The recently unsealed indictment of arms-trafficker extraordinaire Victor Bout is an interesting read. Perhaps the most notable line is on page 10, when Bout told the DEA operatives (who he believed represented the FARC) that America was also his enemy and their fight was his fight. Another international arms dealer, Monzar al-Kasser, who was arrested in a DEA sting, promised the informants to raise an army for the FARC in order to fight the Americans. Are these heartfelt sentiments, or just salesmen trying to ingratiate themselves to a wealthy client and close a lucrative deal?
The truth is probably a combination of both. Many criminals seek to justify their actions as somehow contributing to a greater good by empowering the powerless. But intentions aside, Bout’s capabilities are the real cause for worry. He promised to airlift hundreds of Igla portable surface-to-air missiles (known as MANPADS – man portable self-defense systems) along with UAVs, ultra-light planes, explosives, and millions of rounds of ammunition to the FARC. Bout wasn’t just a dealer, he also could provide training (nothing like good customer service to bring in repeat business.) He also mentioned that he could sell the FARC airplanes if they were interested. Regardless of intent, individuals with the connections and capabilities to acquire and transport large quantities of deadly weapons like MANPADS outside of regulated channels are as dangerous to international security as terrorists.
(As a side-note, the FARC keeps appearing in the headlines on Bout’s capture, but in fact had nothing to do with it – DEA operatives were portraying themselves as FARC representatives. The FARC, which has a terribly long list of vicious misdeeds of its own, does not apparently need Bout, as the latest documents from the captured FARC computers indicate that FARC believed that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez would supply them with everything they might need.)
About the DEA
Bout’s capture, besides being good news in and of itself, highlights the Drug Enforcement Agency as a competent law enforcement/intelligence agency capable of carrying out a complex international operation. On a related note, a recent Justice Department Inspector-General report, the Drug Enforcement Agency has been fairly successful at building its analytical capabilities. Most analysts are satisfied with their work and analyst turnover is much lower than at the FBI. Although the report was mostly positive, it also highlighted the many challenges to building an effective analytical capability. To often analysts are also given administrative tasks and hiring is complicated by the long clearance process (many prime candidates find other jobs while waiting to be cleared.) The DEA’s reports are well regarded by other intelligence agencies, but they apparently are slow to share information. The DEA response to this complaint was particularly interesting – they noted that information was quickly shared through informal channels. But, there is a demanding review process for formal reports and the DEA wants to make sure its analyses are high quality.
The report gives a sense of the nuts and bolts issues of building an intelligence analysis component and is food for thought as the FBI is criticized, yet again, for not building its analytical capabilities. In fairness, the DEA is a much smaller agency with a specific focus and is not being called on to re-invent itself on the fly. Too often these detailed issues regarding organizational capabilities and culture are ignored in favor of grand pronouncements and declarations.
Friday, May 9, 2008
Friday, April 18, 2008
Remembering the Beirut Embassy Bombing: April 18, 1983
Twenty-five years ago today a late model GMC truck packed with explosives slammed into the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and crashing through the lobby door. In his memoir See No Evil former CIA operative Robert Baer, who devoted much of this career to identifying the perpetrators of the bombing, “Even by Beirut standards, it was an enormous blast…”
Often overshadowed by the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut only six months later (as well as the many suicide vehicle bombs since), the Embassy bombing was the deadliest terrorist attack against the United States up to that point, the first major suicide vehicle bombing, and Hezbollah’s opening move in its long war against the United States.
Beyond the symbolism of leveling a U.S. Embassy, the bombing was in fact a major strategic blow on American power. The Marine Barracks bombing appeared to have the more immediate impact, leading to the withdrawal of U.S. forces – and inspiring Bin Laden and others to believe the United States was a paper tiger. But of the seventeen Americans who died in the Embassy bombing (there were 63 total casualties) six were CIA officers – including the station chief, his deputy, and Robert Ames the national intelligence officer for the Near East (who was on a visit.)
The United States is an enormous country with tremendous resources. But experienced case officers are always in short supply. Losing so many in one blow was a severe loss of institutional memory and capacity. It is a loss that has been sorely felt in the quarter-century since as the U.S. has been blind-sided by one Middle East crisis after another. Baer notes:
Often overshadowed by the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut only six months later (as well as the many suicide vehicle bombs since), the Embassy bombing was the deadliest terrorist attack against the United States up to that point, the first major suicide vehicle bombing, and Hezbollah’s opening move in its long war against the United States.
Beyond the symbolism of leveling a U.S. Embassy, the bombing was in fact a major strategic blow on American power. The Marine Barracks bombing appeared to have the more immediate impact, leading to the withdrawal of U.S. forces – and inspiring Bin Laden and others to believe the United States was a paper tiger. But of the seventeen Americans who died in the Embassy bombing (there were 63 total casualties) six were CIA officers – including the station chief, his deputy, and Robert Ames the national intelligence officer for the Near East (who was on a visit.)
The United States is an enormous country with tremendous resources. But experienced case officers are always in short supply. Losing so many in one blow was a severe loss of institutional memory and capacity. It is a loss that has been sorely felt in the quarter-century since as the U.S. has been blind-sided by one Middle East crisis after another. Baer notes:
Never before had the CIA lost so many officers in a single attack. It was a tragedy from which the agency would never recover.
Friday, March 28, 2008
DU Dud: The Silver Lining to FARC’s Uranium
Colombian police have found 30 kilos (65 lbs.) of depleted uranium (DU). DU is what is left over after natural uranium is enriched. It is less radioactive than natural uranium and consequently useless for building dirty bombs (let alone nuclear weapons.) Tons of the stuff is around and there is virtually no market for DU (certainly not to the tune of $2.5 million a kilo).
While the Hollywood scenarios of terrorists dealing in WMD appear to be false, this incident raises interesting questions about the motivations and quality of the FARC’s leadership.
Here is a video from the site of Colombia’s El Tiempo of investigators examining the uranium. A close-up of the Geiger counter shows that it barely registers the radiation and the investigators clean off the bars and the words “depleted uranium” are clearly visible.
It seems likely that the FARC was involved in a scam. The question is were they the scammer or the scammed (or a bit of both)? Whatever the answer, the FARC is exposed as both vicious and incompetent.
If the FARC was the victim of a scam, it shows how they have fallen. First that the FARC would fall for a scam shows a decline in their intelligence and analytical capabilities. Also, the FARC is a heavily armed and vicious. If some hustler was willing to scam them it indicates that the FARC are less feared than in the past. A terrorist group that does not generate fear is a terrorist group in decline.
If the FARC was knowingly committing a scam, they have sacrificed their credibility for a short-term profit. Between this possible scam and the fact that several international arms dealers (including the notorious Victor Bout) have been snagged with FARC bait, other major players in international illicit networks will be much more cautious about dealing with the FARC. If the FARC, in turn, becomes more desperate to purchase weapons and other needed equipment then it will be more vulnerable to law enforcement efforts to infiltrate it – expanding an existing vulnerability.
More than likely, the FARC was aware that this was a scam – but was possibly scammed in being misled about how lucrative and easy this sort of scam would be.
In addition, this incident raises deeper questions about the FARC. While some terrorists (such as al-Qaeda) would readily resort to WMD – there is no political advantage to selling it, besides as a source of income. Whatever the radioactivity of the materials, how could the FARC high command not know that being associated with selling uranium would be politically radioactive? Or did they not care when the chance of a multi-million dollar windfall came their way? But the FARC already has a solid cash flow from the drug trade and other illicit activities. Did they need this extra income, or did they just want it? Either answer shows that the FARC leadership is at an advanced state of decay.
While the Hollywood scenarios of terrorists dealing in WMD appear to be false, this incident raises interesting questions about the motivations and quality of the FARC’s leadership.
Here is a video from the site of Colombia’s El Tiempo of investigators examining the uranium. A close-up of the Geiger counter shows that it barely registers the radiation and the investigators clean off the bars and the words “depleted uranium” are clearly visible.
It seems likely that the FARC was involved in a scam. The question is were they the scammer or the scammed (or a bit of both)? Whatever the answer, the FARC is exposed as both vicious and incompetent.
If the FARC was the victim of a scam, it shows how they have fallen. First that the FARC would fall for a scam shows a decline in their intelligence and analytical capabilities. Also, the FARC is a heavily armed and vicious. If some hustler was willing to scam them it indicates that the FARC are less feared than in the past. A terrorist group that does not generate fear is a terrorist group in decline.
If the FARC was knowingly committing a scam, they have sacrificed their credibility for a short-term profit. Between this possible scam and the fact that several international arms dealers (including the notorious Victor Bout) have been snagged with FARC bait, other major players in international illicit networks will be much more cautious about dealing with the FARC. If the FARC, in turn, becomes more desperate to purchase weapons and other needed equipment then it will be more vulnerable to law enforcement efforts to infiltrate it – expanding an existing vulnerability.
More than likely, the FARC was aware that this was a scam – but was possibly scammed in being misled about how lucrative and easy this sort of scam would be.
In addition, this incident raises deeper questions about the FARC. While some terrorists (such as al-Qaeda) would readily resort to WMD – there is no political advantage to selling it, besides as a source of income. Whatever the radioactivity of the materials, how could the FARC high command not know that being associated with selling uranium would be politically radioactive? Or did they not care when the chance of a multi-million dollar windfall came their way? But the FARC already has a solid cash flow from the drug trade and other illicit activities. Did they need this extra income, or did they just want it? Either answer shows that the FARC leadership is at an advanced state of decay.
Tuesday, March 11, 2008
Update: No FARC Leader in Venezuela
Looks like a false alarm. The man hospitalized in Rubia is not FARC leader Joaquín Gómez. The other story, that Colombia was closing in on another secret FARC leader Alfonso Cano is also unknown, although there are also reports that he was wounded in a helicopter attack on February 21.
Venezuela and Colombia collaborated carefully to bring the matter to a close. This is a positive sign. Also, something (perhaps the heavy guard around the patient) sparked these rumors. Something odd is up and is probably worth keeping an eye on.
Venezuela and Colombia collaborated carefully to bring the matter to a close. This is a positive sign. Also, something (perhaps the heavy guard around the patient) sparked these rumors. Something odd is up and is probably worth keeping an eye on.
Tipping Point? More FARC Leaders Under Pressure
There are unconfirmed reports that Raul Reyes replacement on the FARC Secretariat, Joaquin Gomez, aka Milton de Jesús Toncel Redondo, is being hospitalized in Venezuela having been shot in the face in fighting in Colombia. Reportedly he is under heavy guard. Another report states that the Colombian military shelled the base of another FARC Secretariat member, Alfonso Cano, aka Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas.
If these reports are true - and it should be emphasized that at this point the Colombians are denying any knowledge of Gomez being injured - it only further highlights the extent to which the FARC has been penetrated by Colombian security. The description of Gomez's wounds certainly raise the possibility that, like Rios, he was attacked by his own men. Supposedly Gomez is hospitalized near the Colombian border, which will again raise questions about whether or not Chavez is providing a safe haven for the FARC. The only way to prove he is not would be to extradite - to Colombia - not the U.S. (which would only give Chavez the chance to start an unpleasant row over Luis Posada.*) Chavez may fight this issue, but then the U.S. would have very strong grounds to declare Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism.
This could be a tipping point. Simply removing one leader does not always break a terrorist organization. But systematically removing the entire high command is a tougher blow for even the robust terrorist group. FARC was once very robust, but no longer.
If these reports are true then this weeks earlier counter-terror successes were not simply good luck, but the product of nearly a decade of effectively conceived and implemented strategy.
My ongoing warning still stands - the FARC may remain capable of retaliation.
*For an in-depth story on Luis Posada Carriles, who the Cuban and Venezuelan government accuse of master-minding a 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner with 73 people on board see this story from the Atlantic Monthly. Posada had been a CIA informant, he was part of a cadre of Cuban exiles that worked with the CIA against Castro - many of whom went on to a range of unseemly activities throughout Latin America. Nothing new about blowback.
The article concludes that Posada and the CIA didn't have anything to do with the airline bombing - but that the Cuban and Venezuelan governments love the obvious propaganda value.
If these reports are true - and it should be emphasized that at this point the Colombians are denying any knowledge of Gomez being injured - it only further highlights the extent to which the FARC has been penetrated by Colombian security. The description of Gomez's wounds certainly raise the possibility that, like Rios, he was attacked by his own men. Supposedly Gomez is hospitalized near the Colombian border, which will again raise questions about whether or not Chavez is providing a safe haven for the FARC. The only way to prove he is not would be to extradite - to Colombia - not the U.S. (which would only give Chavez the chance to start an unpleasant row over Luis Posada.*) Chavez may fight this issue, but then the U.S. would have very strong grounds to declare Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism.
This could be a tipping point. Simply removing one leader does not always break a terrorist organization. But systematically removing the entire high command is a tougher blow for even the robust terrorist group. FARC was once very robust, but no longer.
If these reports are true then this weeks earlier counter-terror successes were not simply good luck, but the product of nearly a decade of effectively conceived and implemented strategy.
My ongoing warning still stands - the FARC may remain capable of retaliation.
*For an in-depth story on Luis Posada Carriles, who the Cuban and Venezuelan government accuse of master-minding a 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner with 73 people on board see this story from the Atlantic Monthly. Posada had been a CIA informant, he was part of a cadre of Cuban exiles that worked with the CIA against Castro - many of whom went on to a range of unseemly activities throughout Latin America. Nothing new about blowback.
The article concludes that Posada and the CIA didn't have anything to do with the airline bombing - but that the Cuban and Venezuelan governments love the obvious propaganda value.
Monday, March 10, 2008
Venezuela & The Terror Supporters List: Pros & Cons
An anonymous State Department source told the Miami Herald that they are exploring the possibility of placing Venezuela on the list of state sponsors of terrorism for their relationship with the FARC - as revealed in the laptops captured from FARC leaders.
Being declared a state sponsor of terrorism brings a host of sanctions down on a regime, however the administration has flexibility about how they are enforced (I'll leave it to some of my co-bloggers, who are among the leading experts on U.S. law and state sponsorship of terrorism, to flesh this out.)
More than likely, this leak is just a shot across the bow. Declaring Venezuela a state sponsor of terror is a complicated issue in which many factors have to be carefully weighed including the quality of the evidence, the effect on the U.S. economy, the declaration's regional impact, and whether it furthers U.S. goals.
The laptops seized from Raul Reyes' camp in Ecuador appear to confirm a high-level relationship between FARC and Chavez that is over 15 years old. But, there is the argument, made credibly at the Center for International Policy's Colombia Program that this is only seeing the FARC's perception of the events - not necessarily what actually transpired. The sudden escalation of a single unclear paragraph into a FARC conspiracy to build dirty bombs is but one example of taking the text too far. I for one don't doubt that when the evidence is weighed, Chavez and the FARC will be revealed as political bedfellows in a deep embrace. But the evidence has to be carefully examined first.
It is impossible to discuss sanctions on Venezuela without considering its role as the supplier of about 15% of U.S. oil. Doing business with state sponsors of terror is complicated and U.S.-Venezuela trade is over $40 billion annually. Closing down this relationship would be complicated and expensive. In some ways Venezuela needs the U.S. more than the U.S. need them. Venezuelan oil is heavy and requires special refineries - which exist in the U.S. but not elsewhere. Simply selling their oil to another customer is possible, but between increased transport and the need for new infrastructure Chavez would make a smaller profit. At the same time, the oil market is tight and it is difficult to imagine a U.S. administration causing a disruption that would quickly be felt at the pump - particularly during an election season.
The sanctions component of being declared a state sponsor of terror could be structured to let the oil continue to flow, but that risks making a mockery of the U.S. sanctions regime. Alternately, it could provide the next administration with some useful tools for curbing Chavez' behavior.
There is also the question of how it would play regionally and if it truly advances U.S. goals. Chavez taps a deep vein of anti-Americanism in Latin America (and around the world.) The U.S. has refused to take the bait, toning down its anti-Chavez rhetoric in order to avoid playing into his hands. Declaring Venezuela a state sponsor of terror would grant Chavez an endless issue to exploit. His message would resonate throughout the region and other leaders would have to at least pay him lip service. But it is worth remembering that during the Falklands War the United States (much to British consternation) started off trying to play honest broker in order not to side against Argentina and inflame Latin American public opinion. It turned out the Argentina's war made everyone else in the region extremely nervous and few were upset to see the Argentine junta lose its war. Chavez is also making others in the region nervous, and in his Washington Post column Jackson Diehl argued that many Latin American leaders would like to see the U.S. take a harder line against Chavez.
Finally, would the declaration help the U.S. achieve its long-term goals. Ultimately, the U.S. wants to see Chavez leave power and be replaced by a democratically elected leader. On the one hand the declaration might give him a cause to rally the cadres. On the other, it might embarrass the Venezuelan people (who are probably less anti-American than most in the region) and give them an increased impetus to boot out Chavez.
In sum, declaring Venezuela as a state terrorism supporter is a potentially useful tool in the context of a larger strategy. But first, let all the evidence be unearthed and evaluated. Declaring a state to be a sponsor of terror is a powerful tool - best not to dull it unnecessarily.
Being declared a state sponsor of terrorism brings a host of sanctions down on a regime, however the administration has flexibility about how they are enforced (I'll leave it to some of my co-bloggers, who are among the leading experts on U.S. law and state sponsorship of terrorism, to flesh this out.)
More than likely, this leak is just a shot across the bow. Declaring Venezuela a state sponsor of terror is a complicated issue in which many factors have to be carefully weighed including the quality of the evidence, the effect on the U.S. economy, the declaration's regional impact, and whether it furthers U.S. goals.
The laptops seized from Raul Reyes' camp in Ecuador appear to confirm a high-level relationship between FARC and Chavez that is over 15 years old. But, there is the argument, made credibly at the Center for International Policy's Colombia Program that this is only seeing the FARC's perception of the events - not necessarily what actually transpired. The sudden escalation of a single unclear paragraph into a FARC conspiracy to build dirty bombs is but one example of taking the text too far. I for one don't doubt that when the evidence is weighed, Chavez and the FARC will be revealed as political bedfellows in a deep embrace. But the evidence has to be carefully examined first.
It is impossible to discuss sanctions on Venezuela without considering its role as the supplier of about 15% of U.S. oil. Doing business with state sponsors of terror is complicated and U.S.-Venezuela trade is over $40 billion annually. Closing down this relationship would be complicated and expensive. In some ways Venezuela needs the U.S. more than the U.S. need them. Venezuelan oil is heavy and requires special refineries - which exist in the U.S. but not elsewhere. Simply selling their oil to another customer is possible, but between increased transport and the need for new infrastructure Chavez would make a smaller profit. At the same time, the oil market is tight and it is difficult to imagine a U.S. administration causing a disruption that would quickly be felt at the pump - particularly during an election season.
The sanctions component of being declared a state sponsor of terror could be structured to let the oil continue to flow, but that risks making a mockery of the U.S. sanctions regime. Alternately, it could provide the next administration with some useful tools for curbing Chavez' behavior.
There is also the question of how it would play regionally and if it truly advances U.S. goals. Chavez taps a deep vein of anti-Americanism in Latin America (and around the world.) The U.S. has refused to take the bait, toning down its anti-Chavez rhetoric in order to avoid playing into his hands. Declaring Venezuela a state sponsor of terror would grant Chavez an endless issue to exploit. His message would resonate throughout the region and other leaders would have to at least pay him lip service. But it is worth remembering that during the Falklands War the United States (much to British consternation) started off trying to play honest broker in order not to side against Argentina and inflame Latin American public opinion. It turned out the Argentina's war made everyone else in the region extremely nervous and few were upset to see the Argentine junta lose its war. Chavez is also making others in the region nervous, and in his Washington Post column Jackson Diehl argued that many Latin American leaders would like to see the U.S. take a harder line against Chavez.
Finally, would the declaration help the U.S. achieve its long-term goals. Ultimately, the U.S. wants to see Chavez leave power and be replaced by a democratically elected leader. On the one hand the declaration might give him a cause to rally the cadres. On the other, it might embarrass the Venezuelan people (who are probably less anti-American than most in the region) and give them an increased impetus to boot out Chavez.
In sum, declaring Venezuela as a state terrorism supporter is a potentially useful tool in the context of a larger strategy. But first, let all the evidence be unearthed and evaluated. Declaring a state to be a sponsor of terror is a powerful tool - best not to dull it unnecessarily.
Friday, March 7, 2008
Rios Killed by his own Men & Other Updates
The story behind the killing of FARC leader Ivan Rios has become more interesting - and even more indicative that the FARC is on the verge of collapes. Colombia's Defense Minister now states that Rios was killed by his unit's security chief. Closely pursued by Colombian Security Forces, the security chief, "Rojas" killed Rios and gave his hand, his ID papers, and his computer to the Colombian military.
Wow! The FARC is beginning to turn on itself. The FARC may in fact be on the verge of dissolution.
It is difficult to believe that the assassination of Reyes did not influence these events (they may also get to collect a $5 million reward from the U.S. Department of Justice.) Now the Colombian government has the computer of another top commander. More dominoes will fall.
Other Updates
Initial rumors are apparently false. Ecuador's Correa denies that Betancourt is about to be released.
Also, the OAS hearings on the Colombia-Venezuela spat has ended amicably. Uribe was subject to harsh criticism but gave as good as he got. It ended with a handshake between Correa, Chavez, and Uribe. This might be a good moment for the United States to make an offer to Ecuador (cutting back on aerial spraying of drug fields near the Ecuador-Colombia border might be a good opening gambit) - the disclosures about Correa's links to the FARC are certainly embarrassing.
Meanwhile, a Venezuelan National Guard vehicle crossed into Colombian territory and shots were fired. It was probably just a dumb accident - but these are the sorts of things that happen when leaders looking for a distraction from other troubles take diplomatic spats and turn them into full-scale donnybrooks.
Wow! The FARC is beginning to turn on itself. The FARC may in fact be on the verge of dissolution.
It is difficult to believe that the assassination of Reyes did not influence these events (they may also get to collect a $5 million reward from the U.S. Department of Justice.) Now the Colombian government has the computer of another top commander. More dominoes will fall.
Other Updates
Initial rumors are apparently false. Ecuador's Correa denies that Betancourt is about to be released.
Also, the OAS hearings on the Colombia-Venezuela spat has ended amicably. Uribe was subject to harsh criticism but gave as good as he got. It ended with a handshake between Correa, Chavez, and Uribe. This might be a good moment for the United States to make an offer to Ecuador (cutting back on aerial spraying of drug fields near the Ecuador-Colombia border might be a good opening gambit) - the disclosures about Correa's links to the FARC are certainly embarrassing.
Meanwhile, a Venezuelan National Guard vehicle crossed into Colombian territory and shots were fired. It was probably just a dumb accident - but these are the sorts of things that happen when leaders looking for a distraction from other troubles take diplomatic spats and turn them into full-scale donnybrooks.
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