Golden Oldie: Mannes in the Weekly Standard on Tamil Tigers

With the the notorious Tamil Tigers, once one of the world's most formidable terrorist groups, on the ropes and possibly in their death throes, I thought it would be timely to post this piece I wrote a couple years ago for the Weekly Standard Online urging a more pro-active American counter-terror role against the Tigers.


Catch a Tiger by the Toe
The conflict in Sri Lanka presents the United States with a rare, low-cost opportunity for leadership in the region.
by Aaron Mannes
08/08/2006

WHILE THE WORLD focuses its attention on Lebanon, the bloody civil war in Sri Lanka looks poised for yet another flare-up. Even excluding the Sri Lankan army's current offensive, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)'s June 15 bombing of a passenger bus that killed 64 people and the June 26 assassination of a top Sri Lankan general, LTTE terrorism and Sri Lankan military reprisals have claimed hundreds of lives this year. Sri Lanka is a democratic ally, but the United States has limited options for preventing further bloodshed. However, international frustration with LTTE intransigence has created a rare, low-cost opportunity for American leadership in the region. If the United States can effectively target the LTTE's international finance and smuggling networks, a lack of money and weapons will reduce the group's capability to commit terror attacks, increase the possibility of a political solution in Sri Lanka, and improve the regional situation in Southeast Asia.

Long before the terms entered the American lexicon, the LTTE's struggle for an independent, ethnically Hindu Tamil homeland in northern Sri Lanka featured hundreds of suicide bombings and IEDs at a cost in lives now estimated to exceed 64,000. According to the United Nation's Children's Fund, the LTTE has a history of recruiting child soldiers (including children orphaned by the December 2004 tsunami.) The LTTE has bombed Sri Lanka's World Trade Center and assassinated dozens of political leaders, including two national leaders: former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandhi in 1991 and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993.

Sri Lanka's Tamils have legitimate grievances against the Sinhalese Buddhist-dominated Sri Lankan government. The Tamils have suffered from Sinhalese mob violence and the Sri Lankan military has attacked Tamil civilians both directly and through paramilitary groups. But Sri Lanka is a democracy and Tamils have held high positions in the government. Furthermore, the LTTE pursues a strategy designed to stoke ethnic tensions and provoke attacks on the island's ethnic minority, hamstringing the Sri Lankan government's faltering attempts at a political solution.

The LTTE has two major sources of revenue with which to fund its war: maritime smuggling and the international Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. The LTTE, with its base of operations in close proximity to some of the world's busiest shipping lanes, maintains its own fleet of ocean-going ships that engage in commerce both legitimate and otherwise. LTTE arms buying expeditions have ranged from southern Asia to Africa and beyond. Meanwhile, the international Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora has provided financial and political support critical to the group's survival. Much of this support, according to a Human Rights Watch report, may be coerced through the intimidation and even murder of diaspora Tamils who criticize the LTTE.

These international fundraising and smuggling networks are vulnerable to concerted international efforts. Canada, home to the world's largest Sri Lankan Tamil expatriate community, banned the LTTE this April after the release of the Human Rights Watch report. The EU, frustrated with LTTE obstruction of the Norwegian-sponsored peace process, banned the LTTE in May. While these bans have not brought the LTTE back to the negotiating table, they could be part of a long-term effort to cripple the LTTE's international networks. But such an effort would be futile without American leadership. Only the United States, which banned the LTTE in 1997, could facilitate international intelligence sharing, and ensure the dismantling of the LTTE's international networks by applying the procedures and policies used to target al-Qaeda's financial network.

Although the LTTE is not an Islamist terrorist group, an LTTE crackdown should not be viewed as distraction from the war against Islamist terror. Attacking the LTTE's smuggling and financial networks will likely reveal a wealth of data on other criminal networks in the region. For example, exposing and dismantling the organizations which supply such lethal weaponry to the LTTE could only reduce the availability of arms to the region's Islamist terrorists as well.

Violence in Sri Lanka also has implications for India. The 50 million Tamils living in southern India will be distressed by the suffering of their brethren in Sri Lanka and could demand action. Inspired by the LTTE, India's Tamils may come to nurture their own separatist ambitions. The LTTE's establishment of a satellite television station that reaches throughout Southeast Asia only heightens Indian concerns. American help containing the situation would build bridges with India in a sector where Pakistan, India's traditional rival, has minimal interests.

Certainly, the United States should continue to facilitate development and improvement of human rights policies in Sri Lanka. But adding a few dozen analysts, special agents, and diplomats to pressure the LTTE is an inexpensive way to help ameliorate the violence in Sri Lanka and move the island beyond its past of ethnic conflict.

Lessons Learned: Aaron Mannes in Policy Review on Agresto's Iraq Memoir

The latest issue of Policy Review just published my review of John Agresto's Mugged by Reality: The Liberation of Iraq.

Agresto, a former President of St. John's College and chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities served as the special adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education for about a year. Although a true believer in the cause, he has harsh criticism for poorly thought out U.S. policies. However, as that story has been told by so many others I focus on Agresto's deeper questions about the nature of democracy, the role of higher education in democracy, and the enormous challenges to building an Iraqi democracy. I did not realize that the article would come out as Iraq's provincial elections were being held. The elections have been generally peaceful and according to some reports the secular parties are winning. However, as I discuss in the review, the Iraqis appear to have adopted the forms of democratic government - but the open question remains whether or not the substance has taken hold. This is a fundamental question for reform in Iraq and throughout the region.

BOOKS:
Lessons Learned in Iraq

By Aaron Mannes

Aaron Mannes on Mugged by Reality: The Liberation of Iraq and the Failure of Good Intentions by John Agresto

John Agresto.Mugged by Reality: The Liberation of Iraq and the Failure of Good Intentions. Encounter. 300 pages. $25.95

John Agresto’s Mugged by Reality: The Liberation of Iraq and the Failure of Good Intentions is dedicated to Jim Mollen, a State Department official advising the Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education who was killed on November 24, 2004, and Ali al-Hilfi, an Iraqi who worked for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). After Agresto helped Ali’s sister transfer to another college — a small favor — Ali was so impressed that he declared he was going to start becoming “an American.” When Agresto asked what this meant, Ali replied, “Everyday I will try to do something good for someone I don’t know, like you did for my sister. That’s all.”

Ali was assassinated in his car on August 7, 2005 — a punishment for working with the Americans.

This vignette captures the hopes and frustrations Agresto felt about his own service in Iraq, from 2003 to summer 2004, as the CPA advisor to Iraq’s Ministry of Higher Education. Agresto’s experience with poor planning, inflexible bureaucracies, bad decisions at the top, and a military not configured to its new mission echo other critiques of the American endeavor in Iraq. Many of these problems have since been rectified or ameliorated. Agresto warmly praises many of the individual Iraqis with whom he worked, but, unbound by political correctness, he candidly details not only American failings, but also those of the Iraqis. His greatest criticism of the American liberation of Iraq is of its failure to understand human nature. In examining this critical issue, Agresto sees past the immediate challenges and takes on the broader problem of building a culture that can support democracy.

John Agresto was a true believer, not just in Saddam’s perfidy and the security rationales for removing him, but in the idea of building a new Iraq. When he was invited to play a role in the CPA he signed on “For the duration.” Agresto reminds readers that many shared these ideas and hopes: Virtually all of the civilians he knew in Iraq had volunteered to go in order to help build a new and better Iraq. Ali would have said that Agresto and his CPA comrades were being Americans.

A former policy chief at the National Endowment for the Humanities and president of St. John’s College in Santa Fe, New Mexico, Agresto became the CPA advisor to Iraq’s Ministry of Higher Education, though it was a role in which he had little formal authority or access to resources.

Decades of Saddam’s misrule had taken its toll on Iraq’s institutions of higher learning, just as it had on every institution in Iraqi life. The Baathists had closed Iraq’s private colleges in the 1960s, leaving the entire higher education system under state control. University presidents and officials were selected not to build programs or encourage research and education, but rather to spy on their faculties and keep them in line politically. Saddam’s police state created a culture of fear throughout Iraqi academia that extended to matters major and mundane. A professor insisted, for example, that Agresto sign off on a student’s transferring classes, even though as CPA advisor he had no authority to do so. But the professor pressured Agresto because, as he told him, “your signature will mean that, if a question ever arose, that you yourself had authorized it.” In another instance, a professor of literature and Iraq’s leading authority on Shakespeare, who was considered the best English speaker in the country, feigned public drunkenness to avoid serving as Saddam’s interpreter. Saddam had ordered his execution, but the U.S. invaded before the order was carried out.

Iraqi universities also suffered from material deprivations, which were exacerbated by the post-Gulf War sanctions regime that ended most academic travel and contact with the outside world. Universities were starved for funds (although Saddam could be generous in supporting sectors of the higher education system he found useful and founded several universities himself.) Facilities were hopelessly out of date. In some universities, forty- and fifty-year-old periodicals formed the core of the faculty research collections and were kept under lock and key. Many of the “books” in the university libraries were actually copies of copies of old texts. Basic scientific equipment was scarce, while computers and internet connections were virtually nonexistent.

Unfortunately, according to Agresto, post-liberation mistakes by U.S. forces had some truly terrible consequences. The looting, which then–Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld dismissed by stating, “Freedom is untidy,” had a profound effect on Iraqi infrastructure. Agresto writes:

However many books the library at the Arts College in Baghdad once had, after the war they had none. I toured Mustansiriya University in September of 2003, right after I arrived in Iraq. Vandals had taken everything. Desks, air conditioners, chalkboards, chalk, doors, windows and window frames. . . . They pulled the wiring out of the walls and ripped out plumbing fixtures. And what they couldn’t use — like books — they burned.

Much of what was taken was for use or sale. The wire stripped out of the walls had a good market in Iran. . . . But so much of what happened was simply wanton destruction. . . .

The physical damage was only part of the harm done by the post-invasion looting spree; it also had a devastating impact on how Iraqis viewed the future and the Americans. Many Iraqis greeted the Americans with tremendous hope. That the Americans would permit the vast outbreak of national “untidiness” was inexplicable to the Iraqis, who assumed that there must have been some devious American purpose to this failure to secure order. That the one ministry protected by the Americans was the Oil Ministry only fueled this speculation. All of this set the stage for Iraqis to shift from seeing the Americans as liberators to seeing them as occupiers.

Iraqis also saw the looting as a harbinger of social disorder, and in that environment the dark spots in the Iraqi national psyche began to emerge — particularly sectarian, ethnic, and tribal rivalries. The upsurge in religious fanaticism had a particularly powerful effect on Iraq’s university campuses. Religious groups began insisting on segregated classes and women, even Christians, began covering their hair. Professors and staff reported being harassed. Religious groups began forming campus branches and blocking secular groups from campus elections. Religious fanaticism would have almost certainly surfaced in Iraq no matter what the situation, but the lack of order and security following the U.S. liberation fostered conditions conducive to this rise.

To stem this growing trend, Agresto and his team cobbled together a Bill of Rights for the universities of Iraq. This document declared that the goal of Iraq’s higher education system was promoting “broader capacity for thinking, accepting the opinions of others, and encouraging the search for truth.” It also insisted on freedom of thought, belief, and, significant in the wake of the Islamist resurgence, freedom of dress. It gave university authorities the power to expel individuals who did not respect these rights. This document had some impact, but not for long. The religious militias were too powerful; Agresto started to worry that the American effort to bring democracy to Iraq would lead to elections bringing religious extremists to power.

He ruminates in his book on the nature of democracy, observing that American democracy has been so successful that Americans believe it is easy. But it is not. Elections and institutions are essential to a liberal democracy — but they are not its essence. Something else is required to make democracies run. Agresto illustrates his point by noting that when King Faisal II of Iraq was overthrown in 1958, he was hanged and then dragged behind a car. It is simply inconceivable that in 1958 then-U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower would have had his electoral opponent, Adlai Stevenson, murdered to solidify his own rule. For a democracy to function, citizens must hold certain fundamental values, such as the rejection of violence as a means of resolving disputes, tolerance of dissenting viewpoints, and respect for the freedom of others. Iraqis themselves have an intuitive sense of this problem.

On a trip to the University of Dohuk in Kurdish Iraq, Agresto met the university’s president, Dr. Asmat Khalid, who was hoping to establish a true liberal-arts curriculum. In Iraq, such a program would have been novel. Iraqi higher education was a strictly utilitarian endeavor, and therefore subjects such as medicine and engineering were the most prestigious. Students in these fields had minimal exposure to other subjects, too. Because students were strictly tracked according to test scores, the best students studied the most respected subjects, while areas such as history were the provinces of the less capable. A student in a medical program who preferred history or literature would be considered foolish. Furthermore, most education was rote memorization. Agresto had been lobbying Iraqi university presidents to strengthen their liberal-arts programs, arguing that the liberal arts and social sciences were needed to cultivate future democratic leaders and citizens. Without leaders who have knowledge both of the world and of themselves, and citizens who have some grasp of their political system and can resist propaganda, no democracy can survive.

For Agresto, the critical importance of liberal education crystallized during his trip to Dohuk, when his translator Suhail and Dr. Khalid had an argument — that is, they were “laying out their positions, marshaling evidence, debating consequences.” This, Agresto observes, was the first real intellectual argument (as opposed to the mere assertion of opposing positions) he had observed in his six months in Iraq. Agresto views not only liberal education’s subject matter but also its methods — inquiry, deliberation, interpretation, and argument — as fundamental to the building of an Iraqi democracy.1

That is a powerful and compelling idea. One Iraqi university president, after observing a college seminar in the United States in which students questioned the professor and each other in working to solve a common problem, stated that upon his return he would have all the desks and lecterns at his school removed and replaced with chairs and seminar tables.

In his 2001 What Went Wrong, Bernard Lewis describes the many failed instances of Middle Eastern states attempting to import Western ideas. These transfers began with Western weapons, and when Western arms did not stem the tide of Ottoman defeats, Middle Eastern powers began adopting Western uniforms. They even established Western-style military bands. These transfers extended to politics, the arts, and virtually every aspect of life. Yet, time and again, the transplants were unsuccessful. Most Middle Eastern states have constitutions, elections, and parliaments — but none is a true democracy. Rearranging the furniture in Middle Eastern universities might become only another instance of what Stanley Kurtz has called “adopt[ing] the ‘words’ of various Western cultural innovations while nonetheless failing to master the ‘music.’”2

Iraq’s universities are poorly equipped to take on the challenge of building a democratic culture. While Agresto met many Iraqis of great ability and virtue and is unsparing in his praise for them in his book, Iraqi academics reflect their society. Agresto found even among the most educated Iraqis a predilection for conspiracy theories, and many Iraqi academics were inflexible and resistant to pragmatic reforms. He is somewhat forgiving, noting that the effects of decades of Saddam’s repression understandably squelched normal initiative. But, he writes, “I was constantly reminded of the difficulty of making any progress in a system where honor counted for more than service.” The most often-heard complaint was over faculty pay (perhaps no surprise to any veteran of campus politics). In fact, during Agresto’s tenure, senior professors were paid extremely well by Iraqi standards, receiving twice what they had been paid under Saddam. The problem was that junior professors were making three times as much. When Agresto asked a full professor what would best rectify the situation, raising his salary or lowering the salaries of his junior colleagues, the professor responded, “It doesn’t matter; either way.”

The obsession with honor, even among educated elites, is not an idiosyncrasy; it reflects the core values of the societies of the greater Middle East and is a critical reason why the region (not just Iraq) has been so resistant to Western ideas when, in every other part of the world, nations have been able to adopt at least some aspects of liberal democracy.

McGill University anthropology professor Phillip Carl Salzman, in Culture and Conflict in the Middle East (Humanity Books) argues that the importance of honor is an outgrowth of the patrilineal kin-based social structures that evolved in the Middle East in response to competition for scarce resources. The system is best characterized by the Arabic expression I against my brother; I and my brothers against my cousins; my brothers and my cousins against the world. Under this system, an individual seeks gains, first on behalf of his family against rival families, then on behalf of his clan against rival clans, and so forth. The Sunni-Shia split was rooted in a clan dispute. Ultimately, this framework extends to the Muslim world itself against non-Muslims.

While individuals are not prisoners of their culture, in this highly competitive social system, honor follows strength and is the central social currency. That educated Iraqi professors remain mired in this outlook demonstrates its resilience despite the inroads of urbanization and modernity. It is in this context that Agresto’s friend Ali saw the Americans doing good things for people they did not know as exceptional.

According to Salzman, the clan system that prevails in the Middle East is antithetical to the ideals of liberal democracy:

The particularism of Middle Eastern culture precludes universalism, rule of law, and constitutionalism, all involving the measuring of actions against general criteria, irrespective of the affiliation of the particular actors. What is right and wrong is defined under the rule of law and constitutionalism by general values that apply to all, not by whether one’s group is advantaged or disadvantaged.

The lineage-based clan system is not unique to the greater Middle East. Western history is replete with examples of feuds between lineages, but in such cases there usually have also been alternative sources of legitimate authority. Thus, Agresto’s hope of establishing outlets for liberal education in order to cultivate the values underpinning democracy seems, at best, quixotic. Having repelled so many previous Western imports, Iraq’s rejection of Western education seems comparatively easy. Over the past two centuries Europeans and Americans have established schools and colleges throughout the Middle East. And although they have educated many distinguished graduates, they have failed to spark broader changes.

But there is at least some potential for Iraq to break the tragic cycle of history. First, Salzman and others have observed that if any worldview can dilute the clan-based outlook that prevails in the Middle East, it is individuation: the emphasis of the rights and goals of individuals over the goals of the group. Liberal education can help introduce these perspectives, but it will be decades before more than a tiny number of Iraqis benefit from them. Fostering liberal, democratic values among the elites is essential, but the trickle-down approach to building a democratic culture is insufficient. The broader public must embrace these values as well. Without at least some support from the general public, no democracy is viable, and without public pressure, elites (who frequently benefit under the established system) may not be inclined to support reforms.

There is the potential for a bottom-up approach to social reform based in popular culture. In her brilliant autobiography, Ayaan Hirsi Ali mentions that while she was inspired by great literature, romance novels, with their depictions of such Western ideas as love and passion, also moved her. (Her own, incredible journey to the West was sparked when she fled an arranged marriage.) Other media can also deliver these messages. A Turkish soap opera featuring an independent woman with a glamorous career and a supportive, romantic husband has become a hit in Saudi Arabia.

Without changes in the power structure, the impact of new ideas on a Middle Eastern nation will be minimal. In Iraq, there is a new political situation. Security has improved due to the combination of the surge, the U.S. military’s adaptation to its Iraq mission, the increased capabilities of the Iraqi forces, and the realignment of key Iraqi tribal and militia leaders. As security has improved, Iraq’s democratic government has become increasingly confident and effective. However, without fostering a culture that supports these new democratic institutions, Iraq risks becoming a giant Lebanon — a confessional democracy that functions for a time but is ultimately overwhelmed and collapses. The emerging Iraqi democracy offers a favorable environment to encourage democratic values. The Kurds, in particular, may be an important asset to building a democratic culture there. In his time in Iraq, Agresto consistently found Kurdish educators among the Iraqis most committed to breaking the cycle of history and developing educational programs that will foster democratic values.3

Despite the dramatic improvements in Iraq, a favorable outcome is not guaranteed. Fostering the values needed to support democratic institutions is a long-term project. The U.S. has opened a space where Iraqis can begin to absorb and adapt the values and ideas needed for a democratic culture. But in the Middle East, oppositional, regional forces can close such spaces very quickly. It appears that major American fighting forces will be withdrawn from Iraq in a few years but that substantial residual forces will remain to provide critical intelligence, logistical, and training functions for the Iraqi government, helping to secure it against internal and external foes. These forces will also ensure that the United States has some leverage over the Iraqi government that can, if used judiciously, keep it from slipping into incompetence or autocracy. The enduring American mission in Iraq will be to ensure that this space remains open by helping to ensure Iraq’s security against internal and external threats while also assisting its evolving government so that it does not slip into autocracy or incompetence. Finally, the U.S. needs to promulgate the ideals of liberal democracy by strongly supporting higher education, cultural exchange, and Iraq’s internal dialogue. Achieving these goals will require resources and leadership, but most importantly it will require more of the spirit that so impressed Agresto’s friend Ali — the spirit that made him want to become “an American.”

Aaron Mannes is a researcher and Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland, College Park. He can be reached via www.aaronmannes.com.

1 Agresto admits to a certain irony here because as head of the National Endowment for the Humanities, he was a frequent critic of American higher education.

2 Stanley Kurtz, “Root Causes,” Policy Review112 (April & May 2002).

3 After his service with the CPA, Agresto returned to Iraq to serve as the acting chancellor and provost at the American University of Iraq in Sulaimani and continues to serve on its Board of Regents and Trustees.

Renovations & Rightsizing: Blog Changes

I’ve decided to merge VeepCritique into TerrorWonk because if there is one thing we should all learn from GM, it is that too many brands can kill you. In theory, it would be great to have a blog focused on terrorism and a blog on the research for my thesis on the role of the vice president in national security process. But for a blog to be any good, it needs almost daily posting. I am having enough trouble with weekly posting and by having two distinct blogs, I am barely posting monthly on each.

I am also hoping to merge in my old blog that used to live at Profiles in Terror.

I never hewed strictly to just terrorism as a topic and national security process issues are not unrelated to terrorism issues. But now the blog’s range has expanded to pretty much anything I am interested in – although that will mostly be linked one way or another to international affairs.

TerrorWonk is a good name and it has served me well. But I will try to develop a moniker that better reflects the diversity of things I like to write about – without being so general as to leave casual browsers wondering what this blog is all about.

But most importantly, for my regular readers – I will strive to post more often.

Modeling Terrorist Group Behavior: Hamas & Hezbollah

In my day job at the University of Maryland’s Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics I work with a team of computer scientists and socials scientists to build models of terrorist group behavior. As the in-house TerrorWonk my role is to “interpret” the results and see if they yield any useful insights. I’ve co-authored papers on both Hezbollah and Hamas ( only the abstract is posted online).

The models use a system called SOMA (Stochastic Opponent Modeling Agents) that calculates probabilities of a group acting in a given way in a given situation.

Obviously, we hope that our models can achieve a high level of prediction accuracy. But, regardless they can often reveal facets of an organization’s behavior that were not previously evident. Just as military experts say, “Plans are nothing, planning is everything,” I heard one speaker at a conference say, “All models are wrong, but some are useful.”

Following are short summaries of the findings.

Hezbollah: The Model Holds

On hearing the news that rockets had been fired from Lebanon into Israel yesterday morning, I was surprised as the single clearest rule about Hezbollah behavior was that they do not like to target Israeli civilians during election years – and Lebanon has parliamentary elections coming up in April. Hezbollah even kept their rocket attacks down for 1998’s local elections. It turns out the model held, Hezbollah quickly distanced itself from the rocket launch and did not reply to Israeli counter-fire.

Extrapolating, this trend indicates how highly Hezbollah values its legal and political standing in Lebanon and its recognition that this standing is damaged when it is held responsible for provoking Israeli strikes. This provides a working explanation as to why Hezbollah had not renewed hostilities with Israel in the past few years – Lebanon’s presidential selection crisis, while not exactly an election, had some similar dynamics.

Beyond some utility for predicting (on an annual basis) when Hezbollah might launch rocket strikes, it provides real insight into Hezbollah and even a possible counter-strategy. While Hamas’ rhetoric remains stridently anti-Israel, the group is pressed by its need to satisfy its domestic constituency, the Lebanese Shia, who are a bit tired of being the Muslim world’s spearhead against Israel.

Military efforts against Hezbollah have not been effective, but these findings raise two related questions: how popular is Hezbollah really among its constituents and could political efforts against Hezbollah be successful at marginalizing them. It is worth noting that Hezbollah receives something like $100 million annually from Iran and the Lebanese Shia population is only about 1.5 million people, so these resources would buy a great deal of influence. Other Lebanese Shia groups do not possess comparable resources.

Hamas: Anything but Resistance is Futile

The results of our Hamas model were very different. Strategic decisions to reduce violence were not in evidence. The key driver appeared to be capability. First, the likelihood of suicide bombings (the data set does not include rocket attacks) increased after Hamas came into contact with Hezbollah in 1993, and received training in suicide terror. The other factor, which increased the likelihood of suicide attacks was Hamas’ provision of social services (which would seem counter-intuitive – but as Matt Levitt shows, the social services infrastructure is also a critical part of the terror network.)

Interestingly, when Hamas was participating in the Palestinian democratic process they were also very likely to carry out suicide attacks on Israel. However, the sample size was relatively small and capability seemed like a likelier explanation.

Perhaps the most interesting finding was that certain attacks, such as kidnappings and property attacks on Palestinians, tracked with internal Palestinian conflict. Although it occurred after the data was collected, the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit occurred during the Hamas-Fatah civil war. Another round of Hamas-Fatah fighting is likely in the West Bank, so more of these kinds of actions should be expected.

It could be argued that the 2006 war in Lebanon was a relative success – Hezbollah has kept that border quiet since. The likelihood of a similar modus vivendi with Hamas is Gaza seems less likely based on the model and also based on Hamas rhetoric. In an interview given just days before Hamas began launching rockets the deputy chief of Hamas’ Damascus wing stated:

[Your] question implies that the Tahdiah [truce] is a central issue behind [our] decisions, consultations, and mediation attempts. However, the opposite is true… [for us,] resistance is the main [element] in the relations between the Palestinian people and the Zionist occupation.

Reducing Hamas’ desire to commit violence does not seem possible, it is essential that Israeli strategy reduce their capability. In that regard, cutting the Hamas supply lines of the tunnels between Gaza and Egypt (and attacking the broader smuggling network) is critical.

Continuing Strategic Ripples of Mumbai Attacks

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s address to the chief minister’s Conference on Internal Security earlier this week was primarily focused on the nuts and bolts of internal security. But it also harshly criticized Pakistan, stating “there is enough evidence to show that, given the sophistication and military precision of the attack it must have had the support of some official agencies in Pakistan.” Although this assertion remains publicly unproven (the dossier about the attacks submitted by India to Pakistan does not support it, and it is debatable whether the attack’s sophistication required state sponsorship) Singh’s statement showed that, beyond the carnage, Lashkar-e-Taiba’s assault on Mumbai had another victim – the Indian-Pakistan peace process. Singh is a pragmatic and capable politician who had been open to improving relations with Pakistan. But Singh faces domestic hardliners (and, given the ISI’s long history of links to LeT and other Islamist groups in Pakistan, their suspicion is not unwarranted.) Now, in the wake of the Mumbai massacre, Singh will be unable to make even the smallest concessions. This is not merely a local problem. Pakistan is a geopolitical timebomb, and key to defusing it is improving relations with Pakistan and India.

Pakistan, which provides the key routes into Afghanistan, is a nuclear-armed state on the verge of a financial meltdown, while fighting a major Islamist insurgency. However, the Pakistani leaders, military and civilian (see this report on a recent interview with the ISI chief), have recognized that a better relationship with India is essential to stabilizing Pakistan. The conflict in Kashmir has vastly distorted Pakistan’s development, and been a driver in the rise of radical Islam (including Lashkar-e-Taiba – which the ISI fostered as a proxy for fighting in Kashmir) in Pakistan.

An immediate consequence of the heightened tensions between India and Pakistan post-Mumbai was Pakistan’s shifting troops away from the Islamist insurgency in the tribal areas to face an Indian troop build-up. (In fairness, Pakistan continued extensive operations against the Islamists in the tribal regions.) But the real impact of Pakistan’s conflict with India is much deeper. Pakistan is outmatched by India in quantity (India is about six times more populous than Pakistan) and in quality as India’s economy is growing faster. Worst, Pakistan has long borders with little strategic depth. In an effort to compensate for these disadvantages, an inordinate amount of Pakistan’s national wealth has gone to the military. This has robbed crucial sectors such as economic development, infrastructure, and education. This has contributed to the growth of radical madrassas, high levels of unemployment, and a creaking infrastructure in which major cities experience regular blackouts.

In this unstable environment, a group like Lashkar-e-Taiba can flourish. While a stable and prosperous Pakistan – which has placed its rivalry with India on a backburner – is an anathema to the radical Islamists. Vice President-elect Biden is currently visiting Pakistan (in his capacity as chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee – where he spearheaded the Biden-Lugar plan to provide $15 billion in aid to Pakistan over the next 10 years). This is a strong indication that South Asia will be front and center for the incoming administration - as it needs to be.

Gupta as Surgeon-General: Vice President of Health

The Surgeon General is a position not unlike the vice presidency. It has prestige and profile, but not much power – beyond that of the bully pulpit.

In that light, appointing CNN correspondent/neurosurgeon Sanjay Gupta would be an interesting move. It is obviously an effort to revive the role as a spokesperson on national health issues, a la C. Everett Koop. Gupta, as a TV journalist already has the skills for this role. He also has a dash of Washington experience, having done some writing for Hillary as a White House Fellow. No doubt Gupta hopes to play a substantive policy role as well, he is supposed to sit on the Daschle led healthcare reform commission.

Gupta, having risen to the top of two very difficult professions, is obviously blazingly smart, focused, and capable. But will that translate into his being an effective policy player – as opposed to primarily being a spokesman? Being smart often is not enough, Bill Frist, a Harvard and Princeton-educated cardiac surgeon was less effective as Senate Majority Leader than former Ole Miss cheerleader Trent Lott.

More important to playing a substantive role, is the reality that the Surgeon General has no institutional base. His role is symbolic rather than administrative. (He heads the Public Health Service Commission Corps, which employs over 6000 medical professionals that perform duties in various federal agencies but is not really an agency in its own right.) On a panel with heavyweights like HHS Secretary Tom Daschle (who is also technically his boss) he might not be able to play much of a role. Gupta’s high public recognition might give him some base of influence, but that has to be wielded carefully. Floating trial balloons and advocating inside positions via the media can be effective strategies – but insiders who play those cards too often will soon find themselves outsiders.

Or, like most Vice Presidents, could Gupta use the Surgeon General position as a steppingstone? There isn’t much upward mobility for a neurosurgeon-TV star (astronaut maybe?) But if he catches the politics bug, Gupta is young enough, and capable enough that a political career is possible and he could conceivably go far. John Adams said about the Vice Presidency, “In this I am nothing, but I may be everything.” For a Surgeon-General Gupta a more apt line might be, “In this I’m not much, but I could become anything.”

Hitchen's Flawed Vision of New Gaza

In general I am a big fan of Christopher Hitchens and I envy the elegance, force, and clarity of his arguments. I am always impressed, even when I disagree with him, with his uncompromising stands and vast erudition. Often he provides red meat on issues where my own certainty has wavered. But his recent piece on Gaza is off – way off. While unsparing in his criticism of Hamas, but he seems to think that Palestinian elections were a key factor.

…this month is the one where new elections for the Palestinian Authority have to be called by President Mahmoud Abbas, if not actually held. Before the new year, I talked to one or two knowledgeable Palestinians who argued that, under then-present conditions, Hamas had to hope that such elections would not soon take place. Life in Islamic Gaza was not such as to induce ecstatic happiness and prosperity among the populace… It seems improbable that we'll ever know what would have happened in a free vote, but I think it's safe to say that recent events have further postponed the emergence of a democratic and secular alternative among the Palestinians. I even think it's possible that some people in Israel and some other people in Gaza do not want to see the emergence of such a force, but let me not be cynical.

Hitchens was a friend of the late Edaward Said and also of Rashid Khalidi. (The redoubtable Martin Kramer takes on Hitchens overwrought sympathy for Khalidi’s dispossession.)

Said, Khalidi, etc. have long championed the emergence of a secular, progressive Arab movement. But Khalidi has some limitations as a Middle East analyst. For example (see Kramer’s Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle East Studies in America - download it here) he predicted the first Gulf War would be long and bloody (it wasn’t) and, after being wrong on that front he nonetheless boldly predicted that Saddam’s generals would remove him from power to save themselves. Here he demonstrated ignorance of both Iraq’s military and political situation. Despite his experience with the PLO, his take on the worldview of Gaza’s inhabitants seems similarly skewed.

Leaving aside the difficulties of conducting real elections in Gaza (without having to invade to ensure the elections fairness) or the dubious merits of Hamas’ rival Fatah, the idea that the people of Gaza would be secular and progressive is not for real. Gaza is a clan-based society, not dissimilar to the rest of the greater Middle East. The lineage segmentation system that shapes these societies places a premium on personal honor and conflict. Consider this insightful essay (written in April 2000), by a (and possible the) Gaza-based psychiatrist Eyad el-Sirraj (no friend of Israel by any measure) on the role of anger in Palestinian society:

What brings a high-ranking official to beat his superior or even his minister to overrule a decision? Why does a student throw stones at his professors, or at students from another university? How can we explain an assault against a member of the Legislative Council? How can the murder of an oppressed woman be explained? And what about the popularity—[only] sometimes—of the death penalty? And, what is the common denominator between all these and the torture in the [PA] prisons?

….Searching for the reason, I do not ignore the depth of rage that was inflicted on our lives because of the [Israeli] occupation; but I do not want to hang everything on this peg, [a complaint] that is like a broken record in which Zionism, or the great imperialism, or even petty bourgeoisie, are blamed [for everything]. I want to be clear: one of the main reasons is within us, the result of the education in our homes. Aren't you, my dear reader, one of those fathers who are filled with happiness when your beloved two year old child pronounces the expression "... [damn] your father?!" Don't you dance with joy when he proves his virility by beating another child?

….Don't be surprised, my dear, if you see a student beating up his professor, an official beating up his minister, a soldier beating up his parliament member, a teenager beating his mother or killing his sister, or university students fighting with stones and clubs.

We teach our children that it is permitted to express anger with muscle; we even encourage them to do so in the belief that it is part of the meaning of courage and honor. By doing so, we forget the best part of our Arab heritage and Islamic religion, as well as all that is in Christianity: forgiveness, self-control, overcoming feelings of rage, patience, restraint, and using the mind….

Of course, on this front Hitchens has an idée fixe that religion is the root of all evil. But the clan-based social structures have proven tremendously resistant to all forms of modernity (see this article by Stanley Kurtz). Islam is the product of Middle Eastern society, and while Islam may “seal in” the clan values that dominate the region, Islam is not necessarily the origin of these values.

Many analysts, academics, pundits, and policy-makers have bet on a the emergence of a "new" Middle East. While I support this, and remain hopeful, one should carefully consider what the barriers to this reform are and how deeply they are entrenched.