Conflict & Computer Science

Conflict has often been a driver for technological advances and computer science has been no exception. The requirements of code breaking during World War II led to the construction of Colossus – the first totally electronic computer device, while the Internet was originally constructed to provide a secure communications network for the military in the event of a nuclear war. While terrorist use of technology, and particularly the Internet, receives tremendous press, the current conflict is also sparking important developments in computer science that will have impacts far beyond the security realm.

My employer, the Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics (LCCD) at the University of Maryland is one group seeking to develop the theory and algorithms required for tools to support decision-making in cultural contexts. LCCD has developed numerous systems including T-Rex, which can rapidly scan text in several languages and convert it into a database and SOMA (Stochastic Opponent Modeling Agents) which can extract rules of likely behaviors by organizations from their past behaviors.

LCCD sponsors an annual conference, the International Conference on Computational Cultural Dynamics (ICCCD2009) – to be held this year on December 7-8 at the University of Maryland. Papers being presented include efforts to model insurgencies as well as piracy in Somalia, a tool used to map the Indonesian blogosphere, and SCARE (Spatial Cultural Abduction Reasoning Engine) which can help predict the locations of weapons caches in an urban environment. (See the full program here.)

Augmenting the Mind
The human brain is an impressive system, which also builds models. In some regards it far exceeds anything on the horizon in the realm of computer science. The ability of human beings to take information and place it in context and draw conclusions from it is profound. We build complex models of how the world works in order to function in it. But computers can process some forms of data far faster than humans and will do so systematically. Human minds cannot quickly process large quantities of data. In attempting to make sense of large amounts of information a human beings may discount or ignore information that does not fit in their model of how the world works – or alternately draw significant conclusions based on a very limited amount of data. Imagine an economist ignoring issues of ethnic identity in analyzing a nation’s policies or a political philosopher focusing on ideology while ignoring logistics in studying a terrorist group’s behavior. In short, computer systems are capable of substantially augmenting the power of human reason.

Things to Come
The impacts of these technologies will be profound. Real-time data collection and processing will potentially improve decision-making in many ways. Beyond providing better intelligence, it will allow the creation of in-depth virtual environments, which facilitate training to operate in different cultures. The Marines and Army have built mock Afghan and Iraqi villages staffed by actors for this kind of training. These are terrific facilities, but a computer simulation could inexpensively augment the real world training.

According to the late Alexander George, a renowned scholar of the presidency, many foreign policy accidents have occurred because leaders were unable to see the situation from the perspective of their counterpart. Leaders make assumptions about their opposite number and his (or her) actions based on an intuited model of their behavior. Models not operating on limiting assumptions may provide alternate explanations for behaviors and thereby give leaders the insight to avoid escalating conflicts that arose from misunderstandings.

But these systems will also have civilian applications. Game theory systems used to predict the behavior of adversaries may also be used to understand the behavior of business competitors. Tools that can analyze the opinions expressed on jihadi websites could also be used to analyze public opinion for marketing research. Models that identify the outbreak of terrorism and insurgency may also be turned to studying the outbreak of disease.

But this focuses on applications designed for policy-makers – and no doubt there will be many such tools. But only twenty years ago, very few people imagined a ubiquitous, international system that facilitated instantaneous communications and put vast amounts of information virtually at every user’s fingertips. Models and game theory will not remain in the realm of executives and professional analysts. They will also become everyday tools used by regular people to better plan their activities and make decisions about their lives.

In this vein, ICCCD2009 could prove to be a fascinating glimpse into the future.

Bureaucracy, Culture & Ft. Hood Attacks

Bureaucracy, Culture & Ft. Hood Attacks

The Fort Hood attack was an intelligence failure, just like 9/11 and so many others before. In retrospect, it all seems obvious – these kinds of failures always do. It is easy to blame bureaucratic inertia, but it is also unfair. Large organizations need procedures to function. Priorities must be set and decisions have to be made and implemented.

Examining the system failure is revealing, both about the challenges in preventing these kinds of tragedies but also in how they reveal some of our society’s core values.

Army: Major Problems
It is now clear that Major Hasan’s colleagues were concerned about his actions and behavior. But there were limits to what they could do about. Firing an Army Major is a very big deal. It is now clear that Hasan’s colleagues had doubts about his commitment to the military and about his work habits. But, informally, they judged that he was not dangerous. Consider the situation from their point of view. First, Hasan was a psychiatrist – it is understandable that Hasan’s colleagues would assume that an individual practicing a profession rooted caring, healing, and empathy would not be likely to become a murderer (Hannibal Lector is a fictional character.) But also consider the bureaucratic challenges. Hasan’s relatives reported that when Hasan made informal inquiries about leaving the Army:

They told him that he would be allowed out only if Rumsfeld himself O.K.’d it.

.This may be a slight exaggeration, but removing Hasan would certainly have required authorization from people several levels higher in the chain of command – and the bases for doing so were not evident. What was clear was that Hasan was odd and said disturbing things and that he did not appear devoted to the job and the Army. Virtually every bureaucracy ends up with at least a few such characters. Usually they are slowly eased out. To fire them, without clear evidence of criminal activity, is much harder. It would have taken enormous amounts of time and since Hassan was a Major, General officers would need to have been involved. There were obvious incentives for easing Hasan out, rather than attempting to dismiss him.

No doubt, Hasan’s colleagues are no wishing that they had pursued this process nonetheless and in the future officers faced with comparable situations undoubtedly will do whatever is necessary to remove individuals. But the organizational procedures that make it difficult to remove officers exist to protect them from the arbitrary whims of their superiors. This reflects our cultural belief in meritocracy over patronage and it is a value that has served us well.

FBI: By the Book
Hasan had also garnered the attention of the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF.) Here too, necessary organizational procedures failed to make the crucial connection. The FBI has to prioritize threats – the agency lacks the resources to track down every rumor and case of idle chatter (and an agency capable and mandated to do so would end up resembling STASI or the KGB.) This article from NPR’s All Things Considered gives some insight into the FBI’s criteria – the essence is “The closer the link to al-Qaida, the more serious the plot.” There are three levels, the people directly linked to al-Qaida (travel to Pakistan for training followed up by regular communications is seen as a big red flag.) The second level threats are plots linked to al-Qaida affiliates. The third level threats are the “angry young men” that are often radicalized on the Internet. Hasan would have been a “level three” except that he was a bit older then the usual recruits and his exchanges with radical cleric Anwar al-Aulaqi did not appear to be terribly angry. The FBI determined that he was not a threat.

The fact that the JTTF became aware of Hassan’s email exchange indicates what an enormous volume of material they are required to analyze. Priorities have to be set. Had the analysts gone one step further and spoken to Hasan’s colleagues there is a chance that the dots would have been connected. But the JTTF’s judgment was not an irrational one. Future instances of military personnel corresponding with radical Islamists will undoubtedly be bright red flags in the future. Organizations (like Generals) always prepare for the last crisis. Just as a 9/11-type plot will probably not be successful in the future, it is probable that the appropriate agencies will be able to head off tragedies like the Fort Hood murders in the future.

The question of what is next remains.

Lashkar-e-Taiba - Pakistan's Hezbollah

One group absent from the concoction of Punjabi groups joining the Pashtun Taliban rebellion is Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). Although it recruits from the same general area, the other groups are Deobandi (Pakistan’s homegrown Islamic extremists) whereas LeT is Dar Ahl Hadith, which is basically the Pakistani-offshoot of the Saudi Wahabis. The theological divisions are not enormous and there are links. But LeT appears to be more careful and disciplined in its strategic thinking. It has not been involved in significant violence within Pakistan and has not taken on the Pakistani government. It also appears to have independent funding sources (initial stake money was apparently from Saudi Arabia, but it has since developed its own fund-raising networks.) While there are far fewer Ahl Hadith adherents in Pakistan then Deobandis (or Barelvis or Shia), LeT itself is one of the larger groups – the ISI reports they have 150,000 members. LeT runs schools, hospitals, and other social services along with an extensive print media empire. In short, it is a Hezbollah-like organization with multiple facets, the ability to innovate tactically, and choose its operations strategically (like the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai.)

Saeed Stands Alone
This is important background to the recent Pakistani court decision to dismiss incitement charges against LeT leader Hafiz Mohammed Saeed. B. Raman has a fine analysis here. A few additional points are in order. Westerners love the independent Pakistani judiciary when it is “democratic” but not when it is actually doing its job under the law. The real issue is the way in which Saeed was prosecuted. The charges were incitement – these are loser charges that only make Saeed more popular. Incitement against India is in theory illegal – but is also admired by many in Pakistan.

Saeed is officially head of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which officially has nothing to do with LeT (see previous post.) One imagines evidence could be produced to prove this lack of connection false – but the Pakistani government does not seem interested in producing it. At this point, Pakistan cannot afford to open up a second front against the LeT – not with serious shooting in Wazirstan and the likelihood that operations in the Punjabi heartland will be necessary. The Pakistani army faces several challenges, first every unit deployed is a unit not facing India (the military’s core obsession), second the military is not designed for counter-insurgency operations, third much of the Pakistani army is Punjabi so operations there are fraught with potential morale problems.

It is unknown if the Pakistani high command views LeT as an asset or a problem, but given all of their immediate problems and the LeT’s scrupulous avoidance of taking on the Pakistani government it is easy to see why Pakistani leaders would avoid this particular fight.

They will not be able to avoid it forever.

Pakistan's Jihadi Stew

The aftermath of the attack on the Pakistani military’s GHQ earlier this week has brought attention to the complex stew of jihadi groups running around the Punjab. Imtiaz Gul provides an overview at Foreign Policy while the venerable B. Raman provides another at Outlook India. The story starts with the Saudis supporting anti-Shia groups in Pakistan to counter Iranian-backed Shia militancy. This was exacerbated by local animosities in regions were Pakistan’s Shia minority were wealthy landowners. The main anti-Shia group was Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). Reportedly it received substantial state support under General Zia who wanted to counter his political rivals. SSP became involved in politics and spun-off violent groups, most notably Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in 1996. Supposedly there is no connection between the political SSP and the terrorist LeJ. This is an organizational maneuver that has been repeated endlessly in the Pakistani jihadi milieu. Supposedly, both of these groups have been banned – but banned groups in Pakistan never seem to disappear, they just change their names.

The anti-Shia groups also worked with the Pakistani government during the Afghan war, where they forged links with the Arab jihadis and the Afghans. When Pakistan began supporting jihadi groups to fight in Kashmir the anti-Shia groups were an entryway. An effective unraveling of the Kashmiri groups is an enormous task – a small piece of the picture can be seen here. Individuals often move between groups – either because the group is shifting identity because of too much international attention or just for better “career opportunities.” Jaish-e-Mohammed was founded after Harkat ul-Ansar official Maulana Masood Azhar was freed from Indian prison and found that he was a popular figure. So rather then rejoin his old outfit, now renamed Harkat ul-Mujahideen (after Harkat ul-Ansar became a banned terrorist organization) Azhar founded JeM. Azhar was a model jihadi entrepreneur, with the venture capital provided (reportedly) by the ISI.

Man vs. Mosquito: The Ultimate Insurgent

The past week I celebrated the Jewish holiday Sukkot. During this holiday, observant Jews “dwell” in their sukkah – a temporary structure. This “dwelling,” depending on climate and inclination can vary from formally living in it to merely taking some meals in the sukkah. Personally I like to spend as much time in it as possible. One side effect is that our back door is open a lot and mosquitos get in our house. My wife does not like mosquitos (but they love her), so I sat up one night and tried to hunt down the ones that got into our house. Not easy. Fast and hard to spot, my most effective anti-mosquito tactic was to sit very still and let them get a taste of my arm. A draining, tedious strategy, and in the process I got bored and had a few beers which only reduced my effectiveness. If I had had to deal with more than a handful I would have had to turn to chemical warfare.

The experience brought to mind the classic line from Robert Taber’s 1965 classic on counter-insurgency, The War of the Flea: Guerilla Warfare in Theory and Practice

Analogically, the guerilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog’s disadvantages: too much to defend;too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough - this is the theory – the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on which to close its jaws or rake with its claws.

It was a humbling experience. I guess the one difference is that insurgents can be deterred and co-opted. Mosquitos are remorseless blood-sucking machines.

Quetta Front & the Baluchi Factor

As fighting in Afghanistan, particularly the south, intensifies U.S. policy-makers are beginning to shift their gaze to Afghanistan’s southern border with Pakistan and wondering if the northern regions of Baluchistan are – like the FATA on Afghanistan’s eastern border – serving as a Taliban haven. U.S. officials have even claimed that Taliban head Mullah Omar and his top leaders are living in Baluchistan’s capital Quetta.

This has, unsurprisingly, set off a spasm of denials in Pakistan along with the immediate conclusion in Pakistan that the U.S. was planning drone attacks in Quetta. Not helpful, in the context of American attempts to attach conditions to aid in the Kerry-Lugar bill.

Old News
Two points about this “new” front. First, Quetta should have been on the radar screen from the beginning – back in May 2003 The New York Times reported on Taliban gathering in Quetta. The reporter Carlotta Gall and her Pakistani photographer Akhtar Soomro were beaten up by Pakistani intelligence agents for their trouble.

Pakistan’s Other Insurgency
The second point is that most of the articles speculating about the Taliban leadership residing in Quetta ignore the ongoing Baluchi insurgency in the province. This is not an irrelevant point. The northern part of Baluchistan is dominated by Pashtuns the tribe that spreads across much of Afghanistan and into the NWFP and FATA. Quetta, the provincial capital, is primarily Pashtun but close to the Baluchi/Pashtun fault-line. The Baluchis have never particularly wanted to be a part of Pakistan. This interview with an underground Baluchi rebel leader gives some background as to the depth of Baluchi resentment against the “Punjabis” and the way their activities in Baluchistan are perceived. This article by a Pakistani journalist expands on these themes, arguing that Islamabad has systematically sought to exploit Baluchistan’s resources while not building physical or social infrastructure in the province that benefits its people. Most interesting, he argues that Islamabad sought to play the Pashtuns against the Baluchis and encouraged Islamist Pashtun groups as a bulwark against Baluchi seperatists.

As discussed on this blog before, Pakistan is rife with ethnic cleavages which complicate its counter-terror and development. The Pakistani army turned against the tribal Pashtuns when they became a clear threat to the state – coming down from their mountain strongholds and into the “settled regions.” But the Baluchistan Pashtuns may still be viewed as an asset, balancing the Baluchi separatists and providing a needed line into the Taliban and Afghanistan should (as many Pakistani strategists expect) the U.S. quit the region.

Books could be written about this – there are no pat policy solutions. But if the U.S. hopes to work with Pakistan to clamp down on this southern haven and generally build a stronger and more stable Pakistan, it will need to consider the Baluchi factor and its impact on Pakistani thinking.

Safe for Now - Assessing Recent Terror Plots

Within the past week law enforcement has revealed the disruption of three separate terrorist plots against the United States. These actions highlight the continuing threat to the continental United States, but also the barriers discussed here before to conducting successful terrorist attacks within the United States.

Two of the plots were self-starters; individuals who became motivated to commit acts of violence and in their efforts to find allies inadvertently attracted the attention of law enforcement agencies. One had traveled to Pakistan where he may have received some training. All of them highlight the difficulties of carrying out a terrorist attack.

The two self-starters, in Texas and Illinois were both lured into law enforcement‘s clutches by promises of access to explosives. Weapons are frequently the lure that government informants use against suspected terrorists. This has also worked on the Fort Dix Six and against cells of right-wing domestic radicals in the past.

The case of Najibullah Zazi is a bit different. He had the wit to attempt to produce his own explosives, but that raises problems of a different sort. It appears that the process of acquiring the supplies and preparing the explosives left an extensive trail for law enforcement to follow. It is also appears that some intelligence agencies were interested in his activities beforehand, probably due to his travels to Pakistan, as his cel-phone was tapped.

These plots reinforce the reality that terrorist desire to strike the United States remains strong, but that their capabilities have been reduced. The abilities to move, communicate, and to acquire the skills and equipment needed to carryout terror attacks are limited and efforts to do so frequently tip-off law enforcement.

Tools to address the desire end of the equation still need to be developed. Nor can the current apparent limits on terrorist capabilities be taken for granted. These threats have been neutralized due to diligent efforts by American intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Terrorists can continue to turn to other countries with less capable security forces. There may be flaws in the U.S. security net that can exploited. Terrorists may “shorten their punch” by developing a lower-cost weapon of mass murder then previously deployed. None of these possibilities can be ignored.

Organizational Dynamics
In addition, it is possible (even probable) that baring successful attacks security agency emphasis on the problem will decline. In the classic case study, Essence of Decision, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow explain how before the Challenger accident NASA officials had, based on previous shuttle launches modified the bases on which they made their decisions – ultimately following routine procedures in an unprecedented situation. But it should be emphasized that the routine procedures had served NASA well prior to the Challenger tragedy.

The same could happen on the counter-terror front. One hint of this potential is that the NYPD and the FBI seemed to have had crossed wires in the investigation (NYPD counter-terror officials have been reassigned.) The United States has innumerable law enforcement and intelligence agencies at the federal, state, and local level. The boundaries between their activities are not always clear. As memories of 9/11 fade the possibility of an incident slipping between these seams could increase – it is in the nature of large organizations with competing priorities.

Terrorists have been known to read indictments in terrorism cases for intelligence about what their enemies know about them. They can also consider how to take advantage of agency routines. The terrorist enemy is currently weak, but constantly adapting.