In Politico's Arena on the Romney Machine

Politico’s Arena asked:

Mitt Romney has won the Illinois primary by a considerable margin, the Associated Press projects. Does this win make the path to the Republican nomination any clearer? And does it provide a more obvious signal for either Rick Santorum or Newt Gingrich to exit the race?

I answered

The delegate math has long been in Romney's favor and the Illinois victory shrinks the possibilities for the other candidates from very difficult to nearly impossible.
Santorum has an interesting challenge. He has proved an able campaigner, if a polarizing figure. The Republican party traditionally nominates the runner-up from the previous contest (the next guy in line). Does Santorum seek to to set himself up for 2016 (Gingrich will be 73 then, making a serious run unlikely)? If so, Santorum needs to show his strengths as a campaigner, but not to hang on so long that he damages GOP prospects in the fall.

A few follow-up points – Santorum is only in his mid-fifties. He can wait till 2016, playing the game Romney played by lining up party elders and building his credentials where he is weak and burnishing his image. His problem is if Romney wins, then he must wait at least eight years (maybe longer if Romney chooses an able vice president and natural successor.) While anything is possible – as Santorum’s performance in the Republican primaries and emergence as a major candidate demonstrates – it is tough to see how ex-Senator Santorum can remain in the public eye for almost a decade.

This raises another interesting question that is close to my heart – could Santorum be the VP? (It is never to early to start speculating.) Santorum would provide Romney ideological balance, but not geographic balance (although Pennsylvania is an important swing state.) Santorum also had DC experience. Although Romney is running as a technocrat, he has not actually held a DC office. Technocrat types do not have terrific records as President (Carter and Hoover come to mind – although Customs House director Chester Allen Arthur proved to be surprisingly capable.) Romney, with his MBA background would want a capable VP to advise him on the ways of Washington. However, Santorum is not exactly a grand old man of the Senate like Biden, so Romney might seek a deeper resume.

Of course the most important factor is could Santorum help Romney win the election? This is an open question. Santorum has proved to be a compelling campaigner who speaks eloquently on a number of issues. Santorum would also shore up the base. But on the other side of the ledger, the base despises Obama and would go for Romney regardless. And Santorum turns off lots of moderate voters. Romney will have to do a very hard careful calculation of costs and benefits. This kind of analysis is an area where Romney excels.

Forgetting the Persian BM

Responding to my last post about Iranian options for responding to an Israeli strike, a friend observed that I neglected to discuss Iran's increasingly sophisticated ballistic missile capability. Iran has at least dozens and possibly hundreds of medium-range ballistic missiles that could reach Israel. Even with conventional explosives, this is a serious concern, especially if they struck Tel-Aviv and other Israeli populations centers. Saddam's missile strikes on Israel in the first Gulf War were primarily a fizzle. But the knowledgeable observers believe that Iran's program is far more advanced and at least some in the Israeli defense establishment are worried.

Of course, unleashing large numbers of deadly accurate ballistic missiles would do little to inspire international confidence that Iran is completely. After an Israeli strike, Iran would reap international sympathy, particularly among many general publics around the world. Governments would feel differently. These governments may not like Israel much, but they would respect that Israel's action was based on sober intelligence estimates. If Iran demonstrated a sophisticated ballistic missile capability, many governments at around the world would become very concerned about Iran's intentions. Missiles that can reach Israel can reach Europe as well.

Iran has a credible response that does not depend on proxies, but using it might have serious consequences. Of course Iran's leadership may feel the need to respond due to its own domestic pressures, and Israel would have to prepare for that – although it remains unclear if the Israelis are seriously preparing to strike or if talk of a strike is simply a ploy to keep international pressure on Iran.

Options
Ultimately, political decisions are difficult ones in which leaders have to make determinations about which option is least bad. A nuclear Iran is a very bad outcome, but the options to prevent it are, to say the least, imperfect.

Regime change would be nice, but it is not immediately practical. Overthrowing governments is not easy (and an actual invasion would probably be beyond American capabilities) that the US was successful at it in Iran half a century ago, does not mean that it can happen (particularly with an Iranian leadership and populace aware and deeply paranoid of the possibility). Even if it were possible, revolutions take on a life of their own. There are plenty of Westernized advocates for democracy in Iran. These figures communicate easily with Westerners, but when the revolution comes the situation can be remarkably fluid and it is difficult to know what sentiments will prevail. We have seen this as Egypt unfolds. The liberal Facebook youth seemed to be the harbingers of a new Egypt, but the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis quickly emerged as the real powers on the street.

While there is much to recommend the Solidarity approach (and it is unfortunate that the US has quibbled about supporting Iranian democratizers for the past decade and a half) it is not clear that it can come before Iran acquires a nuclear capability. Further, fear of being overthrown may lead the Iranian leadership to accelerate its efforts to acquire WMD as insurance.

An Israeli strike has some limitations as a policy option. The Israel Air Force would be working at its maximum effective range and may only inflict limited damage. This would delay Iran's program - possibly buying time for other policies to take effect, but would not stop it. Further, it might garner sympathy for Iran and reduce the willingness of the international community to pursue sanctions.

The US could bring far more devastating capabilities to the fore. There are many, many targets but the US has the resources to carry out a sustained campaign, rather than a one-off strike. This could seriously delay the Iranian program (and also hit their ballistic missile program). This would not come without significant costs. The US would use bases in the Gulf and Central Asia, the host countries would be targets to Iranian responses (which could lead them to refuse permission.) Even long-range US based aircraft would need to use air corridors from countries that would be concerned about Iranian retaliation. Plus the United States would be embroiled in yet another war in the Middle East, which would anger people worldwide and complicate American initiatives.

In terms of practically stalling Iran's program this option offers tremendous advantages. Unfortunately it comes at very high costs, and it may fail. If, after the strikes the Iranians maintain a substantial nuclear capacity, they will pursue acquiring a nuclear weapon with an absolute single-mindedness.

Another option is the status quo, this is not without it's advantages. In fact, I've argued (among others) that the primary purpose of Israeli threats is to maintain the status quo in which significant sanctions are harming Iran's economy. In addition, there is a reasonably effective covert campaign against the Iranian program. It is possible that the public aspects (which include cyber-attacks and assassinations) are only the tip of the iceberg. Iranian nuclear capability has been an issue for over twenty years and they have still not built a bomb, if the status quo buys more time at a relatively low-cost it is an effective policy.

But time for what? Are we waiting for the regime to fall or for the sanctions to bite hard enough that the regime is desperate for an agreement?

Finally that leaves negotiations as a possibility. Besides in incredible difficulty in actually carrying them out (an issue I’ll have to leave to experts) it requires the core unpleasant choice. The Iranian regime will demand security guarantees that effectively remove the regime change option. So Tehran may not get the bomb, but the lifting of sanctions will mean the mullahcracy is firmly in place. This may be preferable to an Iranian bomb – but it is not a good outcome.

There is the possibility that in the two-level hall of mirrors that would be US-Iranian negotiations - serious talks with the West would spiral back into Iranian politics in such a way that would empower reformers and any student of history knows that regimes are at their most vulnerable when they try to reform. This could create some interesting possibilities but it will require excellent timing and adroit diplomacy.

With the Soviet Union, the US managed negotiations will also pressing on human rights issues that ultimately undermined the regime. But the mullahs are no fools, they will do whatever they can to take that card out of US hands – in effect their bomb capability is an ace in this poker game from hell.

Can the Persian Empire Strike Back?

One ongoing concern about a military strike on Iran is the prospect of revenge attacks. This may be overblown. There are several possible mechanisms for an Iranian revenge strike, international terror attacks, attacks through Hezbollah directly on Israel, and attacks in the Persian Gulf. The first two may not be as serious a danger as previously thought, although trouble in the Persian Gulf (where Iran is a major presence and can sow discord in several nearby countries) is not something to take lightly.

As I’ve written elsewhere, Hezbollah has been increasingly careful about picking fights with Israel. War with Israel is not popular in Lebanon (the people are tired of being bombed and Hezbollah does seem to take general public sentiment into account – and Hezbollah’s public reputation in Lebanon has suffered multiple blows.) Finally, despite the perception of a Hezbollah victory – Hezbollah was hit hard in the 2006 and can be certain the IDF has been prepping for another round. Exacerbating Hezbollah’s concerns is the turmoil in Syria. Hezbollah has superior arms to the other factions in Lebanon – but an untimely Hezbollah action could open up a new round of sectarian violence in Lebanon, which would quickly tie into fighting in neighboring Syria. Hezbollah has a lot of incentives to hold its fire. (On that front, it is worth noting that Hamas has already opted out of an Iranian-Israeli war.)

Hezbollah and Iran have been responsible in the past for numerous terror attacks worldwide. But the last really devastating Iranian strike abroad was Khobar in 1996. Intelligence agencies worldwide have been carefully monitoring Hezbollah and IRGC operations, and effectively neutralized, but not eliminated, this capability. The relatively small revenge (and unsuccessful) strikes in Georgia, Bangkok, Azerbaijan, and India would seem to be indicative of this. Attacks that get close, without being successful still require substantial operational capability, so writing off Hezbollah-IRGC operational capabilities is pre-mature. But then what was this? Were they a shot across the bow to warn the West that they were back in the international terror business? If so, was it an attempt to “puff up” and appear more capable then they actually are? No doubt the recent operations will reveal intelligence that can then be applied to foiling future operations. The relatively small scale of the operations is also telling: the larger the operation, the more moving parts and thus the greater the likelihood of detection and disruption by Western intelligence. While Iran may be able to carry out tiny attacks, repeats of the terrible bombings in Argentina appears less likely.

Strikes in the Persian Gulf could be serious. Iran has been building its networks with the region’s Shia communities. But, against an Israeli strike these networks would be irrelevant (avenging an Israeli strike by fomenting trouble in Bahrain makes little sense.) Further, the Persian Gulf states have capable security forces and their own levers for stirring up things within Iran.

Historical Perspectives on the Iranian Threat
It is just past Purim, a Jewish holiday that remembers a near disaster in ancient Persia in which a gullible king was led by his wicked vizier to plot to murder the Jews. Through a deft combination of beauty and brains, the vizier, Haman was out-maneuvered and hung from the gallows he had constructed. It is a strange holiday, celebrated with drink (not a typical Jewish motif), but well worth considering as Israel, the United States, and the world debate what to do about Iran and its nuclear program.

It seems worth noting that the victory in Purim was not won by force of arms, but by intelligence. The dangers of an Iranian nuclear weapon should go without saying. Iranian leaders have shown a disturbing tendency to make policy based on eschatology, it would empower Iran to pursue subversive behaviors, and finally it could trigger a Middle Eastern arms race that (even if all the players are careful rational actors – an awfully big if) increases the likelihood of a miscalculation or accident that could lead to a massive tragedy.

However, military options are not a silver bullet. The facilities are buried deep underground and may not be vulnerable. At the same time, the covert campaign has had some significant successes. A bombing campaign against Iran may not stop the program but will almost certainly spike oil prices – which makes a whole lot of people around the world much poorer very quickly.

This is not to say that bombing should be off the table – an Iranian nuke is intolerable, only considered carefully.

Debating the Merits of Analogical Reasoning and CT Ops

I am a big fan of Daniel Drezner and really enjoy his blog. But, just for fun (and because I am bereft of ideas for my own blogging and possibly because I am jealous of people that blog proficiently and write serious academic stuff), I am going to take issue with something he wrote a week ago.

Drezner criticizes the administration’s decision-making over a targeting al-Qaeda operative Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan who was wanted for his role in the 1998 bombing of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and other attacks, along with serving as a link between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab. The options, in order of least to most risky were an offshore strike by Tomahawk missile, a strike by attack helicopters, or a “snatch and grab” by Special Forces. The final option, while risky would have the huge pay-off of possibly bringing in a high-level al-Qaeda operative who would be a source of intelligence. However, the memory of “Black Hawk Down” weighed heavily on the decision-makers and State’s counter-terror coordinator said, “Somalia, helicopters, capture. I just don’t like the sound of this.”

Drezner writes:

Here's the thing though -- as analogies go, this one seems somewhat ill-suited. The most obvious difference was that this raid wasn't going to take place in a city but a remote desert road. It was extremely difficult and bloody for U.S. forces to battle their adversaries in the urban anarchy of Mogadishu. In the open, with no civilians to use as shields, I would think JSOC has the advantage. Even if the snatch-and-grab option was the riskiest option, it does not seem as risky as U.S. efforts to rescue the downed Black Hawk crew back in 1993. In this instance, the worst-case scenario would have been some JSOC soldiers killed -- but given the terrain, the lack of civilians and cover, and the likely firepower advantage held by the Americans, a Black Hawk Down II outcome sounds unlikely.

Despite these differences, analogical reasoning triumphed. The mission succeeded in taking out Nabhan, but it sounds like the slightly riskier option would have yielded greater rewards.

I am interested decision-making. The reality is that rarely are options carefully weighed for each issue, often decisions are made with all kinds of injudiciously included inputs. Basically, every time force is used, is a roll of the dice. Special Operations have lots of moving parts and lots of opportunities for things to go wrong. Undoubtedly, US Special Forces do everything they can reduce those risks, but there are always unknowns. The question is, when does the President choose to roll the dice?

To get OBL – roll the dice! But for a lower-level target, consider carefully if the risks are worth it. Finally, consider the overall context – in this Somalia. It isn’t that the situation is the same as 1993, but that if something does go wrong it could resonate both domestically and internationally – a shot in the arm to the bad guys. A similar operation in Afghanistan, for example, where US forces are constantly involved in an ongoing campaign might not resonate the same way.

This doesn’t detract from Drezner’s argument, but perhaps the flawed analogy still served a purpose in high-lighting bigger picture risks.

U.S. Government Counterterrorism: A Guide to Who Does What

Yesterday I attended a book discussion at the Woodrow Wilson Center on U.S. Government Counterterrorism: A Guide to Who Does What, co-authored by Amb. Edward Marks and my old CTBlog colleague Michael Kraft.

To this TerrorWonk, who is obsessed with how organizations work (among many other things) this event was a real treat. The authors attempted to provide an overview of the different counter-terror functions of the U.S. government. This is not an easy task, and while their volume will be useful they readily admitted that this work is only the tip of the iceberg. One of the important challenges is understanding that lots of the government’s counter-terror capabilities are dual-use.

There are offices that are strictly devoted to counter-terror missions (such as the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism. But there are many more offices that serve counter-terror functions while also serving other functions as well. The Treasury offices that enforce financial sanctions are very important for counter-terror also place sanctions on criminals and other malefactors. Special Forces have a major counter-terror mission, but the perform multiple other functions as well. The FBI is a leading domestic counter-terror agency, but it also fights regular crime (of which, unfortunately, there is no shortage.) Finally there are many more agencies that have a smaller counter-terror component. The NIH and first responder agencies are good examples, in that in the event of a terror attack they would have a role to play – but for the most part they have very different missions. Natural disasters and disease outbreaks are far more common then terror attacks. Of course, it is a natural law of bureaucracies to move to where the money is and when terrorism is a hot issue, agencies discover their relevance to it.

The 9/11 attacks highlighted failures of coordination both in operations and the intelligence community. But, the US government is an enormous, sprawling system and much coordination relies on the personal relationships at the Assistant Secretary level, of course the authors wryly observed that government officials can spend so much time coordinating that they never get to do their jobs.

During the Q&A I asked a question about one of my particular obsessions, the 1986 Vice Presidential Working Group on Terrorism where my two leading public policy interests collide! The authors confirmed what I had read, that the working group established a number of valuable policy recommendations, but that they had not been implemented- nor were they implemented in later terrorism commissions. They also spoke well of the vice president’s role overseeing the task force as important to keeping the project on track, providing political cover, and resolving difficult issues.

Organization charts, standard operating procedures, and nuts and bolts of legislation may not seem to be the most exciting aspect of counter-terrorism (as opposed to drone strikes and special forces) but it is essential. The ways in which government agencies respond to challenges is shaped by their institutional capabilities and the U.S. Government Counterterrorism: A Guide to Who Does What is an essential guide to what those capabilities are.

Will Israel Strike Iran? Thoughts in Politico's Arena

I've been writing a bit about Iran lately. Here is my response to yesterday's the Politico Arena question of the Day about the impact and meaning of SecDef Panetta's statement that Israel would attack Iran by June.

Ironically, Panetta's comments decrease the risk of military action. The threat of a strike is more effective a weapon then a strike itself. Very few actors in the world want Iran to have a nuclear weapon and at the same time very few want to see a military attack on Iran (including Israel, which has limited capabilities for carrying out such a strike) - it could unleash a contagion of violence across an already violence-prone region. At the very least it would lead to a spike in energy prices, which instantly makes billions poorer and fuels unrest in its own right.

But tolerating a nuclear Iran is also a very unpleasant possibility. Iranian politics are complex, but there are substantial radical constituencies that - even if they would not immediately use a nuclear weapon for eschatological reasons - would use it as cover for subversive activities throughout the region. Neighboring Pakistan has become an aggressive user of terrorism as a strategy and gets away with it because of its nuclear arsenal. Iran, sitting astride the energy rich Persian Gulf would be well-placed to make even more international havoc.

International sanctions are starting to bite, hard. But just as the sanctions bite, nations around the world have incentives to start easing them. The threat of an Israeli strike makes everyone nervous, and creates incentives to keep the pressure on Iran - which is difficult but beats the alternative.

I'll add a few additional points, having had a day to think about it. First, for a sense of what a nuclear Iran would look like, check out Pakistan.

The other point to consider is what the end game looks like. There are substantial constituencies that insist on regime change in Iran (internally, by overthrowing the mullahs - no one sensible is talking about invading.) But with the sanctions biting hard, the regime might very well be ready to come to the table. But if official US policy is still seen as pushing for regime change, then there is no incentive to come to the table and every incentive for the Iranian leaders to press on for nukes (the ultimate guarantor of regime survival.) Would Western powers be open to such a bargain - would the US come to terms with the Islamic Revolution if they dumped their nuclear program in a manner that is satisfactory to the US? The example of Libya, where the US ultimately sided with those who overthrew the regime, despite Qadhaffi's re-alignment and ending his WMD program is hardly encouraging - at least from the perspective of the leaders in Tehran.

Research at the Nixon & Reagan Libraries

For Presidents Day, I contributed a post to The Text Message, a blog of the National Archives, about my recent experience doing archival research. The original post is here.

As a PhD candidate at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy I am researching the vice presidential role in national security affairs. While the vast majority of vice presidents played only a tiny role, this has changed dramatically in recent years. My particular area of interest is vice presidential influence – how and when does the vice president get to make policy? The relationship between the president and vice president is essential, as the vice president has no real independent authority.

On a recent family trip to LA, I thought it would be worthwhile to visit the archives at the Nixon and Reagan libraries.

Using the Archives
I know a great deal about vice presidents, but having never done archival research before, I put in calls to chat with the archivists and learn a little bit about what I was getting into. They were extremely helpful. There are extensive descriptions of the archival holdings online and the archivists urged me to identify what I was interested in, so that they could pull the boxes and have them waiting for me.

Picking what I wanted at the Nixon library was pretty easy. The vast majority of Nixon’s records are about his presidency. But I was interested in the Nixon vice presidency, so I identified a relatively small number of boxes relevant to my research.

The Reagan archives was a bit more of a challenge. Reagan was never the vice president and there were only a few boxes referring to his vice president George H. W. Bush. Fortunately – this is all still over the phone – Jennifer Mandel, my contact at the Reagan Library, came to my rescue.

First, she explained that if I wanted to see documents about Bush, I needed to visit his library. Then she gave me a short course on the nature of archival research. In essence, a researcher needs to come in with some fairly specific ideas of what they seek – otherwise they will simply wade through endless masses of paper. Since I am looking for instances in which vice presidents persuaded presidents to adopt policies, I needed to have a pretty good idea of what policies I was interested in and then start looking for the paper trail.

She was not discouraging me, only explaining the practicalities of my endeavor. It is further complicated because a great deal of modern interactions between the president and vice president are informal and not on paper.

However, I had previously written a paper about a working group on terrorism led by Vice President Bush (and studying terrorism is my day job, so I had an additional interest.) So we agreed that should be my focus.

A week later, at the archives, I settled down to actually do my research. It is most helpful to the archivists if the researcher has already submitted requests for particular boxes – but they will do their best to pull them in a timely manner. Facilitating public access to the documents is the critical mission for the archivists, and from what I saw they take it very seriously.

There was a form to fill out – no big deal – and some basic explanations. The archivist monitoring the research room must be able to see the researcher’s hands (documents have been tampered with and pilfered.) Also, documents should be handled carefully. In particular, the archivists need to do any staple removals. There are copy machines available, but through the miracle of technology, a celphone camera can serve as a scanner! There are plenty of smartphone apps that facilitate this – but a camera with just a few mega-pixels will provide a decent image.

Nixon as VP
At the Nixon Library, much of the correspondence was work-a-day material focusing on vice presidential appearances. Nixon is an interesting case, he played a more active role then previous vice presidents, serving as campaigner-in-chief so that Eisenhower could appear to be above the political fray. But this activity did not necessarily translate to influence for Nixon. Recent vice presidents have had offices in the White House. Nixon did not. Many letters from Eisenhower were requests for meetings. In more recent years, if the president wished to meet his vice president, he could just send an aide down the hall. But, at the same time, Nixon was not excluded from the process. He was a regular attendee at Cabinet and National Security Council meetings. In fact, during periods of illness, Eisenhower instructed Nixon to hold and chair these meetings in the President’s absence in order to reduce concerns about Eisenhower’s health and its impact on the functioning of the government.

There were also a number of letters in which Eisenhower warmly thanks Nixon for his efforts and contributions.

Still, it isn’t clear if this meant that Nixon had much influence. This particular memo seemed intriguing. I don’t know the back-story, but it looks like the kind of note a boss sends when he wants an issue dropped.

The picture that appears of Nixon’s vice presidency is that while he took on whatever tasks he was given ably, he was perhaps not in Eisenhower’s inner council of advisors.

VP Bush Combatting Terrorism
In contrast the documents for the George H. W. Bush Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism were voluminous and making sense of them is a real challenge. Still, there are interesting places where the internal bureaucratic machinations are exposed. One of the purposes of the Task Force was to help get the various government agencies concerned with terrorism working together. The hand-written notes attached to copies or on copies of the report give a real sense as to how that process worked.

Presidential Libraries
While visiting the archives, I had the added pleasure of at least a little time at the Presidential Libraries. They are both lovely. One of the highlights of the Reagan Library is Air Force One.

Reagan’s library is also located high in the hills overlooking Simi Valley. It is breathtakingly beautiful.

I was told that the sunsets there are spectacular, but I couldn’t stay. However, when I stepped outside of the Nixon Library the sun was setting. I stood for a time and contemplated the great question of Presidential studies: Is it the man, or is it the moment, or is it perhaps a bit of each?