Salah Ezzedine, a leading Lebanese businessman, turned himself in to Lebanese authorities last week when his large-scale Ponzi scheme collapsed and he declared bankruptcy. This is could be a major blow to Hezbollah, which has already had a very bad year.
Ezzedine was closely tied to Hezbollah and several top Hezbollah leaders personally lost money in investments with him. Now referred to as Hezbollah’s Madoff, he had once been known as the Mughniyeh of money (in reference to Hezbollah’s long-time operations chief Imad Mughniyeh who was killed in a car-bombing in February 2008.)
Ezzedine was well known in Lebanon as a businessman and philanthropist. He ran an organization that arranged trips to Mecca and owned Dar al-Hadi, an Islamic publishing house that published books by senior Hezbollah figures and was visited by former Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati in 2004.
Ezzedine’s companies took major losses when the price of oil began to fall and he reportedly sought to cover these losses by bringing in more investors. His investors not only included major Gulf businessmen (hence the extensive coverage of the case in the Gulf) but also thousands of modest Lebanese Shia. Reportedly people mortgaged their house to invest with Ezzedine and take advantage of his promised high returns.
Implications
This is a double-hit on Hezbollah. First it appears that they have lost a great deal of money (some reports are that it was over $600 million). What’s more, they will be challenged in replacing these lost funds as donors become more wary of donating or investing with Hezbollah.
But there is a second aspect to this. Imagine if Madoff were closely linked with a political party. Even if the party had not done anything wrong, the relationship would have seriously damaged that party’s public standing. Hezbollah was regarded as being a basically clean political party in a country where corruption runs rampant. Further, for Hezbollah to counter this perception they will need to spend money – and they will have far less of it to spread around.
The importance of this loss in public standing should not be underestimated, models of Hezbollah behavior indicate that the organization takes its public standing within Lebanon very seriously – and its disappointing performance in Lebanon’s elections indicates that their public standing in Lebanon is weakening.
The latest reports are that Hezbollah Secretary-General Nasrallah is denying that Hezbollah was linked to the bankruptcy scandal. But it will be tough to persuade people that there was no link, considering the deep ties between Ezzedine and Hezbollah. Ezzedine’s publishing company, Dar al-Hadi was named for Nasrallah’s son Hadi who was killed fighting Israel in 1997.
At the same time, Hezbollah has also failed to avenge the assassination of its operations chief Imad Mughniyeh. Several plots have been disrupted, most recently a plan targeting the IDF chief of staff. Hezbollah seems to have gone from being the “A team of terrorism” to the bad news Bears. Mughniyeh must be turning in his grave.
Showing posts with label Hezbollah. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hezbollah. Show all posts
Tuesday, September 8, 2009
Friday, June 26, 2009
Can Hezbollah Launch Long-Range Terror Attacks?
In his new book Homeland Security, Assessing the First Five Years, former DHS secretary Michael Chertoff argues:
In 1992, exactly one month after Israel assassinated Hezbollah Secretary-General Abbas al-Musawi, the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires was bombed. Two years later, on July 18, 1994 Hezbollah bombed the Jewish communal offices in Buenos Aires, at least partially in response to Israel’s capture of Hezbollah leader Mustafa Dirani on May 21 and a bombing of a Hezbollah training camp on June 2.
In contrast, it has been almost a year and a half since Hezbollah terror master-mind Imad Mughniyeh was assassinated. Hezbollah has threatened revenge against Israel for the assassination of Mughniyeh. But attempts to kidnap Israeli tourists and bomb the Israeli embassy in Baku have been foiled. Azerbaijan borders Iran and Iran has a very large Azerbaijani population, so Hezbollah and its IRGC allies should have had a relatively easy time carrying out an attack.
Has Hezbollah’s ability to launch an attack deteriorated, or is it merely biding its time? In and of itself, this is an important question – but it achieves even greater significance in light of the unstable situation in Iran. One constraint on Western action is the concern of long-range terror by Hezbollah and its allies in the IRGC. If that threat is not be as significant as previously assessed, then one barrier to action is lowered.
Terror International
There is no question that Hezbollah has been one of the most terrorist groups. The bombings and hostage crisis in Lebanon in the 1980s were textbooks cases of how to use terrorism to advance a cause. The 1983 Marine barracks bombing led to the withdrawal of an international peacekeeping force from Beirut – leaving Lebanon as prey for Syria and Iran. Six months earlier a Hezbollah car bomb destroyed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 including about half a dozen experienced CIA Middle East operatives – a blow from which the CIA has never recovered.
Hezbollah attacks were not limited to Lebanon. Besides the Buenos Aires attacks, Iran and Hezbollah worked hand in hand throughout the 1980s to carry out attacks in Europe to advance Iranian interests and eliminate opposition to the regime.
Victims of their Success
Hezbollah’s very effectiveness led to a heavy focus on their operations. Hezbollah’s international terror attacks declined after the 1996 Khobar tower bombing. One reason was that U.S. intelligence outed Iranian intelligence operatives worldwide. According to Jeff Stein’s always informative blog SpyTalk intelligence agencies worldwide have focused on Hezbollah and have scored a number of successes rolling up Hezbollah cells. In addition, in 2007 Ali Resa Asgari, an IRGC commander who had worked closely with Hezbollah defected to the west.
The Weakest Link
Hezbollah is known to have supporters everywhere there is a substantial Lebanese Shiite population (including West Africa, Latin America, Europe, Australia, and the United States.) Cells of Hezbollah operatives committing petty crimes to raise money for the organization have been discovered in Latin America but also in the United States. At the same time, Hezbollah remains an organization with tremendous capabilities. It has money, recruits, overseas supporters, and access to technology. So what Hezbollah capability has been degraded that hampers their international operations?
While Hezbollah has supporters worldwide, this support may have limits. Some of these groups, such as the network of drug traffickers recently arrested in Curacao are in it for the money and their support is limited to financing. This is NOT to downgrade the importance of cracking down on terrorist financing operations, merely to point out that such groups may have limited utility in carrying out terror attacks. Even if they have the motivation to carry out these attacks, they usually lack the skills. Terror attacks require high-level skills at constructing explosives, surveillance of targets, and operational security. In addition, suicide bombings require suicide bombers who need to be indoctrinated.
It would appear that Hezbollah is having some difficulties moving these key personnel without detection. Past attacks have relied heavily on support from Iranian Embassies. These Embassies appear to be carefully monitored by intelligence agencies. While there have been numerous reports of high staffing levels at Iranian Embassies throughout Latin America, the mere fact that these reports are public (to the extent that Iran’s Ambassador to Nicaragua had to publicly deny that the IRGC was operating out of his Embassy) indicates that the Iranians and Hezbollah are no longer able to operate in the shadows.
Implications
The downgrading of Hezbollah’s international reach (if it is true, as this post posits, and not the product of a strategic decision by Hezbollah) has been achieved at a high cost in intelligence resources. Unfortunately, Hezbollah continues to have the motivation to carryout international attacks, and will search for new avenues through which to launch these attacks. Intelligence agencies must remain vigilant. Further, Hezbollah and Iran certainly retain capabilities in Iraq and the Persian Gulf - which are particularly sensitive theaters.
However, Hezbollah is being pulled in a number of directions and the inability to carryout international attacks complicates their situation. In my work modeling Hezbollah at the University of Maryland there is substantial evidence that Hezbollah is sensitive to public opinion in Lebanon. One crucial example is not launching attacks against Israel before elections. It is unclear what Hezbollah will do now that the elections are over, but the fallout from the 2006 as well as Lebanon’s mini-civil war in which Hezbollah fought the government, have tarnished Hezbollah’s reputation. There are some reports that suggest Hezbollah is now facing recruitment difficulties. However, their core constituency and their Iranian sponsors are virulently anti-Israel and will insist that Hezbollah strike at Israel. Unwilling to open a direct front on Israel’s northern border and unable to strike at Israeli targets abroad, Hezbollah will find it difficult to satisfy its constituencies.
Now is the time for a political offensive that exacerbates these tensions and works to deligitimate Hezbollah.
Al-Qaeda and its network are our most serious immediate threat, they may not be our most serious long-term threat….[Hezbollah] has developed capabilities that Al-Qaeda can only dream of, including large quantities of missiles and highly sophisticated explosives.Chertoff’s statement is conventional wisdom among many terrorism experts. Shortly after 9/11 then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated:
Hezbollah may be the 'A-Team of Terrorists' and maybe al-Qaeda is actually the 'B' team.But Hezbollah has not carried out a successful out-of-area attack since the 1996 Khobar strike. Is Hezbollah still capable of carrying out long-range terror attacks?
In 1992, exactly one month after Israel assassinated Hezbollah Secretary-General Abbas al-Musawi, the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires was bombed. Two years later, on July 18, 1994 Hezbollah bombed the Jewish communal offices in Buenos Aires, at least partially in response to Israel’s capture of Hezbollah leader Mustafa Dirani on May 21 and a bombing of a Hezbollah training camp on June 2.
In contrast, it has been almost a year and a half since Hezbollah terror master-mind Imad Mughniyeh was assassinated. Hezbollah has threatened revenge against Israel for the assassination of Mughniyeh. But attempts to kidnap Israeli tourists and bomb the Israeli embassy in Baku have been foiled. Azerbaijan borders Iran and Iran has a very large Azerbaijani population, so Hezbollah and its IRGC allies should have had a relatively easy time carrying out an attack.
Has Hezbollah’s ability to launch an attack deteriorated, or is it merely biding its time? In and of itself, this is an important question – but it achieves even greater significance in light of the unstable situation in Iran. One constraint on Western action is the concern of long-range terror by Hezbollah and its allies in the IRGC. If that threat is not be as significant as previously assessed, then one barrier to action is lowered.
Terror International
There is no question that Hezbollah has been one of the most terrorist groups. The bombings and hostage crisis in Lebanon in the 1980s were textbooks cases of how to use terrorism to advance a cause. The 1983 Marine barracks bombing led to the withdrawal of an international peacekeeping force from Beirut – leaving Lebanon as prey for Syria and Iran. Six months earlier a Hezbollah car bomb destroyed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 including about half a dozen experienced CIA Middle East operatives – a blow from which the CIA has never recovered.
Hezbollah attacks were not limited to Lebanon. Besides the Buenos Aires attacks, Iran and Hezbollah worked hand in hand throughout the 1980s to carry out attacks in Europe to advance Iranian interests and eliminate opposition to the regime.
Victims of their Success
Hezbollah’s very effectiveness led to a heavy focus on their operations. Hezbollah’s international terror attacks declined after the 1996 Khobar tower bombing. One reason was that U.S. intelligence outed Iranian intelligence operatives worldwide. According to Jeff Stein’s always informative blog SpyTalk intelligence agencies worldwide have focused on Hezbollah and have scored a number of successes rolling up Hezbollah cells. In addition, in 2007 Ali Resa Asgari, an IRGC commander who had worked closely with Hezbollah defected to the west.
The Weakest Link
Hezbollah is known to have supporters everywhere there is a substantial Lebanese Shiite population (including West Africa, Latin America, Europe, Australia, and the United States.) Cells of Hezbollah operatives committing petty crimes to raise money for the organization have been discovered in Latin America but also in the United States. At the same time, Hezbollah remains an organization with tremendous capabilities. It has money, recruits, overseas supporters, and access to technology. So what Hezbollah capability has been degraded that hampers their international operations?
While Hezbollah has supporters worldwide, this support may have limits. Some of these groups, such as the network of drug traffickers recently arrested in Curacao are in it for the money and their support is limited to financing. This is NOT to downgrade the importance of cracking down on terrorist financing operations, merely to point out that such groups may have limited utility in carrying out terror attacks. Even if they have the motivation to carry out these attacks, they usually lack the skills. Terror attacks require high-level skills at constructing explosives, surveillance of targets, and operational security. In addition, suicide bombings require suicide bombers who need to be indoctrinated.
It would appear that Hezbollah is having some difficulties moving these key personnel without detection. Past attacks have relied heavily on support from Iranian Embassies. These Embassies appear to be carefully monitored by intelligence agencies. While there have been numerous reports of high staffing levels at Iranian Embassies throughout Latin America, the mere fact that these reports are public (to the extent that Iran’s Ambassador to Nicaragua had to publicly deny that the IRGC was operating out of his Embassy) indicates that the Iranians and Hezbollah are no longer able to operate in the shadows.
Implications
The downgrading of Hezbollah’s international reach (if it is true, as this post posits, and not the product of a strategic decision by Hezbollah) has been achieved at a high cost in intelligence resources. Unfortunately, Hezbollah continues to have the motivation to carryout international attacks, and will search for new avenues through which to launch these attacks. Intelligence agencies must remain vigilant. Further, Hezbollah and Iran certainly retain capabilities in Iraq and the Persian Gulf - which are particularly sensitive theaters.
However, Hezbollah is being pulled in a number of directions and the inability to carryout international attacks complicates their situation. In my work modeling Hezbollah at the University of Maryland there is substantial evidence that Hezbollah is sensitive to public opinion in Lebanon. One crucial example is not launching attacks against Israel before elections. It is unclear what Hezbollah will do now that the elections are over, but the fallout from the 2006 as well as Lebanon’s mini-civil war in which Hezbollah fought the government, have tarnished Hezbollah’s reputation. There are some reports that suggest Hezbollah is now facing recruitment difficulties. However, their core constituency and their Iranian sponsors are virulently anti-Israel and will insist that Hezbollah strike at Israel. Unwilling to open a direct front on Israel’s northern border and unable to strike at Israeli targets abroad, Hezbollah will find it difficult to satisfy its constituencies.
Now is the time for a political offensive that exacerbates these tensions and works to deligitimate Hezbollah.
Friday, August 29, 2008
Aaron Mannes on Covert Radio disussing FARC, Georgia, and the VP and National Security
Covert Radio just posted a podcast where we discuss a number of topics. My perennials, FARC, Chavez, and Hezbollah, but also the implications of Russian moves in Georgia.
We also spent a lot of time discussing my new hobby-horse, the Vice President and the national security process - for more see my other blog - Veep Critique.
We also spent a lot of time discussing my new hobby-horse, the Vice President and the national security process - for more see my other blog - Veep Critique.
Friday, March 7, 2008
Assessing the Jerusalem Attack
The attack on a religious school in Jerusalem yesterday was the first major terror attack in that city since April 2006. There are several aspects of the attack that are worth noting.
First it is a reminder that Palestinian terrorists remain capable, perhaps at a much lower level than at the height of the al-Aqsa Intifada, but deadly capable nonetheless.
Second, the attacks came at a crucial time and place. The location was the Mercaz Harav, a leading religious school associated with Israel’s religious Zionist movement. The attack came both just as peace talks were re-starting also just after an extensive Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip had ended. The attack was celebrated in Gaza as revenge for the Gaza operations.
Third, the attack was reminder of how terrorists adapt when a particular mode of operation is denied them. With increasing difficulty in mounting a suicide bombing, the perpetrators of this attack turned to firearms. This is an old story. After the Entebbe rescue, the PLO dropped airline hijackings from their repertoire and tried to infiltrate Israel from Lebanon. About two decades later, when Hezbollah was having difficulty infiltrating Israel, they sought to infiltrate European members into Israel as tourists to carry out bombings. The rockets from Gaza are due to the difficulties of infiltrating Israel from Gaza and the lack of Israeli targets within Gaza since Israel dismantled its Gaza settlements.
This is not to argue that counter-terror measures are inherently pyrrhic. In many cases denying a terrorist group a tactic is a worthy achievement. But it is a reminder that effective terrorist groups are formidable organizations that are capable of analysis and adaptation.
Finally, there was the claim by the previously unknown “Galilee Freedom Battalions - the Martyrs of Imad Mughniyeh and Martyrs of Gaza” broadcast on Hezbollah’s al-Manar satellite TV channel as a tag line running across the bottom of the screen with no further comment or elaboration.
If this attack was Hezbollah’s response to the assassination of Mughniyah it is only the beginning – more can be expected. Hezbollah has been building capabilities in the West Bank and Gaza as well as links with Hamas and Islamic Jihad for over a decade, so the capability to organize such an attack may exist. If the claim originated with Palestinians it shows the extent to which the Palestinians are identifying with Hezbollah. This is also a worrisome sign.
The inclusion of the Galilee, northern Israel, might imply a Lebanese interest - in which case the claim might have been Lebanese kids sending al-Manar an email and cheering that they got on TV.
First it is a reminder that Palestinian terrorists remain capable, perhaps at a much lower level than at the height of the al-Aqsa Intifada, but deadly capable nonetheless.
Second, the attacks came at a crucial time and place. The location was the Mercaz Harav, a leading religious school associated with Israel’s religious Zionist movement. The attack came both just as peace talks were re-starting also just after an extensive Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip had ended. The attack was celebrated in Gaza as revenge for the Gaza operations.
Third, the attack was reminder of how terrorists adapt when a particular mode of operation is denied them. With increasing difficulty in mounting a suicide bombing, the perpetrators of this attack turned to firearms. This is an old story. After the Entebbe rescue, the PLO dropped airline hijackings from their repertoire and tried to infiltrate Israel from Lebanon. About two decades later, when Hezbollah was having difficulty infiltrating Israel, they sought to infiltrate European members into Israel as tourists to carry out bombings. The rockets from Gaza are due to the difficulties of infiltrating Israel from Gaza and the lack of Israeli targets within Gaza since Israel dismantled its Gaza settlements.
This is not to argue that counter-terror measures are inherently pyrrhic. In many cases denying a terrorist group a tactic is a worthy achievement. But it is a reminder that effective terrorist groups are formidable organizations that are capable of analysis and adaptation.
Finally, there was the claim by the previously unknown “Galilee Freedom Battalions - the Martyrs of Imad Mughniyeh and Martyrs of Gaza” broadcast on Hezbollah’s al-Manar satellite TV channel as a tag line running across the bottom of the screen with no further comment or elaboration.
If this attack was Hezbollah’s response to the assassination of Mughniyah it is only the beginning – more can be expected. Hezbollah has been building capabilities in the West Bank and Gaza as well as links with Hamas and Islamic Jihad for over a decade, so the capability to organize such an attack may exist. If the claim originated with Palestinians it shows the extent to which the Palestinians are identifying with Hezbollah. This is also a worrisome sign.
The inclusion of the Galilee, northern Israel, might imply a Lebanese interest - in which case the claim might have been Lebanese kids sending al-Manar an email and cheering that they got on TV.
Wednesday, February 27, 2008
Proof of Mughniyah's Evil
So I just found a terrific blog ...Or Does it Explode? Inside the struggle for civil rights in the Middle East. Good stuff all around, but what particularly caught my eye was learning that Imad Mughniyeh's son Jihad appears to be a Yankees fan. Bronx Bombers suddenly takes on a sinister meaning.
I'll leave it to some aspiring comparative lit prof to deconstruct the meaning of this in terms of cultural hegemony, post-modern irony, and globalization. My own interpretation is simpler.
I've written before that the New York Yankees are evil. This seals it.
Now to get cracking on a network graph linking Mughniyeh to George Steinbrenner.
I'll leave it to some aspiring comparative lit prof to deconstruct the meaning of this in terms of cultural hegemony, post-modern irony, and globalization. My own interpretation is simpler.
I've written before that the New York Yankees are evil. This seals it.
Now to get cracking on a network graph linking Mughniyeh to George Steinbrenner.
Wednesday, February 13, 2008
After Mughniyah: Will Hezbollah Retaliate?
Long-time Hezbollah operations director Imad Mughniyah has been a seminal figure in the evolution of modern terrorism. He has links to Arafat and bin Laden, and is believed to have masterminded suicide vehicle bombings in Beirut, Argentina, and Saudi Arabia. His demise by car bomb in Damascus is just (and fitting). It is an open question as to whether or not it will prove to be a major body blow or inspire revenge attacks.
There may be reason to worry, but it is also possible that this was the best possible time to target Mughniyah.
Pyrrhic Victory?
Assassinating Mughniyah was an impressive operation. Israel (the most likely actor) managed to penetrate the notoriously difficult Hezbollah security network to get to Mughniyah and they carried out an operation in the heart of an Arab capital. Of course, many observers have noted that Israel’s assassination of Abu Jihad in 1988 was an impressive operation, but did little to stymie the First Intifada.
Formal studies of the targeted killing strategy are sparse – it is clear that some groups decline when their leaders are removed (Aum Shinrikyo, Sendero Luminoso, and Action Directe – to name a few.) Other groups are damaged, but come back – such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which was hobbled after its leader Fathi Shqaqi was assassinated in Malta in 1995. PIJ made a comeback when it became an Iranian proxy, closely allied with Hezbollah.
Other groups are motivated by the death and capture of their leaders. Baader-Meinhof in Germany is one example. Hezbollah is another. On February 17, 1992, Israel assassinated Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Abbas Musawi. Hezbollah responded on March 17, 1992 by striking Israel’s Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 and wounding 252. On May 21, 1994 Israel captured Hezbollah leader Mustafa Dirani and on June 2, 1994 Israel bombed a Hezbollah training camp in eastern Lebanon. On July 18, 1994 Hezbollah responded by bombing the Argentine Jewish community center (AMIA), killing 85 and wounding over 200.
The key factors in whether or not a group will fold or adapt or retaliate after losing a top leader are the group’s strength, leadership, and adaptability. Unfortunately, Hezbollah is strong in every category. In raw numbers, they are believed to have hundreds of core members and thousands of affiliated members. Beyond numbers they have secure physical and financial bases. While Nasrallah is the Secretary-General and major face to the world, Hezbollah is run by a council and has replaced its leadership before. It is not a group that relies entirely on a major charismatic figure like Aum Shinrikyo. Finally, Hezbollah has proven its adaptability time and again – developing new tactics, expanding into new businesses, and developing new means to propagate its message, including a satellite channel and video games.
Finally, Hezbollah has a powerful patron in Iran, which has advised and guided it since its inception. If Hezbollah and its patron have not prepared a deep bench of operatives to replace Mughniyah then they are very stupid. Does anyone believe that Hezbollah and Iran are stupid?
On the Other Hand
While there is reason to believe that Hezbollah will try something, there are also mitigating factors. Potential Hezbollah targets are also adaptable, and the memories of 1992 and 1994 remain strong. In addition Israel’s demonstrated ability to penetrate Syria with virtual impunity could lead the Syrians to check potential Hezbollah strikes. Finally, Hezbollah itself may have to check any efforts at retaliation. Research I am doing at the University of Maryland modeling terrorist group behavior indicates that Hezbollah can be very sensitive to the political situation in Lebanon. They have learned from experience. In spring 1996 Israel and Hezbollah fought a bloody campaign in which many Lebanese civilians were killed. While Israel was held responsible, Hezbollah lost two seats in the elections later that year.
The political situation in Lebanon is very delicate, and many Lebanese leaders are becoming increasingly critical of Hezbollah. For example, Druse leader and March 14 movement figure Walid Jumblatt recently called Hezbollah a “totalitarian party.” Hezbollah wants to maintain and expand its power in Lebanon, and to do so it cannot completely alienate important Lebanese constituencies.
Taking these factors into account, this may have been an ideal time for the Israelis to remind their enemies of their capabilities and serve justice to one of the world's most wanted terrorists. Nonetheless, the prospect of a retaliatory strike cannot be ignored. If it comes, it will probably be outside the region. Direct attacks on Israel from Lebanon could invite retaliations in Lebanon which would isolate Hezbollah even further in the current Presidential stand-off. Israeli institutions worldwide will undoubtedly be on high alert. Hopefully Jewish communal institutions and U.S. military bases (the other favored Hezbollah targets) will also tighten security.
One thing is certain. This attack does not put Hezbollah out of business and it will undoubtedly review its internal security carefully and identify how crucial information about Mughniyah’s whereabouts leaked. About 35 years ago, Fatah faced the same problem of protecting its leaders from Israeli assassins. The response was to establish an elite bodyguard that became known as Force 17. It was with Force 17 that a young Imad Mughniyah began his long and terrible career.
There may be reason to worry, but it is also possible that this was the best possible time to target Mughniyah.
Pyrrhic Victory?
Assassinating Mughniyah was an impressive operation. Israel (the most likely actor) managed to penetrate the notoriously difficult Hezbollah security network to get to Mughniyah and they carried out an operation in the heart of an Arab capital. Of course, many observers have noted that Israel’s assassination of Abu Jihad in 1988 was an impressive operation, but did little to stymie the First Intifada.
Formal studies of the targeted killing strategy are sparse – it is clear that some groups decline when their leaders are removed (Aum Shinrikyo, Sendero Luminoso, and Action Directe – to name a few.) Other groups are damaged, but come back – such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which was hobbled after its leader Fathi Shqaqi was assassinated in Malta in 1995. PIJ made a comeback when it became an Iranian proxy, closely allied with Hezbollah.
Other groups are motivated by the death and capture of their leaders. Baader-Meinhof in Germany is one example. Hezbollah is another. On February 17, 1992, Israel assassinated Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Abbas Musawi. Hezbollah responded on March 17, 1992 by striking Israel’s Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 and wounding 252. On May 21, 1994 Israel captured Hezbollah leader Mustafa Dirani and on June 2, 1994 Israel bombed a Hezbollah training camp in eastern Lebanon. On July 18, 1994 Hezbollah responded by bombing the Argentine Jewish community center (AMIA), killing 85 and wounding over 200.
The key factors in whether or not a group will fold or adapt or retaliate after losing a top leader are the group’s strength, leadership, and adaptability. Unfortunately, Hezbollah is strong in every category. In raw numbers, they are believed to have hundreds of core members and thousands of affiliated members. Beyond numbers they have secure physical and financial bases. While Nasrallah is the Secretary-General and major face to the world, Hezbollah is run by a council and has replaced its leadership before. It is not a group that relies entirely on a major charismatic figure like Aum Shinrikyo. Finally, Hezbollah has proven its adaptability time and again – developing new tactics, expanding into new businesses, and developing new means to propagate its message, including a satellite channel and video games.
Finally, Hezbollah has a powerful patron in Iran, which has advised and guided it since its inception. If Hezbollah and its patron have not prepared a deep bench of operatives to replace Mughniyah then they are very stupid. Does anyone believe that Hezbollah and Iran are stupid?
On the Other Hand
While there is reason to believe that Hezbollah will try something, there are also mitigating factors. Potential Hezbollah targets are also adaptable, and the memories of 1992 and 1994 remain strong. In addition Israel’s demonstrated ability to penetrate Syria with virtual impunity could lead the Syrians to check potential Hezbollah strikes. Finally, Hezbollah itself may have to check any efforts at retaliation. Research I am doing at the University of Maryland modeling terrorist group behavior indicates that Hezbollah can be very sensitive to the political situation in Lebanon. They have learned from experience. In spring 1996 Israel and Hezbollah fought a bloody campaign in which many Lebanese civilians were killed. While Israel was held responsible, Hezbollah lost two seats in the elections later that year.
The political situation in Lebanon is very delicate, and many Lebanese leaders are becoming increasingly critical of Hezbollah. For example, Druse leader and March 14 movement figure Walid Jumblatt recently called Hezbollah a “totalitarian party.” Hezbollah wants to maintain and expand its power in Lebanon, and to do so it cannot completely alienate important Lebanese constituencies.
Taking these factors into account, this may have been an ideal time for the Israelis to remind their enemies of their capabilities and serve justice to one of the world's most wanted terrorists. Nonetheless, the prospect of a retaliatory strike cannot be ignored. If it comes, it will probably be outside the region. Direct attacks on Israel from Lebanon could invite retaliations in Lebanon which would isolate Hezbollah even further in the current Presidential stand-off. Israeli institutions worldwide will undoubtedly be on high alert. Hopefully Jewish communal institutions and U.S. military bases (the other favored Hezbollah targets) will also tighten security.
One thing is certain. This attack does not put Hezbollah out of business and it will undoubtedly review its internal security carefully and identify how crucial information about Mughniyah’s whereabouts leaked. About 35 years ago, Fatah faced the same problem of protecting its leaders from Israeli assassins. The response was to establish an elite bodyguard that became known as Force 17. It was with Force 17 that a young Imad Mughniyah began his long and terrible career.
Friday, January 25, 2008
Geopolitics of Gaza
In the coverage of the breach of the Gaza border, the focus has been on the increased threat to Israel. While there is little question that terrorists will acquire new capabilities and use them against Israel, their gaze may turn to a nearby but softer target.
In his memoirs Knights under the Prophet’s Banner: Meditations on the Jihadist Movement, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri observed:
Now, in Gaza, the enemies of the Egyptian regime finally have the secure base they have long sought. There are reports of Palestinian terror cells affiliating with al-Qaeda as well as international “volunteers” filtering in. However, al-Qaeda is not the gravest Gaza-based threat to Egypt. Hamas itself has proven to be a formidable organization. The destruction of the Gaza barrier was a formidable technical achievement that required months of careful preparation. But the political preparation was also carefully managed. Hamas successfully advanced its story of deprivation at the hands of an Israeli blockade (in fact, Israel consistently allowed necessities through and only cut off fuel in response to a barrage of rocket attacks). But Hamas also provoked a border incident with the Egyptian border police earlier in the week. In the incident they used a tactic that they had often used against Israel, fomenting a riot and then shooting from among the mob. The Israelis developed counter-measures (particularly snipers), but as this video shows the Egyptians did not.
These images, broadcast live on al-Jazeera, helped inspire large-scale demonstrations orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which has close relations with the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza (which is better known as Hamas.)
Although the Egyptian government insists it will restore order on the border, the fact that another section of the wall has been destroyed since, makes this unlikely. Egypt was outmaneuvered by Hamas and does not have the stomach for a real crackdown if it also means confronting its domestic Islamist opposition. Mubarak is paying the price for his long double game of Islamists at home and abroad.
Hamas however is also a key component of the Hezbollah-Iran-Syria-Hamas axis (helpfully dubbed HISH by Barry Rubin). Iran and Hezbollah link with Hamas are deep and extensive. They have trained together; their leaderships are in regular contact and Hezbollah personnel have operated in Gaza for several years. In addition, Iran has established a network of hospitals in the West Bank.
Certainly the terrorist threat to Israel will increase. Imported rockets can reach Ashkelon, an important Israeli port and industrial center. While Gaza has been a poor base for suicide bombs against Israel, Israeli security is now worried about suicide attacks from Gaza entering Israel via the Sinai. However, as serious as these threats are, they can be contained.
However, a new base of operations against Egypt could have vast geopolitical implications. Egypt has a fragile economy, frustrated populace with a large Islamist movement, and an aging leadership. There have already been terror attacks in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula with Gaza links. Even if the regime is not overthrown, HISH will acquire substantial leverage over Egypt, and further the penetration of radical Islam into the largest Arab state, while acquiring a staging ground into the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, and beyond.
In his memoirs Knights under the Prophet’s Banner: Meditations on the Jihadist Movement, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri observed:
The problem of finding a secure base for jihad activity in Egypt used to occupy me a lot, in view of the [activity against us] by the security forces and because of Egypt’s flat terrain, which made government control easy, for the River Nile runs in its narrow valley between two deserts that have no vegetation or water. Such a terrain made guerilla warfare in Egypt impossible…Because of the difficulties in overthrowing the Egyptian government, Zawahiri and many other Egyptian Islamists moved to Afghanistan where they coalesced around Osama bin Laden and his nascent al-Qaeda movement, and helped turn al-Qaeda’s focus to the backer of the corrupt Arab regimes – the United States.
Now, in Gaza, the enemies of the Egyptian regime finally have the secure base they have long sought. There are reports of Palestinian terror cells affiliating with al-Qaeda as well as international “volunteers” filtering in. However, al-Qaeda is not the gravest Gaza-based threat to Egypt. Hamas itself has proven to be a formidable organization. The destruction of the Gaza barrier was a formidable technical achievement that required months of careful preparation. But the political preparation was also carefully managed. Hamas successfully advanced its story of deprivation at the hands of an Israeli blockade (in fact, Israel consistently allowed necessities through and only cut off fuel in response to a barrage of rocket attacks). But Hamas also provoked a border incident with the Egyptian border police earlier in the week. In the incident they used a tactic that they had often used against Israel, fomenting a riot and then shooting from among the mob. The Israelis developed counter-measures (particularly snipers), but as this video shows the Egyptians did not.
These images, broadcast live on al-Jazeera, helped inspire large-scale demonstrations orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which has close relations with the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza (which is better known as Hamas.)
Although the Egyptian government insists it will restore order on the border, the fact that another section of the wall has been destroyed since, makes this unlikely. Egypt was outmaneuvered by Hamas and does not have the stomach for a real crackdown if it also means confronting its domestic Islamist opposition. Mubarak is paying the price for his long double game of Islamists at home and abroad.
Hamas however is also a key component of the Hezbollah-Iran-Syria-Hamas axis (helpfully dubbed HISH by Barry Rubin). Iran and Hezbollah link with Hamas are deep and extensive. They have trained together; their leaderships are in regular contact and Hezbollah personnel have operated in Gaza for several years. In addition, Iran has established a network of hospitals in the West Bank.
Certainly the terrorist threat to Israel will increase. Imported rockets can reach Ashkelon, an important Israeli port and industrial center. While Gaza has been a poor base for suicide bombs against Israel, Israeli security is now worried about suicide attacks from Gaza entering Israel via the Sinai. However, as serious as these threats are, they can be contained.
However, a new base of operations against Egypt could have vast geopolitical implications. Egypt has a fragile economy, frustrated populace with a large Islamist movement, and an aging leadership. There have already been terror attacks in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula with Gaza links. Even if the regime is not overthrown, HISH will acquire substantial leverage over Egypt, and further the penetration of radical Islam into the largest Arab state, while acquiring a staging ground into the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, and beyond.
Monday, December 24, 2007
Ghosts of Iranian Terror Future
Although there are signs that Iran is tamping down violence in Iraq there are also worrying signs that Iran is ramping up for another round of international terror. Israeli intelligence has noted that Iranian Embassies are in Venezuela and Nicaragua have over 30 staffers each – far out of proportion to the scale of relations between these countries - and is expanding its diplomatic presence throughout the region. The Iranian presence in Nicaragua has become so extensive that Iran’s Ambassador in Managua actually gave an interview denying there were any Pasdaran in Nicaragua (a sure sign that they are in fact there.) There have also been a number of incidents in the United States with the Iranian mission at the UN. Every country uses its Embassy for a bit of espionage. But the Iranian tradition far exceeds the norm. Considering the long involvement of Iranian diplomats with terrorism, US military claims of Iranian diplomats engaged in inappropriate activities in Iraq should be given some credence.
This Iranian network will be well supported by Hezbollah’s extensive international fundraising network. Besides the well-documented Hezbollah activities in the Tri-Border region drug dealing and counterfeiting cells with Hezbollah links have been found recently in Ecuador and Los Angeles. There are major centers of Lebanese Shia in Isle Margherita in Venezuela and in East Africa. Hezbollah works along family connections so where there are large numbers of Lebanese Shia, there is sure to be Hezbollah.
While the respite in violence in Iraq is certainly welcome – and hopefully does represent a real policy shift – Iran’s capacity to strike worldwide remains and Western abilities to forecast Iranian intentions are notably weak.
This Iranian network will be well supported by Hezbollah’s extensive international fundraising network. Besides the well-documented Hezbollah activities in the Tri-Border region drug dealing and counterfeiting cells with Hezbollah links have been found recently in Ecuador and Los Angeles. There are major centers of Lebanese Shia in Isle Margherita in Venezuela and in East Africa. Hezbollah works along family connections so where there are large numbers of Lebanese Shia, there is sure to be Hezbollah.
While the respite in violence in Iraq is certainly welcome – and hopefully does represent a real policy shift – Iran’s capacity to strike worldwide remains and Western abilities to forecast Iranian intentions are notably weak.
Friday, December 21, 2007
Ghosts of Iranian Terror Past
The Buenos Aires bombings were a particularly bloody and long-range operation but it was not, an isolated instance of Iran combining diplomacy and terror. Hezbollah was founded by the Iranian Ambassador to Damascus, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi (google “Father of Hezbollah” and his name is the most frequent.) In 1985-6 a series of bombs in Paris were linked to the Iranian Embassy. When French authorities tried to question Wahid Gordji, a translator at the Iranian Embassy in Paris an armed standoff ensued (ultimately Gordji was questioned briefly and then permitted to flee to Iran.)
In 1992 four Iranian Kurdish leaders were assassinated at a Berlin restaurant called Mykonos. Ultimately the trial implicated Rafsanjani, Khamenei, foreign minister Velayati, and intelligence chief Ali Fallahian. The gunmen, again, were Hezbollah members. The coordinator for this attack, Kazem Darabi, was performing the cultural attaché function in Germany but did not have diplomatic immunity. He was tried and sentenced for his crime. Iran learned its lesson, Rabbani (coordinator of the AMIA attack) was granted diplomatic immunity in March 1994 (only four months before the attack) even though he had been in Argentina for 11 years. It is difficult to believe these operations were carried out without official approval from the top.
All of these attacks (and there were others) furthered Iranian international objectives. After the Paris bombings the French released frozen Iranian funds, previously the French had strongly backed the Iraqis in the Iran-Iraq war. The Iranian Kurdish leaders murdered in the Mykonos affair were key opposition leaders. The 1992 Embassy bombing in Buenos Aires was to avenge Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah chief Abbas Musawi.
This period of high profile Iranian terrorism ended in 1996 after the Khobar bombing. Richard Clarke, who was counter-terror chief at the NSC at the time, stated that the United States responded to Iran through covert action. This may have been outing Iranian agents around the world, which would have hurt their international terror infrastructure.
The shift was tactical (perhaps like the change in the nuclear weaponization program). The regime remained involved in terrorism, just in different arenas and more often through proxies. Tehran is still Hezbollah’s lead sponsor, has provided training and logistical support to al-Qaeda (and a range of Sunni Islamists), and become the leading sponsor of Palestinian terror.
In 1992 four Iranian Kurdish leaders were assassinated at a Berlin restaurant called Mykonos. Ultimately the trial implicated Rafsanjani, Khamenei, foreign minister Velayati, and intelligence chief Ali Fallahian. The gunmen, again, were Hezbollah members. The coordinator for this attack, Kazem Darabi, was performing the cultural attaché function in Germany but did not have diplomatic immunity. He was tried and sentenced for his crime. Iran learned its lesson, Rabbani (coordinator of the AMIA attack) was granted diplomatic immunity in March 1994 (only four months before the attack) even though he had been in Argentina for 11 years. It is difficult to believe these operations were carried out without official approval from the top.
All of these attacks (and there were others) furthered Iranian international objectives. After the Paris bombings the French released frozen Iranian funds, previously the French had strongly backed the Iraqis in the Iran-Iraq war. The Iranian Kurdish leaders murdered in the Mykonos affair were key opposition leaders. The 1992 Embassy bombing in Buenos Aires was to avenge Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah chief Abbas Musawi.
This period of high profile Iranian terrorism ended in 1996 after the Khobar bombing. Richard Clarke, who was counter-terror chief at the NSC at the time, stated that the United States responded to Iran through covert action. This may have been outing Iranian agents around the world, which would have hurt their international terror infrastructure.
The shift was tactical (perhaps like the change in the nuclear weaponization program). The regime remained involved in terrorism, just in different arenas and more often through proxies. Tehran is still Hezbollah’s lead sponsor, has provided training and logistical support to al-Qaeda (and a range of Sunni Islamists), and become the leading sponsor of Palestinian terror.
Friday, December 14, 2007
AMIA & the NIE
The NIE on Iran’s nuclear weapons program has sparked an ongoing controversy about the nature of the Iranian regime and its intentions. While the Iranian regime appears to have halted its nuclear weaponization program in 2003, it continues to research ballistic missiles and, most importantly, acquire fissile material (which is the hardest part of building a nuclear weapon.) Putting aside the inherent uncertainty of any intelligence estimate, it is quite feasible that scaling back the weaponization program was a tactical move because the regime was having technical difficulties. The centrifuges used to enrich uranium are sophisticated and fragile – running thousands of them for long periods is no small technical challenge. These technical challenges are not insurmountable so the real question remains, “What is the nature of the Iranian regime?”
Iran’s sponsorship and execution of the AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, should be a reminder that this is a regime that uses terrorism as tool of diplomacy.
AMIA, the communal offices of the Argentine Jewish community, was struck by a massive suicide truck bomb on July 18, 1994 – 85 were killed and over 200 injured. Iran and Hezbollah were suspected from the beginning. The Argentine investigation has had several false starts and has been mired in corruption, but in recent years has gotten on track. Last month Interpol voted overwhelmingly to issue a red letter calling for the arrest of five Iranians (along with Hezbollah’s external operations chief Imad Mughniyah) on the basis of the Argentine investigation. The publicly available report on the AMIA bombing offers tremendous insight into the Iranian regime’s modus operandi and worldview.
Below are two network graphs (for more on the graphs and my research at the University of Maryland see the end of the post). The first graph illustrates the web of interconnecting people and events that carried out the bombing. The second graph is the network linked to Mohsen Rabbani, the cultural affairs attaché at the Iranian Embassy who was the operations coordinator for the attack.
Graph of Events Linked to the AMIA Bombing
Network Graph of Mohsen Rabbani - Operations Chief for the AMIA Bombing
In the first graph, red nodes represent people and blue square nodes are events. The blue lines (edges in network graph lingo) represent a person’s involvement in an event (dotted lines represent uncertainty as to whether a person participated in an event) while the yellow edges represent events that came before the central event (in this graph the AMIA bombing.) A few things become apparent, particularly the central role of Rabbani in pulling the attack together and the number of Iranian diplomats who left Latin America just prior to the attack.
The web of events helps shed light on Rabbani’s network graph. The yellow lines linked to Rabbani indicate the diplomats serving at Iran’s Embassy in Argentina. The dark blue edges linking Rabbani and several others, including Mughniyeh, represent the individuals named in the Interpol letter. In this graph the light blue lines are particularly important, they represent the people who were in an event together. The main tangle of blue that includes Rabbani and also then (and possibly future) Iranian President Rafsanjani, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and then intelligence chief Ali Fallahian is the planning session in which the decision to bomb AMIA was made that reportedly took place nearly a year before the bombing on August 14, 1993 in the Iranian city of Mashad.
Many of the light blue edges represent specific events linked to the bombing. Carlos Alberto Telleldin was the man unfortunate enough to sell Rabbani the used Renault Trafic van used in the bombing. Rabbani had been visiting rental agencies for some time looking for a similar vehicle. There was a web of calls between Rabbani and the Tri-Border region, where Mughniyeh had established coordinating cell. That was apparently where the suicide bomber, Ibrahim Hussein Berro was prepared for the task. The light blue edges between Berro and his brothers Assad and Hussein represent the phone calls he reportedly made to them in his final moments. The gray lines linked to Rabbani represent the web of mosques and business fronts he helped establish in Buenos Aires. Rabbani had been based there since 1983 and had built an extensive network, which also bombed the Israeli Embassy to Argentina in 1992.
Looking at the graph, the central role of Hezbollah’s operations chief Mughniyeh in international terrorism becomes evident. The prominent dark blue cluster represents Hezbollah’s leadership. The smaller clusters represent his links to al-Qaeda (Mughniyeh met bin Laden in the mid-1990s and established an al-Qaeda-Hezbollah alliance) and his links to Fatah (Mughniyeh got his start in Arafat’s praetorian guard – Force 17.)
The overall story told by these graphs is of Iran using its Embassy as a base for a terror attack and working seamlessly with Hezbollah to carry out a complex operation on the far side of the world. The nuts and bolts of the operation were revealed by forensic evidence such as the paper trail telephone logs, travel records, and financial transactions, along with the serial number of the truck bomb. The weakest portion of the case deals with the planning meeting in Mashad and the involvement in Iran’s top leaders (it was based on testimony by a defector). Yet it is difficult to imagine a pair of major operations (remember the 1992 Embassy bombing in Argentina) being launched from the Buenos Aires Embassy with the regime’s top leaders being unaware. Rafsanjani and Khamenei are now the moderates who are checking Ahmadenijad's eschatological ambitions.
The AMIA bombing was, in part, to avenge Israel’s abduction of Hezbollah officer Mustafa Dirani and Israel bombing in Lebanon. But it also had another angle – Argentina, under U.S. pressure, terminated arrangements to share nuclear technology with Iran. A regime prepared to flout all diplomatic norms to commit mass murder halfway around the world over its nuclear program is not likely to give it up so easily.
Even if Iran has forsworn nuclear weapons, its links to international terrorism are deep and should weigh heavily in any assessment of its intentions.
About the Graph and My Research at the University of Maryland
A brief description of my dayjob using the Semantic Web to research terrorism is here.
While I will continue on this project, I also have a new position (still with the University of Maryland) with the Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics which seeks “to develop the theory and algorithms required for tools to support decision making in cultural contexts.” That is, we hope to develop computer systems that will help model how different cultures act and react in different situations. When these models are developed they can be applied to a range of issues including counter-insurgency, development, crime prevention, and disaster relief.
I also hope to do some posting on my work there soon.
Iran’s sponsorship and execution of the AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, should be a reminder that this is a regime that uses terrorism as tool of diplomacy.
AMIA, the communal offices of the Argentine Jewish community, was struck by a massive suicide truck bomb on July 18, 1994 – 85 were killed and over 200 injured. Iran and Hezbollah were suspected from the beginning. The Argentine investigation has had several false starts and has been mired in corruption, but in recent years has gotten on track. Last month Interpol voted overwhelmingly to issue a red letter calling for the arrest of five Iranians (along with Hezbollah’s external operations chief Imad Mughniyah) on the basis of the Argentine investigation. The publicly available report on the AMIA bombing offers tremendous insight into the Iranian regime’s modus operandi and worldview.
Below are two network graphs (for more on the graphs and my research at the University of Maryland see the end of the post). The first graph illustrates the web of interconnecting people and events that carried out the bombing. The second graph is the network linked to Mohsen Rabbani, the cultural affairs attaché at the Iranian Embassy who was the operations coordinator for the attack.
Graph of Events Linked to the AMIA Bombing
Network Graph of Mohsen Rabbani - Operations Chief for the AMIA Bombing
In the first graph, red nodes represent people and blue square nodes are events. The blue lines (edges in network graph lingo) represent a person’s involvement in an event (dotted lines represent uncertainty as to whether a person participated in an event) while the yellow edges represent events that came before the central event (in this graph the AMIA bombing.) A few things become apparent, particularly the central role of Rabbani in pulling the attack together and the number of Iranian diplomats who left Latin America just prior to the attack.
The web of events helps shed light on Rabbani’s network graph. The yellow lines linked to Rabbani indicate the diplomats serving at Iran’s Embassy in Argentina. The dark blue edges linking Rabbani and several others, including Mughniyeh, represent the individuals named in the Interpol letter. In this graph the light blue lines are particularly important, they represent the people who were in an event together. The main tangle of blue that includes Rabbani and also then (and possibly future) Iranian President Rafsanjani, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and then intelligence chief Ali Fallahian is the planning session in which the decision to bomb AMIA was made that reportedly took place nearly a year before the bombing on August 14, 1993 in the Iranian city of Mashad.
Many of the light blue edges represent specific events linked to the bombing. Carlos Alberto Telleldin was the man unfortunate enough to sell Rabbani the used Renault Trafic van used in the bombing. Rabbani had been visiting rental agencies for some time looking for a similar vehicle. There was a web of calls between Rabbani and the Tri-Border region, where Mughniyeh had established coordinating cell. That was apparently where the suicide bomber, Ibrahim Hussein Berro was prepared for the task. The light blue edges between Berro and his brothers Assad and Hussein represent the phone calls he reportedly made to them in his final moments. The gray lines linked to Rabbani represent the web of mosques and business fronts he helped establish in Buenos Aires. Rabbani had been based there since 1983 and had built an extensive network, which also bombed the Israeli Embassy to Argentina in 1992.
Looking at the graph, the central role of Hezbollah’s operations chief Mughniyeh in international terrorism becomes evident. The prominent dark blue cluster represents Hezbollah’s leadership. The smaller clusters represent his links to al-Qaeda (Mughniyeh met bin Laden in the mid-1990s and established an al-Qaeda-Hezbollah alliance) and his links to Fatah (Mughniyeh got his start in Arafat’s praetorian guard – Force 17.)
The overall story told by these graphs is of Iran using its Embassy as a base for a terror attack and working seamlessly with Hezbollah to carry out a complex operation on the far side of the world. The nuts and bolts of the operation were revealed by forensic evidence such as the paper trail telephone logs, travel records, and financial transactions, along with the serial number of the truck bomb. The weakest portion of the case deals with the planning meeting in Mashad and the involvement in Iran’s top leaders (it was based on testimony by a defector). Yet it is difficult to imagine a pair of major operations (remember the 1992 Embassy bombing in Argentina) being launched from the Buenos Aires Embassy with the regime’s top leaders being unaware. Rafsanjani and Khamenei are now the moderates who are checking Ahmadenijad's eschatological ambitions.
The AMIA bombing was, in part, to avenge Israel’s abduction of Hezbollah officer Mustafa Dirani and Israel bombing in Lebanon. But it also had another angle – Argentina, under U.S. pressure, terminated arrangements to share nuclear technology with Iran. A regime prepared to flout all diplomatic norms to commit mass murder halfway around the world over its nuclear program is not likely to give it up so easily.
Even if Iran has forsworn nuclear weapons, its links to international terrorism are deep and should weigh heavily in any assessment of its intentions.
About the Graph and My Research at the University of Maryland
A brief description of my dayjob using the Semantic Web to research terrorism is here.
While I will continue on this project, I also have a new position (still with the University of Maryland) with the Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics which seeks “to develop the theory and algorithms required for tools to support decision making in cultural contexts.” That is, we hope to develop computer systems that will help model how different cultures act and react in different situations. When these models are developed they can be applied to a range of issues including counter-insurgency, development, crime prevention, and disaster relief.
I also hope to do some posting on my work there soon.
Friday, November 9, 2007
Justice for AMIA: Interpol & Argentina vs. Iran
There is a country and an international organization willing to stand up to the Iranians. Earlier this week Interpol voted overwhelmingly (74-14 with 26 abstentions) to issue a red letter calling for the arrest of five Iranians accused by the Argentine government of orchestrating the 1994 bombing of the Jewish communal offices (known as AMIA) in Buenos Aires. This move may not bring real justice to the AMIA victims, but it is a small step in the right direction and it sheds important light on the nature of the Iranian regime.
Interpol’s red letter placed five Iranians and Hezbollah’s notorious director of external operations on its most wanted list. This move will probably not bring the perpetrators of the bombing to justice. Interpol has no power to enforce these arrests. Countries that abide by international standards are likely to comply; countries that evade international standards do not comply. Iran is notorious for evading international standards, on issues large (such as the nuclear program) and small (such as keeping politics out of the Olympics).
Unsurprisingly Iran lobbied heavily against the decision and accuses Interpol of bowing to U.S. pressure.
The Argentine investigation of the AMIA bombing, which killed 85 people and wounded over 200 got off to a rocky start and has been dogged by allegations of corruption and incompetence – leading Interpol to deny previous Argentine requests. However, the Interpol vote endorses the latest investigation as “highly professional” and thorough. (A summary translated into English can be read here.)
The Argentine government and deserves full credit for taking Iran to the mat on this issue. This was done despite the ongoing fear in Argentina that Iran will strike them again. There was also substantial political pressure. Outgoing President Nestor Kirchner was close to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez who bailed Argentina out when it reneged on its international debt. Chavez has a burgeoning relationship with Iran, but despite this multi-billion dollar favor, Kirchner supported the investigation and refused to attend events where Iran’s President Ahmedinejad was also in attendance.
The investigation shows both operationally and politically how Iran incorporates terrorism into its foreign policy. Operationally the attack was planned out of the Embassy in Buenos Aires and featured seamless cooperation between Iran and Hezbollah. The attack was carried out both to punish Israel and Argentina (for reneging on deals to provide Iran and Syria nuclear and missile technology.)
Perhaps most significantly are the two figures not included in the Interpol red letter, Rafsanjani and Khameini, the President and Supreme Leader of Iran when the attack was launched. They were not included because heads of state and government are exempt from Interpol warrants for actions carried out in office. However, these gentlemen are the “moderates” who will hopefully check Ahmedenijad’s eschatological ambitions.
As the recent arrests of Hezbollah operatives in LA shows, Iran’s reach remains truly global. The Interpol decisions should be a wake-up call to the entire world about this regime, before they put this network to use yet again.
Interpol’s red letter placed five Iranians and Hezbollah’s notorious director of external operations on its most wanted list. This move will probably not bring the perpetrators of the bombing to justice. Interpol has no power to enforce these arrests. Countries that abide by international standards are likely to comply; countries that evade international standards do not comply. Iran is notorious for evading international standards, on issues large (such as the nuclear program) and small (such as keeping politics out of the Olympics).
Unsurprisingly Iran lobbied heavily against the decision and accuses Interpol of bowing to U.S. pressure.
The Argentine investigation of the AMIA bombing, which killed 85 people and wounded over 200 got off to a rocky start and has been dogged by allegations of corruption and incompetence – leading Interpol to deny previous Argentine requests. However, the Interpol vote endorses the latest investigation as “highly professional” and thorough. (A summary translated into English can be read here.)
The Argentine government and deserves full credit for taking Iran to the mat on this issue. This was done despite the ongoing fear in Argentina that Iran will strike them again. There was also substantial political pressure. Outgoing President Nestor Kirchner was close to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez who bailed Argentina out when it reneged on its international debt. Chavez has a burgeoning relationship with Iran, but despite this multi-billion dollar favor, Kirchner supported the investigation and refused to attend events where Iran’s President Ahmedinejad was also in attendance.
The investigation shows both operationally and politically how Iran incorporates terrorism into its foreign policy. Operationally the attack was planned out of the Embassy in Buenos Aires and featured seamless cooperation between Iran and Hezbollah. The attack was carried out both to punish Israel and Argentina (for reneging on deals to provide Iran and Syria nuclear and missile technology.)
Perhaps most significantly are the two figures not included in the Interpol red letter, Rafsanjani and Khameini, the President and Supreme Leader of Iran when the attack was launched. They were not included because heads of state and government are exempt from Interpol warrants for actions carried out in office. However, these gentlemen are the “moderates” who will hopefully check Ahmedenijad’s eschatological ambitions.
As the recent arrests of Hezbollah operatives in LA shows, Iran’s reach remains truly global. The Interpol decisions should be a wake-up call to the entire world about this regime, before they put this network to use yet again.
Tuesday, October 23, 2007
Anniversary of the Marine Barracks Bombing
Almost a quarter-century ago today a multiple simultaneous suicide bombers struck the barracks of U.S. Marines and French paratroopers who (along with British and Italian soldiers) were attempting to stabilize the war-torn city of Beirut. International terrorism had long been on the world scene since the PLO sky-jackings that started in 1968 and continued throughout the 1970s. Suicide bombings had only just become a major tactic (most notably a deadly strike against the U.S. Embassy in Beirut only a few months earlier). But this bombing, in which nearly 300 lives (241 Marines and sailors and 58 French paratroopers) were snuffed out in moments, took this phenomenon to a new scale. Politically, the attack caused the peace-keeping operation to fold - sending terrorists the message that if you hit the Western powers hard enough they will retreat.
Lebanon was then left as prey to Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran.
In the mid-1990s Osama bin Laden met with the attack's mastermind, Hezbollah's top killer Imad Mughniyah (view his network graph here). Bin Laden expressed his admiration for Mughniyah's achievement. An alliance was cemented and Hezbollah tutored the nascent al-Qaeda in this tactical innovation, the multiple simultaneous suicide attack.
This attack has raised certain questions about the definition of terrorism. The victims were uniformed military and terrorism is generally defined as the targeting of civilians. There is the argument for modifying the definition of terrorism, or viewing the Barracks Bombing as an act of war rather than terrorism.
The debate is academic and to some extent trumped by the inscription on the monument to the victims of the attack at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina -
Lebanon was then left as prey to Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran.
In the mid-1990s Osama bin Laden met with the attack's mastermind, Hezbollah's top killer Imad Mughniyah (view his network graph here). Bin Laden expressed his admiration for Mughniyah's achievement. An alliance was cemented and Hezbollah tutored the nascent al-Qaeda in this tactical innovation, the multiple simultaneous suicide attack.
This attack has raised certain questions about the definition of terrorism. The victims were uniformed military and terrorism is generally defined as the targeting of civilians. There is the argument for modifying the definition of terrorism, or viewing the Barracks Bombing as an act of war rather than terrorism.
The debate is academic and to some extent trumped by the inscription on the monument to the victims of the attack at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina -
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