Real Cyberwar: Mannes & Hendler in the Washington Times

This morning, The Washington Times ran an op-ed on cyberwar I co-wrote with my friend (and former boss) Jim Hendler. Much has been written about cyber-war, but very little of it is grounded in reality. Many over-hype the issue while others discount it completely. Much of the misinformation about cyberwar revolves around denial of services attacks, which are serious criminal activity but not much of a national security concern - we've written on this topic in the wake of Russian conflicts with Estonia and Georgia.

Here we try to inject a bit of sober and informed reason into the discussion.


Wednesday, August 5, 2009
Profile of a real cyberwar

Aaron Mannes and James Hendler

The denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that started on July 4 garnered typical headlines about cyberwar, but in fact, from a technical standpoint, those "attacks" may be the opposite of real cyberwar. A much less noticed report in Israel's leading daily, Ha'aretz, on Israel's operations against Iran's nuclear program may give greater insight into how cyberwar actually will work.

It is no secret that several countries, including the United States, China, Russia and Israel, have examined cyberwar capabilities. What those capabilities might be or how a cyberwar might look are shrouded in mystery. The denial-of-service attacks that made headlines are not it.

Those attacks are nothing more than the sending of enormous numbers of requests to servers, preventing Web sites from responding to legitimate traffic and interfering with e-mail. Competent information-technology professionals usually can mitigate these attacks, and even when successful, their impact -- from a national security standpoint -- is marginal.

The DoS attacks are carried out by botnets, thousands of compromised computers that can be commanded to simultaneously send e-mails or visit a Web site. The botnets are built using malware that attacks individual computers, often simply taking advantage of software that has not downloaded current security patches. Computers linked to government agencies have been compromised and have become part of botnets -- but this does not necessarily have tremendous security implications. Real cyberwar may require the opposite of the skills required for the DoS attacks that make headlines.

According to the article in Ha'aretz, Israeli intelligence has sought to systematically insert malware that can damage information systems within the Iranian nuclear program. It is believed those systems are not connected to the broader Internet and that the malware is inserted into equipment sold to the Iranian government.

This is the probable future cyberwar. Modern societies are complex networks of people, information systems and equipment. Enormous advantages will be obtained by powers that can quickly identify and neutralize critical nodes within the systems.

Critical government systems are run on Intranets, networks that are separate from the Internet. The most crucial systems, such as the command-and-control system for nuclear weapons, are believed to be air-gapped -- that is, they do not link to other systems. Most government Intranets do have points at which they interface with the Internet, and Intranets have been infected with malware from the Internet. However, Intranets are relatively controlled environments, so anomalous activity (at least theoretically) can be controlled and isolated quickly.

Because compromising those networks may be crucial in a military conflict, nation-states with serious cyberwar ambitions will carefully tailor malware for specific systems. This is the opposite of the malware that builds botnets by seeking low-hanging fruit.

The most serious cases of identity theft usually involve social engineering, tricking the target to reveal crucial information that facilitates the crime. The same may be true in tailoring attacks to critical networks. Most advanced nation-states have extensive infrastructures of contractors and academics that have both public roles and contacts with the security establishment. Social-network analysis could be used to identify individuals who are likely to have contacts within the security establishment and attempt to insert malware through them.

Imagine the now ubiquitous phishing attacks masquerading as e-mail from banks and credit card companies but instead designed by sophisticated intelligence agencies and carefully targeted at small communities.

What the malware might do when it gets into a system is an open question. Chinese hackers reportedly have infiltrated computers and manipulated them to remove sensitive documents, log keystrokes and trigger Web cameras. Whether these capabilities could operate for a substantial length of time on a secure Intranet is an open question. Any malware that entered a sensitive system might have a short life span and its designers would need to consider carefully how best to use this window. Alternatively, this malware may be embedded for long periods of time and activated when needed. Options might include relaying valuable information, manipulating information, damaging the network or providing information on the real-world location of crucial network nodes so that they can be destroyed physically.

However, cyberwar capabilities cannot be used lightly. Once malware is detected, the defenders can counter it and make their system stronger and more resistant to further infiltration.

In the heat of battle, the ability to penetrate an enemy information network could be crucial. However, in the long-term dialectic of war, in which sides continually respond to one another's innovations, cyberwar will become another facet of conflict -- at times decisive and at other times peripheral. The nations that first master cyberwar could obtain a fundamental advantage at the beginning stages of a conflict. Nations that ignore cyberwar will do so at their own peril.

Aaron Mannes is a researcher at the University of Maryland. James Hendler is a professor of computer science at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

Kashmir Peace: Another Mumbai Casualty?

"It is too early to say."

Zhou Enlai's response when asked for his assessment of the 1789 French Revolution

In the last week’s issue of the New Yorker Steve Coll reported that in 2007 India and Pakistan where, through diplomatic back-channels, engaged in talks “so advanced that we’d come to semi-colons” on a deal over Kashmir. Unfortunately, Musharraf lost his political credibility and had to resign from the Pakistani Presidency before the deal could be completed. The new civilian and military leaders are, by most accounts, inclined towards continuing the process. But in the wake of the Mumbai attacks, it is difficult to see how this process can be re-started.

Pakistani-Indian rapprochement could be a tremendous aid to the Pakistani leadership in their efforts to stabilize their deteriorating country. If the Mumbai attacks have made that impossible, then the Mumbai terror attacks may prove to be one of the most consequential terrorist attacks in history.

Pakistan in Free Fall
Yesterday’s attack on the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team, while a tactical failure relative to its ambition of copying the Mumbai assault (the cricket players survived and were not taken hostage and overall casualties were limited), was another blow to Pakistan’s domestic and international prestige.

Other incidents highlighting Pakistan’s possible collapse were the all too successful attacks on highly symbolic targets such as the Islamabad Marriott (the watering hole of Pakistan’s elite) and the assassination of former PM Benazir Bhutto. The recent “deal” allowing Islamists to govern the Swat Valley is yet another example of the state’s loss of control.

Unfortunately, Pakistan’s twin assets of nuclear weapons and a strategic location (American efforts in landlocked Afghanistan will become untenable without access to Pakistan’s ports) mean that the country cannot be ignored.

Game Changer
It would require multiple volumes to explain the complex interlocking problems facing Pakistan. But, Pakistan’s conflict with India, primarily over Kashmir, is central and exacerbates many of Pakistan’s other challenges. Having fought (and lost) several wars with India, Pakistan is locked into an arms race that it cannot win. Beyond India’s demographic and economic advantages, Pakistan has long borders and little strategic depth. Massive outlays for defense needs have choked off funds for much needed development, while the military – once respected for its relative probity – is becoming yet another Pakistani institution mired in corruption. Islamist organizations have filled the void left by the government’s failure to provide basic social services like education.

The conflict over Kashmir is not merely over resources and territory. It also touches on Pakistan’s identity as the homeland for Indian Muslims. In the face of the Indian threat and its own panoply of ethnic divides, the government relied on Islam as a national unifier. These policies, combined with ISI support, created a fertile ground for Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba to take root.

An agreement with India over Kashmir, the key point of Pakistani-Indian contention, would have allowed military reformers both to shrink the military overall and to re-orient it from its conventional war India mission of countering India to a lighter counter-insurgency force that can keep peace within Pakistan.

An agreement with India is no guarantee that Pakistan would stabilize – the Islamist groups are now effectively self-sustaining and the country has been so poorly governed that reforms may be too little too late. But it is difficult to see how Pakistan can make the necessary institutional changes without an improved relationship with India, and the agreement described in Coll’s article would at least have improved Pakistan’s odds.

World Historical Terror
There is an interesting argument that most terrorism proves to be politically ineffective. This excellent paper surveys major terrorist groups and finds that, with few exceptions, terrorist groups do not achieve their political ends. The most notable exception is Hezbollah’s campaign against the U.S. and other Western powers in Lebanon in the 1980s.

But there are also terror attacks that have world historical significance beyond the orchestrating organization’s ambitions. 9/11 would be an example. Sadat’s assassination is also an example of an attack that did not achieve specific political goals (the Egyptian government remained in power) but did remove the Arab politician who had the greatest potential to change the dismal course of Middle Eastern politics.

If the Mumbai attack has successfully derailed Indian-Pakistani negotiations for the foreseeable future, then the attack may join the annals of terror attacks with great historical reverberations. It is not inconceivable that future historians will see the failure of peace talks as Pakistan’s last chance to come to grips with its internal challenges and avoid collapse. If this collapse occurs, even laying aside the nuclear weapons, it is sure to be a geopolitical earthquake leaving a vacuum in a strategic location and sending waves of refugees into the unstable Middle East and beyond.

History is not set in stone. It is still possible for Pakistan and India to come to an agreement. Both countries’ leaders recognize the importance of defusing their conflict, although it remains unclear if the Pakistani leadership has grasped the precariousness of the Pakistani state. If these leaders can overcome the setbacks they can deny the Mumbai murderers the ultimate victory

Islamabad Bombing I: Brute Force Tactics

In the span of week, there were two attacks against hard targets, the September 17 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, and Saturday’s strike on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates still face difficulties launching attacks in Western countries, due to the difficulty of transporting the necessary experienced operatives to the West in the face of diligent and capable Western security services.

But these attacks highlight growing capabilities within the greater Middle East, where security forces are not as skilled and the operatives move with greater ease. Both of these attacks were against targets with formidable security, and the success of the Marriott attack indicates the limits inherent in hardening targets and the potential for enormous quantities of explosive to overcome security measures. This tactic will become more widespread where terrorists possess the necessary logistical and technical capabilities.

Brute Force

The attack on the Embassy in Sanaa, Yemen was a sophisticated, multi-pronged strike that included two carbombs and gunmen (a State Department briefing describing the attack is here. Although the attack took ten lives, it did not penetrate the Embassy itself. There may be lessons learned from this semi-successful attack that can be incorporated into future strikes – but Embassy security will also adapt. However, the fortress-like status of American Embassies around the world exacts a high price on U.S. efforts to conduct effective public diplomacy. The Marriott is a hotel. While Embassies can adopt extensive security procedures at some cost to their effectiveness, hotels cannot pay that same price.

What the Yemen attack attempted to achieve by guile, the Islamabad attack managed by sheer brute force. Marriott security appeared to have worked. The truck was kept away from the building, detonating at a blast wall some 60 feet away. (This image from BBC makes it look like the blast was closer to the building – but the crater created by the explosion itself was 60 feet wide.) There were reportedly 600 kg of military grade explosives (about 1400 lbs) on the truck. By comparison, the primary explosive in the Bali bombing (in which 202 people were killed) included about 150 kg of explosives (and some reports indicate that only a portion of them detonated.) Had the truck been able to reach the Marriott itself, the immediate damage might have been far worse.


Terrorist activity requires logistics, and the more extensive the attack, the greater the logistical support needed. The ability to assemble and transport such an enormous bomb without being detected gives a sense of the perpetrator’s capabilities and is a very deep cause for concern.

It is worth noting that the Islamabad Marriott had been targeted before in January 2007 when a suicide bomber attempting to enter the hotel killed a security guard. The failure of the human missile approach may have helped lead the attackers to adopt the brute force approach.

Fire Multiplier

The bomb was laced with aluminum powder, an accelerant that, after the explosion ignited a gas leak, intensified the blaze. This led to more casualties and complicated the rescue effort. In the right circumstances, these cascading effects – such as fires started by explosions – can be a devastating force multiplier and may also become a component of terror attack planning.

Initial reports indicate that Pakistani firefighters acted bravely (their actions probably prevented the building from collapsing), but lacked the appropriate equipment and training and that the Marriott’s fire system did not respond properly. The city government is apparently engaging international consultants to assist in building firefighting capacity. (My recent post - Fire as a Tool of Terror - discussed some of these issues in detail, particularly the importance of firefighting diplomacy.)

Madrassas Extending into Pakistani Heartlands

This short analysis from the invaluable Middle East Media Research Institute is well worth a read. It discusses the controversy Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) leader, Asif Zardari set off when, while delivering the keynote address at the 23rd Internationalist Socialist Congress, he described madrassas as propagating Islamist extremism.

Unsurprisingly, Pakistan’s religious leaders condemned him. But reading the report, and these notes from MEMRI’s Urdu-Pashto Blog also indicates that the madrassas have spread from the Northwest Frontier Province into the rest of the country – including the Punjabi heartland. Although Islam is central to Pakistan’s national identity, the traditional practice of Islam was relatively moderate. In fact there have been skirmishes between different factions within the Sunni community (not to mention the bloody Shia-Sunni violence within Pakistan) – particularly in Karachi.

Considering the endemic corruption and misrule in Pakistan, it is surprising that radicalism has not made inroads faster. Consistently, the Islamist parties do not do terribly well in Pakistani elections (when they proved no better then their secular counterparts, the lost power in NWFP.) But as their influence expands they can, not only expand their parties, they can also re-shape the positions of the major parties, the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). Although the PPP is generally perceived as secular and the PML is seen as closer to the Islamists – both turn to Islam when it is convenient.

Zardari is a problematic figure (although, despite reports, he is not mentally ill). He often seems to say the right thing, calling for a more moderate approach to India, and criticizing madrassas. He may actually believe these things. It is also possible that, because he cannot match Nawaz Sharif’s popularity on the ground – his wife the late Benazir Bhutto could – that he is appealing the West and particularly the U.S. as a balance. A real Pakistan policy needs to look beyond any given leader and build a deeper relationship.

To that end, the recent meetings between top U.S. and Pakistani military officers on the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln for a “brainstorming session” is a step in the right direction. But the relationship needs to be far, far deeper.

According to Mark Bowden’s story in the Atlantic Monthly, “To Kill a Terrorist,” when the U.S. decided Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines was a serious problem they sent a CIA operative to liaise with the Philippine security forces. One of this operative’s key tasks was identifying which Philippine units and commanders were effective and then making sure they had the equipment and intelligence necessary to do the job. This sort of operation needs to be repeated dozens (maybe hundreds) of times if the FATA regions are to be brought under any kind of control.

Also, the relationship has to be more than military. Pakistan assumes that the U.S. will eventually abandon them. They have their reasons, first from the U.S. losing interest in them after the Soviets left Afghanistan and then when the U.S. sanctioned them for testing nuclear weapons. The burgeoning U.S.-India relationship also doesn’t help. When Presidential candidates threaten military incursions into Pakistan, it only heightens these fears.

Pakistan cannot be coddled – the U.S. must push for real economic and social reforms. The Islamist inroads into this nuclear power are too great to be ignored. But trying to achieve these things through threats and intimidation alone is unlikely to be successful.

If Musharraf Goes: Assessments and Opportunities

There are reports that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf will be stepping down in the next few days in order to avoid impeachment. Musharraf has denied these reports, but the prominence of the rumors indicates strongly that the political balance of power has shifting against Musharraf – he will almost certainly be reduced to a figurehead. It is difficult to say how history will judge Musharraf. From the American perspective he was not adequately taking on Islamic extremism. But from the Pakistani perspective he was becoming an American lackey. The truth is somewhere in between. What Musharraf lacked was either the desire or the capability to take on the systemic problems bedeviling Pakistan. It is possible that with his exit from the scene, a new opportunity to take on these challenges could emerge.

On one level, Musharraf has been cooperative on counter-terror issues, arresting high-profile al-Qaeda and acquiescing to missile strikes on Pakistani territory. However, while missile strikes are a useful tool – they are no substitute for a serious policy. They have also contributed to Musharraf’s loss of standing in Pakistan, since he is seen as subordinating Pakistani sovereignty – and lives (these strikes have, unfortunately, killed civilians) – to American priorities.

On the other hand, Pakistan has not successfully taken control of the tribal areas where al-Qaeda is re-grouping. Americans would be wise to temper their criticism of the Pakistani military’s counter-insurgency efforts. Imagine a heavy military force designed for conventional conflict being forced to fight a major conventional war stumbling when forced to fight a tough insurgency in hard terrain.

In addition, when Pakistan has cracked down harshly on Islamist groups (such as storming the Lal Masjid Mosque in Islamabad) the response has been waves of Islamist violence – a certain amount of trepidation is understandable.

Large organizations do not change quickly or easily – no matter what the political leadership orders. Ultimately, the Pakistani military’s size (a drag on the economy), shape (oriented towards conflict with India), and operations (such as meddling in Afghanistan) are due to its ongoing conflict with India over Kashmir. The Kashmir issue probably cannot be effectively resolved. However, in general Pakistan’s civilian leaders have been willing to lower the level of tension (in fairness, so did Musharraf). When PPP chief Asif Zardari stated that relations with New Delhi should not be held hostage to the Kashmir issue he was criticized from almost every quarter. Several days later General Kayani made a highly publicized visit to the Line of Control in Kashmir.

Pakistan is at a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis India, both in geography and power (Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy is motivated by a desire to keep that country weak, and thus potential strategic depth for Pakistan in a conflict with India.) U.S. policy has to take Pakistan’s security concerns seriously.

With a civilian government holding real power, the United States might be able to offer security guarantees that would reduce Pakistani fears of conventional defeat by India. Equally important would be the framework of this dialogue. The United States should work to structure these discussions so that Pakistan’s leadership is not negotiating from an inferior position. This combination of real guarantees and the appearance of dealing with the U.S. from a position of strength (essential for the new leadership to establish that it is not in the American pocket) might give Pakistan’s civilian leadership the strength to re-shape the security establishment for its current challenges, reduce the size of the ISI, and counter-act the military’s ongoing expropriation of Pakistan’s civilian economy.

This approach will require a combination of strength and subtlety from both the Pakistani and American sides – qualities that have been in short supply. Nonetheless, a nuclear-armed nation of 200 million, in a strategic location – and at least some democratic currents in its politics – demands this level of attention.

Pakistani Intelligence Sponsoring Terror

This morning, The New York Times has a front page story stating that U.S. intelligence has determined that Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, aided the July 7, 2008 attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul. The conclusion was “based on intercepted communications between Pakistani intelligence officers and militants who carried out the attack…”

This is a very big deal. Indian intelligence sees the ISI behind every adverse event (it should be noted that sometimes, this assessment is correct), but oftentimes the follow-up investigation is lax and inconclusive. India’s security services are of uneven quality (with, it should be emphasized, some able people in top slots) and blaming the ISI is easier than engaging in the needed long-term reform. More recently Afghanistan’s President Karzai has been publicly accusing Pakistan of supporting the Taliban against his regime.

But for U.S. intelligence, particularly the CIA (which has a long working relationship with the ISI) to come to this conclusion – and allow it to appear in the newspaper of record is an event of a different magnitude altogether and it should be taken very seriously. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan’s Prime Minister has denied this support. But the U.S., which has given Pakistan billions in aid since 9/11 and tried to build a strategic alliance, would have little incentive to accuse Pakistan of something so serious.

Unfortunately, effective policy options are not readily available. Too much pressure could isolate Pakistan and lead to a rupture in relations. This is inadvisable - since Pakistan is nuclear-armed, and al-Qaeda cannot be neutralized and Afghanistan cannot be stabilized without Pakistani cooperation. Pakistan can also turn to other powers (particularly China, which is building a giant port at Gwadar) for support.

Also, Pakistan is not completely hopeless. While radical Islam is on the rise in Pakistan, considering how poorly the country has been governed it is surprising that the Pakistani people have not turned even more strongly to radical Islam. The government has recently returned to democracy - a corrupt, inept democracy - but one of the few in the Muslim world.

Pakistan, is one of the central theaters in the war on terror. The recently reported revelations about its intelligence agency's involvement with Islamist terrorists make this an unavoidable reality about Pakistan that the next administration will need to face directly, with resolve, subtlety, and creativity.

But, as Doug Farah notes, simply writing checks is insufficient.

DEA as Counter-Terror Agency

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has, quietly, become a very effective counter-terror agency. The arrest of international arms dealers Victor Bout and Monzar al-Kasser (in operations worthy of movie scripts) were only one example. The agency had at least a peripheral role in the Betancourt rescue – a DEA operation inserted bugged satellite phones into the FARC, a crucial tactic that has made a tremendous contribution to the FARC’s overall breakdown. In general the agency seems to have adapted well overall to the counter-terror mission, among other things doing a competent job at building up its analytical capabilities.

Last Friday, the DEA’s chief of operations Michael Braun gave a presentation at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (hosted by co-CT Blogger and Washington Institute Fellow Michael Jacobson) that provided important insight into the DEA’s adaptation to the counter-terror mission.

Organizational Analysis

While many pundits give lip-service to “changing organizational culture” it is an issue that is generally not given its due. Policy and political issues are "sexier." But organizational issues are in fact central to any complex problem of governance. In their classic Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow argue that one conceptual model useful for understanding government behavior is:

…less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior…. To perform complex tasks, the behavior of large numbers of individuals must be coordinated. Coordination requires standard operating procedures: rules according to which things are done….

At any given time, a government consists of existing organizations, each with a fixed set of standard operating procedures and programs. The behavior of these organizations-and relevant to an issue in any particular instance is, therefore, determined primarily by routines established prior to that instance….

Chief Braun’s presentation hit many of these points. First, in the decades prior to 9/11 the DEA had gained extensive experience targeting complex, adaptive international organizations that were skilled in using technology and had extensive resources (i.e. drug cartels and – what Braun describes as the wave of the future – terrorist/drug cartel hybrids such as the FARC.) The DEA turned some of its weaknesses - its relatively small size and low profile and the limitations of being a law enforcement agency – into strengths. Because it was small and low-profile it could practice patience in its investigations and develop appropriate (and creative) techniques. The DEA didn’t have the budget to develop or access to the top intelligence systems (satellites etc.) and it learned that HUMINT (infiltration) was the best way to get into the drug cartels. Here, counter-intuitively, the DEA’s status as a law enforcement agency served it well. Informants (usually lower-level criminals who were given a choice between being charged or turning informant) were carefully vetted, because the DEA agents knew that the informant would eventually have to testify in a U.S. court.

Because of the international scope of drug trafficking, the DEA has the largest international law enforcement presence of any U.S. agency (87 foreign offices in 63 countries) and these offices are staffed by agents who are operationally active with their international partners. (Braun stated that there was one office where the DEA was not operationally active, but wouldn’t say which – I am guessing Venezuela.)



Braun explained the international world of illicit activity, which relies heavily on ungoverned spaces, where both organized crime and terrorists can flourish. Here the DEA had to adapt. All illicit activity is united by money. Previously agents followed the drug trail – Braun urged them to follow the money trail instead because it allowed them to peer into multiple sectors of illicit activity.

While the issues surrounding organizational adaptation were interesting, Braun had many other points to make. He discussed how the FARC is the case study for the evolution and (hopefully) dissolution of a hybrid terrorist-criminal organization that can be adapted to the Taliban. He mentioned the Madrid bombing as an example of low level drug dealing supporting terrorism, and the DEA’s efforts to take on this new threat.

Normative Issues

When asked about legalization, Braun explained that this will lead to massive levels of addiction. After the Civil War opiates and cocaine were legal and about 1/200 Americans was an addict. But, like pretty much everyone who has looked at the issue, Braun stated that more treatment for drug users would be helpful.

Braun certainly did not say this, but there are reasons to be skeptical of whether law enforcement response to drug trafficking is effective at reducing the drug supply. But it is, in some regards, a moot argument. First, because drug cartels have a deleterious effect on lawful government and therefore are a serious problem in their own right and secondly, as a moral issue, because people engaged in illegal activity should be punished.

DEA as Diplomatic Back-Channel

Finally, Braun was asked about collaboration between the DEA and the Iranian counter-narcotics organizations. Iran shares a border with Afghanistan and has a growing epidemic of drug use. Because of the ongoing dispute between the U.S. and Iran direct cooperation is impossible, but Braun noted that they have third party interlocutors that can relay valuable information. This raises an interesting possibility of the DEA serving as an alternate channel to regimes with which the U.S. has estranged relations.

There is some talk in Washington of engaging Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez by trying to restore DEA operations there. Back in 2005 Chavez revoked diplomatic immunity for DEA agents in Venezuela (he accused them of spying, plus the U.S. had revoked the visas of Venezuelan officials in DC.) This effectively shut down the agency’s operations. Since then Venezuela has become a leading conduit for drugs to Europe. Chavez is beginning to take pressure from the Europeans about this and – on occasion – turned drug dealers over to other countries. Reinstating the DEA could be useful to everyone and create a pragmatic alternate channel to Caracas.

Force vs. FARC: Israel's Contribution

On being rescued, Ingrid Betancourt stated: "This is a miracle, a miracle. We have an amazing military. I think only the Israelis can possibly pull off something like this."

Her comment set off immediate speculation that there had been an Israeli hand in the dramatic operation. It is high praise for Israeli special forces that so many would readily assume that an effective commando operation was their handiwork. From a practical standpoint, the Israeli contribution to Betancourt’s rescue was modest (dwarfed by the U.S. contribution). But Israel’s philosophical contribution was enormous.

Technical Support

Yossi Melman of Haaretz (a leading Israeli daily) reported:

The Israeli activity, involving dozens of Israeli security experts, was coordinated by Global CST, owned by former General Staff operations chief, Brigadier General (res.) Israel Ziv, and Brigadier (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser…..

"It's a Colombian Entebbe operation," Ziv said Thursday when he returned from Bogota. "Both regarding its national and international importance. Betancourt has become a symbol of the struggle against international terror. This is an amazing operation that wouldn't shame any army or special forces anywhere in the world."

Asked about the Israeli involvement in it Ziv said there is "no need to exaggerate."

"We don't want to take credit for something we didn't do," a company source said. "We helped them prepare themselves to fight terror. We helped them to plan operations and strategies and develop intelligence sources. That's quite a bit, but shouldn't be taken too far."

Another article discussing the Israeli role (and this less flattering cases of ex-IDF personnel training Colombia's vicious paramilitaries) is here.

The American contribution, reported in The Washington Post was far more extensive involving a 100 person team of analysts and operatives. The operation received vetting from the Secretary of State and the Vice President. Overall Colombian capabilities benefited from a decade of extensive U.S. aid. Beyond helping to build a professional military, the U.S. contributed with its unparalleled electronic intelligence capabilities.

Israeli Counter-Terror: Setting the Stage

The real Israeli contribution occurred nearly forty years ago, with the dawn of modern international terrorism. On July 23, 1968 an El Al plane was hijacked by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and forced to land in Algeria. The Israelis had no response and after three weeks were forced to hand over a dozen Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the passengers and crew. It was the first and last successful hijacking of an Israeli airliner.

For a time the terrorists had the initiative, carrying out a wave of bombings and hijackings around the world. It seemed unstoppable. Then, as now, there were voices calling for negotiations, capitulation, and “addressing the root causes.”

But the Israelis developed counter-measures and responses. Secure check-in and armed sky marshals drawn from elite army units were only a few of the procedures the Israelis adopted. At the same time, Israel developed responses, training commando teams for hostage rescue operations. Entebbe is, deservedly the most famous, but not the only example. Other countries followed suit, in 1977 German commandos carried out a daring rescue of a hijacked Luthansa jet in Mogadishu. Like the Israelis, the Germans had been caught flat-footed in a previous terror attack – this time with the world watching at the 1972 Olympics. Perhaps the most significant of these rescues was in 1994 when French commandos stormed a hijacked Air France plane in Marseilles. The Algerian terrorists were believed to be planning to fly the plane into the Eiffel Tower.

Effective responses to terrorism are not limited to airborne terror. Capable strategy and tactics can marginalize terrorists and insurgents. Israel has brought Palestinian suicide attacks down from a weekly event at the height of the al-Aqsa Intifada to a few times a year.

That force can be useful against terrorists does not mean brute force is the right path. Almost every country that encounters terrorists and guerillas has turned to harsh brute force crackdowns. In and of themselves, these crackdowns are not always effective over the long term and often bring human rights violations in their wake. But creative thinking, rigorous intelligence gathering, analysis, and planning, and quality training can defeat terrorism.

At the same time, counter-terror is not only a task for commandos. In Colombia, the regular army played an essential role in setting the stage for the dramatic rescue. First, by re-claiming large parts of Colombian territory, which limited the FARC’s freedom of movement. Then, before the operation itself, the army played a long painstaking cat and mouse game with the FARC unit that held the hostages (getting so close that they actually saw the U.S. hostages) to learn its operations.

Not every terror attack can be prevented, but Israel has stood in the forefront of reminding the world that force – properly and intelligently applied - can be used to neutralize terrorism, thereby setting the stage for last week’s dramatic events in Colombia.

Questions About the Rescue in Colombia

The dramatic rescue of the FARC hostages raises a host of important questions, here are a few, with short answers following and lengthy answers below:

Was the rescue the cover for an arrangement with the FARC?
Probably not.

What effect will this have on future hostage releases?
It will probably lead to more units dissolving and possibly releasing their hostages.

Colombian security used a ruse claiming to be an NGO, could such ploys undermine the legitimate role of NGOs?
Possibly, it’s complicated.

Staged Rescue

Cesar, the commander of the FARC front holding the hostages put them on a helicopter after receiving an order he believed came from the FARC jefe Alfonso Cano. Consider the implications of this: it would be as if someone tricked a General into believing he had just received an order from the President. Such communications are not handled casually. The fact that Colombian intelligence could deliver this fake message probably indicates a very high-level of human and electronic penetration into the FARC’s communications networks. A few specialists have quietly speculated that this was an inside job – perhaps Cano wanted to arrange this to set the stage for a peaceful surrender. While anything is possible, the correspondence unearthed from Raul Reyes’ laptop – such as the talk of selling uranium – has a certain clueless quality. The blog of the Center for International Policy’s Colombia Program cites a FARC assessment of the U.S. elections as another example of strange assertions and gross inaccuracies in the FARC’s perception of the world. Based on the FARC’s seeming poor information about and ability to assess the outside world, it does seem conceivable that the organization has simply become dysfunctional and that its organizational nervous system has in fact been deeply compromised.

The fate of the hundreds of remaining hostages

The FARC holds many more hostages, possibly as many as 700, about 40 of whom are prominent. It is possible that the rescue operation will make it harder to negotiate for the release of the remaining hostages. Without their most valuable chits, the FARC cannot hope to obtain any of the concessions it demands – consequently the remaining hostages may languish. But, as the FARC breaks down, it is more and more likely that fronts will abandon the fight altogether, particularly as they become isolated from the central command (or mistrust its instructions). The rescue was a huge blow and FARC morale will sink even further. Expect the Colombian campaign to encourage FARC members to desert to expand and include incentives to bring in hostages as well.

NGO Quandaries

Finally, in my previous post I noted that there may be a cost in using ruses involving NGOs. Several people with a lot of background on the issue told me that many Colombian NGOs are effectively FARC fronts. The mere fact that the hostages’ guards fell for a ruse that an NGO was aiding in a FARC operation lends some credence to this argument. It is not an unfamiliar phenomenon, the Israelis complain deeply (and with much justice) about NGOs acting as fronts and agents for terrorist groups as well.

However, NGOs in principle are expressions of the fundamental right of association aka civil society – a right and value that is essential for the liberal democratic polity. That some become fronts for loathsome causes is not new, Stalin too had his useful idiots and front groups. One of the great challenges of asymmetric warfare (whether it is terrorism, counter-insurgency or something else) is distinguishing between groups exercising this right – even if their views are controversial – and groups that are fronts for organizations undermining legitimate authority.

This is a tricky problem, one faced here in the United States as well, as our law enforcement agencies attempt to determine if Islamic charities and other organizations are operating legitimately or are linked to Hamas, al-Qaeda or Hezbollah.

That being said, I am not questioning the Colombian use of the NGO ruse in this case – the benefits outweighed the cost. But, similar operations, if done too often could undermine the rightful place of legitimate NGOs. This could have pragmatic consequences such as hurting the ability of NGOs to deliver aid, to broader philosophical consequences of undermining freedom of association.

There is a parallel with the Colombian strike that killed Raul Reyes in Ecuador. As a matter of principle, military attacks that cross national borders are not a good idea. But, there are times and places where such strikes necessary. However, when done too often violating the national sovereignty of other states will exact a cost in legitimacy.

FARC is FARC'd: Assessing the Hostage Rescue

The first reports about the Colombian military’s rescue of the 15 hostages held by FARC (in Spanish) indicate an impressive intelligence operation. The hostages were held in three separate locations. Colombian intelligence had infiltrated one of the FARC fronts holding the hostages as well as the FARC Secretariat. They told the front commander “Cesar” that the hostages were being transferred on the orders of FARC chief Alfonso Cano. After gathering the hostages in one location the FARC unit was met by a helicopter, ostensibly from an NGO (that doesn’t actually exist). Then the hostages were loaded onto the helicopter and the FARC commander and his deputy were taken captive to be handed over to judicial authorities. The other members of the FARC front were permitted to escape.

The fifteen hostages were rescued without firing a shot. The long nightmare of the hostages and their families is finally over.

There are many implications to this tremendous success. It indicates both the FARC’s rot and impressive Colombian capabilities. That Colombian intelligence could manage this elaborate ruse shows how much information they have gathered about the FARC’s internal workings. The computer files seized, both from Raul Reyes, but also from the computer of FARC leader Ivan Rios – who was killed by his own men, were no doubt invaluable. That FARC would fall for this ruse indicates increasing fragmentation and decay. The loss of several top leaders, and the reported serious illness of FARC’s top military commander Mono Jojoy have all contributed to FARC's weakness.

Communications has long been an Achilles heel for the FARC, which is spread out in Colombia’s vast hinterland. The hostage rescue operation is the most dramatic capitalization of this weakness so far and it will also exacerbate it. FARC leaders will now doubt the origin of their orders – leading to further fragmentation.

It is an impressive operation – imagine if Iraqi forces could carry out operations like this. (Colombia’s security forces have benefited tremendously from U.S. support under Plan Colombia – hopefully some of the lessons learned will be transferable to the global counter-insurgency against radical Islamist terrorists.)

The escape of the rest of the FARC front was probably a wise operational move. Engaging them could have resulted in a firefight in which hostages could have been hurt or killed. The unit will probably dissolve and its members may join the chorus of former FARC members broadcasting calls for active FARC members to turn themselves in. (The program has been successful – over 1000 FARC fighters desert per year according to some reports and has included top commanders.)

One dark spot: the use of the NGO ruse may have consequences – not just in Colombia – but worldwide. Future efforts to negotiate these kinds of releases may be effected – and the FARC is believed to hold an additional 700 hostages. The NGO role of serving as interlocutors between states and terrorist groups – while easy to criticize – is often useful and necessary. Their neutrality in these conflicts worldwide does allow them to deliver humanitarian aid and facilitate communications. If terrorist groups are more hesitant to engage with NGOs because of this incident it may block these useful channels.

However, this kind of ruse may only work with a particularly isolated group. Less fragmented groups, like Hezbollah, would probably restrict their dealings to well-established NGOs - so that the impact may be limited.

Update

The invaluable Bloggings By Boz a leading stop for LatAm news reports the fascinating detail that the Colombian rescuers were wearing Che T-shirts.

FARC's Top Military Commander Ailing?

The Colombian daily El Tiempo reports that Mono Jojoy, the top FARC military commander has a severe form of diabetes. (A picture from El Tiempo is posted below.) Head of the “Eastern Bloc” Mono Jojoy is generally believed to be the organization’s top military leader. With 4000 fighters the Eastern Bloc is one of the stronger FARC Blocs. It borders Venezuela and is heavily engaged in the drug trade. Mono Jojoy represents the military wing, as opposed to the new chief Alfonso Cano who represents the political wing. There has
been substantial speculation that the two are rivals – although the internal processes of FARC decision-making are opaque so much of this is guesswork (like Kremlinology without the snow or military parades.)

If Mono Jojoy were ill, that would provide an alternate explanation for, or at least another factor in, the leadership transitions. In addition, it appears that Mono Jojoy’s position is not completely secure, his own bodyguards recently tried to kill him. The Colombian military also claims that it is putting pressure on the Eastern Bloc in general and Mono Jojoy in particular. While individuals with access to quality medical care can live perfectly healthy lives with diabetes, life on the run in the jungle cannot be good for Mono Jojoy’s condition and a weakened physical state may interfere with his ability to command the Eastern Bloc or take part in the FARC’s internecine power struggles.



What this means for the future of the FARC is difficult to say.

Mono Jojoy, who was born Victor Julio Suarez Rojas, and is also known as Jorge Briceno Suarez, has a background similar to the late Tirofijo, the FARC’s founder. Like Tirofijo he was born to very modest rural circumstances. He joined the FARC as a boy, served as Tirofijo’s bodyguard, and has a reputation as a very capable commander. Mono Jojoy represent’s the FARC rural roots and commitment to autonomy that were embodied by Tirofijo. If Mono Jojoy fades, the better educated, more urban leaders such as Alfonso Cano may be more inclined to increase FARC’s political presence while demoting its military activities. (These hopes should be tempered by the reality that Cano too is a deeply committed radical who, among other things, may have been plotting to take FARC operations international by attacking Colombians in Madrid.)

Still, the political leadership may be more inclined to end the terrible hostage crisis (including the release of the three American contractors held by the FARC for five years), which has brought FARC almost no benefit whatsoever. At the very least, if Mono Jojoy is ill, it is yet another sign of the FARC’s decline and hopefully an end to the armed struggle that has ravaged Colombia.

Statistical Analysis of Decapitation as a Counter-Terror Strategy

The most recent edition of The Journal of International Policy Solutions published a statistical analysis I wrote on the efficacy of killing or capturing the top leaders of a terrorist organizations. Entitled "Testing The Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group's Activity?" the article can be read in its entirety here a summary of the method and findings follows.

It is conventional wisdom that removing an organization's leaders is an effective counter-terror strategy, but the quantitative analysis is less clear on the issue. Most of the successes focus on specific instances, such as the collapse of Sendero Luminoso in Peru after its leaders were removed. There are also examples on the other side, such as Hezbollah's increased deadliness and effectiveness after Israel's 1992 assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Abbas Musawi.

This study was an attempt to shed some light on the issue, focusing strictly on removing top leaders (#1 or #2 - so OBL or Zawahiri would count, but Khalid Sheikh Mohammed did not.) Sixty cases of terrorist leaders being killed, dying, or being captured and imprisoned for lengthy periods were identified. Using the Terrorism Knowledge Base, which is now sadly not available to the public anymore, I gathered data on incidents and fatalities in the two and five year periods before and after the organization lost its leader. Because there are lots of reasons why a terrorist group's level of activity might change I tested these results against a comparison group of 21 terrorist groups that did not lose a leader.

The Results

The data-set was relatively small so most of the results were not statistically significant. There was a trend of lower numbers of incidents after a group lost its leader, a trend that increased when a group lost its leader more than once. On the other hand there was an indication that the number of fatalities by Islamist groups increase after they lose a leader. Building on that when an Islamist leader is killed, rather than arrested, the increase is even greater.

None of these findings are rock solid and there are many other factors that could effect a terrorist group's activity. In particular, the increase in killings by Islamist groups after their leader is killed could reflect that the killing occurred i n the midst of a large-scale war (such as Chechnya or Algeria which were included in this study.) Still it is a potential cause for concern. Iraq was not included in this study, in great part because the data was too complicated to work with.

This is another key point the paper discusses, the data problems and other challenges (for example what should be measured - 9/11 was nearly 3000 deaths, but 4 incidents) in doing any quantitative analysis of terrorist activity. The paper also reviews other statistical studies of decapitation as a counter-terror strategy. At this point, my overall conclusions are the old academic fallback, "More study is needed." The paper ends:

Tolstoy began Anna Karenina by noting, "Happy families are all alike, every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." Like unhappy families, terrorist groups differ from each other and finding universally applicable rules to understand them may not be realistic. Regardless of the quantitative results, decapitation will remain a counter-terror strategy. If a quantitative test can help indicate where and when it is most likely to be effective or have deleterious results, it can help conserve scarce counter-terror resources and avoid exacerbating situations where the decapitation strategy may be counter-productive."

Feared FARC Commander Surrenders

Another FARC commander has surrendered to Colombian authorities. Nelly Avila Moreno, aka Karina, turned herself in (along with her daughter andher partner, known as Michin.) Karina was commander of the 47th Front. (She was also one of the top-ranked women in the FARC – here is some background on the women in the FARC.) This would be roughly equivalent to a Captain surrendering. At a news conference, she stated the FARC was “crumbling.” She had been out of communications with the FARC leadership for two years. Her once feared unit of 350 was down to about 50 fighters.

A few notes about Karina’s surrender and the FARC’s collapse:

The FARC’s collapse is good news for everyone except perhaps the several hundred hostages still held by the FARC (including Ingrid Betancourt and three American contractors.) Their daily life is an absolute hell. Unfortunately, as the FARC disintegrates it is increasingly likely that the hostages may be executed or die in the process of constant movement. The Colombian government has shown a great deal of creativity in battling the FARC, perhaps it can do the same in developing strategies for the hostages’ release.

Karina had been shaken by the death of Ivan Rios at the hands of his own men. She had a $900,000 reward on her head. She told reporters, "You may have a lot of fighters at your side, but you never have an idea of what they are really thinking,"

The bounty strategy has worked well against the FARC. But it is no silver bullet. It has not been successful against al-Qaeda. Every terrorist group is different. Also, the rewards program has only worked against the FARC after years of hard fought counter-insurgency.

There is extensive discussion of the role of the Internet and terrorism. But against the FARC low-tech radio has been a key part of a successful information campaign. The Colombian government regularly broadcasts appeals for FARC members to surrender (over 2000 have defected over the past two years – the FARC’s peak strength was about 18,000 in 2002.) In the case of Karina, President Uribe made a personal appeal for her to surrender.

Karina is suspected of a role in the 1983 murder of Uribe’s father. It is unclear what deal was negotiated regarding the charges against her. Colombia has an ongoing, but problematic “Justice and Peace” process to demobilize, prosecute and re-integrate former paramilitaries (groups that formed to fight the FARC and committed innumerable bloody massacres in their own right.) For the many thousands of low-level figures the process seems to work well – but for the commanders, with real blood on their hands (and often links to important political figures) it is not clear that justice is always being served. As more and more high-level FARC figures surrender these issues will surface in that context as well.

FARC Eats it Own

Reporting on Interpol’s assertion that the files on the captured FARC computers are authentic has focused on potential Chavez-FARC ties. But another bit of FARC news should be noted. Six of FARC commander Mono Jojoy’s bodyguards had plotted kill him, probably to collect the $5 million reward. The plot was discovered and three of the six were killed, the other three escaped and are now aiding the Colombian authorities. This plot was no doubt inspired by the death of another member of the FARC Secretariat, Ivan Rios – again at the hands of his bodyguards. The Colombian government’s decision to pay Rios’ bodyguards the reward no doubt encouraged Mono Jojoy’s bodyguards. This is roughly equivalent to Generals being shot by their own troops.

There is probably no better counter-terror strategy than to get a group to turn on itself. The campaign against the notorious Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) in the late 1980s was successful because the paranoid leader, the eponymous Abu Nidal (real name Sabri al-Banna) became convinced that his organization had been infiltrated by the CIA and his subordinates were plotting against him. He became unhinged and began burying them in wet cement. Reportedly, on one night he killed 150 ANO members.

In addition, FARC is losing its mid-level leaders to arrest or death and experienced cadres are deserting at increasing rates. Whatever international, regional, or public support the FARC ever had has evaporated.

The capture of the computer equipment from Raul Reyes’ camp will accelerate all of these trends. Their public image will be further decimated as their own records of their violence are exposed. Colombian intelligence will receive a terrific insight into the FARC modus operandi. Also, as I’ve written before the metadata associated with the documents may be a treasure trove in its own right. Photograph files on laptops often reveal information about the cameras that took them (possibly leading to information about where they were purchased.) Emails may include information about their origin and receipt that could reveal patterns of movement and usage. Combined with Colombia (and American) electronic intelligence capabilities this is sure to be an intelligence bonanza.

The FARC is in a state of rapid decline. Unfortunately it will probably not be vanquished soon – and there is the concern that a smaller, more violence and ideological successor group could emerge. Nonetheless, the FARC's decline is good news. In the 1990s when Plan Colombia was initiated, there was a very real concern that the government of Colombia could "lose" and the FARC could win. Now this possibility is increasingly remote.

Me on Covert Radio Discussing Latin America

Attention fellow TerrorWonks there is a terrfic new online resource, Brett Winterble's Covert Radio. It features interviews with - among others - Olivier Guitta, Bill Roggio, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross (anyone see a theme developing here.)

Not long ago I had a chat with Brett about Hugo Chavez, the FARC, and threats emanating from Latin America.

Listen here.

About Bout & the DEA

The recently unsealed indictment of arms-trafficker extraordinaire Victor Bout is an interesting read. Perhaps the most notable line is on page 10, when Bout told the DEA operatives (who he believed represented the FARC) that America was also his enemy and their fight was his fight. Another international arms dealer, Monzar al-Kasser, who was arrested in a DEA sting, promised the informants to raise an army for the FARC in order to fight the Americans. Are these heartfelt sentiments, or just salesmen trying to ingratiate themselves to a wealthy client and close a lucrative deal?

The truth is probably a combination of both. Many criminals seek to justify their actions as somehow contributing to a greater good by empowering the powerless. But intentions aside, Bout’s capabilities are the real cause for worry. He promised to airlift hundreds of Igla portable surface-to-air missiles (known as MANPADS – man portable self-defense systems) along with UAVs, ultra-light planes, explosives, and millions of rounds of ammunition to the FARC. Bout wasn’t just a dealer, he also could provide training (nothing like good customer service to bring in repeat business.) He also mentioned that he could sell the FARC airplanes if they were interested. Regardless of intent, individuals with the connections and capabilities to acquire and transport large quantities of deadly weapons like MANPADS outside of regulated channels are as dangerous to international security as terrorists.

(As a side-note, the FARC keeps appearing in the headlines on Bout’s capture, but in fact had nothing to do with it – DEA operatives were portraying themselves as FARC representatives. The FARC, which has a terribly long list of vicious misdeeds of its own, does not apparently need Bout, as the latest documents from the captured FARC computers indicate that FARC believed that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez would supply them with everything they might need.)

About the DEA

Bout’s capture, besides being good news in and of itself, highlights the Drug Enforcement Agency as a competent law enforcement/intelligence agency capable of carrying out a complex international operation. On a related note, a recent Justice Department Inspector-General report, the Drug Enforcement Agency has been fairly successful at building its analytical capabilities. Most analysts are satisfied with their work and analyst turnover is much lower than at the FBI. Although the report was mostly positive, it also highlighted the many challenges to building an effective analytical capability. To often analysts are also given administrative tasks and hiring is complicated by the long clearance process (many prime candidates find other jobs while waiting to be cleared.) The DEA’s reports are well regarded by other intelligence agencies, but they apparently are slow to share information. The DEA response to this complaint was particularly interesting – they noted that information was quickly shared through informal channels. But, there is a demanding review process for formal reports and the DEA wants to make sure its analyses are high quality.

The report gives a sense of the nuts and bolts issues of building an intelligence analysis component and is food for thought as the FBI is criticized, yet again, for not building its analytical capabilities. In fairness, the DEA is a much smaller agency with a specific focus and is not being called on to re-invent itself on the fly. Too often these detailed issues regarding organizational capabilities and culture are ignored in favor of grand pronouncements and declarations.

Remembering the Beirut Embassy Bombing: April 18, 1983

Twenty-five years ago today a late model GMC truck packed with explosives slammed into the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and crashing through the lobby door. In his memoir See No Evil former CIA operative Robert Baer, who devoted much of this career to identifying the perpetrators of the bombing, “Even by Beirut standards, it was an enormous blast…”

Often overshadowed by the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut only six months later (as well as the many suicide vehicle bombs since), the Embassy bombing was the deadliest terrorist attack against the United States up to that point, the first major suicide vehicle bombing, and Hezbollah’s opening move in its long war against the United States.

Beyond the symbolism of leveling a U.S. Embassy, the bombing was in fact a major strategic blow on American power. The Marine Barracks bombing appeared to have the more immediate impact, leading to the withdrawal of U.S. forces – and inspiring Bin Laden and others to believe the United States was a paper tiger. But of the seventeen Americans who died in the Embassy bombing (there were 63 total casualties) six were CIA officers – including the station chief, his deputy, and Robert Ames the national intelligence officer for the Near East (who was on a visit.)

The United States is an enormous country with tremendous resources. But experienced case officers are always in short supply. Losing so many in one blow was a severe loss of institutional memory and capacity. It is a loss that has been sorely felt in the quarter-century since as the U.S. has been blind-sided by one Middle East crisis after another. Baer notes:

Never before had the CIA lost so many officers in a single attack. It was a tragedy from which the agency would never recover.

DU Dud: The Silver Lining to FARC’s Uranium

Colombian police have found 30 kilos (65 lbs.) of depleted uranium (DU). DU is what is left over after natural uranium is enriched. It is less radioactive than natural uranium and consequently useless for building dirty bombs (let alone nuclear weapons.) Tons of the stuff is around and there is virtually no market for DU (certainly not to the tune of $2.5 million a kilo).

While the Hollywood scenarios of terrorists dealing in WMD appear to be false, this incident raises interesting questions about the motivations and quality of the FARC’s leadership.

Here is a video from the site of Colombia’s El Tiempo of investigators examining the uranium. A close-up of the Geiger counter shows that it barely registers the radiation and the investigators clean off the bars and the words “depleted uranium” are clearly visible.

It seems likely that the FARC was involved in a scam. The question is were they the scammer or the scammed (or a bit of both)? Whatever the answer, the FARC is exposed as both vicious and incompetent.

If the FARC was the victim of a scam, it shows how they have fallen. First that the FARC would fall for a scam shows a decline in their intelligence and analytical capabilities. Also, the FARC is a heavily armed and vicious. If some hustler was willing to scam them it indicates that the FARC are less feared than in the past. A terrorist group that does not generate fear is a terrorist group in decline.

If the FARC was knowingly committing a scam, they have sacrificed their credibility for a short-term profit. Between this possible scam and the fact that several international arms dealers (including the notorious Victor Bout) have been snagged with FARC bait, other major players in international illicit networks will be much more cautious about dealing with the FARC. If the FARC, in turn, becomes more desperate to purchase weapons and other needed equipment then it will be more vulnerable to law enforcement efforts to infiltrate it – expanding an existing vulnerability.

More than likely, the FARC was aware that this was a scam – but was possibly scammed in being misled about how lucrative and easy this sort of scam would be.

In addition, this incident raises deeper questions about the FARC. While some terrorists (such as al-Qaeda) would readily resort to WMD – there is no political advantage to selling it, besides as a source of income. Whatever the radioactivity of the materials, how could the FARC high command not know that being associated with selling uranium would be politically radioactive? Or did they not care when the chance of a multi-million dollar windfall came their way? But the FARC already has a solid cash flow from the drug trade and other illicit activities. Did they need this extra income, or did they just want it? Either answer shows that the FARC leadership is at an advanced state of decay.

Venezuela & The Terror Supporters List: Pros & Cons

An anonymous State Department source told the Miami Herald that they are exploring the possibility of placing Venezuela on the list of state sponsors of terrorism for their relationship with the FARC - as revealed in the laptops captured from FARC leaders.

Being declared a state sponsor of terrorism brings a host of sanctions down on a regime, however the administration has flexibility about how they are enforced (I'll leave it to some of my co-bloggers, who are among the leading experts on U.S. law and state sponsorship of terrorism, to flesh this out.)

More than likely, this leak is just a shot across the bow. Declaring Venezuela a state sponsor of terror is a complicated issue in which many factors have to be carefully weighed including the quality of the evidence, the effect on the U.S. economy, the declaration's regional impact, and whether it furthers U.S. goals.

The laptops seized from Raul Reyes' camp in Ecuador appear to confirm a high-level relationship between FARC and Chavez that is over 15 years old. But, there is the argument, made credibly at the Center for International Policy's Colombia Program that this is only seeing the FARC's perception of the events - not necessarily what actually transpired. The sudden escalation of a single unclear paragraph into a FARC conspiracy to build dirty bombs is but one example of taking the text too far. I for one don't doubt that when the evidence is weighed, Chavez and the FARC will be revealed as political bedfellows in a deep embrace. But the evidence has to be carefully examined first.

It is impossible to discuss sanctions on Venezuela without considering its role as the supplier of about 15% of U.S. oil. Doing business with state sponsors of terror is complicated and U.S.-Venezuela trade is over $40 billion annually. Closing down this relationship would be complicated and expensive. In some ways Venezuela needs the U.S. more than the U.S. need them. Venezuelan oil is heavy and requires special refineries - which exist in the U.S. but not elsewhere. Simply selling their oil to another customer is possible, but between increased transport and the need for new infrastructure Chavez would make a smaller profit. At the same time, the oil market is tight and it is difficult to imagine a U.S. administration causing a disruption that would quickly be felt at the pump - particularly during an election season.

The sanctions component of being declared a state sponsor of terror could be structured to let the oil continue to flow, but that risks making a mockery of the U.S. sanctions regime. Alternately, it could provide the next administration with some useful tools for curbing Chavez' behavior.

There is also the question of how it would play regionally and if it truly advances U.S. goals. Chavez taps a deep vein of anti-Americanism in Latin America (and around the world.) The U.S. has refused to take the bait, toning down its anti-Chavez rhetoric in order to avoid playing into his hands. Declaring Venezuela a state sponsor of terror would grant Chavez an endless issue to exploit. His message would resonate throughout the region and other leaders would have to at least pay him lip service. But it is worth remembering that during the Falklands War the United States (much to British consternation) started off trying to play honest broker in order not to side against Argentina and inflame Latin American public opinion. It turned out the Argentina's war made everyone else in the region extremely nervous and few were upset to see the Argentine junta lose its war. Chavez is also making others in the region nervous, and in his Washington Post column Jackson Diehl argued that many Latin American leaders would like to see the U.S. take a harder line against Chavez.

Finally, would the declaration help the U.S. achieve its long-term goals. Ultimately, the U.S. wants to see Chavez leave power and be replaced by a democratically elected leader. On the one hand the declaration might give him a cause to rally the cadres. On the other, it might embarrass the Venezuelan people (who are probably less anti-American than most in the region) and give them an increased impetus to boot out Chavez.

In sum, declaring Venezuela as a state terrorism supporter is a potentially useful tool in the context of a larger strategy. But first, let all the evidence be unearthed and evaluated. Declaring a state to be a sponsor of terror is a powerful tool - best not to dull it unnecessarily.

Rios Killed by his own Men & Other Updates

The story behind the killing of FARC leader Ivan Rios has become more interesting - and even more indicative that the FARC is on the verge of collapes. Colombia's Defense Minister now states that Rios was killed by his unit's security chief. Closely pursued by Colombian Security Forces, the security chief, "Rojas" killed Rios and gave his hand, his ID papers, and his computer to the Colombian military.

Wow! The FARC is beginning to turn on itself. The FARC may in fact be on the verge of dissolution.

It is difficult to believe that the assassination of Reyes did not influence these events (they may also get to collect a $5 million reward from the U.S. Department of Justice.) Now the Colombian government has the computer of another top commander. More dominoes will fall.

Other Updates

Initial rumors are apparently false. Ecuador's Correa denies that Betancourt is about to be released.

Also, the OAS hearings on the Colombia-Venezuela spat has ended amicably. Uribe was subject to harsh criticism but gave as good as he got. It ended with a handshake between Correa, Chavez, and Uribe. This might be a good moment for the United States to make an offer to Ecuador (cutting back on aerial spraying of drug fields near the Ecuador-Colombia border might be a good opening gambit) - the disclosures about Correa's links to the FARC are certainly embarrassing.

Meanwhile, a Venezuelan National Guard vehicle crossed into Colombian territory and shots were fired. It was probably just a dumb accident - but these are the sorts of things that happen when leaders looking for a distraction from other troubles take diplomatic spats and turn them into full-scale donnybrooks.