno para venderle arto tienen 50 kilos listos y pueden vender mucho más, tiene el contacto directo con los que tienen el producto.So it appears that the FARC is entering the uranium smuggling business - a logical move for them (uranium is mined in Colombia and Venezuela). But, unlike cocaine, there are far fewer buyers and the consequences of getting caught – which the FARC seems to be aware of, hence the emphasis on selecting buyers – are very high.
The Dirt on Dirty Bombs
But this doesn’t get us to the dirty bomb accusation. Uranium, apparently, is a terrible material for building a dirty bomb - in and of itself it is not radioactive. An excellent primer on dirty bombs is this CRS report from April 1, 2004 (a 6 page pdf).
In a nutshell, in all but the least developed societies there are substantial amounts of radioactive material used for innumerable medical, industrial, and mundane capacities. Acquiring the material for a dirty bomb is not that hard, but all radioactive material is not equal. Most of the material that can be readily acquired is not that radioactive and unless truly enormous quantities were obtained, would probably just raise background radiation level by a small amount. There are specific materials that could do much worse than that, however there is another problem. The radioactive material has to be converted into a form that is easily dispersed (say a fine powder.) Milling down a highly radioactive metal bar would be difficult (probably killing the workers in the process.)
The FARC could easily build a low level dirty bomb. But it is a problematic tactic, in that all it would do is raise the background radiation level and possibly causing slight long-term increases in health risks. (There is a debate among experts about the efficacy of dirty bombs – an ongoing issue for consequence management in the U.S. is that strict EPA standards might force the closure of areas hit by a dirty bomb when the practical impact on health is minimal.) In general, an unsophisticated dirty bomb would amount to a big, expensive hassle. Some experts argue that a dirty bomb, regardless of the real effects, would cause a massive panic – hopefully this proposition will never be tested, but in many stressful disaster situations social networks prove to be surprisingly resilient. For the FARC a dirty bomb might not be an attractive weapon since it would do minimal damage, while making the FARC politically radioactive.
Nonetheless, news that the FARC is entering the uranium trade is interesting and worrisome. More than any other terrorist group the FARC sits on the nexus of international crime and terrorism. This was epitomized by the deal with the IRA – drugs for weapons training – that was disrupted in August 2001. The extent of these links should be one of the many valuable things gleaned from the laptops of Raul Reyes.
*Full disclosure, my own Spanish is terrible but I work closely with a very diligent Spanish-speaking researcher.
Tuesday, March 4, 2008
Aaron Mannes in NRO on FARC, Chavez, & Colombia
National Review Online ran my article Finding FARC on the fallout from Colombia's killing of FARC #2 Raul Reyes and Hugo Chavez's reaction.
March 4, 2008
Finding FARC
An important victory for Columbia sparks a major diplomatic spat.
By Aaron Mannes
The Colombian government’s successful killing of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) number-two Raul Reyes is an important victory in Colombia’s 44-year war with the narco-terrorists. Perhaps more significantly, the Colombian government’s ability to target the FARC will be substantially augmented by the computers captured from Reyes’s base. Advantages aside, however, the killing of Reyes and the contents of his hard drives have sparked a major diplomatic spat that has important regional implications.
The attack took place on March 1 about a mile and a half inside of Ecuadorian territory. Ecuador’s government was perturbed by this violation of their sovereignty, but the Colombian government apologized and the official Ecuadorian government reaction was subdued.
It was Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez who loudly and undiplomatically condemned Colombia’s President Uribe calling him a mafia chief, a criminal, and — the most offensive insult Chavez can level — an oligarch. He also called Colombia the Israel of Latin America (such sentiments are de rigueur for Chavistas). Chavez stated that similar attacks in Venezuela would be an act of war, and ordered ten battalions to the Colombian border. After its initially mild reaction, Ecuador followed suit, mobilizing troops and, in like fashion, expelling Colombian diplomats. But if it was Ecuadorian sovereignty that was violated, why is Chavez taking the lead in bashing Colombia?
There are several possibilities:
First, the hard drives captured from the FARC camp are absolute dynamite. So far the documents reveal that the FARC was negotiating with the Ecuadorian government at a very high level, that the FARC had given Chavez $150,000 while he was imprisoned after his 1992 coup attempt, and received $300 million from Chavez in return. And the revelations have only begun; it is likely that over time more will become lucid. Having declared that the FARC is a legitimate army, Chavez may not be concerned about the elucidation of his connections to the FARC. But his ally, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa, having claimed that he was not dealing with the FARC, is now embarrassed. By fomenting a diplomatic crisis, Chavez shifts the heated attention away from his ally.
Second, Chavez is deterring possible Colombian attacks on FARC leaders in Venezuela. It has long been an open secret that the Venezuelan frontier regions were open territory to the FARC. But the level of FARC activity in Venezuela has been increasing and at the same time Chavez has endorsed the FARC more vocally, insisting (contrary to most other countries in the world) that they are not terrorists. In deploying his forces he is sending a message to the Colombians that they must not target FARC in Venezuela.
Third, Chavez is looking for an international crisis to distract the Venezuelans from their domestic crisis. This is the oldest play in the book for dictators the world over. An article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs by the former chief economist for the Venezuelan National Assembly explains that for all of Chavez’s rhetoric about aiding Venezuela’s poor, actual improvements have been minimal. Venezuela’s economy has been booming due to high oil prices, but there has been little trickle down. At the same time many of Chavez’s polices — particularly price controls on staples — have led to the predictable shortages and to popular discontent. From Nasser to Fidel to Sukarno, third world dictators thrive on diplomatic spats and saber rattling.
Fourth: Hugo es loco. There have been many rumors about Hugo’s mental health and some of his recent acts (such as calling for the exhumation of his hero Simon Bolivar’s remains for tests to see if he was assassinated by the oligarchs) are increasingly loopy. It is possible, though not too likely, that Chavez actually wants this fight. Nonetheless, the history books are full of wars that should not have happened. Once an escalation begins, it can be difficult to bring it to an end.
If it comes to shooting, the odds would be on Colombia. The Venezuelan military will probably not show much enthusiasm for this adventure — and might rebel. Hugo’s high-priced weapons platforms take time to integrate, and the more sophisticated the equipment the more training is required. The United States would share satellite and electronic intelligence — just as it has in battling the FARC. In modern warfare the electronic advantage is crucial and for Venezuela will probably be insurmountable. A war would probably result in a catastrophic defeat for Chavez and his fall from power. It would also be an expensive bloody disaster for both Colombia and Venezuela.
Fortunately, it will probably not come to war. The other nations of Latin America are rushing to negotiate a settlement. The United States is wisely staying in the background (open confrontations with Chavez only play to his advantage). But as more intelligence about the FARC emerges from the late Raul Reyes’s hard drive, the nations of Latin America may be forced to make some tough decisions. Ecuador’s President Correa will have to decide if he wants to play Syria to Chavez’s Iran. But more broadly, the nations of Latin America, many of which have suffered from violence linked to the FARC, will have to decide if they can tolerate a state sponsor of terrorism in their midst or if that state should suffer the consequences of supporting terror.
— Aaron Mannes, editor of TheTerrorWonk, researches international security affairs at the University of Maryland’s Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics, and is a Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland.
March 4, 2008
Finding FARC
An important victory for Columbia sparks a major diplomatic spat.
By Aaron Mannes
The Colombian government’s successful killing of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) number-two Raul Reyes is an important victory in Colombia’s 44-year war with the narco-terrorists. Perhaps more significantly, the Colombian government’s ability to target the FARC will be substantially augmented by the computers captured from Reyes’s base. Advantages aside, however, the killing of Reyes and the contents of his hard drives have sparked a major diplomatic spat that has important regional implications.
The attack took place on March 1 about a mile and a half inside of Ecuadorian territory. Ecuador’s government was perturbed by this violation of their sovereignty, but the Colombian government apologized and the official Ecuadorian government reaction was subdued.
It was Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez who loudly and undiplomatically condemned Colombia’s President Uribe calling him a mafia chief, a criminal, and — the most offensive insult Chavez can level — an oligarch. He also called Colombia the Israel of Latin America (such sentiments are de rigueur for Chavistas). Chavez stated that similar attacks in Venezuela would be an act of war, and ordered ten battalions to the Colombian border. After its initially mild reaction, Ecuador followed suit, mobilizing troops and, in like fashion, expelling Colombian diplomats. But if it was Ecuadorian sovereignty that was violated, why is Chavez taking the lead in bashing Colombia?
There are several possibilities:
First, the hard drives captured from the FARC camp are absolute dynamite. So far the documents reveal that the FARC was negotiating with the Ecuadorian government at a very high level, that the FARC had given Chavez $150,000 while he was imprisoned after his 1992 coup attempt, and received $300 million from Chavez in return. And the revelations have only begun; it is likely that over time more will become lucid. Having declared that the FARC is a legitimate army, Chavez may not be concerned about the elucidation of his connections to the FARC. But his ally, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa, having claimed that he was not dealing with the FARC, is now embarrassed. By fomenting a diplomatic crisis, Chavez shifts the heated attention away from his ally.
Second, Chavez is deterring possible Colombian attacks on FARC leaders in Venezuela. It has long been an open secret that the Venezuelan frontier regions were open territory to the FARC. But the level of FARC activity in Venezuela has been increasing and at the same time Chavez has endorsed the FARC more vocally, insisting (contrary to most other countries in the world) that they are not terrorists. In deploying his forces he is sending a message to the Colombians that they must not target FARC in Venezuela.
Third, Chavez is looking for an international crisis to distract the Venezuelans from their domestic crisis. This is the oldest play in the book for dictators the world over. An article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs by the former chief economist for the Venezuelan National Assembly explains that for all of Chavez’s rhetoric about aiding Venezuela’s poor, actual improvements have been minimal. Venezuela’s economy has been booming due to high oil prices, but there has been little trickle down. At the same time many of Chavez’s polices — particularly price controls on staples — have led to the predictable shortages and to popular discontent. From Nasser to Fidel to Sukarno, third world dictators thrive on diplomatic spats and saber rattling.
Fourth: Hugo es loco. There have been many rumors about Hugo’s mental health and some of his recent acts (such as calling for the exhumation of his hero Simon Bolivar’s remains for tests to see if he was assassinated by the oligarchs) are increasingly loopy. It is possible, though not too likely, that Chavez actually wants this fight. Nonetheless, the history books are full of wars that should not have happened. Once an escalation begins, it can be difficult to bring it to an end.
If it comes to shooting, the odds would be on Colombia. The Venezuelan military will probably not show much enthusiasm for this adventure — and might rebel. Hugo’s high-priced weapons platforms take time to integrate, and the more sophisticated the equipment the more training is required. The United States would share satellite and electronic intelligence — just as it has in battling the FARC. In modern warfare the electronic advantage is crucial and for Venezuela will probably be insurmountable. A war would probably result in a catastrophic defeat for Chavez and his fall from power. It would also be an expensive bloody disaster for both Colombia and Venezuela.
Fortunately, it will probably not come to war. The other nations of Latin America are rushing to negotiate a settlement. The United States is wisely staying in the background (open confrontations with Chavez only play to his advantage). But as more intelligence about the FARC emerges from the late Raul Reyes’s hard drive, the nations of Latin America may be forced to make some tough decisions. Ecuador’s President Correa will have to decide if he wants to play Syria to Chavez’s Iran. But more broadly, the nations of Latin America, many of which have suffered from violence linked to the FARC, will have to decide if they can tolerate a state sponsor of terrorism in their midst or if that state should suffer the consequences of supporting terror.
— Aaron Mannes, editor of TheTerrorWonk, researches international security affairs at the University of Maryland’s Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics, and is a Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland.
Sunday, March 2, 2008
Death of Raul Reyes: FARC's Zawahiri
The killing of FARC chief ideologue Raul Reyes will have important implications for the FARC and also for the region.
Reyes, who’s birth name was Luis Edgar Devia Silva, was the FARC’s chief ideologue and voice to the outside world. He was the first member of the FARC secretariat to be killed. The internal affairs of the FARC are opaque, but Reyes was frequently described as the number two in the FARC hierarchy after Manuel Marulanda, who is in his late 70s and is rumored to be ill. In the FARC’s hierarchy he is roughly equivalent to al-Qaeda number two Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The loss of Reyes to the FARC is important in and of itself, but it is one in a series of reverses that indicate the organization may be in serious decline. According to the State Department’s 2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report the FARC has lost a number of important leaders in the past year.
FARC’s Future
Despite its decline, knockout blows against the FARC are not likely. The organization still has thousands of fighters under arms, a steady revenue stream (from narcotics, kidnapping, and other criminal activity), international links to other terrorist groups and criminals, and – in Hugo Chavez – a supporter willing to provide a safe haven across the border as well as rhetorical support. A major FARC revenge attack is well within the realm of possibility.
It is possible that Reyes killing could lead to internal power struggles, but it should be emphasized that there do not appear to be any moderates in the FARC’s upper echelons. The divide might be between the ideologues and the drug dealers. One very real concern would be that as it fractures FARC factions may turn from its rural insurgency to major terror attacks – both within Colombia and without. If any terrorist group had the capacity to go international it would be the FARC, with its extensive international links.
It is also difficult to predict what Reyes’ killing will mean for the long-suffering hostages held by the FARC. Reyes was the key negotiator and without him future transfers may be difficult to arrange. On the other hand, the hostage issue is central to the FARC. They appear to be releasing them in tiny drabs in the hope of negotiating for a de-militarized zone in Colombia. Such a zone would be crucial for the organization to train and re-energize the organization.
International Implications
Colombia helicopters killed Reyes just inside of Ecuador. It is worth noting the Simon Trinidad, the highest-ranking member of the FARC captured, was arrested in Ecuador in 2004. Colombia’s President insists that he informed the President of Ecuador. But Ecuador is calling for a “clarification,” calling the attack an “aggression on our territory.”
Naturally, Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez bristled, stating that any Colombian actions that crossed the border with Venezuela would be an act of war. He also called Colombia the Israel of South America. Chavez’s bluster is also a de-facto admission that he is permitting the FARC to operate in Venezuelan territory. States that support terrorism are subject to severe sanctions from the United States and the international community.
Finally, this is a victory for the people of Colombia, but there was a U.S. hand in it. American intelligence support has been crucial in penetrating the FARC’s communications networks. A recent US indictment claims that the Drug Enforcement Agency infiltrated compromised satellite phones into the FARC.
The killing of Reyes is an important step forward, but unfortunately for the long-suffering people of Colombia, the FARC cannot be counted out – yet.
Reyes, who’s birth name was Luis Edgar Devia Silva, was the FARC’s chief ideologue and voice to the outside world. He was the first member of the FARC secretariat to be killed. The internal affairs of the FARC are opaque, but Reyes was frequently described as the number two in the FARC hierarchy after Manuel Marulanda, who is in his late 70s and is rumored to be ill. In the FARC’s hierarchy he is roughly equivalent to al-Qaeda number two Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The loss of Reyes to the FARC is important in and of itself, but it is one in a series of reverses that indicate the organization may be in serious decline. According to the State Department’s 2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report the FARC has lost a number of important leaders in the past year.
The GOC achieved significant success against the FARC leadership in 2007. Over a dozen mid-to-high level FARC commanders were killed or apprehended, including FARC 37th Front leader Gustavo Rueda Díaz, alias ‘Martin Caballero,’ 42nd Front leader Ernesto Orjuela Tovar, alias ‘Giovanni Rodriguez,’ and 16th Front leader, Tomas Molina Caracas, alias ‘Negro Acacio.’ Molina Caracas was considered a Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) by the USG and was one of 50 FARC commanders indicted in the U.S. in March 2006 for allegedly running the country’s largest cocaine smuggling organization.In addition, the rank and file is also suffering from attrition – reportedly 2800 FARC cadres deserted the FARC in 2007. While that number may have been exaggerated, there have been many desertions and it is clear that the rank and file are losing their ideological fervor. (Last year the diaries of a disgruntled FARCette were discovered and shed some light on the sordid daily reality of life in the FARC.)
FARC’s Future
Despite its decline, knockout blows against the FARC are not likely. The organization still has thousands of fighters under arms, a steady revenue stream (from narcotics, kidnapping, and other criminal activity), international links to other terrorist groups and criminals, and – in Hugo Chavez – a supporter willing to provide a safe haven across the border as well as rhetorical support. A major FARC revenge attack is well within the realm of possibility.
It is possible that Reyes killing could lead to internal power struggles, but it should be emphasized that there do not appear to be any moderates in the FARC’s upper echelons. The divide might be between the ideologues and the drug dealers. One very real concern would be that as it fractures FARC factions may turn from its rural insurgency to major terror attacks – both within Colombia and without. If any terrorist group had the capacity to go international it would be the FARC, with its extensive international links.
It is also difficult to predict what Reyes’ killing will mean for the long-suffering hostages held by the FARC. Reyes was the key negotiator and without him future transfers may be difficult to arrange. On the other hand, the hostage issue is central to the FARC. They appear to be releasing them in tiny drabs in the hope of negotiating for a de-militarized zone in Colombia. Such a zone would be crucial for the organization to train and re-energize the organization.
International Implications
Colombia helicopters killed Reyes just inside of Ecuador. It is worth noting the Simon Trinidad, the highest-ranking member of the FARC captured, was arrested in Ecuador in 2004. Colombia’s President insists that he informed the President of Ecuador. But Ecuador is calling for a “clarification,” calling the attack an “aggression on our territory.”
Naturally, Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez bristled, stating that any Colombian actions that crossed the border with Venezuela would be an act of war. He also called Colombia the Israel of South America. Chavez’s bluster is also a de-facto admission that he is permitting the FARC to operate in Venezuelan territory. States that support terrorism are subject to severe sanctions from the United States and the international community.
Finally, this is a victory for the people of Colombia, but there was a U.S. hand in it. American intelligence support has been crucial in penetrating the FARC’s communications networks. A recent US indictment claims that the Drug Enforcement Agency infiltrated compromised satellite phones into the FARC.
The killing of Reyes is an important step forward, but unfortunately for the long-suffering people of Colombia, the FARC cannot be counted out – yet.
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