Continuing Strategic Ripples of Mumbai Attacks

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s address to the chief minister’s Conference on Internal Security earlier this week was primarily focused on the nuts and bolts of internal security. But it also harshly criticized Pakistan, stating “there is enough evidence to show that, given the sophistication and military precision of the attack it must have had the support of some official agencies in Pakistan.” Although this assertion remains publicly unproven (the dossier about the attacks submitted by India to Pakistan does not support it, and it is debatable whether the attack’s sophistication required state sponsorship) Singh’s statement showed that, beyond the carnage, Lashkar-e-Taiba’s assault on Mumbai had another victim – the Indian-Pakistan peace process. Singh is a pragmatic and capable politician who had been open to improving relations with Pakistan. But Singh faces domestic hardliners (and, given the ISI’s long history of links to LeT and other Islamist groups in Pakistan, their suspicion is not unwarranted.) Now, in the wake of the Mumbai massacre, Singh will be unable to make even the smallest concessions. This is not merely a local problem. Pakistan is a geopolitical timebomb, and key to defusing it is improving relations with Pakistan and India.

Pakistan, which provides the key routes into Afghanistan, is a nuclear-armed state on the verge of a financial meltdown, while fighting a major Islamist insurgency. However, the Pakistani leaders, military and civilian (see this report on a recent interview with the ISI chief), have recognized that a better relationship with India is essential to stabilizing Pakistan. The conflict in Kashmir has vastly distorted Pakistan’s development, and been a driver in the rise of radical Islam (including Lashkar-e-Taiba – which the ISI fostered as a proxy for fighting in Kashmir) in Pakistan.

An immediate consequence of the heightened tensions between India and Pakistan post-Mumbai was Pakistan’s shifting troops away from the Islamist insurgency in the tribal areas to face an Indian troop build-up. (In fairness, Pakistan continued extensive operations against the Islamists in the tribal regions.) But the real impact of Pakistan’s conflict with India is much deeper. Pakistan is outmatched by India in quantity (India is about six times more populous than Pakistan) and in quality as India’s economy is growing faster. Worst, Pakistan has long borders with little strategic depth. In an effort to compensate for these disadvantages, an inordinate amount of Pakistan’s national wealth has gone to the military. This has robbed crucial sectors such as economic development, infrastructure, and education. This has contributed to the growth of radical madrassas, high levels of unemployment, and a creaking infrastructure in which major cities experience regular blackouts.

In this unstable environment, a group like Lashkar-e-Taiba can flourish. While a stable and prosperous Pakistan – which has placed its rivalry with India on a backburner – is an anathema to the radical Islamists. Vice President-elect Biden is currently visiting Pakistan (in his capacity as chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee – where he spearheaded the Biden-Lugar plan to provide $15 billion in aid to Pakistan over the next 10 years). This is a strong indication that South Asia will be front and center for the incoming administration - as it needs to be.

Gupta as Surgeon-General: Vice President of Health

The Surgeon General is a position not unlike the vice presidency. It has prestige and profile, but not much power – beyond that of the bully pulpit.

In that light, appointing CNN correspondent/neurosurgeon Sanjay Gupta would be an interesting move. It is obviously an effort to revive the role as a spokesperson on national health issues, a la C. Everett Koop. Gupta, as a TV journalist already has the skills for this role. He also has a dash of Washington experience, having done some writing for Hillary as a White House Fellow. No doubt Gupta hopes to play a substantive policy role as well, he is supposed to sit on the Daschle led healthcare reform commission.

Gupta, having risen to the top of two very difficult professions, is obviously blazingly smart, focused, and capable. But will that translate into his being an effective policy player – as opposed to primarily being a spokesman? Being smart often is not enough, Bill Frist, a Harvard and Princeton-educated cardiac surgeon was less effective as Senate Majority Leader than former Ole Miss cheerleader Trent Lott.

More important to playing a substantive role, is the reality that the Surgeon General has no institutional base. His role is symbolic rather than administrative. (He heads the Public Health Service Commission Corps, which employs over 6000 medical professionals that perform duties in various federal agencies but is not really an agency in its own right.) On a panel with heavyweights like HHS Secretary Tom Daschle (who is also technically his boss) he might not be able to play much of a role. Gupta’s high public recognition might give him some base of influence, but that has to be wielded carefully. Floating trial balloons and advocating inside positions via the media can be effective strategies – but insiders who play those cards too often will soon find themselves outsiders.

Or, like most Vice Presidents, could Gupta use the Surgeon General position as a steppingstone? There isn’t much upward mobility for a neurosurgeon-TV star (astronaut maybe?) But if he catches the politics bug, Gupta is young enough, and capable enough that a political career is possible and he could conceivably go far. John Adams said about the Vice Presidency, “In this I am nothing, but I may be everything.” For a Surgeon-General Gupta a more apt line might be, “In this I’m not much, but I could become anything.”

Hitchen's Flawed Vision of New Gaza

In general I am a big fan of Christopher Hitchens and I envy the elegance, force, and clarity of his arguments. I am always impressed, even when I disagree with him, with his uncompromising stands and vast erudition. Often he provides red meat on issues where my own certainty has wavered. But his recent piece on Gaza is off – way off. While unsparing in his criticism of Hamas, but he seems to think that Palestinian elections were a key factor.

…this month is the one where new elections for the Palestinian Authority have to be called by President Mahmoud Abbas, if not actually held. Before the new year, I talked to one or two knowledgeable Palestinians who argued that, under then-present conditions, Hamas had to hope that such elections would not soon take place. Life in Islamic Gaza was not such as to induce ecstatic happiness and prosperity among the populace… It seems improbable that we'll ever know what would have happened in a free vote, but I think it's safe to say that recent events have further postponed the emergence of a democratic and secular alternative among the Palestinians. I even think it's possible that some people in Israel and some other people in Gaza do not want to see the emergence of such a force, but let me not be cynical.

Hitchens was a friend of the late Edaward Said and also of Rashid Khalidi. (The redoubtable Martin Kramer takes on Hitchens overwrought sympathy for Khalidi’s dispossession.)

Said, Khalidi, etc. have long championed the emergence of a secular, progressive Arab movement. But Khalidi has some limitations as a Middle East analyst. For example (see Kramer’s Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle East Studies in America - download it here) he predicted the first Gulf War would be long and bloody (it wasn’t) and, after being wrong on that front he nonetheless boldly predicted that Saddam’s generals would remove him from power to save themselves. Here he demonstrated ignorance of both Iraq’s military and political situation. Despite his experience with the PLO, his take on the worldview of Gaza’s inhabitants seems similarly skewed.

Leaving aside the difficulties of conducting real elections in Gaza (without having to invade to ensure the elections fairness) or the dubious merits of Hamas’ rival Fatah, the idea that the people of Gaza would be secular and progressive is not for real. Gaza is a clan-based society, not dissimilar to the rest of the greater Middle East. The lineage segmentation system that shapes these societies places a premium on personal honor and conflict. Consider this insightful essay (written in April 2000), by a (and possible the) Gaza-based psychiatrist Eyad el-Sirraj (no friend of Israel by any measure) on the role of anger in Palestinian society:

What brings a high-ranking official to beat his superior or even his minister to overrule a decision? Why does a student throw stones at his professors, or at students from another university? How can we explain an assault against a member of the Legislative Council? How can the murder of an oppressed woman be explained? And what about the popularity—[only] sometimes—of the death penalty? And, what is the common denominator between all these and the torture in the [PA] prisons?

….Searching for the reason, I do not ignore the depth of rage that was inflicted on our lives because of the [Israeli] occupation; but I do not want to hang everything on this peg, [a complaint] that is like a broken record in which Zionism, or the great imperialism, or even petty bourgeoisie, are blamed [for everything]. I want to be clear: one of the main reasons is within us, the result of the education in our homes. Aren't you, my dear reader, one of those fathers who are filled with happiness when your beloved two year old child pronounces the expression "... [damn] your father?!" Don't you dance with joy when he proves his virility by beating another child?

….Don't be surprised, my dear, if you see a student beating up his professor, an official beating up his minister, a soldier beating up his parliament member, a teenager beating his mother or killing his sister, or university students fighting with stones and clubs.

We teach our children that it is permitted to express anger with muscle; we even encourage them to do so in the belief that it is part of the meaning of courage and honor. By doing so, we forget the best part of our Arab heritage and Islamic religion, as well as all that is in Christianity: forgiveness, self-control, overcoming feelings of rage, patience, restraint, and using the mind….

Of course, on this front Hitchens has an idée fixe that religion is the root of all evil. But the clan-based social structures have proven tremendously resistant to all forms of modernity (see this article by Stanley Kurtz). Islam is the product of Middle Eastern society, and while Islam may “seal in” the clan values that dominate the region, Islam is not necessarily the origin of these values.

Many analysts, academics, pundits, and policy-makers have bet on a the emergence of a "new" Middle East. While I support this, and remain hopeful, one should carefully consider what the barriers to this reform are and how deeply they are entrenched.

Teddy Roosevelt Meets his Match

Ninety years ago today, Teddy Roosevelt died at his home in Oyster Bay. He was sixty. Besides the grim reaper, there were few forces that could contain TR's energy. As VP he came face to face with two of them.

Theodore Rex did many tremendous things in his fascinating life. He authored dozens of books, was a war hero in the Spanish-American War, governor of New York, and he was an able President who won the Nobel Peace Prize while in office (for negotiating the end of the Russo-Japanese War). With all of this on his resume, it is easy to forget that he was also vice president. He didn't really want to be, he had said,

I would a great deal rather be anything, say professor of history, than Vice-President.

Still, Roosevelt took the job figuring it would set him up for the Presidency (his plans came to fruition early when President McKinley was assassinated in September 1901.) But the Vice Presidency, boring to most politicians, was absolutely painful to a man of Teddy Roosevelt's energies. So he took a vacation during which, according to the Senate Historical Office's invaluable Vice Presidents of the United States, 1789-1993:

The lack of pressing business as vice president allowed Theodore to spend time playing football with his sons and sparring with his tempestuous older daughter, Alice.

It is unclear if these were verbal jousts or actual fisticuffs Teddy would have preferred the latter, especially since Alice became Alice Roosevelt Longworth, the Washington society figure who famously said,

If you haven't got anything nice to say about anybody, come sit next to me.

Alice clearly had her father's number, once remarking

My father always wanted to be the corpse at every funeral, the bride at every wedding and the baby at every christening.

When he became President, TR stated,

I can be President of the United States, or I can attend to Alice. I can't do both.

Fathers of daughters, from King Lear to the present can no doubt relate.

Enough Veep

At a New Year's Eve party I was talking to a few friends in the kitchen. I saw my wife standing in the doorway, about to come in. Then she heard me say, "Vice President" and she turned around and walked out.

Managing Gaza

Israel’s operation in Gaza is reaching a critical point. While talking heads will debate grand strategy, the options are limited. Behind the headlines is the crucial issue of how Israel’s national security process works (or doesn’t – in light of the weaknesses revealed in the 2006 Lebanon war). The next moves will demonstrate whether or not Israel has successfully incorporated the lessons from the failures of the 2006 Lebanon War. This is crucial to re-establishing Israeli deterrence.

Strategic Limitations

A true peace agreement with Hamas is not realistic. A quick scan of clips from Hamas’ al-Aqsa network or of statements by Hamas leaders from the Middle East Media Research Institute - particularly horrible are these scenes from Hamas produced children’s television - should disabuse all but the most useful idiots of any notions of a moderate Hamas.

Fatah is theoretically an alternative to Hamas, but has been eliminated from Gaza and has little credibility or capability.

Military options also do not offer definite solutions. Re-occupying Gaza would require tens of thousands of Israeli troops and likely lead to hundreds of Israeli and thousands of Palestinian casualties. The Israelis do not want to pay this price. It also might not work. Hamas might be able to maintain an ongoing, costly insurgency against the Israelis, which would be perceived as a victory. (Hamas has taken lessons from Hezbollah’s 2006 war with Israel and has prepared and is hoping for an IDF ground campaign.)

Hamas’ supply lines are the tunnels into Egypt. The tunnels themselves are only the endpoint of a vast smuggling network that extends throughout the Sinai and into the heart of Egypt. Egypt is a poor country, the smuggling opportunities are lucrative, and law enforcement is weak. In Kashmir, criminal networks in an impoverished environment have fostered a self-sustaining insurgency. The same situation could occur Gaza.

Ultimately, there are no solutions in Gaza on the immediate horizon. This is a problem Israel will have to manage.

Applying the Lessons of 2006

The Lebanon war of the summer of 2006 revealed shortcomings up and down the Israeli national security system – from inadequately prepared reserve infantry units up to the prime minister’s office. While Hezbollah and its supporters worldwide celebrated the defeat of the vaunted Israeli soldier, the more substantial problems were farther up the line, particularly at the top.

The political and military leadership never defined its goals. Prime Minister Olmert spoke of destroying Hezbollah, but did not consider what it would require to achieve them. The prime minister and the defense minister had limited security experience and the chief of staff was an air force officer who was overly wedded to the efficacy of airpower. The IDF wielded tremendous influence on decision-makers – shutting out Israel’s national security council and other institutions.

There were other problems up and down the chain of command – such as the impact of policing the Palestinians on IDF war-fighting capability and the effects of nouveau military philosophy on the officer corps. But poor decision-making and a lack of clear objectives, combined with Hezbollah’s knack for tactical surprise, created a situation in which Israel appeared to not know what it was doing. This contributed heavily to the image of an Israeli defeat.

In the fighting in Gaza, it is essential that – at the very top – the Israelis establish that they know what they are doing. There are many signs that lessons from Lebanon have been applied. The Gaza operations have been more systematically planned than the Lebanon war, including extensive war-gaming and an effective disinformation effort accompanied by massive intelligence gathering.

This still raises the question of whether or not Israel knows what it is doing. Reportedly, Ehud Barak, the former Chief of Staff and Prime Minister, called Prime Minister Ehud Olmert hours after the Lebanon war began and warned: "It's very important to define how and when you'll end [the war], because the more time goes by, the greater the potential for complications."

Barak is now the Defense Minister and his key statement is that he wishes “to totally change the rules of the game.” That his publicly stated goal is vague does not mean that goals are not established. It likely refers to establishing a framework in which Hamas knows that as rocket fire increases, Israelis will counter with overwhelming force. There will still be some rockets, but they will be a relative few. This would re-establish Israel’s deterrence.

A key part of re-establishing deterrence is showing that Israel can manage its security affairs and not get pulled into disadvantageous situations. This management will be put to the test if, as appears likely, Israel engages in ground operations in Gaza. This ability to manage the national security process (an interest of mine) is essential, as Gaza will not be the last crisis that Israel is forced to manage.

Ontology Writing for Dopes

With a new book out in which my efforts to write an ontology to support my terrorism research was a case study, I thought this presentation that I delivered pretty often about my experience as an ontology writer would be of interest.

Reminder: ontologies help the computer place information in context, allowing it search more efficiently, infer relationships, and ease the use of applications