Implications of VPs as a punchline

I like the funnies, and Frazz is a good one. But I was a little bummed to see them go for the easy laugh here. Sure memorizing vice presidents is pointless, but strictly speaking so is memorizing presidents, state capitols, mythological deities. Multiplication tables and poetry may, in fairness, make some sense. But on the off-chance one finds themselves in a profession that requires knowledge of the 50 state capitols (or the VPs like yours truly) pick it up in on-the-job-training.

My different selves are caught on this. The academic in me wants to right the wrong of VP inconsequence mostly to expand my own academic micro-niche. But the small government conservative says, it is a good thing that government officials are not taken too seriously - government should matter less, not more. But the policywonk in me has a deep respect for people who, as Teddy Roosevelt says "is in the arena." Full quote is here:

It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat.

Geriatric Terror?

A quartet of senior citizens in Georgia (the state) were recently arrested for plotting massive terror attacks. They were pseudo-militia types, concerned about the expansion of the US government into a tyranny and inspired by Tim McVeigh. They had a bucket-list of officials they hoped to target.

In some regards they followed the typical profile for far-right terror in the US -that is expansive and violent goals - with limited capability. By comparison leftist terrorists in the US (say ALF/ELF) tend to be well educated, disciplined, and focused in their targeting and operations. As one analyst who has studied domestic terrorists, the rightwingers are dumb but unstable and violent.

The prospects for their plots' success, including making a WMD from ricin (which has proven pretty much undoable even for nation states), were very low. The FBI spent months infiltrating their meetings at the Waffle House and their homes. One is forced it wonder exactly how the FBI came to be aware of this cell of geezers.

Overall, terrorism appears to be a young man's game. The leaders may be older, but the actual operatives tend to be young. There is no obvious reason for this (unless the plan is specifically for fedayeen attacks). Elderly operatives should be less suspicious when reconnoitering targets or planting explosives. But there are few cases of this occurring.

The image of an angry young men spouting nihilistic radicalism is common, and even a bit sympathetic. The same anger coming from someone forty years older seems only pathetic.

Response to WaPo on VP Selection

A few weeks ago The Washington Post Outlook section ran a lengthy article arguing that party conventions should select the vice president, rather then the presidential nominee. The key was that the office was too important to leave to presidential whim and the convention delegates would select stronger candidates more fit for the presidency.

I dashed off a letter to the editor disagreeing, but it was not printed. So, here goes:

Mr. Leahy's recent Outlook feature argued that party conventions should select the vice president. This idea appeals to political journalists because it would make conventions interesting. But it would not result in better vice presidents. The conventions selected some vice presidents of great ability such as Teddy Roosevelt, but also many non-entities and a few scoundrels (consider Aaron Burr or Schuyler Colfax.)

More importantly, the era of party selected vice presidents was characterized by poor relationships between the two nationally elected officials. Coolidge's Vice President Charles Dawes’ refusal to attend cabinet meetings illuminates this situation. Dawes (an outstanding figure who won the Nobel Peace Prize, was a WWI hero, and popular composer - but an utter failure as vice president), did not want to set a precedent of vice presidential attendance because, he wrote, the relationship between a President and his advisors “…is a confidential one, and the selection of a confidant belongs to him who would be injured by the abuse of confidence-however unintentional. Suppose, in the future, some President, with this precedent fixed, must face the alternative of inviting a loquacious publicity seeker into his private councils, or affronting him in the public eye by denying him what has come to be considered as his right-how embarrassing it would be!”

Presidents should continue to choose their running mates because a President that does not have complete confidence in the
vice president’s discretion and loyalty will exclude the vice president from the decision-making process. In the modern complex world the United States cannot afford an ill-informed vice president ascending to the nation’s highest office.

Light Footprint/Right Footprint in Counter-Terror Deployments

Walter Pincus’ national security column today ended on an oddly discordant note. Overall the column discussed the challenges the military will face maintaining skilled personnel in the face of likely budget cuts. This is particularly challenging because top-level NCOs and mid-level officers take a long time to train and really bring up to speed. Fifteen years (at least) go into developing a Major, even more into training a ship commander. Capable individuals who will flourish in these roles will also do well in the civilian world.

These are excellent points that should be of real concern to defense policy wonks. But then he veers off to criticize the recent deployment of 100 special forces troops to Uganda to help fight the Lord’s Resistance Army. Pincus concludes:

Step back for a moment. A small group of concerned Americans teamed up with members of Congress to pass the bill that authorized the anti-LRA deployment. The Pentagon had prepared specially trained units to carry out what is now designed as a narrowly focused training mission. How many other ungoverned parts of the world exist where leaders can say their enemies represent a terrorist threat and they need U.S. military assistance?

In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent the 82nd Airborne into the Dominican Republic to prevent what he called a second Cuba. He told Sen. J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) that if he hadn’t had the deployment-ready military units, he would have had to rely on diplomacy to solve the problem.

Fulbright later told me that both nations would have been better off had the 82nd Airborne not been there to make the military solution easy when diplomacy appeared more difficult. It’s a lesson remembered and reinforced by the last 10 years of warfare.

That comparison does not quite hold. The deployment of the 82nd Airborne was a large-scale use of military force, sending 100 special forces on a training mission is a much less extensive and expensive endeavor. It is true that the US military cannot make even small such small deployments to every ungoverned space on earth, but if a relatively modest commitment can help an ally (Uganda is a playing a useful role in Somalia) then it seems reasonable.

Of terrorist groups and insurgencies around the world the LRA is one of the very, very nastiest and is destabilizing a region of the world that has suffered so much in the past few decades. Quite frankly, diplomatic solutions for the LRA are probably not realistic.

It is fair to say the US diplomacy has become overly militarized in the past decade. But deploying small numbers to Special Forces trainers to strengthen local capabilities seems like exactly the strategy the United States should be pursuing (it was the US strategy in the Philippines among other places). It is repositioning the military to support diplomatic efforts – righting the past decades unbalance in State-Defense operations.

VeepStakes '12a - Mannes in Politico: Thumbs Down for Marco Rubio

Although the GOP doesn't have a nominee yet, the 2012 veepstakes have begun. Politico's Arena asks if Marco Rubio is a viable VP candidate. The short answer is NO, the longer answer is:

Marco Rubio is not VP material yet and has probably missed his moment to be considered presidential material. Over the past 35 years Americans have preferred outsider, people with minimal Washington experience to be president (Carter, Reagan, Clinton, Bush 43 and Obama.) These outsider candidates (including the one losing outsider - Dukakis) have picked experienced D.C.-insiders, often to explicitly balance their own lack of experience.

With the exception of Gingrich and Ron Paul, all of the current Republican candidates are outsiders who would probably select an experienced D.C.-hand as their running mate. Rubio, with less then a year in the Senate is hardly experienced.

Young, telegenic and charming Rubio might have had a chance for the presidency. A few years in the Senate doesn't eliminate the "outsider" label. Obama did not complete his term in the Senate before becoming president. But it may take years for the current controversy \around Rubio to fade in which case he will no longer be an outsider. But, like Biden who wrecked a presidential run with a minor controversy decades ago - Rubio could become a respected insider and become VP material around 2028.

THe Washington Post also takes a skeptical look at Rubio, noting that as a Cuban-American he does not resonate with the vast majority of Latino voters. Probably true, but I take a structural look. While candidates certainly choose based on politics, outsider candidates have had a strong record of picking experienced "presidential" running mates.

Was Killing al-Awlaki a Strategic Error?

The execution of radical cleric (and US citizen) Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen at the beginning of this month may have been an error – not necessarily a legal or moral mistake, but an error of policy.

In the wake of the Awlaqi assassination, Christopher Hitchens asks the most salient question which is that while he shares concerns of those who opposed the action because of “the horrible idea that our government claims the right to add its own citizens to a death list that is compiled by methods and standards unknown” – those opposed are obligated to explain what their alternative policy would be.

In a follow-up column Hitchens provides a justification/precedent/potential policy to address this situation in the future.

In short, while the use of targeted killings is a disturbing policy and the methods by which its use are justified could easily become a slippery slope – there are also legitimate justifications for such a policy in the instance of an American citizen who is involved with dangerous plots against the country and who places himself beyond the reach of the law.

But that is not my problem. Al-Awlaki was first and foremost a media figure (although policy-makers re-defined him as an operational commander.) Applying America’s formidable intelligence and military capabilities to strike him down seems out of proportion and could appear to send the message that the US is an overweening bully quick to squash those who stand up against it. In effect, Awlaki was too rhetorically strong, so we turned to brute force.

I am NOT arguing the morality or targeting al-Awlaki – I am arguing the prudence of the decision. True, his rhetoric had a corrosive effect on our civil society and discourse. But, ten years into our confrontation with Islamic extremism we should be able to counter a two-bit sophist like al-Awlaki, tie him into rhetorical knots, and make him such an easy punching bag that Muslims worldwide start to wonder if he is really a CIA plant!

Instead, in killing him we effectively reinforce his narrative of the Muslim world being subjected by cruel American power. Additionally, the fact that we cannot counter this rhetoric tells Muslim radicals that there is something hollow in our strength – that it is all technological but not based on beliefs.

Let me reiterate, I’m NOT saying this is true, only that it can be perceived this way!

It is true that al-Awlaki was not merely a spokesman. He was linked to active plots. But tactically, targeting him may have been a mistake. He could have become an involuntary honey pot. Contact with him should have been the trigger to investigate Nidal Hassan more carefully.

There are two important counter-arguments. David Ignatius wrote that the strike told radical leaders around that world that targeting the US was not wise but that otherwise we don’t want to get involved in internal matters and “potential increase anti-U.S. sentiment.” It is a fair, but sadly limited argument.

First, the resources the United States is focusing on preventing attacks here is out of proportion to the danger. The real danger is state collapse and increased radicalism across the greater Middle East. Yemen, Egypt, and Pakistan are all poor countries with fast-growing populations, strategic locations, and very negative social trends. The corrosive ideology of radical Islam only further exacerbates these problems. Drones have limited utility in addressing these problems, whereas an ideological counter-campaign is absolutely needed.

The second argument is more difficult. Al-Awlaki’s great success was radicalizing Nidal Hassan who went on to murder 13 fellow soldiers. In targeting him, the message was being sent to American men and women in uniform that these casualties were being avenged – that someone linked to killing American soldiers at a base in the US where they should have been safe – would not be permitted to escape. This is a fair argument. Societies at war demand a great deal of their armed forces and sometimes policies that support them are necessary. Israel’s lopsided deal for the release of Gilad Shalit falls in the same category. Israel is a society of citizen-soldiers and the message that the state will do everything possible to retrieve a captured soldier is necessary to maintain morale and the complex bonds between those who serve, the population at large, and the political leadership.

The drones are amazing technological achievements that serve a valuable role in the battle against Islamic extremism. But, they also call to mind that when one holds a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.

Assessing Iran's Hollywood Style Terror Plot

There has been lots of speculation about the recent strange Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to Washington. Iran is a world champion at long-distance strategic terror – as I’ve written before about the assassination campaign in Europe and the terrible 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires.

But this one seems strange. Wire transfers and cell-phone calls can be monitored and it was not done through a complex chain of cutout. The hallmark of previous Iranian terror is excellent tradecraft, and the reports so far do not show much sign of that.

Also, the idea of hiring a Mexican cartel to carry out an assassination is good Hollywood fodder. The Secretary of State is wrong when she says, “You can’t make this stuff up.” In fact it is the stock and trade of a decent screenwriter. But outsourcing terror is not an easy thing to do. First, why would a Mexican cartel want to get involved in something like this, they could easily makes millions a month on drug-trafficking – so why bother with a far-fetched plot for only $1.5 million? Further, a plot like this could potentially bring enormous, negative attention on them. On the Iranian side, they must know that criminals can be umm… unreliable.

Also, criminal gangs, just like terrorist groups, know that they are subject to infiltration and consequently are careful in whom they do business with and how they do it.

In the past I’ve speculated that Iran may have lost its long-range terror capability, which is one reason they haven’t avenged the death of Hezbollah operations chief Imad Mughniyeh.

An attempt to hire a Mexican cartel would further support this hypothesis, but I did not argue that they had lost their long-range terror abilities because they were stupid.

One possibility is that this “plot” was something of a rogue operation designed by one Iranian faction to embarrass another – possibly linked to efforts to improve relations to the US and/or Saudi Arabia. Under this scenario, even the plot’s failure is a success because now any quiet negotiations are quashed in their infancy. But I can’t speculate on who in Iran would be up to this – Iranian politics is a bit of a black box and, to paraphrase Teddy Roosevelt (discussing looking after his daughter Alice), “I can follow Iranian politics or I can have a life. I can’t do both.”