Friday, December 28, 2007

Pakistan & A Bomb Too Far

Less than a week before the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, there had been another bloody assassination attempt in Pakistan – both could represent turning points in Pakistan’s ongoing struggle with Islamist violence.

In northwest Pakistan a suicide bomber detonated his bomb inside a crowded mosque on Eid al-Adha (the Islamic Feast of Sacrifice which marks the end of the annual hajj.) The attack was an attempt to kill former Interior Minister Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao. Forty-eight people were killed and over 100 were wounded, including Sherpao's son and two grandnephews. Sherpao was unharmed.

This was the second attempt on Sherpao’s life in eight months, the previous attempt at a political rally in nearby Charsadda, 28 were killed and Sherpao was slightly wounded.

That Islamists would attack Sherpao is unsurprising. As Interior Minister he was a top security official and a key player in the Lal Masjid Mosque crackdown that has sparked the present high levels of violence. But for an Islamist to enter a mosque on a major holiday and murder innocent worshipers should be beyond the pale – even for radical Islamists.

Audrey Kurth Cronin, a professor at the National War College, in this excellent article in International Security How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups describes how the loss of popular support is a key factor in the demise of terrorist groups. Describing one of the most common paths to this collapse, she writes:
…a terrorist group’s attacks can cause revulsion among its actual or potential public constituency. This is a historically common strategic error and can cause the group to implode. Independent of the counterterrorist activity of a government, a terrorist group may choose a target that a wide range of its constituents consider illegitimate.
The attacks on Bhutto, which have also killed many innocents, have undoubtedly deepened the revulsion amongst Pakistan’s public. But the attack on Sherpao and its attendant massacre of innocent worshipers should foster revulsion among the Islamist’s core base of support, the Pashtun tribes of the Northwest Frontier Province.

Time and again, the Pakistani people have shown that they are not radical Islamists. The Islamist parties rarely poll even in the low double digits in national elections. Since taking power in the Northwest Frontier Province the Islamists have actually lost a great deal of support, when their rule proved little better than their secular predecessors.

In the midst of the many tragedies faced by Pakistan there are real opportunities. If moderates in the Pakistani government and civil society can show real leadership (always a big if) against the Islamists they could find real support among Pakistan’s public and help turn Pakistan from a global security problem into the modern liberal Muslim democracy envisioned by its founders.

Thursday, December 27, 2007

Bhutto's Assassination Needs a Real Investigation

Facts about Benazir Bhutto’s assassination are in short supply. Unfortunately that is unlikely to change. There is a long tradition of failure to investigate political murders in Pakistan. This cannot continue if Pakistan is to become a stable democratic state that serves its people and exists at peace with the world. The first step is that Musharraf invite the international community to advise in the investigation into Bhutto’s death. The investigation will be politically expensive – it may not reach Musharraf himself but it will reach deep into the civilian and military elites running Pakistan. Broad, tough international engagement is essential to seeing this forward – the stakes are very high.

While the Islamists are the most likely suspects, they certainly hated Bhutto as a secular female politician – Bhutto had many other enemies. As I noted after the October attempt on Bhutto’s life:
In courting Western support for her return to Pakistan, Bhutto promised that the International Atomic Energy Agency would receive access to A. Q. Khan, father of the Pakistani nuclear program and head of an international clandestine nuclear proliferation ring, who is currently under house arrest. It is inconceivable that Khan carried out his operations without substantial assistance from figures in Pakistan’s military and intelligence services.
A thorough investigation might be a first step to countering the rot pervading Pakistani politics. But if the murderers and their backers can get away with this murder Pakistan’s downward spiral will only continue.

A History of Uninvestigated Political Murders
A thorough investigation into a political murder would be a unique thing in Pakistani history. The October assassination attempt on Bhutto has not been thoroughly investigated – nor for that matter have the numerous assassination attempts on Musharraf. On October 16, 1951 Pakistan’s first Prime Minister was assassinated in Rawalpindi – in the same park where Bhutto was killed. Security forces immediately killed the assassin so little was gleaned about the plot. There remain unanswered questions about the deaths of Bhutto’s own brother Shahnawaz (poisoned in France in 1985) and Murtaza (who was shot by police in 1996.) There are ongoing suspicions that Benazir had a role in Murtaza’s death – suspicions held by other members of the Bhutto family.

For that matter, Pakistan’s most famous artist Abdul Mohamed Ismail – better known as Gulgee - was killed at his home in Karachi recently and little has surfaced from the investigation.

Bhutto’s father, is one of the few exceptions to this terrible trend – Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was overthrown by Pakistan’s Chief of Staff Zia al-Huq, sentenced to death by courts controlled by Zia, and hanged on April 4, 1979. (General al-Huq was killed in a plane crash that was never thoroughly investigated. Based on the general aviation problems in Pakistan’s history it was probably a mechanical failure.)

Building an Investigation Coalition: ISI vs. CSI
An FBI led investigation, or even its participation, may not be politically tenable. The United States is broadly distrusted in Pakistan, in part because of its close alliance with Musharraf. There are plenty of other nations with capable law enforcement agencies. Ideally many nations would participate – possibly using the Hariri assassination investigation as a model.

The real problem will be getting the Pakistani government to sign on. Many top figures have much to fear. One important move that could swing broader support to an international investigation would be an expanded effort to build peaceful relations between Pakistan and India.

The military is Pakistan’s most powerful institution and its core focus is seeking balance with India, which is an inherently much stronger power. This is why the recent news about US aid to Pakistan being diverted to conventional military capabilities targeted against India is no surprise. From the perspective of the Pakistani military, Islamists are at worst a nuisance and often an asset – India is the real existential threat.

Final settlements in Kashmir are not likely, but frameworks that made a conventional war less likely and helped tamp down terrorist activity could go a long way to giving both sides the leeway to stand down, thus reducing Pakistani anxieties. India, on the whole, with its economic boom and global ambitions, has shown some willingness to reach accommodations with Pakistan. But having been abandoned by the U.S. before and watching the U.S.-Indian relationship grow this will be a hard sell to the Pakistanis. If the threat of national dismemberment (a very real one for Pakistan in a war against India) can be achieved then the moderates in the Pakistani military would be empowered against their extremist colleagues and a real house cleaning, particularly at the ISI could begin. Nothing less will do.

Bhutto was a grand historical figure, talented but flawed. She died in the cause of a secular, moderate Pakistan. If a thorough investigation into her murder helps move Pakistan towards becoming a moderate Muslim democracy her death will not have been in vain.

Monday, December 24, 2007

Ghosts of Iranian Terror Future

Although there are signs that Iran is tamping down violence in Iraq there are also worrying signs that Iran is ramping up for another round of international terror. Israeli intelligence has noted that Iranian Embassies are in Venezuela and Nicaragua have over 30 staffers each – far out of proportion to the scale of relations between these countries - and is expanding its diplomatic presence throughout the region. The Iranian presence in Nicaragua has become so extensive that Iran’s Ambassador in Managua actually gave an interview denying there were any Pasdaran in Nicaragua (a sure sign that they are in fact there.) There have also been a number of incidents in the United States with the Iranian mission at the UN. Every country uses its Embassy for a bit of espionage. But the Iranian tradition far exceeds the norm. Considering the long involvement of Iranian diplomats with terrorism, US military claims of Iranian diplomats engaged in inappropriate activities in Iraq should be given some credence.

This Iranian network will be well supported by Hezbollah’s extensive international fundraising network. Besides the well-documented Hezbollah activities in the Tri-Border region drug dealing and counterfeiting cells with Hezbollah links have been found recently in Ecuador and Los Angeles. There are major centers of Lebanese Shia in Isle Margherita in Venezuela and in East Africa. Hezbollah works along family connections so where there are large numbers of Lebanese Shia, there is sure to be Hezbollah.

While the respite in violence in Iraq is certainly welcome – and hopefully does represent a real policy shift – Iran’s capacity to strike worldwide remains and Western abilities to forecast Iranian intentions are notably weak.

Friday, December 21, 2007

Ghosts of Iranian Terror Past

The Buenos Aires bombings were a particularly bloody and long-range operation but it was not, an isolated instance of Iran combining diplomacy and terror. Hezbollah was founded by the Iranian Ambassador to Damascus, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi (google “Father of Hezbollah” and his name is the most frequent.) In 1985-6 a series of bombs in Paris were linked to the Iranian Embassy. When French authorities tried to question Wahid Gordji, a translator at the Iranian Embassy in Paris an armed standoff ensued (ultimately Gordji was questioned briefly and then permitted to flee to Iran.)

In 1992 four Iranian Kurdish leaders were assassinated at a Berlin restaurant called Mykonos. Ultimately the trial implicated Rafsanjani, Khamenei, foreign minister Velayati, and intelligence chief Ali Fallahian. The gunmen, again, were Hezbollah members. The coordinator for this attack, Kazem Darabi, was performing the cultural attaché function in Germany but did not have diplomatic immunity. He was tried and sentenced for his crime. Iran learned its lesson, Rabbani (coordinator of the AMIA attack) was granted diplomatic immunity in March 1994 (only four months before the attack) even though he had been in Argentina for 11 years. It is difficult to believe these operations were carried out without official approval from the top.

All of these attacks (and there were others) furthered Iranian international objectives. After the Paris bombings the French released frozen Iranian funds, previously the French had strongly backed the Iraqis in the Iran-Iraq war. The Iranian Kurdish leaders murdered in the Mykonos affair were key opposition leaders. The 1992 Embassy bombing in Buenos Aires was to avenge Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah chief Abbas Musawi.

This period of high profile Iranian terrorism ended in 1996 after the Khobar bombing. Richard Clarke, who was counter-terror chief at the NSC at the time, stated that the United States responded to Iran through covert action. This may have been outing Iranian agents around the world, which would have hurt their international terror infrastructure.

The shift was tactical (perhaps like the change in the nuclear weaponization program). The regime remained involved in terrorism, just in different arenas and more often through proxies. Tehran is still Hezbollah’s lead sponsor, has provided training and logistical support to al-Qaeda (and a range of Sunni Islamists), and become the leading sponsor of Palestinian terror.

Friday, December 14, 2007

AMIA & the NIE

The NIE on Iran’s nuclear weapons program has sparked an ongoing controversy about the nature of the Iranian regime and its intentions. While the Iranian regime appears to have halted its nuclear weaponization program in 2003, it continues to research ballistic missiles and, most importantly, acquire fissile material (which is the hardest part of building a nuclear weapon.) Putting aside the inherent uncertainty of any intelligence estimate, it is quite feasible that scaling back the weaponization program was a tactical move because the regime was having technical difficulties. The centrifuges used to enrich uranium are sophisticated and fragile – running thousands of them for long periods is no small technical challenge. These technical challenges are not insurmountable so the real question remains, “What is the nature of the Iranian regime?”

Iran’s sponsorship and execution of the AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, should be a reminder that this is a regime that uses terrorism as tool of diplomacy.

AMIA, the communal offices of the Argentine Jewish community, was struck by a massive suicide truck bomb on July 18, 1994 – 85 were killed and over 200 injured. Iran and Hezbollah were suspected from the beginning. The Argentine investigation has had several false starts and has been mired in corruption, but in recent years has gotten on track. Last month Interpol voted overwhelmingly to issue a red letter calling for the arrest of five Iranians (along with Hezbollah’s external operations chief Imad Mughniyah) on the basis of the Argentine investigation. The publicly available report on the AMIA bombing offers tremendous insight into the Iranian regime’s modus operandi and worldview.

Below are two network graphs (for more on the graphs and my research at the University of Maryland see the end of the post). The first graph illustrates the web of interconnecting people and events that carried out the bombing. The second graph is the network linked to Mohsen Rabbani, the cultural affairs attaché at the Iranian Embassy who was the operations coordinator for the attack.

Graph of Events Linked to the AMIA Bombing


Network Graph of Mohsen Rabbani - Operations Chief for the AMIA Bombing


In the first graph, red nodes represent people and blue square nodes are events. The blue lines (edges in network graph lingo) represent a person’s involvement in an event (dotted lines represent uncertainty as to whether a person participated in an event) while the yellow edges represent events that came before the central event (in this graph the AMIA bombing.) A few things become apparent, particularly the central role of Rabbani in pulling the attack together and the number of Iranian diplomats who left Latin America just prior to the attack.

The web of events helps shed light on Rabbani’s network graph. The yellow lines linked to Rabbani indicate the diplomats serving at Iran’s Embassy in Argentina. The dark blue edges linking Rabbani and several others, including Mughniyeh, represent the individuals named in the Interpol letter. In this graph the light blue lines are particularly important, they represent the people who were in an event together. The main tangle of blue that includes Rabbani and also then (and possibly future) Iranian President Rafsanjani, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and then intelligence chief Ali Fallahian is the planning session in which the decision to bomb AMIA was made that reportedly took place nearly a year before the bombing on August 14, 1993 in the Iranian city of Mashad.

Many of the light blue edges represent specific events linked to the bombing. Carlos Alberto Telleldin was the man unfortunate enough to sell Rabbani the used Renault Trafic van used in the bombing. Rabbani had been visiting rental agencies for some time looking for a similar vehicle. There was a web of calls between Rabbani and the Tri-Border region, where Mughniyeh had established coordinating cell. That was apparently where the suicide bomber, Ibrahim Hussein Berro was prepared for the task. The light blue edges between Berro and his brothers Assad and Hussein represent the phone calls he reportedly made to them in his final moments. The gray lines linked to Rabbani represent the web of mosques and business fronts he helped establish in Buenos Aires. Rabbani had been based there since 1983 and had built an extensive network, which also bombed the Israeli Embassy to Argentina in 1992.

Looking at the graph, the central role of Hezbollah’s operations chief Mughniyeh in international terrorism becomes evident. The prominent dark blue cluster represents Hezbollah’s leadership. The smaller clusters represent his links to al-Qaeda (Mughniyeh met bin Laden in the mid-1990s and established an al-Qaeda-Hezbollah alliance) and his links to Fatah (Mughniyeh got his start in Arafat’s praetorian guard – Force 17.)

The overall story told by these graphs is of Iran using its Embassy as a base for a terror attack and working seamlessly with Hezbollah to carry out a complex operation on the far side of the world. The nuts and bolts of the operation were revealed by forensic evidence such as the paper trail telephone logs, travel records, and financial transactions, along with the serial number of the truck bomb. The weakest portion of the case deals with the planning meeting in Mashad and the involvement in Iran’s top leaders (it was based on testimony by a defector). Yet it is difficult to imagine a pair of major operations (remember the 1992 Embassy bombing in Argentina) being launched from the Buenos Aires Embassy with the regime’s top leaders being unaware. Rafsanjani and Khamenei are now the moderates who are checking Ahmadenijad's eschatological ambitions.

The AMIA bombing was, in part, to avenge Israel’s abduction of Hezbollah officer Mustafa Dirani and Israel bombing in Lebanon. But it also had another angle – Argentina, under U.S. pressure, terminated arrangements to share nuclear technology with Iran. A regime prepared to flout all diplomatic norms to commit mass murder halfway around the world over its nuclear program is not likely to give it up so easily.

Even if Iran has forsworn nuclear weapons, its links to international terrorism are deep and should weigh heavily in any assessment of its intentions.

About the Graph and My Research at the University of Maryland
A brief description of my dayjob using the Semantic Web to research terrorism is here.

While I will continue on this project, I also have a new position (still with the University of Maryland) with the Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics which seeks “to develop the theory and algorithms required for tools to support decision making in cultural contexts.” That is, we hope to develop computer systems that will help model how different cultures act and react in different situations. When these models are developed they can be applied to a range of issues including counter-insurgency, development, crime prevention, and disaster relief.

I also hope to do some posting on my work there soon.

Monday, December 3, 2007

Darkness on Referendum Eve in Caracas

Lost in the good news that the Venezuelan people rejected President Hugo Chavez’s constitutional referendum is the story that federal police raided the main Jewish social club in Caracas the night before the polls opened for the referendum. This should be a reminder that although Chavez appeared conciliatory when he addressed his supporters there are some very dark tendencies in his regime. These aspects of the regime have not fully manifested themselves – beyond rhetorical chumminess with some of the world’s worst characters such as Iranian President “I want to erase Israel” Ahmadinejad, Cuba’s Castro, and Zimbabwe’s Mugabe. But as Chavez finds his domestic reforms stymied (one aspect of the defeated referendum was to allow the President to be re-elected indefinitely) and his economy implodes (inflation is on the upswing and government controlled pricing has led to food shortages) naked violence and repression may appear openly with tragic consequences for Venezuela and perhaps beyond.

Two things must be made absolutely clear. First, violence, repression and terrorism often start by targeting Jews – but they inevitably move beyond the initial victims.

Second, this raid, ostensibly searching for weapons and explosives, was not an isolated incident – it is part of a pattern of anti-Semitic behavior by the Chavez regime.

The Sunday morning raid echoes an ugly incident from December 2004 when, after a Chavez ally was killed in a carbombing (and state-controlled media cited Mossad plots), Venezuelan security raided Caracas’ Jewish day school Colegio Hebraica – first thing in the morning as children were arriving. The incident shocked many Venezuelans, Carlos Blanco, a prominent journalist wrote (translation courtesy of an excellent blog, Daniel’s Venezuela News and Views:
When a Jew is attacked for being such, we enter a zone of total and absolute risk for the free thinking and existence of all, Jews and non Jews alike. Do not believe the official apologies, they are part of the same set up.
Recently, when former Defense Minister Juan Baduel broke publicly with Chavez, Chavistas accused Baduel of allying with Venezuela’s small Jewish community. Tarek William Saab, governor of Anzoatequi and a Chavez ally stated in an interview that Baduel, “has been captured by the international ultra right wing, by international Zionism.”

In his 2005 Christmas Eve address, spoke of “…the descendents of the same ones that crucified Christ, the descendents of the same ones that kicked Bolivar out of here and also crucified him in their own way over there in Santa Marta, in Colombia. A minority has taken possession all of the wealth of the world . . . "

The anti-Semitism of the chavismo is no affectation; it is core to their worldview. One of Chavez’s mentors was a notorious Argentine anti-Semitic and Holocaust denying social scientist, the late Norberto Ceresole (thanks to another first-rate Venezuelan blog, The Devil’s Excrement, for this background).

So far, as authoritarian demagogues go, Chavez has been relatively mild. Swag and swagger have fueled his rise on the world stage. But the strain of ancient evil running through the chavismo is a worrying sign that something darker lies beneath the bluster.

Wednesday, November 28, 2007

Aaron Mannes in Policy Review: Tribalism, Islamism & Women

The October-November issue of Policy Review published an article I wrote reviewing a pair of impressive books: Infidel by Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Now They Call Me Infidel: Why I Renounced Jihad for America, Israel, and the War on Terror by Nonie Darwish.

They are a pair of impressive books which shed important light not only on the nature of radical Islam, but also the way it along with tribalism pervade the societies of the greater Middle East and stifle freedom for women, but also for men.

My review is below.

Policy Review
October & November 2007, No. 145

BOOKS: Infidel Tales

by AARON MANNES

From sources as diverse as Bernard Lewis and the un’s Arab Human Development Report we hear the argument that improving the status of women is essential to reform in the Muslim world. But understanding what this entails demands more than statistics about female literacy rates. The memoirs of two exceptional women, born into very different circumstances in the Muslim world, provide a glimpse into the scale of this problem. Chief among the many virtues of Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s Infidel and Nonie Darwish’s Now They Call Me Infidel, is that they show the cruelty and banal petty oppression that encircles Muslim women.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali, now a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has become a figure on the international stage and an outspoken critic of radical Islam. In Infidel she tells the dramatic, almost unbelievable, story of her life so far. She was born into a prominent Somali clan, the daughter of a leader in the opposition to Somali dictator Siad Barre and something of a modernizer. Her father instructed that his family break with tradition and not excise the genitals of his daughters. While he was imprisoned his children were in the care of their maternal grandmother, who arranged the procedure. The Islam practiced by the Somalis was relaxed and combined with local traditions, but it remained central to the Somali identity. When political pressure forced the family to leave Somalia, Hirsi Ali’s mother refused at first to go to Ethiopia, both because it was Somalia’s longstanding enemy and because it was a predominantly Christian country. Instead they relocated to Saudi Arabia, where Hirsi Ali endured the difficulties of functioning in a country where women are not permitted out of the home without a male escort. They then moved briefly to Ethiopia, where she saw, first-hand, the impact of clan loyalties on the Somali opposition. Hirsi Ali’s mother, unhappy with barracks life, eventually took her three children to Nairobi, where the family survived on aid from wealthier Somali exiles.

Hirsi Ali grew to adulthood in Nairobi, where she was educated at a Western school and swept up in the rising Islamist tide. As a teenager she was an adherent of the rapidly expanding Muslim Brotherhood. She wore a hijab and attended prayers. But she could not reconcile the internal contradictions of the Muslim Brotherhood’s interpretation of Islam, particularly the inequality between men and women and the vilification of the West and non-Muslims. At the same time, she was going to films, reading English literature and Harlequin romance novels, and even dating surreptitiously. Her friends began to enter arranged marriages. Their descriptions of married life, particularly the passionless sex, horrified her. She put off her own suitors, but her father, though in many ways a liberal modernizer, had three wives himself and ignored his daughter’s objections to an arranged marriage with a prominent clan member. Her prospective husband was in Canada, and in 1992 Hirsi Ali was sent to live with relatives in Germany while she waited for a Canadian visa. Stunned by the order and cleanliness of the West, she also found herself quite able to navigate it. She began plotting her escape: She traveled to the Netherlands under the guise of visiting a family member, hoping to make her way to England. On learning of the lax asylum standards in the Netherlands, she decided to stay there instead. She was accepted as a refugee under false pretenses, having claimed that she was fleeing from Somalia’s civil war and given a false name and birth date.

If the book had ended with Hirsi Ali’s building a new life in the Netherlands, it would have been a fitting end to an amazing story. But the story does not end there. Seeking to discover why some places had governments that worked well and others did not, she obtained a university degree in politics. She also worked as a translator for Dutch police and social services agencies with Somali immigrants, and here she saw the ills of her native society — particularly the abuse of women — being imported into her adopted country. She was disturbed to find the Dutch acquiescing to immigrant demands to establish enclaves, rather than assimilating the immigrants into Dutch society.

Hirsi Ali entered politics as a researcher with a think tank. In the wake of 9/11, as Dutch elites insisted that terrorism was an aberration from Islam, Hirsi Ali argued the opposite — that Islam justified terrorism. As her criticisms of Islam became more pointed, Dutch elites recoiled from her message and Muslims began threatening her life; but she had touched a popular chord. She was elected to the Dutch parliament, where she pressed for Dutch police to track honor killings. With Theo Van Gogh she made the short film, Submission, about the treatment of women under Islam, which scandalized Muslims. In November 2004, Van Gogh was stabbed to death in broad daylight by a young Muslim. Dutch authorities, unprepared for this kind of terrorist threat, whisked Hirsi Ali out of the country and kept her confined under harsh and occasionally surreal conditions in rural locations in the United States and Germany. At the same time, as part of a political power play, there was an effort to strip her of her Dutch citizenship based on the false information she had provided when applying for asylum. Ultimately, seeking time to write and think, and finding the security requirements and constant moving in the Netherlands too onerous, Hirsi Ali resigned from the Dutch parliament and accepted a position at the American Enterprise Institute.

This bare summary does no justice Hirsi Ali’s page-turning memoir. From her harrowing description of her excision, to the details of life in Saudi Arabia, where little boys can turn off their mothers’ television programs, Hirsi Ali’s book illustrates the world of her origin, the values and principles that drive it, and the astounding level of violence that permeates it. Her wide-eyed descriptions of her first encounters with Western life are touching: police who are courteous and helpful, a religion that emphasizes dialogue and love rather than fear and submission, and marriages that are entered voluntarily and consist of two equal partners.

The life of Nonie Darwish, as she chronicles it in Now They Call Me Infidel: Why I Renounced Jihad for America, Israel, and the War on Terror, lacks the drama of Hirsi Ali’s experience, though there are many parallels. Darwish’s father was a highly regarded Egyptian military officer who was killed in Gaza by the Israelis just before the 1956 Suez War. (She describes growing up singing songs praising martyrdom in the battle with Israel as the state-controlled press churned out anti-Semitic diatribes.) Born into Egypt’s elite, Darwish was not directly touched by the worst aspects of the oppression of women, but she was not unaware of it. Honor killings were a regular theme in Egyptian literature and cinema, and the family’s maids told terrible stories of being raped by previous employers. A raped woman is considered to have dishonored the family; the only way for the family to restore its honor is to kill her. Darwish’s widowed mother could not remarry — it would have been dishonoring the memory of the shahid (martyr). At the same time, not having a male head of the household left the family vulnerable to rumor. The outgoing Darwish was warned by her mother to watch her behavior; otherwise the family might be suspected of improprieties. Dating and normal mixing between the sexes was simply impossible for young Egyptians, and marriages were arranged. Darwish relates the poignant sight of her mother walking, fully clothed, along the shoreline during beach vacations. Her mother joked about being young again and donning a bathing suit and swimming, but actually doing so would have been scandalous.

What is remarkable about Darwish’s narrative is that by the 1950s Egypt had been attempting to modernize for nearly a century and a half, and Nasser, who crushed the Muslim Brotherhood, was supposedly a great progressive figure. Yet, even at the very apex of Egypt’s secular elite society, the heavy hand of tradition trapped women. At the same time, while few Egyptians were devout, no one would criticize Islam. Darwish gives a sense of the extent to which Islam and tribal traditions saturate Muslim societies with most of the region’s ostensibly secular political movements and politicians, including Fatah, the Baath Party, and Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, emerging from this milieu.

Like Hirsi Ali, Darwish possessed an innate sense that allowed her to see through her society’s shibboleths. As a young woman she found Egyptian bravado prior to the Six Day War unbelievable and was unsurprised when Nasser’s adventure ended in a tragic defeat. And she realized early that she needed to leave Egypt, though her exodus in 1978 was more prosaic: She followed her Copt boyfriend, who had family in Los Angeles, to the United States. She was impressed by the general order and cleanliness she found there, and equally so in the message of love and tolerance she heard in Christianity. Still, like Hirsi Ali in the Netherlands, Darwish found that the Middle East had followed her to the West. Not a regular mosque-goer, when she did attend she was surprised by the vitriol and dogmatism. She noticed more and more Muslim women at malls and on campuses in full hijab.

On a visit to Egypt more than two decades later, Darwish was shocked by the poverty and anger (particularly at the United States), and the growing religious extremism. She was grateful when her plane landed in Los Angeles. It was September 10, 2001.

She was doubly shocked when the responses of her friends and relatives in Egypt vacillated between denying that Arabs had perpetrated 9/11 and assertions that the United States had had it coming. She began writing and speaking, trying to warn Americans of the nature of the terrorist threat and providing a different Arab perspective. She was even moved to defend Israel, and came to understand that it was Nasser and the mad ideologies that dominated the Muslim world that took her father’s life, not Israel.

While Hirsi Ali hews closely to her life story, Darwish addresses the broader impact of the traditions and restrictions that bind Muslim women. She explains how the tradition of polygamy reduces the status of Muslim women, by making husbands masters over their wives. A husband can easily, under the law, take a second wife if his first one displeases him, and she will have no legal recourse. This creates unhealthy alliances between mothers and sons, as mothers rely on their sons to protect them and advance their fortunes. Darwish points out that Arab men also suffer under this system. They are deprived of the joys and emotional depth of the voluntary monogamous marriage, which has been a cornerstone of western civilization. Of course, many Muslim couples love each other and remain monogamous, but this is not a central value of many of the societies of the greater Middle East.

Many of the worst customs prevailing in the Muslim world (honor killings, female genital mutilation, polygamy), as well as the general practice of restricting the sphere of activity of women, existed before Islam and are characteristics of tribalism. Although this social structure evolved as a response to the requirements of desert life, aspects of it have remained strong and it continues to define settled life in towns and rural areas throughout the greater Middle East and parts of Africa. The overwhelming centrality of extended family in daily life defines politics and has stifled the growth of civil society and entrepreneurial commerce. Hirsi Ali describes her relief at life in the Netherlands, where clan affiliation does not matter.

Westernized Muslims may reach into Muslim tradition and craft a modern Islam that is in accord with liberal democratic values. Alternately, tribal societies may develop mechanisms to change in the face of modernity. But Islam fused with tribalism creates an all-encompassing worldview and provides a theological framework reinforcing ancient customs. Islam permits, but does not require, female circumcision. Nevertheless, in communities where it is prevalent, most people, including local religious authorities, believe the procedure is required. This presumed fusion of Islam and tribalism was exemplified during a parliamentary debate in Jordan over establishing harsher sentences for men who killed female relatives who had violated family honor, when one Senator argued, “whether we like it or not, women are not equal to men in Islam. Adulterous women are much worse than adulterous men because women determine the lineage.”

In What Went Wrong Bernard Lewis writes that when buying Western weapons was insufficient to reverse Middle Eastern military decline, Middle Eastern nations adopted Western uniforms and martial music. But the systems and principles underpinning Western success were not imported. Women’s rights may follow a similar path. Some Muslim nations may be adopting reforms on behalf of women’s rights, but without changing the underlying value system. Egypt has made strides against female genital mutilation, and polygamy has been outlawed in several Muslim nations and is being redefined as socially unacceptable in others. Some states, responding to international pressure against them over egregious acts against women in the name of family honor, have begun to take steps against honor killings. These reforms, welcome though they are, are enacted under Western pressure and to maintain a veneer of modernity. It is not clear that the underlying principles of equality and personal liberty are also being adopted. Efforts to expand women’s education in the Muslim world appear more promising, although considering the generally poor quality of education in the region this initiative may also have a limited impact.

Muslim societies, trapped between religion and culture, have changed only slowly over centuries. But the lives of Darwish and Hirsi Ali offer a few possibilities for change. Both women were educated at Western schools, giving them the skills, particularly fluency in English, they needed to fend for themselves in a modern society. Darwish worked for a U.S. company, helping her achieve a certain measure of financial independence. Improving the educational and economic opportunities open to women, along with the attendant legal reforms, would give women greater autonomy. But the economies of the greater Middle East have been essentially stagnant for decades, and deeper changes will be necessary.

Other possibilities lie in the realm of ideas. Western literature and films, and even romance novels, inspired both women. These stories fostered a longing for romance and planted the seeds of individualism. In discussing reform, Hirsi Ali claims that Islam needs a Voltaire, and Darwish observes that creating the freedom to leave Islam is essential — only then, she says, will Islam be forced to compete equally for adherents. Today an individual who openly leaves Islam is an apostate and, as Hirsi Ali can attest, marked for death.

Fostering reform in the Muslim world is the great challenge of this century. But it is a challenge that cannot be evaded. Both Darwish and Hirsi Ali give warning that radical Islam is on the rise within the West itself and that immigrant communities are bringing tribal social structures with them. But their books are more than jeremiads. They are both also love stories of a sort: Two impressive, able women from backgrounds that squelched their talents came to the West and fell in love with the values espoused by Western societies and the opportunities and freedoms they provide. This message is also vital. If the West is to aid efforts to reform the Muslim world, it will need to believe in itself first. Darwish and Hirsi Ali provide a timely reminder, from people intimately familiar with the alternative, that Western societies and liberal democratic values are good and worth defending.

Aaron Mannes (www.aaronmannes.com), author of Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations (Rowman & Littlefield 2004), is a researcher at the University of Maryland’s Laboratory of Computational Cultural Dynamics and a doctoral student at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy.