The Washington Times is one of the few major media outlets that pays much attention to the question of Puerto Rican statehood. Today’s editorial catches their general slant as opposing it – although they have run commentaries in the past arguing for new policies towards the island colony.
This particular piece argues that the plurality, but not the majority, of Puerto Ricans prefer the current commonwealth status but that the process being put in place will slant the decision-making towards statehood.
The surface explanation for this editorial is that Puerto Rico will be a strong Democratic state, adding a pair on the Democratic side of the aisle in the Senate and it certainly no secret that the Washington Times slants right. The editorial also notes that as a bi-lingual territory Puerto Rico as a state would force the issue in the U.S. and bilingual nationhood is not a good direction for the U.S. to take – our language should unite us.
The merit of that argument aside, there is another aspect to this problem. The tiny also-ran in Puerto Rican politics are the independentistas. It has been a strong enough sentiment to inspire some serious terrorism including a failed assassination attempt against President Truman and bombings in NYC. (The U.S. government has done some violence to the Puerto Ricans as well.) Now, the Puerto Rican independence movements have been infiltrated and are pretty marginal. But there is a certain gut appeal for independence among many Puerto Ricans. As one Puerto Rican journalist I met put it, “On Saturday night at the bar everyone is for independence. But when they wake up Sunday morning they come to the senses.”
Puerto Rico is a poor island with high unemployment and deficient social services. It is either the wealthiest country in Latin America or the poorest state in the union. Statehood has been the Holy Grail for an important faction of Puerto Rican politics. But will statehood reduce the island’s structural problems? Currently, in exchange for not having representation in Washington, Puerto Ricans are exempt from federal taxes (no taxation without representation.)
Whatever federal benefits their representatives in Washington can obtain – they will probably not be sufficient to counterbalance having to now pay federal taxes.
Is it inconceivable that, once Statehood is reached, the independentistas will be able to shout “I told you so!” as the island’s fundamental problems remain? In those circumstances, could a new secessionist movement gain traction?
This may seem far-fetched. Perhaps Puerto Rico’s sentiments for independence are not that great and will not gain much favor. But the United States fought a long, bloody war over whether or not states can leave the union – the issue is like Pandora’s Box and is best left closed.
That being said, Puerto Rico’s situation is unfair. But in life and politics perfect justice is rarely obtainable. The Puerto Ricans do not wish for independence and statehood isn’t in the cards. But there is some compensation. The tax freedom is a good example as is Puerto Rico’s Olympic Committee. Under the current status Puerto Rico can enjoy the fun part of nationhood, while avoiding the less pleasant aspects. There are worse situations.
Friday, February 26, 2010
Monday, February 8, 2010
Visiting The Republic
As a PhD student at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy, I have to take a comprehensive exam on normative issues. The first books on the reading list are selections from the classics, which I studied at St. John’s – Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau. While most of the moral and political philosophy we are required to read is “modern” (i.e. written in the last two centuries and thus not of interest to Johnnies) I am thrilled to be spending time with some old friends.
Beastly to the Books
When I studied The Republic at St. John’s College there was a guy in the class who always sought to tear down the books – trying to pick them apart and expose them as unserious. This was not the St. John’s way, and I feuded a bit with him. I took to calling him Thrasymachus after a character in The Republic who assails Socrates “like a wild beast” insisting that injustice is the true justice in book 1. (Things really get rolling in book 2 when Glaucon makes the same argument more calmly asking in effect if justice is a virtue or is it just fear of getting caught and that the truly great men are those who don’t get caught. The question of how to instill a love for justice is fundamental to all societies and at the core of this most profound book.)
I regret deeply that my in-class frustration with Thrasymachus led to a frayed relationship out of class. I should have taken to heart the words of a wiser classmate who observed that Thrasymachus was so passionate because he wanted so deeply to understand truth and justice. If you are out there and recognize yourself and happen to stumble on this shoot me a note. Mea culpa.
A Kiss is but a Kiss
Socrates explains that in his perfect city (which is a thought experiment not a political action plan) after the army wins a battle the returning soldiers will be free to kiss anyone in the city.
Thrasymachus (in our class not in the book) saw a loose thread to pull on and observed, “Is that a euphemism or what?”
There were times when I deftly responded to this sort of statement. This was not one of them, because almost everyone in class sort of agreed that this was the case and none of us had any particular thoughts on dealing with it. What I wished I had said was this:
Now, years later, I think I have some idea what Plato was talking about – maybe. Since studying Middle Eastern politics I have become interested in the overwhelming importance of clans in the region’s societies. One feature of many clan societies (and particularly those of the Middle East) are the restrictions on the movements and behavior of women. Clans are based on patrilineal heritage and any question that a man’s male ancestor is in doubt can undermine the web of loyalties underpinning this system – the family honor. Hence, the requirements that women always be in the company of male relatives in public.
Ancient Greece also had some elements of this system, laws varied by the movement of women was frequently restricted. In his proposal, perhaps Socrates was attempting to reinforce loyalty to the polis as opposed to clan-lineage loyalties and build the ethos of the polis as a voluntary community.
As it happens, this explanation (which seems plausible but requires more research) would not have flown in seminar. At St. John’s we tried to focus exclusively on the books themselves and not their historical context.
Beastly to the Books
When I studied The Republic at St. John’s College there was a guy in the class who always sought to tear down the books – trying to pick them apart and expose them as unserious. This was not the St. John’s way, and I feuded a bit with him. I took to calling him Thrasymachus after a character in The Republic who assails Socrates “like a wild beast” insisting that injustice is the true justice in book 1. (Things really get rolling in book 2 when Glaucon makes the same argument more calmly asking in effect if justice is a virtue or is it just fear of getting caught and that the truly great men are those who don’t get caught. The question of how to instill a love for justice is fundamental to all societies and at the core of this most profound book.)
I regret deeply that my in-class frustration with Thrasymachus led to a frayed relationship out of class. I should have taken to heart the words of a wiser classmate who observed that Thrasymachus was so passionate because he wanted so deeply to understand truth and justice. If you are out there and recognize yourself and happen to stumble on this shoot me a note. Mea culpa.
A Kiss is but a Kiss
Socrates explains that in his perfect city (which is a thought experiment not a political action plan) after the army wins a battle the returning soldiers will be free to kiss anyone in the city.
Thrasymachus (in our class not in the book) saw a loose thread to pull on and observed, “Is that a euphemism or what?”
There were times when I deftly responded to this sort of statement. This was not one of them, because almost everyone in class sort of agreed that this was the case and none of us had any particular thoughts on dealing with it. What I wished I had said was this:
Your interpretation is the obvious one and I don’t have a response, only this thought. If someone says aloud “World War II” a pair of images leap into my mind: the marines raising the flag at Iwo Jima and the sailor kissing the nurse in Times Square on V-J day. That makes me think something else is going on here. I don’t know what, but I give Plato the benefit of the doubt - he doesn’t deal in cheap euphemisms.As Time Goes By
Now, years later, I think I have some idea what Plato was talking about – maybe. Since studying Middle Eastern politics I have become interested in the overwhelming importance of clans in the region’s societies. One feature of many clan societies (and particularly those of the Middle East) are the restrictions on the movements and behavior of women. Clans are based on patrilineal heritage and any question that a man’s male ancestor is in doubt can undermine the web of loyalties underpinning this system – the family honor. Hence, the requirements that women always be in the company of male relatives in public.
Ancient Greece also had some elements of this system, laws varied by the movement of women was frequently restricted. In his proposal, perhaps Socrates was attempting to reinforce loyalty to the polis as opposed to clan-lineage loyalties and build the ethos of the polis as a voluntary community.
As it happens, this explanation (which seems plausible but requires more research) would not have flown in seminar. At St. John’s we tried to focus exclusively on the books themselves and not their historical context.
Tuesday, January 26, 2010
Setback in Baghdad: Counter-Forensics and Counter-Terror
Counter-forensics has long been part of the terrorist playbook, so today’s attack on the central forensics lab in Baghdad is by no means unprecedented in the annals of terrorism.
CSI Belfast
According to Tony Geraghty’s fascinating The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the IRA and British Intelligence the IRA was obsessed with preventing evidence from falling into the hands of British authorities. The developed extensive internal research and development capabilities to counter British forensic science and wrote manuals to train their members how not to leave evidence. The manuals get very detailed, including instructions about the dangers of incriminating particles and fibers in the hair and clothes of operatives.
The IRA had good reason to be concerned. British authorities found clothes and hair to be forensic bingo and actually ran an undercover operation operation disguised as a mobile valet service to gather forensic evidence.
The IRA found that a good offense was the best defense and ambushed the mobile valet unit in October 1972. They also bombed the Northern Ireland Forensic Laboratory – twice. The first time they faked and accident so that a car with a bomb planted inside would be taken into the forensics lab, where it detonated and destroyed substantial quantities of forensic evidence. Later, in September 1992, the IRA set off a 3,000 lb on the lab’s perimeter.
CSI Baghdad
In many cases the most sensitive nodes are people – killing key leaders or specialists can disable a movement or organization. At least some of the victims of the bombing were investigators and they will not be easy to replace. The specialized equipment will also be difficult to replace. But, if the IRA’s history is any example, the accumulated physical evidence could be the greatest loss for Iraq’s counter-terror efforts. In almost any kind of research quality data is everything.
Terrorists in Iraq are clearly ramping up activities, having carried out two terrible deadly attacks in as many days. Breaking clandestine networks requires the careful sifting of evidence, seeking clues and patterns. But now, the evidence is gone and the investigators are back to square one.
Today’s attack was a strategic one, reducing the government’s ability to defeat its enemies both in the short and long-term.
CSI Belfast
According to Tony Geraghty’s fascinating The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the IRA and British Intelligence the IRA was obsessed with preventing evidence from falling into the hands of British authorities. The developed extensive internal research and development capabilities to counter British forensic science and wrote manuals to train their members how not to leave evidence. The manuals get very detailed, including instructions about the dangers of incriminating particles and fibers in the hair and clothes of operatives.
The IRA had good reason to be concerned. British authorities found clothes and hair to be forensic bingo and actually ran an undercover operation operation disguised as a mobile valet service to gather forensic evidence.
The IRA found that a good offense was the best defense and ambushed the mobile valet unit in October 1972. They also bombed the Northern Ireland Forensic Laboratory – twice. The first time they faked and accident so that a car with a bomb planted inside would be taken into the forensics lab, where it detonated and destroyed substantial quantities of forensic evidence. Later, in September 1992, the IRA set off a 3,000 lb on the lab’s perimeter.
CSI Baghdad
In many cases the most sensitive nodes are people – killing key leaders or specialists can disable a movement or organization. At least some of the victims of the bombing were investigators and they will not be easy to replace. The specialized equipment will also be difficult to replace. But, if the IRA’s history is any example, the accumulated physical evidence could be the greatest loss for Iraq’s counter-terror efforts. In almost any kind of research quality data is everything.
Terrorists in Iraq are clearly ramping up activities, having carried out two terrible deadly attacks in as many days. Breaking clandestine networks requires the careful sifting of evidence, seeking clues and patterns. But now, the evidence is gone and the investigators are back to square one.
Today’s attack was a strategic one, reducing the government’s ability to defeat its enemies both in the short and long-term.
Thursday, January 21, 2010
Cited by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
A recent column in the highly regarded Bulletin of Atomic Scientists cites (favorably) an op-ed I co-authored with Jim Hendler in The Washington Times discussing realistic scenarios for cyber-war.
The column, by Joshua Pollack, a contributor to Arms Control Wonk - which also inspired the name of this blog - is titled Is the cyber threat a weapon of mass destruction?
The article discusses China's recent attack on Google, observing that placing aggressive cyber activity on a par with WMD is inaccurate. Overall China's activity is more akin to spying then to warfare. However, the article states:
The column, by Joshua Pollack, a contributor to Arms Control Wonk - which also inspired the name of this blog - is titled Is the cyber threat a weapon of mass destruction?
The article discusses China's recent attack on Google, observing that placing aggressive cyber activity on a par with WMD is inaccurate. Overall China's activity is more akin to spying then to warfare. However, the article states:
The damage to goodwill has been considerable. It isn't shocking that one major power spies on another, or necessarily even intolerable. As the saying goes, "It's all in the game." But the game has never been friendly, and there's something breathtakingly crude about how it's being played today. The attempt to capture as many computers as possible is aggressive and indiscriminate, reaching into the lives of private citizens in the United States and beyond. In a particularly insidious turn, the spies have been known to take advantage of professional contacts between Americans and Chinese in order to assemble convincingly spoofed messages and to mine e-mail address books for targets.
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
Targeting Jordan
An important detail of the December 30 attack on the CIA Camp Chapman is that the Jordanian intelligence officer killed, Ali bin Zaid, was a relative to Jordanian King Abdullah II. It cannot be a coincidence that a cousin of the king was personally in charge of this highly sensitive portfolio. This illustrates broad points about how much of Middle Eastern politics is in fact a “family affair,” but it also has specific implications for the Kingdom of Jordan.
Clan Tectonics
Much of what passes for politics in the greater Middle East are in fact driven by family, clan, and tribal interests. There is a famous Arabic expression:
These dynamics are excellently described in a short article The Arab World’s Travails: The Desert’s Burden by Gideon Kressel of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Prof Kressel writes:
Implications for Jordan
For Westerners clan dynamics are abstract. For Jordanians the implications of the death of a royal at a CIA base at the hands of an al-Qaeda operative will be clear. It highlights the close relationship between Jordan’s royal family and the United State – an alliance that is not popular among many Jordanians. Emphasizing this partnership may spur greater opposition to the Jordanian regime. It a blow to Jordan’s vaunted intelligence service, which has been praised both within intelligence circles, in print, and on screen. The fact that a member of the royal family was killed is also a sign of weakness that may embolden the regime’s enemies.
A recent failed attack on Israeli diplomats in Jordan would, in this light, have been particularly disastrous. That attack would also have emphasized both regime weakness and the regime’s close relationship with an ally that is unpopular with the general public.
Besides being a reliable ally of the United States, Jordan has a particular significance. It, as much as any regime in the region, represents a viable, modernizing path. With its admittedly limited resources, the Hashemites have invested in education and science. By Western standards, Jordan is far from a liberal democracy, but within the Arab world it is towards the head of the pack for freedoms. Perhaps, most importantly, the Hashemites have attempted to build a legitimate regime that relies on more than force to hold power.
Threats to this regime are profound threats to American interests, but also to the future of the region.
Clan Tectonics
Much of what passes for politics in the greater Middle East are in fact driven by family, clan, and tribal interests. There is a famous Arabic expression:
In other words, my family against another family, my clan against another clan, my tribe against another tribe and so forth. This is a fundamental organizing principle in the societies of the greater Middle East. (It has also existed in the West – consider Romeo and Juliet, the Guelphs and the Ghibellines, and the Hatfields and McCoys – but has been ameliorated by competing values and institutions.) Religious and political splits (such as the Sunni-Shia) are often based heavily on clan affairs – the real tectonic forces of the region.
I against my brother;
I and my brothers against my cousins;
I and my brothers and my cousins against the world.
These dynamics are excellently described in a short article The Arab World’s Travails: The Desert’s Burden by Gideon Kressel of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Prof Kressel writes:
The huge role of male lineage and tribes in the Middle East derives from the desert milieu….These points are explained at greater length in Philip Carl Salzman’s Culture and Conflict in the Middle East. Another good short article on these themes is Stanley Kurtz’s Root Causes.
The logic is simple: the power and status of a nomadic patrilineal group depends principally on the number of combatant men available. The larger an agnate group, the larger the territory it can protect against competing groups, and therefore the larger its camel herd and the greater its power. Feuds are the chief mechanism by which tribes effect changes in status...
One can go further and argue that the framework of feuding provides the backdrop for conflict between states. The Middle East's notoriously high incidence of fighting across international borders relates to this personal feuding; governments, like families, stress such matters as kinship, honor, and revenge. Most notably, these have been recent themes of the conflict between Iraq and its neighbors, Iran and Kuwait; northern and southern Yemen; and Morocco, Mauritania, and Libya. These themes were also critical in the delimitation of Saudi Arabia's borders with its neighbors.
Implications for Jordan
For Westerners clan dynamics are abstract. For Jordanians the implications of the death of a royal at a CIA base at the hands of an al-Qaeda operative will be clear. It highlights the close relationship between Jordan’s royal family and the United State – an alliance that is not popular among many Jordanians. Emphasizing this partnership may spur greater opposition to the Jordanian regime. It a blow to Jordan’s vaunted intelligence service, which has been praised both within intelligence circles, in print, and on screen. The fact that a member of the royal family was killed is also a sign of weakness that may embolden the regime’s enemies.
A recent failed attack on Israeli diplomats in Jordan would, in this light, have been particularly disastrous. That attack would also have emphasized both regime weakness and the regime’s close relationship with an ally that is unpopular with the general public.
Besides being a reliable ally of the United States, Jordan has a particular significance. It, as much as any regime in the region, represents a viable, modernizing path. With its admittedly limited resources, the Hashemites have invested in education and science. By Western standards, Jordan is far from a liberal democracy, but within the Arab world it is towards the head of the pack for freedoms. Perhaps, most importantly, the Hashemites have attempted to build a legitimate regime that relies on more than force to hold power.
Threats to this regime are profound threats to American interests, but also to the future of the region.
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
Terror Taxonomy: Re-Emergence of al-Qaeda Prime
Since 9/11 there have been innumerable articles on the emergence of al-Qaeda 2.0 or 3.0. The attack in Afghanistan that killed several CIA officials along with a Jordanian intelligence officer, harks back to al-Qaeda prime – the disciplined organization that from the late 1990s to 9/11 carried out a series of sophisticated, meticulously planned, multi-pronged strikes against hard targets.
The attack on the CIA base in Afghanistan similarly involved a careful analysis of American systems and vulnerabilities and tremendous patience and tradecraft. And it did devastating damage to a particularly sensitive node – experienced CIA operatives are the products of decades of experience, they are not easy to replace. In addition procedures for vetting information and agents will become more cumbersome, further hampering operations.
Yemen Franchise
If the attack on the CIA in Afghanistan represents al-Qaeda Prime, the attacks emanating from Yemen are examples of al-Qaeda 2.0 and 3.0. While the attacks linked to Yemen have received far more press and drew more blood – they have not had the same level of sophistication. From a technical standpoint the attempted Christmas bombing was only a slight variation on a previously tried tactic – that has had only limited success in the past. The operational security was not sophisticated (which is why so many are in an uproar that US intelligence failed to intercept the bomber.) This is al-Qaeda 2.0, a regional affiliate operating independently and while not as capable as al-Qaeda prime, still possessing substantial capabilities.
The other two attacks in the U.S. linked to Yemen are indicative of al-Qaeda 3.0 – the self-starters and “lone wolves.” The two attacks are Nidal Hassan’s murderous spree at Ft. Hood, Texas and the June 1 shooting at an army recruiting center in Little Rock Arkansas that killed one soldier and wounded another (and has been lost in the shuffle of terrorism news.) Hassan received inspiration and justification from Yemen-based radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, while the Little Rock shooter had travelled to Yemen where he became radical (exactly what he was doing in Yemen is a matter of dispute).
Some have taken comfort in the relative lack of sophistication of the Yemen-based attacks. The lone-wolf attacks are tragic for the victims and their families, but not true strategic dangers to the United States. I stand by my own analysis that complex strategic attacks against the U.S. homeland remain difficult because of the barriers to moving trained operatives. Getting one past security is all too possible. But the more complicated the plan, the more operatives required and the greater probability of detection.
Nonetheless, there are causes for concern.
Blinking Red
Then director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told the 911 Commission that in the summer of 2001 “The system was blinking red.”
However, the previous successful al-Qaeda strikes (1998 embassy bombings and 2000 Cole bombing) were against U.S. targets abroad, thus the intelligence community focused on that possibility – missing the signs of 9/11.
Apparently, the same situation prevailed in late 2009 – a focus on al-Qaeda attacks abroad. Now, the Christmas bombing is driving the vast U.S. intelligence apparatus to re-focus its gaze on Islamist attempts to reach the U.S. While necessary to some extent, it could also prove a vast strategic distraction.
But given the inherent challenges of long-range strikes, as well as the growing capability to hit hard targets abroad – al-Qaeda may choose to focus its efforts on more useful targets closer to its operating theaters. While space may dilute the long-range effectiveness of al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula, closer to home it is may show greater sophistication. The October attack on Saudi Prince Nayef foreshadowed the Christmas bombing technically, but operationally was more akin to the attack on the CIA base. The attacker reached the prince by claiming to be a terrorist prepared to surrender personally to Prince Nayef, who directs Saudi counter-terror efforts.
Al-Qaeda has also shown political/strategic sophistication in its targeting and there are an enormous number of hard targets in their operational strongholds – including U.S. Embassies and other installations, oil facilities, high-profile political targets in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other U.S. allies, and the ultimate prize, Pakistan’s nuclear program (to name just a few.) Alternately, rather than going for “spectaculars” they may more attacks like the CIA bombing that effectively throw sand in the gears of American military organizational machinery.
Again, the system is blinking red, but are we monitoring the right gauges?
The attack on the CIA base in Afghanistan similarly involved a careful analysis of American systems and vulnerabilities and tremendous patience and tradecraft. And it did devastating damage to a particularly sensitive node – experienced CIA operatives are the products of decades of experience, they are not easy to replace. In addition procedures for vetting information and agents will become more cumbersome, further hampering operations.
Yemen Franchise
If the attack on the CIA in Afghanistan represents al-Qaeda Prime, the attacks emanating from Yemen are examples of al-Qaeda 2.0 and 3.0. While the attacks linked to Yemen have received far more press and drew more blood – they have not had the same level of sophistication. From a technical standpoint the attempted Christmas bombing was only a slight variation on a previously tried tactic – that has had only limited success in the past. The operational security was not sophisticated (which is why so many are in an uproar that US intelligence failed to intercept the bomber.) This is al-Qaeda 2.0, a regional affiliate operating independently and while not as capable as al-Qaeda prime, still possessing substantial capabilities.
The other two attacks in the U.S. linked to Yemen are indicative of al-Qaeda 3.0 – the self-starters and “lone wolves.” The two attacks are Nidal Hassan’s murderous spree at Ft. Hood, Texas and the June 1 shooting at an army recruiting center in Little Rock Arkansas that killed one soldier and wounded another (and has been lost in the shuffle of terrorism news.) Hassan received inspiration and justification from Yemen-based radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, while the Little Rock shooter had travelled to Yemen where he became radical (exactly what he was doing in Yemen is a matter of dispute).
Some have taken comfort in the relative lack of sophistication of the Yemen-based attacks. The lone-wolf attacks are tragic for the victims and their families, but not true strategic dangers to the United States. I stand by my own analysis that complex strategic attacks against the U.S. homeland remain difficult because of the barriers to moving trained operatives. Getting one past security is all too possible. But the more complicated the plan, the more operatives required and the greater probability of detection.
Nonetheless, there are causes for concern.
Blinking Red
Then director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told the 911 Commission that in the summer of 2001 “The system was blinking red.”
However, the previous successful al-Qaeda strikes (1998 embassy bombings and 2000 Cole bombing) were against U.S. targets abroad, thus the intelligence community focused on that possibility – missing the signs of 9/11.
Apparently, the same situation prevailed in late 2009 – a focus on al-Qaeda attacks abroad. Now, the Christmas bombing is driving the vast U.S. intelligence apparatus to re-focus its gaze on Islamist attempts to reach the U.S. While necessary to some extent, it could also prove a vast strategic distraction.
But given the inherent challenges of long-range strikes, as well as the growing capability to hit hard targets abroad – al-Qaeda may choose to focus its efforts on more useful targets closer to its operating theaters. While space may dilute the long-range effectiveness of al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula, closer to home it is may show greater sophistication. The October attack on Saudi Prince Nayef foreshadowed the Christmas bombing technically, but operationally was more akin to the attack on the CIA base. The attacker reached the prince by claiming to be a terrorist prepared to surrender personally to Prince Nayef, who directs Saudi counter-terror efforts.
Al-Qaeda has also shown political/strategic sophistication in its targeting and there are an enormous number of hard targets in their operational strongholds – including U.S. Embassies and other installations, oil facilities, high-profile political targets in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other U.S. allies, and the ultimate prize, Pakistan’s nuclear program (to name just a few.) Alternately, rather than going for “spectaculars” they may more attacks like the CIA bombing that effectively throw sand in the gears of American military organizational machinery.
Again, the system is blinking red, but are we monitoring the right gauges?
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
SOMA on TV!
Since SOMA, a project I've worked on, is in the news. I'd be remiss in failing to mention that it has also been on popular television. The CBS crime drama Numb3rs mentioned it (although it failed to give the University of Maryland credit.)
Also - as far as credit goes - I didn't conceive of, or build, the system. My contribution was interpreting the results.
Without further ado...here are the clips.
Also - as far as credit goes - I didn't conceive of, or build, the system. My contribution was interpreting the results.
Without further ado...here are the clips.
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