In Politico's Arena on the Romney Machine

Politico’s Arena asked:

Mitt Romney has won the Illinois primary by a considerable margin, the Associated Press projects. Does this win make the path to the Republican nomination any clearer? And does it provide a more obvious signal for either Rick Santorum or Newt Gingrich to exit the race?

I answered

The delegate math has long been in Romney's favor and the Illinois victory shrinks the possibilities for the other candidates from very difficult to nearly impossible.
Santorum has an interesting challenge. He has proved an able campaigner, if a polarizing figure. The Republican party traditionally nominates the runner-up from the previous contest (the next guy in line). Does Santorum seek to to set himself up for 2016 (Gingrich will be 73 then, making a serious run unlikely)? If so, Santorum needs to show his strengths as a campaigner, but not to hang on so long that he damages GOP prospects in the fall.

A few follow-up points – Santorum is only in his mid-fifties. He can wait till 2016, playing the game Romney played by lining up party elders and building his credentials where he is weak and burnishing his image. His problem is if Romney wins, then he must wait at least eight years (maybe longer if Romney chooses an able vice president and natural successor.) While anything is possible – as Santorum’s performance in the Republican primaries and emergence as a major candidate demonstrates – it is tough to see how ex-Senator Santorum can remain in the public eye for almost a decade.

This raises another interesting question that is close to my heart – could Santorum be the VP? (It is never to early to start speculating.) Santorum would provide Romney ideological balance, but not geographic balance (although Pennsylvania is an important swing state.) Santorum also had DC experience. Although Romney is running as a technocrat, he has not actually held a DC office. Technocrat types do not have terrific records as President (Carter and Hoover come to mind – although Customs House director Chester Allen Arthur proved to be surprisingly capable.) Romney, with his MBA background would want a capable VP to advise him on the ways of Washington. However, Santorum is not exactly a grand old man of the Senate like Biden, so Romney might seek a deeper resume.

Of course the most important factor is could Santorum help Romney win the election? This is an open question. Santorum has proved to be a compelling campaigner who speaks eloquently on a number of issues. Santorum would also shore up the base. But on the other side of the ledger, the base despises Obama and would go for Romney regardless. And Santorum turns off lots of moderate voters. Romney will have to do a very hard careful calculation of costs and benefits. This kind of analysis is an area where Romney excels.

Forgetting the Persian BM

Responding to my last post about Iranian options for responding to an Israeli strike, a friend observed that I neglected to discuss Iran's increasingly sophisticated ballistic missile capability. Iran has at least dozens and possibly hundreds of medium-range ballistic missiles that could reach Israel. Even with conventional explosives, this is a serious concern, especially if they struck Tel-Aviv and other Israeli populations centers. Saddam's missile strikes on Israel in the first Gulf War were primarily a fizzle. But the knowledgeable observers believe that Iran's program is far more advanced and at least some in the Israeli defense establishment are worried.

Of course, unleashing large numbers of deadly accurate ballistic missiles would do little to inspire international confidence that Iran is completely. After an Israeli strike, Iran would reap international sympathy, particularly among many general publics around the world. Governments would feel differently. These governments may not like Israel much, but they would respect that Israel's action was based on sober intelligence estimates. If Iran demonstrated a sophisticated ballistic missile capability, many governments at around the world would become very concerned about Iran's intentions. Missiles that can reach Israel can reach Europe as well.

Iran has a credible response that does not depend on proxies, but using it might have serious consequences. Of course Iran's leadership may feel the need to respond due to its own domestic pressures, and Israel would have to prepare for that – although it remains unclear if the Israelis are seriously preparing to strike or if talk of a strike is simply a ploy to keep international pressure on Iran.

Options
Ultimately, political decisions are difficult ones in which leaders have to make determinations about which option is least bad. A nuclear Iran is a very bad outcome, but the options to prevent it are, to say the least, imperfect.

Regime change would be nice, but it is not immediately practical. Overthrowing governments is not easy (and an actual invasion would probably be beyond American capabilities) that the US was successful at it in Iran half a century ago, does not mean that it can happen (particularly with an Iranian leadership and populace aware and deeply paranoid of the possibility). Even if it were possible, revolutions take on a life of their own. There are plenty of Westernized advocates for democracy in Iran. These figures communicate easily with Westerners, but when the revolution comes the situation can be remarkably fluid and it is difficult to know what sentiments will prevail. We have seen this as Egypt unfolds. The liberal Facebook youth seemed to be the harbingers of a new Egypt, but the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis quickly emerged as the real powers on the street.

While there is much to recommend the Solidarity approach (and it is unfortunate that the US has quibbled about supporting Iranian democratizers for the past decade and a half) it is not clear that it can come before Iran acquires a nuclear capability. Further, fear of being overthrown may lead the Iranian leadership to accelerate its efforts to acquire WMD as insurance.

An Israeli strike has some limitations as a policy option. The Israel Air Force would be working at its maximum effective range and may only inflict limited damage. This would delay Iran's program - possibly buying time for other policies to take effect, but would not stop it. Further, it might garner sympathy for Iran and reduce the willingness of the international community to pursue sanctions.

The US could bring far more devastating capabilities to the fore. There are many, many targets but the US has the resources to carry out a sustained campaign, rather than a one-off strike. This could seriously delay the Iranian program (and also hit their ballistic missile program). This would not come without significant costs. The US would use bases in the Gulf and Central Asia, the host countries would be targets to Iranian responses (which could lead them to refuse permission.) Even long-range US based aircraft would need to use air corridors from countries that would be concerned about Iranian retaliation. Plus the United States would be embroiled in yet another war in the Middle East, which would anger people worldwide and complicate American initiatives.

In terms of practically stalling Iran's program this option offers tremendous advantages. Unfortunately it comes at very high costs, and it may fail. If, after the strikes the Iranians maintain a substantial nuclear capacity, they will pursue acquiring a nuclear weapon with an absolute single-mindedness.

Another option is the status quo, this is not without it's advantages. In fact, I've argued (among others) that the primary purpose of Israeli threats is to maintain the status quo in which significant sanctions are harming Iran's economy. In addition, there is a reasonably effective covert campaign against the Iranian program. It is possible that the public aspects (which include cyber-attacks and assassinations) are only the tip of the iceberg. Iranian nuclear capability has been an issue for over twenty years and they have still not built a bomb, if the status quo buys more time at a relatively low-cost it is an effective policy.

But time for what? Are we waiting for the regime to fall or for the sanctions to bite hard enough that the regime is desperate for an agreement?

Finally that leaves negotiations as a possibility. Besides in incredible difficulty in actually carrying them out (an issue I’ll have to leave to experts) it requires the core unpleasant choice. The Iranian regime will demand security guarantees that effectively remove the regime change option. So Tehran may not get the bomb, but the lifting of sanctions will mean the mullahcracy is firmly in place. This may be preferable to an Iranian bomb – but it is not a good outcome.

There is the possibility that in the two-level hall of mirrors that would be US-Iranian negotiations - serious talks with the West would spiral back into Iranian politics in such a way that would empower reformers and any student of history knows that regimes are at their most vulnerable when they try to reform. This could create some interesting possibilities but it will require excellent timing and adroit diplomacy.

With the Soviet Union, the US managed negotiations will also pressing on human rights issues that ultimately undermined the regime. But the mullahs are no fools, they will do whatever they can to take that card out of US hands – in effect their bomb capability is an ace in this poker game from hell.

Can the Persian Empire Strike Back?

One ongoing concern about a military strike on Iran is the prospect of revenge attacks. This may be overblown. There are several possible mechanisms for an Iranian revenge strike, international terror attacks, attacks through Hezbollah directly on Israel, and attacks in the Persian Gulf. The first two may not be as serious a danger as previously thought, although trouble in the Persian Gulf (where Iran is a major presence and can sow discord in several nearby countries) is not something to take lightly.

As I’ve written elsewhere, Hezbollah has been increasingly careful about picking fights with Israel. War with Israel is not popular in Lebanon (the people are tired of being bombed and Hezbollah does seem to take general public sentiment into account – and Hezbollah’s public reputation in Lebanon has suffered multiple blows.) Finally, despite the perception of a Hezbollah victory – Hezbollah was hit hard in the 2006 and can be certain the IDF has been prepping for another round. Exacerbating Hezbollah’s concerns is the turmoil in Syria. Hezbollah has superior arms to the other factions in Lebanon – but an untimely Hezbollah action could open up a new round of sectarian violence in Lebanon, which would quickly tie into fighting in neighboring Syria. Hezbollah has a lot of incentives to hold its fire. (On that front, it is worth noting that Hamas has already opted out of an Iranian-Israeli war.)

Hezbollah and Iran have been responsible in the past for numerous terror attacks worldwide. But the last really devastating Iranian strike abroad was Khobar in 1996. Intelligence agencies worldwide have been carefully monitoring Hezbollah and IRGC operations, and effectively neutralized, but not eliminated, this capability. The relatively small revenge (and unsuccessful) strikes in Georgia, Bangkok, Azerbaijan, and India would seem to be indicative of this. Attacks that get close, without being successful still require substantial operational capability, so writing off Hezbollah-IRGC operational capabilities is pre-mature. But then what was this? Were they a shot across the bow to warn the West that they were back in the international terror business? If so, was it an attempt to “puff up” and appear more capable then they actually are? No doubt the recent operations will reveal intelligence that can then be applied to foiling future operations. The relatively small scale of the operations is also telling: the larger the operation, the more moving parts and thus the greater the likelihood of detection and disruption by Western intelligence. While Iran may be able to carry out tiny attacks, repeats of the terrible bombings in Argentina appears less likely.

Strikes in the Persian Gulf could be serious. Iran has been building its networks with the region’s Shia communities. But, against an Israeli strike these networks would be irrelevant (avenging an Israeli strike by fomenting trouble in Bahrain makes little sense.) Further, the Persian Gulf states have capable security forces and their own levers for stirring up things within Iran.

Historical Perspectives on the Iranian Threat
It is just past Purim, a Jewish holiday that remembers a near disaster in ancient Persia in which a gullible king was led by his wicked vizier to plot to murder the Jews. Through a deft combination of beauty and brains, the vizier, Haman was out-maneuvered and hung from the gallows he had constructed. It is a strange holiday, celebrated with drink (not a typical Jewish motif), but well worth considering as Israel, the United States, and the world debate what to do about Iran and its nuclear program.

It seems worth noting that the victory in Purim was not won by force of arms, but by intelligence. The dangers of an Iranian nuclear weapon should go without saying. Iranian leaders have shown a disturbing tendency to make policy based on eschatology, it would empower Iran to pursue subversive behaviors, and finally it could trigger a Middle Eastern arms race that (even if all the players are careful rational actors – an awfully big if) increases the likelihood of a miscalculation or accident that could lead to a massive tragedy.

However, military options are not a silver bullet. The facilities are buried deep underground and may not be vulnerable. At the same time, the covert campaign has had some significant successes. A bombing campaign against Iran may not stop the program but will almost certainly spike oil prices – which makes a whole lot of people around the world much poorer very quickly.

This is not to say that bombing should be off the table – an Iranian nuke is intolerable, only considered carefully.