Keeping Tabs on Terrorists: Aaron Mannes & V.S. Subrahmanian in the "Wall Street Journal"

The Wall Street Journal Asia just posted an article my colleague V.S. Subrahmanian and I wrote on the ongoing game of catch-up intelligence agencies are forced to play as terrorists quickly adopt and adapt the latest communications technologies.


* OPINION INDIA
* AUGUST 22, 2010

Keeping Tabs on Terrorists
India's spat with the maker of the Blackberry underlines a broader technological challenge for intelligence agencies.


By V.S. SUBRAHMANIAN AND AARON MANNES

The war on terror came closer to home this month, when the Indian government pressured Canadian company Research in Motion to hand over encryption keys for its popular Blackberry device. New Delhi claims terrorists are using the company's secure networks for covert communications. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia—all of which face significant terror threats—have also expressed concern. But such moves may do more harm than good.

India's concern is clearly justified: Terrorists are using new media sources to facilitate covert communications that—directly or indirectly—have led to numerous deaths. According to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center's Worldwide Incident Tracking System, Pakistan-based terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), perpetrator of the deadly 2008 Mumbai attacks, is responsible for over 700 fatalities in India during the last five years.

But publicly browbeating RIM into providing its encryption keys is a Pyrrhic victory. Terrorist organizations can only survive if they study the capabilities of their adversaries and adapt. Terrorist organizations backed by intelligence agencies tend to be even more sophisticated. If terrorists know that Blackberries are monitored, terrorists will not employ them—or will do so only in combination with other channels of communication in order to evade intelligence agencies. The much-publicized nature of India's threat to Blackberry thus may well have compromised potential operational gains.

LeT's Mumbai attack shows how quickly terrorists adapt to new technology. According to the publicly released portion of an Indian intelligence dossier, the LeT terrorists were in continuous communication with their Pakistani handlers using a mix of mobile phones and an obscure Voice over Internet Protocol provider called Callphonex. Handlers based in Pakistan were able to monitor Indian security efforts, providing real-time intelligence to the terrorists that prolonged the attack for three days and provided the terrorists with the media exposure they craved. In other words, using readily available commercial technology, the Mumbai terrorists created an effective battlefield communication system.

Intelligence agencies, on the other hand, are often slow to develop the monitoring mechanisms needed for new communications media. This is a weakness that terrorists systematically exploit. As new communications media proliferate, security analysts are forced to play a constant game of "catch up" irrespective of whether a Blackberry or Google hand over their security keys and provide server access.

Security agencies need to quickly identify emerging communication technologies and develop monitoring mechanisms tailored for each new media in almost in real-time. The technical and analytical requirements of monitoring Voice over Internet Protocol, for example, are very different from those needed to monitor photo-sharing sites. Monitoring mechanisms must be grounded in systematic research about how people actually use communications media and how new forms of communication can be monitored.

This sounds like an impossible task, but it isn't. These studies can be combined with "red team" activities in which specialists game out the terrorist role in live and virtual simulations to consider how new technologies can be used. An important virtue of "red teams" is not that they will always identify specific terrorist methods, but that they will foster a culture of rapid adaptation to technological innovation within the security services.

The development of monitoring mechanisms is a technical issue, distinct from the legal and ethical question of when a nation should monitor electronic communications. However, well-designed monitoring mechanisms can help intelligence agencies operate ethically and within the laws and discern appropriate targets for surveillance from legitimate, legal online activity. It is in the absence of effective monitoring mechanisms that states may be tempted to take in data without discrimination, violating the privacy rights of their citizens.

While there are legitimate security needs that require communications companies to provide access to their systems, simply obtaining more data without developing both a process and technology to monitor emerging communications media is a losing proposition even for the most capable intelligence agencies. As new communications technologies proliferate, smarter intelligence strategies are needed to get ahead of terrorists and prevent rather then react to the next attack.

Mr. Subrahmanian is the director and Mr. Mannes is a researcher at the University of Maryland's Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics.

Golden Oldie: Pakistan Needs U

Just over three years ago, National Review Online published an article I wrote urging the U.S. to rush aid to Pakistan in response to a cyclone that had devastated Pakistan's coastal regions. Much of it appears all too relevant now.


July 6, 2007 7:30 A.M.
Pakistan Needs U
And we need Pakistan.
Hopefully the United States is preparing a massive relief package for Pakistan’s coastal regions, which have been hard hit by flooding caused by a cyclone and heavy monsoon rains since June 23. In addition to the humanitarian importance of this mission, aiding Pakistan’s response to the flooding could have some positive implications for the U.S.-Pakistani relationship.

While possibly not as horrendous as the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, there have been over 200 deaths so far and at least two million are homeless. Karachi, Pakistan’s leading port, and a sprawling megalopolis with over ten million inhabitants (some population estimates double this figure) that suffers from power outages and poor municipal services at the best of times, was battered. Particularly hard hit were the coastal regions of the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, where the floods have isolated communities, cutting transport and communications links. Outbreaks of cholera and other diseases also loom.

The Pakistani provincial and federal governments have been slow to respond. In shades of our own Katrina disaster, Pakistan’s National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has been roundly criticized for its failures. At one point, the NDMA chairman claimed that there had been 14 deaths when the media had already confirmed nearly 100. There have been large-scale protests throughout flood-hit parts of Baluchistan.

At the moment the Pakistani government is distracted. There is a standoff in Pakistan’s capital between government forces and the radical Islamist “Red Mosque.” The nation has also been rocked with massive protests in the wake of President Musharraf’s ham-handed firing of the chief justice.

A timely and large-scale relief package is much needed. Aiding people suffering from natural disasters is always the right thing to do. Also, it is good public diplomacy. The Pakistani image of the United States changed when the U.S. led the way in delivering assistance to Pakistan after the 2005 earthquakes. Models of U.S. Army Chinook helicopters became the favorite toy for Kashmiri children.

U.S. aid to Pakistan’s coastal regions would also serve a range of positive strategic purposes. The aid would be an opportunity for U.S. and Pakistani military forces to work together in a peaceful role. The Pakistani military is effective, but heavily focused on a conventional war with India. The U.S. has been assisting the Pakistani military in its transformation into a more nimble force that can perform a range of missions. Collaborating on flood relief would be a learning experience for both militaries.

One of the Pakistani government’s major concerns is that eventually the United States will abandon it, leaving Pakistan encircled by India. A major rescue operation might help reassure Pakistan that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is for the long-term. If the Pakistani government were more confident in strength of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship it might also be more flexible in undertaking political reforms that move the country back to democratic civilian rule.

The region hardest hit by the flooding is Baluchistan, the largest in area, but poorest province of Pakistan. Sitting on mineral wealth, including natural gas, and with a seacoast that is just beyond the Straits of Hormuz and the terminus for the shortest land route to Central Asia, Baluchistan has become central for Pakistan’s future development. Baluchi frustration with the Pakistani government has sparked uprisings in the past. The current round of violence between the Baluchi tribes and the government is fueled by the failure of the investments in the province to bring benefits to the inhabitants. Past Pakistani governments responded to Baluchi uprisings with negotiations, but currently the Pakistani military is responding with a large-scale offensive. Last year, the Pakistani military assassinated a prominent tribal leader, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. The government’s failure to deliver disaster relief is seen as simply another example of the Pakistani government’s attitude towards the region.

A strong aid program might help defuse some of these tensions and allow the government and the Baluchis to resolve their disputes. With Baluchistan bordering southern Afghanistan (Taliban leader Mullah Omar is rumored to be in the vicinity of the provincial capital Quetta) the Pakistani military does not need this distraction from the main battle against the radical Islamists. Additionally, China has built a deep-water port at Gwadar on the Baluchi coastline. It would only be prudent for the United States to also be engaged in this strategic region. Finally, if assistance from other sources is not forthcoming, the void will be filled by Pakistan’s powerful Islamist organizations. The Baluchis have not traditionally been extremist in their religious beliefs, but if no one else shows concern for their plight that could change.

Delivering aid to the suffering people in Pakistan’s coastal regions is an opportunity to provide much needed humanitarian relief while improving relations with a nation crucial in the fight against radical Islam.

— Aaron Mannes is a researcher in international-security affairs and Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland.

Pakistan Fissures II: Ethnic Cleavages

In the Washington Post yesterday Selig Harrison, wrote an op-ed arguing that the Punjabi-Pashtun ethnic conflict underpins the rise of the Taliban. The Punjab is Pakistan’s most powerful province. Home to about half of the country’s population, the Punjab dominates Pakistan politically and is the primary source of manpower for the army. Harrison argues that Pakistan’s Pashtuns are cut off from Afghanistan’s Pashtuns and marginalized. Pashtuns are the largest single ethnicity in Afghanistan, and combined with Pakistan’s Pashtun population would dominate that country. In addition to fostering dissatisfaction among the Pashtuns, the situation creates an incentive for Pakistan to keep Afghanistan weak and off-balance – so that it is less able to foment trouble among Pakistan’s Pashtun population.

The well-informed Pakistan Policy blog takes issue with several of Harrison’s assertions and criticizes Harrisons policy prescription of incorporating the tribal FATA with the “settled” NWFP as a map re-drawing “fetish” of “old white men.”

Pashtun vs. Pashtun
The truth is probably somewhere in between. The Pashtuns have, to a great extent, allied with the Punjabis and serve in Pakistan’s armies in substantial numbers – but, at the same time, Pashtun nationalism has absolutely been a concern for Pakistani elites. The Taliban’s rise could also be understood as settled Pashtuns vs. tribal Pashtuns. This is the oasis people vs. desert people paradigm set forth by the great Arab historian Ibn Khaldun over 600 years ago (this plays into the issue of feudalism raised in my previous post. Many of the settled Pashtuns of the NWFP look towards Islamabad and ally with the Punjabis, while some of the tribes of the FATA seek closer bonds with the Pashtuns on the other side of the Durand Line.

One of Many Ethnic Conflicts
While Pashtun nationalism is a potentially serious challenge to the integrity of the Pakistani state, unfortunately, it is only one of a myriad of ethnic conflicts that shape Pakistani politics.

Baluchistan, Pakistan’s largest and poorest province has been in a state of on and off again insurrection, virtually since the state was founded. Baluchistan’s resources are important to Pakistan’s staggering economy and the new Chinese-built port in Gwadar has the potential to serve as a transit point serving central Asia and the Persian Gulf area. Needless to say, the Baluchis have not benefited from these projects (the Pakistani government blames the Baluchi leaders – again, see the post on feudalism in Pakistan). This conflict distracts the Pakistani military from other missions and fosters suspicions (not entirely unfounded) that the Baluchis are receiving aid from foreign powers – particularly India.

In a sense the Pashtun-Punjabi and Baluchi-Punjabi conflicts are dwarfed by the Sindhi-Punjabi conflict. The Sindh is Pakistan’s second largest province in population. Most importantly, the great city of the Sindh, the sprawling megalopolis of Karachi, is Pakistan’s primary port. Both the founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the Bhutto clan are Sindhi. However moves by the Pakistani government, have led the Sindhis to feel slighted by the state. A substantial amount of Sindhi land has been granted to retired army officers (primarily Punjabis) and the capital was moved from Karachi to the newly constructed city of Islamabad. At Benazir Bhutto’s funeral, crowds cried, “We don’t want Pakistan!”

Punjabi vs. everyone is not the complete extent of the ethnic divides within Pakistan. Pashtun-Baluchi relationships have not always been ideal, nor have Sindhis always had amicable relations with the Pashtuns or Baluchis. Mohajirs (descendents of Muslims who fled India when the partition occurred) dominate the city of Karachi and have fought with the Sindhis in the past and are now engaged in clashes with Pashtun immigrants to Karachi. (The multi-faceted violence that regularly roils Karachi will receive its own post.)

Implications: Hanging Together or…
None of these latent, or not so latent, conflicts mean that Pakistan is about to fall apart. First, the Pakistani army remains, by far, the dominant force in the country – none of the provinces have the capacity to defy it indefinitely. Also, it is not clear that any of the provinces would be terribly successful outside of Pakistan. Sindh would be dependent on Punjab for water and the Punjab would be dependent on the Sindh for an outlet to the sea. A Pashtunistan would be landlocked and an independent Baluchistan would be desperately poor.

Every country fears separatist movements, but for Pakistan ethnic separatism strikes at the very core of the state – which views itself as home to India’s Muslims. Worse, Pakistan has already suffered a split, when Bangladesh (originally East Pakistan) became independent after a Pakistani-Indian war in 1971. Fear of another runs very deep in Pakistani security services. That Bangladesh’s independence came due to foreign interference has fueled paranoia among Pakistan’s leadership about foreign conspiracies to dismember the state.

In this context, U.S. drone strikes are matches thrown onto gasoline.

Kashmir Peace: Another Mumbai Casualty?

"It is too early to say."

Zhou Enlai's response when asked for his assessment of the 1789 French Revolution

In the last week’s issue of the New Yorker Steve Coll reported that in 2007 India and Pakistan where, through diplomatic back-channels, engaged in talks “so advanced that we’d come to semi-colons” on a deal over Kashmir. Unfortunately, Musharraf lost his political credibility and had to resign from the Pakistani Presidency before the deal could be completed. The new civilian and military leaders are, by most accounts, inclined towards continuing the process. But in the wake of the Mumbai attacks, it is difficult to see how this process can be re-started.

Pakistani-Indian rapprochement could be a tremendous aid to the Pakistani leadership in their efforts to stabilize their deteriorating country. If the Mumbai attacks have made that impossible, then the Mumbai terror attacks may prove to be one of the most consequential terrorist attacks in history.

Pakistan in Free Fall
Yesterday’s attack on the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team, while a tactical failure relative to its ambition of copying the Mumbai assault (the cricket players survived and were not taken hostage and overall casualties were limited), was another blow to Pakistan’s domestic and international prestige.

Other incidents highlighting Pakistan’s possible collapse were the all too successful attacks on highly symbolic targets such as the Islamabad Marriott (the watering hole of Pakistan’s elite) and the assassination of former PM Benazir Bhutto. The recent “deal” allowing Islamists to govern the Swat Valley is yet another example of the state’s loss of control.

Unfortunately, Pakistan’s twin assets of nuclear weapons and a strategic location (American efforts in landlocked Afghanistan will become untenable without access to Pakistan’s ports) mean that the country cannot be ignored.

Game Changer
It would require multiple volumes to explain the complex interlocking problems facing Pakistan. But, Pakistan’s conflict with India, primarily over Kashmir, is central and exacerbates many of Pakistan’s other challenges. Having fought (and lost) several wars with India, Pakistan is locked into an arms race that it cannot win. Beyond India’s demographic and economic advantages, Pakistan has long borders and little strategic depth. Massive outlays for defense needs have choked off funds for much needed development, while the military – once respected for its relative probity – is becoming yet another Pakistani institution mired in corruption. Islamist organizations have filled the void left by the government’s failure to provide basic social services like education.

The conflict over Kashmir is not merely over resources and territory. It also touches on Pakistan’s identity as the homeland for Indian Muslims. In the face of the Indian threat and its own panoply of ethnic divides, the government relied on Islam as a national unifier. These policies, combined with ISI support, created a fertile ground for Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba to take root.

An agreement with India over Kashmir, the key point of Pakistani-Indian contention, would have allowed military reformers both to shrink the military overall and to re-orient it from its conventional war India mission of countering India to a lighter counter-insurgency force that can keep peace within Pakistan.

An agreement with India is no guarantee that Pakistan would stabilize – the Islamist groups are now effectively self-sustaining and the country has been so poorly governed that reforms may be too little too late. But it is difficult to see how Pakistan can make the necessary institutional changes without an improved relationship with India, and the agreement described in Coll’s article would at least have improved Pakistan’s odds.

World Historical Terror
There is an interesting argument that most terrorism proves to be politically ineffective. This excellent paper surveys major terrorist groups and finds that, with few exceptions, terrorist groups do not achieve their political ends. The most notable exception is Hezbollah’s campaign against the U.S. and other Western powers in Lebanon in the 1980s.

But there are also terror attacks that have world historical significance beyond the orchestrating organization’s ambitions. 9/11 would be an example. Sadat’s assassination is also an example of an attack that did not achieve specific political goals (the Egyptian government remained in power) but did remove the Arab politician who had the greatest potential to change the dismal course of Middle Eastern politics.

If the Mumbai attack has successfully derailed Indian-Pakistani negotiations for the foreseeable future, then the attack may join the annals of terror attacks with great historical reverberations. It is not inconceivable that future historians will see the failure of peace talks as Pakistan’s last chance to come to grips with its internal challenges and avoid collapse. If this collapse occurs, even laying aside the nuclear weapons, it is sure to be a geopolitical earthquake leaving a vacuum in a strategic location and sending waves of refugees into the unstable Middle East and beyond.

History is not set in stone. It is still possible for Pakistan and India to come to an agreement. Both countries’ leaders recognize the importance of defusing their conflict, although it remains unclear if the Pakistani leadership has grasped the precariousness of the Pakistani state. If these leaders can overcome the setbacks they can deny the Mumbai murderers the ultimate victory

Islamabad Bombing I: Brute Force Tactics

In the span of week, there were two attacks against hard targets, the September 17 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, and Saturday’s strike on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates still face difficulties launching attacks in Western countries, due to the difficulty of transporting the necessary experienced operatives to the West in the face of diligent and capable Western security services.

But these attacks highlight growing capabilities within the greater Middle East, where security forces are not as skilled and the operatives move with greater ease. Both of these attacks were against targets with formidable security, and the success of the Marriott attack indicates the limits inherent in hardening targets and the potential for enormous quantities of explosive to overcome security measures. This tactic will become more widespread where terrorists possess the necessary logistical and technical capabilities.

Brute Force

The attack on the Embassy in Sanaa, Yemen was a sophisticated, multi-pronged strike that included two carbombs and gunmen (a State Department briefing describing the attack is here. Although the attack took ten lives, it did not penetrate the Embassy itself. There may be lessons learned from this semi-successful attack that can be incorporated into future strikes – but Embassy security will also adapt. However, the fortress-like status of American Embassies around the world exacts a high price on U.S. efforts to conduct effective public diplomacy. The Marriott is a hotel. While Embassies can adopt extensive security procedures at some cost to their effectiveness, hotels cannot pay that same price.

What the Yemen attack attempted to achieve by guile, the Islamabad attack managed by sheer brute force. Marriott security appeared to have worked. The truck was kept away from the building, detonating at a blast wall some 60 feet away. (This image from BBC makes it look like the blast was closer to the building – but the crater created by the explosion itself was 60 feet wide.) There were reportedly 600 kg of military grade explosives (about 1400 lbs) on the truck. By comparison, the primary explosive in the Bali bombing (in which 202 people were killed) included about 150 kg of explosives (and some reports indicate that only a portion of them detonated.) Had the truck been able to reach the Marriott itself, the immediate damage might have been far worse.


Terrorist activity requires logistics, and the more extensive the attack, the greater the logistical support needed. The ability to assemble and transport such an enormous bomb without being detected gives a sense of the perpetrator’s capabilities and is a very deep cause for concern.

It is worth noting that the Islamabad Marriott had been targeted before in January 2007 when a suicide bomber attempting to enter the hotel killed a security guard. The failure of the human missile approach may have helped lead the attackers to adopt the brute force approach.

Fire Multiplier

The bomb was laced with aluminum powder, an accelerant that, after the explosion ignited a gas leak, intensified the blaze. This led to more casualties and complicated the rescue effort. In the right circumstances, these cascading effects – such as fires started by explosions – can be a devastating force multiplier and may also become a component of terror attack planning.

Initial reports indicate that Pakistani firefighters acted bravely (their actions probably prevented the building from collapsing), but lacked the appropriate equipment and training and that the Marriott’s fire system did not respond properly. The city government is apparently engaging international consultants to assist in building firefighting capacity. (My recent post - Fire as a Tool of Terror - discussed some of these issues in detail, particularly the importance of firefighting diplomacy.)

Madrassas Extending into Pakistani Heartlands

This short analysis from the invaluable Middle East Media Research Institute is well worth a read. It discusses the controversy Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) leader, Asif Zardari set off when, while delivering the keynote address at the 23rd Internationalist Socialist Congress, he described madrassas as propagating Islamist extremism.

Unsurprisingly, Pakistan’s religious leaders condemned him. But reading the report, and these notes from MEMRI’s Urdu-Pashto Blog also indicates that the madrassas have spread from the Northwest Frontier Province into the rest of the country – including the Punjabi heartland. Although Islam is central to Pakistan’s national identity, the traditional practice of Islam was relatively moderate. In fact there have been skirmishes between different factions within the Sunni community (not to mention the bloody Shia-Sunni violence within Pakistan) – particularly in Karachi.

Considering the endemic corruption and misrule in Pakistan, it is surprising that radicalism has not made inroads faster. Consistently, the Islamist parties do not do terribly well in Pakistani elections (when they proved no better then their secular counterparts, the lost power in NWFP.) But as their influence expands they can, not only expand their parties, they can also re-shape the positions of the major parties, the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). Although the PPP is generally perceived as secular and the PML is seen as closer to the Islamists – both turn to Islam when it is convenient.

Zardari is a problematic figure (although, despite reports, he is not mentally ill). He often seems to say the right thing, calling for a more moderate approach to India, and criticizing madrassas. He may actually believe these things. It is also possible that, because he cannot match Nawaz Sharif’s popularity on the ground – his wife the late Benazir Bhutto could – that he is appealing the West and particularly the U.S. as a balance. A real Pakistan policy needs to look beyond any given leader and build a deeper relationship.

To that end, the recent meetings between top U.S. and Pakistani military officers on the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln for a “brainstorming session” is a step in the right direction. But the relationship needs to be far, far deeper.

According to Mark Bowden’s story in the Atlantic Monthly, “To Kill a Terrorist,” when the U.S. decided Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines was a serious problem they sent a CIA operative to liaise with the Philippine security forces. One of this operative’s key tasks was identifying which Philippine units and commanders were effective and then making sure they had the equipment and intelligence necessary to do the job. This sort of operation needs to be repeated dozens (maybe hundreds) of times if the FATA regions are to be brought under any kind of control.

Also, the relationship has to be more than military. Pakistan assumes that the U.S. will eventually abandon them. They have their reasons, first from the U.S. losing interest in them after the Soviets left Afghanistan and then when the U.S. sanctioned them for testing nuclear weapons. The burgeoning U.S.-India relationship also doesn’t help. When Presidential candidates threaten military incursions into Pakistan, it only heightens these fears.

Pakistan cannot be coddled – the U.S. must push for real economic and social reforms. The Islamist inroads into this nuclear power are too great to be ignored. But trying to achieve these things through threats and intimidation alone is unlikely to be successful.

Trouble for Pakistan's Possible Next President?

Reports have surfaced that PPP leader Asif Ali Zardari "was suffering from severe psychiatric problems as recently as last year..."

Zardari (husband of the late Benazir Bhutto) is the defacto head of Pakistan's largest political party. His alliance with the other major political party PML-N fell apart shortly after Musharraf resigned. Knowing Pakistani politics this is not surprising.

Zardari is probably fine, the claims of psychiatric troubles were really a legal gambit to postpone a trial for corruption in the UK.

It would be nice to think that this is a sign that Pakistani politics has moved to character assassination - a real improvement since usually that nation's politics is rocked by the real thing. But it is maddening that the country's leaders cannot seem to come together in a time of severe crisis.

Another worrying sign is the tiff between the American Ambassador to the UN, Zalmay Khalilzad, and the State Department's assistant secretary for South Asia Richard Boucher. Boucher is mad because Khalilzad is having unsanctioned contacts with Zardari and somehow this spat found its way into The New York Times. Hmmm...

Boucher is long-time Foreign Service, whereas Khalilzad is close to the administration. Virtually every administration complains about the State Department. FDR considered them more obstreperous then Treasury - but not as bad as the Navy. Kennedy thought Foggy Bottom was running its own government. In general, administrations figure out how to work with the foreign policy bureaucracy, but this administration has not been able to do so. Every administration has to do occasional end runs around the bureauracy sometimes, and the administration undoubtedly has its reasons for being frustrated with "the striped pants crowd."

But these end runs must be sued sparingly and this is a crucial issue. Pakistan is an impoverished, cobbled together country that in the best of times is in a partial state of collapse. And it has nukes. Currently in the throes of multiple insurgencies, an economic crisis, rising Islamist radicalism, Pakistan will be at the top of the next administration's priority list. And they have nukes!

Yes, the hour is late and this administration doesn't have much gas left. But building frameworks that can be expanded under the next President is still possible. Biden mentioned Pakistan as a major area of concern in his speech tonight. Even some spadework would be appreciated no matter who takes office in January

It is frustrating that Pakistan's political class cannot get its act together and move forward in the national interest - but on this issue the United States is a glass house.

If Musharraf Goes: Assessments and Opportunities

There are reports that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf will be stepping down in the next few days in order to avoid impeachment. Musharraf has denied these reports, but the prominence of the rumors indicates strongly that the political balance of power has shifting against Musharraf – he will almost certainly be reduced to a figurehead. It is difficult to say how history will judge Musharraf. From the American perspective he was not adequately taking on Islamic extremism. But from the Pakistani perspective he was becoming an American lackey. The truth is somewhere in between. What Musharraf lacked was either the desire or the capability to take on the systemic problems bedeviling Pakistan. It is possible that with his exit from the scene, a new opportunity to take on these challenges could emerge.

On one level, Musharraf has been cooperative on counter-terror issues, arresting high-profile al-Qaeda and acquiescing to missile strikes on Pakistani territory. However, while missile strikes are a useful tool – they are no substitute for a serious policy. They have also contributed to Musharraf’s loss of standing in Pakistan, since he is seen as subordinating Pakistani sovereignty – and lives (these strikes have, unfortunately, killed civilians) – to American priorities.

On the other hand, Pakistan has not successfully taken control of the tribal areas where al-Qaeda is re-grouping. Americans would be wise to temper their criticism of the Pakistani military’s counter-insurgency efforts. Imagine a heavy military force designed for conventional conflict being forced to fight a major conventional war stumbling when forced to fight a tough insurgency in hard terrain.

In addition, when Pakistan has cracked down harshly on Islamist groups (such as storming the Lal Masjid Mosque in Islamabad) the response has been waves of Islamist violence – a certain amount of trepidation is understandable.

Large organizations do not change quickly or easily – no matter what the political leadership orders. Ultimately, the Pakistani military’s size (a drag on the economy), shape (oriented towards conflict with India), and operations (such as meddling in Afghanistan) are due to its ongoing conflict with India over Kashmir. The Kashmir issue probably cannot be effectively resolved. However, in general Pakistan’s civilian leaders have been willing to lower the level of tension (in fairness, so did Musharraf). When PPP chief Asif Zardari stated that relations with New Delhi should not be held hostage to the Kashmir issue he was criticized from almost every quarter. Several days later General Kayani made a highly publicized visit to the Line of Control in Kashmir.

Pakistan is at a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis India, both in geography and power (Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy is motivated by a desire to keep that country weak, and thus potential strategic depth for Pakistan in a conflict with India.) U.S. policy has to take Pakistan’s security concerns seriously.

With a civilian government holding real power, the United States might be able to offer security guarantees that would reduce Pakistani fears of conventional defeat by India. Equally important would be the framework of this dialogue. The United States should work to structure these discussions so that Pakistan’s leadership is not negotiating from an inferior position. This combination of real guarantees and the appearance of dealing with the U.S. from a position of strength (essential for the new leadership to establish that it is not in the American pocket) might give Pakistan’s civilian leadership the strength to re-shape the security establishment for its current challenges, reduce the size of the ISI, and counter-act the military’s ongoing expropriation of Pakistan’s civilian economy.

This approach will require a combination of strength and subtlety from both the Pakistani and American sides – qualities that have been in short supply. Nonetheless, a nuclear-armed nation of 200 million, in a strategic location – and at least some democratic currents in its politics – demands this level of attention.

Pakistani Intelligence Sponsoring Terror

This morning, The New York Times has a front page story stating that U.S. intelligence has determined that Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, aided the July 7, 2008 attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul. The conclusion was “based on intercepted communications between Pakistani intelligence officers and militants who carried out the attack…”

This is a very big deal. Indian intelligence sees the ISI behind every adverse event (it should be noted that sometimes, this assessment is correct), but oftentimes the follow-up investigation is lax and inconclusive. India’s security services are of uneven quality (with, it should be emphasized, some able people in top slots) and blaming the ISI is easier than engaging in the needed long-term reform. More recently Afghanistan’s President Karzai has been publicly accusing Pakistan of supporting the Taliban against his regime.

But for U.S. intelligence, particularly the CIA (which has a long working relationship with the ISI) to come to this conclusion – and allow it to appear in the newspaper of record is an event of a different magnitude altogether and it should be taken very seriously. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan’s Prime Minister has denied this support. But the U.S., which has given Pakistan billions in aid since 9/11 and tried to build a strategic alliance, would have little incentive to accuse Pakistan of something so serious.

Unfortunately, effective policy options are not readily available. Too much pressure could isolate Pakistan and lead to a rupture in relations. This is inadvisable - since Pakistan is nuclear-armed, and al-Qaeda cannot be neutralized and Afghanistan cannot be stabilized without Pakistani cooperation. Pakistan can also turn to other powers (particularly China, which is building a giant port at Gwadar) for support.

Also, Pakistan is not completely hopeless. While radical Islam is on the rise in Pakistan, considering how poorly the country has been governed it is surprising that the Pakistani people have not turned even more strongly to radical Islam. The government has recently returned to democracy - a corrupt, inept democracy - but one of the few in the Muslim world.

Pakistan, is one of the central theaters in the war on terror. The recently reported revelations about its intelligence agency's involvement with Islamist terrorists make this an unavoidable reality about Pakistan that the next administration will need to face directly, with resolve, subtlety, and creativity.

But, as Doug Farah notes, simply writing checks is insufficient.

Pakistan & A Bomb Too Far

Less than a week before the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, there had been another bloody assassination attempt in Pakistan – both could represent turning points in Pakistan’s ongoing struggle with Islamist violence.

In northwest Pakistan a suicide bomber detonated his bomb inside a crowded mosque on Eid al-Adha (the Islamic Feast of Sacrifice which marks the end of the annual hajj.) The attack was an attempt to kill former Interior Minister Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao. Forty-eight people were killed and over 100 were wounded, including Sherpao's son and two grandnephews. Sherpao was unharmed.

This was the second attempt on Sherpao’s life in eight months, the previous attempt at a political rally in nearby Charsadda, 28 were killed and Sherpao was slightly wounded.

That Islamists would attack Sherpao is unsurprising. As Interior Minister he was a top security official and a key player in the Lal Masjid Mosque crackdown that has sparked the present high levels of violence. But for an Islamist to enter a mosque on a major holiday and murder innocent worshipers should be beyond the pale – even for radical Islamists.

Audrey Kurth Cronin, a professor at the National War College, in this excellent article in International Security How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups describes how the loss of popular support is a key factor in the demise of terrorist groups. Describing one of the most common paths to this collapse, she writes:

…a terrorist group’s attacks can cause revulsion among its actual or potential public constituency. This is a historically common strategic error and can cause the group to implode. Independent of the counterterrorist activity of a government, a terrorist group may choose a target that a wide range of its constituents consider illegitimate.

The attacks on Bhutto, which have also killed many innocents, have undoubtedly deepened the revulsion amongst Pakistan’s public. But the attack on Sherpao and its attendant massacre of innocent worshipers should foster revulsion among the Islamist’s core base of support, the Pashtun tribes of the Northwest Frontier Province.

Time and again, the Pakistani people have shown that they are not radical Islamists. The Islamist parties rarely poll even in the low double digits in national elections. Since taking power in the Northwest Frontier Province the Islamists have actually lost a great deal of support, when their rule proved little better than their secular predecessors.

In the midst of the many tragedies faced by Pakistan there are real opportunities. If moderates in the Pakistani government and civil society can show real leadership (always a big if) against the Islamists they could find real support among Pakistan’s public and help turn Pakistan from a global security problem into the modern liberal Muslim democracy envisioned by its founders.

Bhutto's Assassination Needs a Real Investigation

Facts about Benazir Bhutto’s assassination are in short supply. Unfortunately that is unlikely to change. There is a long tradition of failure to investigate political murders in Pakistan. This cannot continue if Pakistan is to become a stable democratic state that serves its people and exists at peace with the world. The first step is that Musharraf invite the international community to advise in the investigation into Bhutto’s death. The investigation will be politically expensive – it may not reach Musharraf himself but it will reach deep into the civilian and military elites running Pakistan. Broad, tough international engagement is essential to seeing this forward – the stakes are very high.

While the Islamists are the most likely suspects, they certainly hated Bhutto as a secular female politician – Bhutto had many other enemies. As I noted after the October attempt on Bhutto’s life:

In courting Western support for her return to Pakistan, Bhutto promised that the International Atomic Energy Agency would receive access to A. Q. Khan, father of the Pakistani nuclear program and head of an international clandestine nuclear proliferation ring, who is currently under house arrest. It is inconceivable that Khan carried out his operations without substantial assistance from figures in Pakistan’s military and intelligence services.

A thorough investigation might be a first step to countering the rot pervading Pakistani politics. But if the murderers and their backers can get away with this murder Pakistan’s downward spiral will only continue.

A History of Uninvestigated Political Murders
A thorough investigation into a political murder would be a unique thing in Pakistani history. The October assassination attempt on Bhutto has not been thoroughly investigated – nor for that matter have the numerous assassination attempts on Musharraf. On October 16, 1951 Pakistan’s first Prime Minister was assassinated in Rawalpindi – in the same park where Bhutto was killed. Security forces immediately killed the assassin so little was gleaned about the plot. There remain unanswered questions about the deaths of Bhutto’s own brother Shahnawaz (poisoned in France in 1985) and Murtaza (who was shot by police in 1996.) There are ongoing suspicions that Benazir had a role in Murtaza’s death – suspicions held by other members of the Bhutto family.

For that matter, Pakistan’s most famous artist Abdul Mohamed Ismail – better known as Gulgee - was killed at his home in Karachi recently and little has surfaced from the investigation.

Bhutto’s father, is one of the few exceptions to this terrible trend – Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was overthrown by Pakistan’s Chief of Staff Zia al-Huq, sentenced to death by courts controlled by Zia, and hanged on April 4, 1979. (General al-Huq was killed in a plane crash that was never thoroughly investigated. Based on the general aviation problems in Pakistan’s history it was probably a mechanical failure.)

Building an Investigation Coalition: ISI vs. CSI
An FBI led investigation, or even its participation, may not be politically tenable. The United States is broadly distrusted in Pakistan, in part because of its close alliance with Musharraf. There are plenty of other nations with capable law enforcement agencies. Ideally many nations would participate – possibly using the Hariri assassination investigation as a model.

The real problem will be getting the Pakistani government to sign on. Many top figures have much to fear. One important move that could swing broader support to an international investigation would be an expanded effort to build peaceful relations between Pakistan and India.

The military is Pakistan’s most powerful institution and its core focus is seeking balance with India, which is an inherently much stronger power. This is why the recent news about US aid to Pakistan being diverted to conventional military capabilities targeted against India is no surprise. From the perspective of the Pakistani military, Islamists are at worst a nuisance and often an asset – India is the real existential threat.

Final settlements in Kashmir are not likely, but frameworks that made a conventional war less likely and helped tamp down terrorist activity could go a long way to giving both sides the leeway to stand down, thus reducing Pakistani anxieties. India, on the whole, with its economic boom and global ambitions, has shown some willingness to reach accommodations with Pakistan. But having been abandoned by the U.S. before and watching the U.S.-Indian relationship grow this will be a hard sell to the Pakistanis. If the threat of national dismemberment (a very real one for Pakistan in a war against India) can be achieved then the moderates in the Pakistani military would be empowered against their extremist colleagues and a real house cleaning, particularly at the ISI could begin. Nothing less will do.

Bhutto was a grand historical figure, talented but flawed. She died in the cause of a secular, moderate Pakistan. If a thorough investigation into her murder helps move Pakistan towards becoming a moderate Muslim democracy her death will not have been in vain.

Aaron Mannes in NRO on the Attack on Bhutto

This morning NRO ran my article on the suicide bombing attack on Benazir Bhutto.


October 23, 2007, 9:50 a.m.

The Bhutto Attacks
Cold comfort is the best we can hope for.

By Aaron Mannes

The question of who was behind Friday’s assassination attempt on Benazir Bhutto is the whodunit from hell and, instead of a pistol, the drawing room dénouement will feature Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s October 18 return from a decade of exile was bound to be a pivotal moment in Pakistani politics, and thus, also will likely to be a violent one. Frustrated with President Musharraf’s unending military dictatorship and stagnating living conditions, the people of Karachi turned out in huge numbers to greet Bhutto as their potential savior.

The attack, which struck as Bhutto’s convoy slowly made its way through the city of Karachi, did not injure Bhutto. It did, however, kill 140 people, half of whom were members of Bhutto’s security detail. So far details remain unclear, although security services claim to have identified the heads of two suicide bombers.

At the best of times Pakistan is a society with a penchant for conspiracy theories, and the circumstances of the attack can only fuel this speculation. Despite ample warning that an attack on Bhutto was likely, security was inadequate to control the massive crowds that formed to meet Bhutto. Because of these crowds Bhutto’s convoy took about ten hours to travel about ten miles, while Karachi became a giant street party — and a perfect target for terror. Oddly, streetlights along the convoy’s route were turned off, complicating security efforts to spot possible attackers. In fairness however, Pakistani infrastructure is spotty at best, and these failings may have been due to raw incompetence. The government’s response to Bhutto’s accusations is that Bhutto ignored their security advice and insisted on a massive rally — of course such rallies are central to Pakistani politics.

Bhutto has vowed to fight Pakistan’s Islamists. Reportedly, a Taliban leader in South Waziristan, Baitullah Mehsud, who has been linked to the bombing attacks that were a response to the government’s storming of the Red Mosque earlier this summer, promised to greet Bhutto with suicide bombs. Mehsud has since denied making this statement. Even if this particular band of Islamists had nothing to do with the attacks, there is a vast constellation of Pakistani Islamist groups — most with at least tangential links to al Qaeda - that would object to Bhutto taking power and many would be savvy enough not to advertise their intentions.

However, many Pakistanis, including Bhutto herself, believe that if the Islamists were involved, they did so as cat’s paws for Pakistani intelligence. Pakistani intelligence has supported various Islamist groups to further its interests in Aghanistan, Kashmir, and Pakistan. Bhutto goes further and has stated that while she does not hold Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf responsible; there are three officials, whom she will not name, linked to former President Zia ul-Haq (who overthrew and executed her father), behind the attack. Not surprisingly, there is a great deal of speculation about these individuals. Topping the list is retired General Ejaz Shah, the head of the Intelligence Bureau (and consequently ultimately responsible for Bhutto’s security). Shah was reportedly the intelligence community’s liaison to the Taliban, al Qaeda, and to Omar Sheikh who is in prison for the murder of Daniel Pearl.

Also suspected are Chaudhru Pervez Ellahi and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain. When Musharraf deposed the last elected Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, the intelligence services engineered a split of Sharif’s party, the Pakistani Muslim League (PML). The Chaudhry cousins head the faction loyal to Musharraf. Bhutto, head of the other major national party, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), has been in ongoing negotiations with Musharraf about entering a power-sharing arrangement. Few in Pakistan think much of the Chaudhry faction of the PML, while the PPP (as seen in the turnout to Bhutto’s homecoming) commands a substantial following. With Bhutto providing civilian legitimacy to Musharraf’s regime, the Chaudhry brothers would be out of the equation. Another possible candidate for Bhutto’s list is Ejaz ul-Haq, currently Musharraf’s Minister for Religious Affairs and the son of Zia ul-Haq, who executed Bhutto’s father.

Although Bhutto’s charges are a fascinating window into Pakistani politics, their veracity is uncertain. It is possible that as Bhutto moves closer to Musharraf, these are rivals that will need to be removed. She had previously called on Musharraf to fire General Shah because of his Islamist links. PML chief Hussain has responded that there was in fact a conspiracy, engineered by Bhutto’s husband (nicknamed Mr. 10% for his “deal-making” activities when Bhutto was in office) in order to garner sympathy for Bhutto.

There are other, more harrowing potential motives behind the attempt on Bhutto’s life. In courting Western support for her return to Pakistan, Bhutto promised that the International Atomic Energy Agency would receive access to A. Q. Khan, father of the Pakistani nuclear program and head of an international clandestine nuclear proliferation ring, who is currently under house arrest. The full extent of Khan’s network remains unknown. It is inconceivable that Khan carried out his operations without substantial assistance from figures in Pakistan’s military and intelligence services. This is information that the intelligence services would not like to see revealed. Another player that would prefer that the IAEA not have access to A. Q. Khan would be his leading customer. Khan may be able to reveal critical details about Iran’s nuclear program that would galvanize the international community against the Iranian nuclear program. Iran has launched suicide terror attacks around the world in support of their strategic interests, and there are militant Shia organizations in Pakistan with links to Iran.

Because of the long links between Pakistani intelligence and the Islamists, none of these scenarios are mutually exclusive. The government has refused Bhutto’s request for international participation in the investigation, which will only foster conspiracy theorists. But, in all likelihood, the attack on Bhutto was linked to a Pakistani Islamist organization. However, it is a cold comfort that attributing a massive terror attack to the Islamist “usual suspects” is the least disturbing scenario.

— Aaron Mannes, editor of TheTerrorWonk, researches international security affairs at the University of Maryland’s Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics and is a Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland.

Aaron Mannes in AP on Intra-Muslim Violence

Associated Press quoted me for this story about terror attacks by Muslims on Muslims. The story was in the wake of the attack on Bhutto in Karachi. One note, I wasn't checking my notes and said Pakistan's population was 200 million. It isn't yet, it is only 145 million. Still, my basic point stands.

VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN
Muslims killing Muslims
In the aftermath of the deadly attempt on former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's life, asap's OTIS HART examines the notion of Muslim extremists murdering fellow Muslims.
Friday, 19 October, 2007, 17:05 EDT, US
By OTIS HART

There were no foreign dignitaries Thursday night in Karachi. No Americans on parade, no "infidels." The convoy belonged to former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, a Muslim who hopes to reshape Pakistani politics.

Just like the bombers who tried to kill her.

Yes, the intra-denominational slaughter that has characterized Iraq's descent into what some call a civil war hit Pakistan especially hard, killing up to 136 people and injuring another 250. Bhutto said Friday that she believed the Taliban and Al-Qaida initiated the attack.

The assassination attempt highlights the fractured state of Islam, a religion defined these days by its degrees of faith. Extremists target their moderate brethren as if they carried crosses. Sects quibble violently over interpretation of Islamic law.

But this is hardly religion's first deadly identity crisis.

___

THE MORE THINGS CHANGE ...

Intra-denominational wars have raged for ages, according to Dr. Henry Munson Jr., the chairman of anthropology at the University of Maine.

"Historically, it has happened a lot in other religions," he said. "Christians have slaughtered each other for centuries. For instance, there was the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) between Catholics and Protestants. Muslims certainly do not have a monopoly on this sort of thing."

For an example closer to home for Americans, look no further than the Ku Klux Klan, Munson said.

"The KKK was very much engaged in violence against fellow Christians," he said. "In the 1920s it was very much a fundamentalist movement that would go around attacking people accused of adultery and such. It wasn't just a matter of race."

More recently, Israel has had to deal with schisms in Judaism, with Orthodox Jews threatening to attack then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon if he gave up the Gaza Strip. A right-wing fanatic assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 for his moderate views and compromises with the Palestinians.

"You find in most religions, virtually all, that it's permissible to kill people of your own religious grouping if they are deemed in some sense to be heretics," Munson said.

____

ISLAM'S PLIGHT

When Muslims kill Muslims today, it's tempting to simplify it as moderates vs. extremists, said Aaron Mannes, author of "Profiles in Terror: A Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations." But while that is in some cases true, Mannes believes there is much more to these crimes.

"Islam is in a complicated phase now," Mannes said. "Pakistan is in many ways a tribal society, ridden with all types of ethnic tensions. When human nature is at its best, perhaps religion counteracts some of these things, but often it goes the other way, where religion becomes an exacerbating factor."

Fundamentalism can sometimes take a back seat to more elemental issues, like land rights, food and (surprise!) money.

"Religion provides a convenient excuse, but if you look at Somalia, it's not clear that Islam is what tore it apart," Mannes said. "There's always a mix of issues."

___

SUICIDE BOMBINGS

Suicide attacks resonate for nearly everyone, most often in a negative light. Mannes cited Pew Research Center studies that suggest that countries who are hit by suicide bombers tend to come to that negative view even more readily than those who observe at a distance.

However, it only takes one impressionable young man to pick up where a previous "martyr" left off and continue the wave of terror in the name of Islam, for example.

"Overall, there'll be a revulsion (after a bombing)," Mannes said. "But Pakistan is a nation of 200 million people ... so if 1 percent are inclined to be thinking a certain way, that's a pretty huge number. The fringe remains formidable."

That's something Bhutto knows all too well.

___

Otis Hart is an asap staff reporter in New York.

Aaron Mannes in the CSM on the Red Mosque siege

The Christian Science Monitor cited my comments on the Pakistani government's storming of the Red Mosque in Islamabad. (My comments are at the end.)

from the July 10, 2007 edition

Pakistan mosque siege continues
Islamabad mosque siege remains tough test for Musharraf and reveals US frustration.
By Dan Murphy

Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf, a close ally of US President George W. Bush, backed off from plans to storm a mosque controlled by militants in the heart of Pakistan's capital Islamabad, deciding that a negotiated solution to the standoff is still possible.

The siege of the Red Mosque, whose leaders have sought to impose Taliban style rule in Islamabad, is proving a rallying point for at least some of Mr. Musharraf's Islamist opponents, the Associated Press reports.

The siege sparked an anti-government protest Monday by some 20,000 tribesmen, including hundreds of masked militants wielding assault rifles, in the northwest region of Bajur.

Many chanted "Death to Musharraf" and "Death to America" in a rally led by Maulana Faqir Mohammed, a cleric wanted by authorities and who is believed to be a close lieutenant of al-Qaida No. 2 leader Ayman al-Zawahri.

"All of Musharraf's policies are against Islam and the country therefore he has become our enemy. He will not be spared and revenge will be taken against him for these atrocities," he said.

Reuters reports that Pakistani soldiers fired tear gas into the Red Mosque compound and traded gunfire with an estimated 200 to 500 militants inside late on Monday, but there was "no sign of an imminent assault."

The mosque has an attached school for girls, and the government is worried about the fallout from an assault that could result in the deaths of many unarmed women and children. At least 21 people have died in the violence, and government forces have tried to give women and children a chance to evacuate the compound.

A woman who feared her daughter had been killed and buried inside the compound waited with around a dozen other anxious parents behind barbed wire barriers. "I request the law enforcement agencies to let me go

inside. I can go alone, and I know nobody will fire from inside. I know these people very well," Asia Bibi said, adding she wanted to discover her daughter's fate for herself.

There are concerns some children have been either coerced or persuaded to stay behind to act as human shields.

The Los Angeles Times reports that Pakistani authorities are denying claims made by Abdul Rashid Ghazi, the cleric leading the militants inside the mosque, that 300 of his followers have been killed by the security forces.

Pakistan's leading English language newspaper, The Dawn, reports that a helicopter flyover of the compound on Sunday revealed no signs of dead or injured students. The paper also says the government is being pressured by clerics to promise freedom to Mr. Ghazi in exchange for surrender, but the government is ruling that out.

Interior Minister Aftab Sharpao told reporters that the government would never provide a safe passage to Maulana Ghazi. He said the government was avoiding an attack on the mosque in order to save the lives of innocent students who had been made hostage by hardcore militants.

Talking to Dawn, Interior Secretary Syed Kamal Shah said that at least 15 suicide bombers were present in the mosque and they had been given explosive belts. "We also have information that militants have heavy

ammunition, landmines and rocket launchers," he said.

The British Broadcasting Corp. carries a profile of Abdul Rashid Ghazi, describing him as once having a "relatively westernized lifestyle" when he worked for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

His life changed when his father Abdullah Aziz, who headed the Red Mosque, was shot dead by a lone gunman, believed to be from a rival Islamic group. There are dark hints of links with Pakistani intelligence services, and then the Taleban in Afghanistan.

What is clear is that by the time the US launched its campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan's President Musharraf chose to support it, Abdul Rashid Ghazi's friends said there was no trace left of the moderate history student.

President Musharraf, who came to power in a coup, receives large amounts of aid from the US, and his government has been intimately involved with US efforts in neighboring Afghanistan. But the pro-Taliban sentiments of many Pakistanis, and the desire of many there for religious rule, has at times made him a reluctant partner, and left President Bush leery of pushing too hard.

The New York Times reports that the US military thought it knew where Al Qaeda No. 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri and other Al Qaeda leaders were hiding inside Pakistan in early 2005, but a planned raid to capture the men was called off because administration officials worried it would "jeopardize relations with Pakistan."

But the mission was called off after Donald H. Rumsfeld, then the defense secretary, rejected an 11th-hour appeal by Porter J. Goss, then the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, officials said. Members of a Navy Seals unit in parachute gear had already boarded C-130 cargo planes in Afghanistan when the mission was canceled, said a former senior intelligence official involved in the planning. The decision to halt the planned "snatch and grab" operation frustrated some top intelligence officials and members of the military's secret Special Operations units, who say the United States missed a significant opportunity to try to capture senior members of Al Qaeda.

In recent months, the White House has become increasingly irritated with Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, for his inaction on the growing threat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Certainly, the Pakistani economy has benefited from increased American support in exchange for the country's cooperation in the "war on terror," reports The Christian Science Monitor. It's a familiar cycle for Pakistan, which is no stranger to American interventions. The Pakistani economy grew at a rate of 6.5 percent annually in both the 1960s, when Pakistan allowed the US to base anti-Soviet spy planes there, and the 1980s, when Pakistan served as America's "front line" against the Soviets in Afghanistan. When US support dwindled, economic growth fell to 2.7 and 4 percent, respectively.

This same has been true this time. The government is receiving some $2.5 billion a year from other countries – mostly the US – and, more important, it had much of its debt forgiven in return for its pledge to fight terrorism after Sept. 11.

Before 2001, one-third of the budget went toward paying debts and economic growth was at 2 percent. Because of the debt burden, "throughout the 1990s, Pakistan did not have the fiscal space to carry out any developmental work," says Dr. [Kaiser] Bengali, [an independent economic analyst in Karachi].

On Friday, Reuters reported that an attempt was made to shoot down Musharraf's plane as it flew over the town of Rawalpindi, where Pakistan's Army is headquartered, citing an unnamed intelligence official. A Reuters photographer said he saw an antiaircraft gun mounted on the roof of a house near the city's airport.

Aaron Mannes, an author who specializes in writing about terrorism, says on the Counterterrorism Blog that the attempt on the president's life and the Mosque siege highlight the weakness of US policy and the problems inside Pakistan that he argues are fueling militancy there.

The Red Mosque siege indicates that the government does not even control its own capital city. That a large campus – with over a thousand residents – is incubating radical Islamists minutes from the Supreme Court is nerve-wracking (particularly in light of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.)

This has led the United States and other nations to view Musharraf as the indispensable man, holding back the tide of radical Islam in Pakistan. Whatever Musharraf's virtues or faults, it is essential that policy look beyond him. The rise of radical Islam has, in great part been fueled by the economic and social stagnation of military rule. Parts of the military have also supported radical Islamist groups, both to counter civilian political parties and as proxies in fighting India in Kashmir and extending Pakistani influence in Afghanistan.