James Comey, the former Deputy Attorney General who famously stood up to the administration's warrantless wire-tapping policies is back in the news because he is about to be appointed Director of the FBI. His back-story is also relevant as US domestic intelligence collection policies are in the news.
A quick re-cap, when Jack Goldsmith took over the Office of Legal Counsel at DOJ he tossed out the previous opinion that authorized the administration's domestic intelligence collection. He persuaded Comey that the opinion authored by his predecessor and used as legal support for the adminstration's domestic intelligence collection policies was not legally sound. One aspect of the program was that it had to be re-authorized by the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence every 45 days. Comey, acting in Ashcroft's stead during the Attorney General's hospitalization, refused to re-authorize the program. This led to the infamous hospital scene in which White House chief of staff Andrew Card and White House Counsel Alfredo Gonzales went to Ashcroft's hospital room to get him to sign and had a confrontation with Comey. Comey took the issue to the President, warning him that appointees at the Department of Justice would resign en masse if the program were continued. The President, who reportedly did not know the extent of DOJ's dissatisfaction with the situation, altered the program.
This story is generally taken as yet another case of Cheney's nefarious influence. Cheney's support of the intelligence gathering policy is not in dispute and apparently there was little love lost between Cheney and Comey. But was Cheney really in the driver's seat? I think there is another way to view the incident - not as a matter the facts, but rather the interpretation.
First, the episode occurred in 2004. Bush's priority would have been on his re-election campaign. He told his vice president to keep things off of his personal agenda if it all possible.
Second, the program had been re-authorized 20 times without incident. From Cheney's perspective the question had to be, in effect, "What now?"
Bush called the ailing Ashcroft at his hospital to press him to sign and he agreed to do so. When Bush's people arrived though Comey was there digging his heels in. It could be argued that Cheney might have served the President better by alerting him to these kinds of difficulties so that the administration could address the problems before they became a crisis. But by most accounts, Bush was not passively drawn into the extensive surveillance programs - he thought they were a good idea and was a proponent of them. So his staff was acting as his bludgeon - pushing through his preferences.
So instead of Darth Cheney, architect of a surveillance program dimly understood by his callow President - we see VP Cheney doing what VPs have done since they were given a role: help the President do whatever it is the President wants to do.
VPs do sometimes provide the "wait a minute" moments - telling Presidents a difficult truth that no one else can articulate. Maybe it would have been wise for Cheney to play that role (as Ford's chief of staff he sought to make sure Ford heard a range of views on key issues and ensure there was an orderly policy process.) And maybe he did that on some issues. But the President specifically tasked Cheney with ensuring there were no more attacks against the US, and Cheney took that mission to heart.
This is an alternate take, but it is tough to know what the real truth was. Still as I keep thinking along these lines, I remember an old SNL skit:
Tuesday, June 18, 2013
Friday, April 19, 2013
Boston Marathon Bombings: The System is Working
I was in Boston this weekend for family stuff. I left Sunday morning, the lobby of my hotel was full of people getting ready for the marathon. I came in from my morning run. (Several times I week I run about three miles and eat cookies.) The real runners looked me over, friendly, but appraising. I waved and told them I'm just a casual runner, "I couldn't run a marathon - I get tired driving 26.2 miles."
I flew to LA on a United Airlines flight just before 9/11. My family and I could easily have been on one of the flights - but we scheduled our trip around the Jewish New Year. So being Jewish might have saved my life...
The sniper was in my neighborhood and I was on Capitol Hill on anthrax day.
Maybe I am the root cause of terrorism?
But seriously folks, what is to be made of the bombing in Boston?
First, little is really known. We have two Chechen brothers, one alive and one dead who apparently had lived in the United States for about a decade. Their specific motivations and path to violence are not known although there are certainly suggestions of links to radical Islam. The extent of their contacts abroad is unknown at this point.
This is the nightmare scenario that counter-terror experts have been worried about for some time - the lone wolves and self-starter terrorists that simply cannot be detected before they carry-out their mayhem. As always, my instinct is to ask - particularly considering the plethora of targets and relative ease of carry out operations: why haven't we seen more of these kinds of attack?
William Saletan at Slate points out that there have been about 20 bombing attempts since 9/11 but for various reasons none of them worked out. Some of this was luck, other was good law enforcement. Saletan may underplay that bomb-making is not for amateurs. In Iraq and Afghanistan where there are communities of bomb-makers in touch with one another and sharing information and experimenting they get pretty good at it. But individuals, without special training, face a steep learning curve. Still, sooner or later someone was bound to get it right.
We have also faced many shooting attacks by terrorists, but here again, considering the ease of such attacks it is surprising that there are not a great deal more of them. The exemplary Daveed Gartenstein-Ross points out that quite simply that radical causes simply are not attracting that much support, thus limiting how many threats we face.
So what do we do?
Policy options are limited.
Chechen Connection
We don't know if there is a live connection between the brothers and Chechnya, but even if there is we want to think carefully about getting involved in Chechnya. A lot of people are going to claim to be experts on Chechnya in the near future. Some of them might now something. I am not one of them, but I know it is a complicated place with an unfamiliar culture and a complex local power dynamics. It is also a world center for smuggling. Maybe the US should have been helping to mitigate Russia's heavy-handed tactics there over a decade ago - but that is water under the bridge now. That also raises another point, which anything big we want to do vis-a-vis Chechnya involves Russia. What are we prepared to give them and what issue are we prepared to drop from the agenda if we add Chechen issues?
Intelligence Options
It appears one of the perpetrators was into Islamist videos. Could the radicalization process have been detected beforehand? Maybe, but that would involve a pretty deep intelligence apparatus monitoring a great deal of activity, followed up by investigations. Such work yields lots of false positives which are very expensive (financially and also socially - people's lives can be ruined.) DO we want that kind of monitoring - lots of people watch disturbing videos online, do we want a government monitoring this?
There may be some inside baseball moves. Intelligence assets will be re-deployed, hopefully some targets will be hardened, and lessons will be learned. But I for one am leery of a major national initiative because that would involve the President. The things that reach the President's desk should be problems that only POTUS can address. Right now the appropriate agencies are responding appropriately. We should take some pride and comfort in that - plenty of countries don't have that luxury.
Tipping Points
As awful as the Boston Marathon Bombing was, and it was a tragedy, a handful of serious terror attacks on US soil over the past decade may be an indication that things are going pretty well. Annually the US loses 15000 people to homicide, 30000 to auto accidents, and another 30000 to suicide.
Deaths from terrorist attacks are not the same those in accidents. Terrorists seek to undermine legitimate authority and terrorist violence has a particular resonance. But the level of terrorist violence seen in the US since 9/11 is not remotely close to undermining our society. By comparison on the day of the Marathon bombing, 32 people were killed in Iraq.
There is a point at which large scale reactions are needed - after 9/11 or after Oklahoma City for example. But right now Americans can take comfort in the fact that while every single bad thing is not preventable we are blessed with trained capable professionals who can mitigate the damage and track down the perpetrators and a civilian population that readily supports their professionals in every way possible.
If the Marathon Bombing was the first in a wave, stronger responses may be necessary. But for now, I'll sign off by citing my friend BJ Tucker who cites the ultimate slogan for resiliency: Keep Calm and Carry On.
I flew to LA on a United Airlines flight just before 9/11. My family and I could easily have been on one of the flights - but we scheduled our trip around the Jewish New Year. So being Jewish might have saved my life...
The sniper was in my neighborhood and I was on Capitol Hill on anthrax day.
Maybe I am the root cause of terrorism?
But seriously folks, what is to be made of the bombing in Boston?
First, little is really known. We have two Chechen brothers, one alive and one dead who apparently had lived in the United States for about a decade. Their specific motivations and path to violence are not known although there are certainly suggestions of links to radical Islam. The extent of their contacts abroad is unknown at this point.
This is the nightmare scenario that counter-terror experts have been worried about for some time - the lone wolves and self-starter terrorists that simply cannot be detected before they carry-out their mayhem. As always, my instinct is to ask - particularly considering the plethora of targets and relative ease of carry out operations: why haven't we seen more of these kinds of attack?
William Saletan at Slate points out that there have been about 20 bombing attempts since 9/11 but for various reasons none of them worked out. Some of this was luck, other was good law enforcement. Saletan may underplay that bomb-making is not for amateurs. In Iraq and Afghanistan where there are communities of bomb-makers in touch with one another and sharing information and experimenting they get pretty good at it. But individuals, without special training, face a steep learning curve. Still, sooner or later someone was bound to get it right.
We have also faced many shooting attacks by terrorists, but here again, considering the ease of such attacks it is surprising that there are not a great deal more of them. The exemplary Daveed Gartenstein-Ross points out that quite simply that radical causes simply are not attracting that much support, thus limiting how many threats we face.
So what do we do?
Policy options are limited.
Chechen Connection
We don't know if there is a live connection between the brothers and Chechnya, but even if there is we want to think carefully about getting involved in Chechnya. A lot of people are going to claim to be experts on Chechnya in the near future. Some of them might now something. I am not one of them, but I know it is a complicated place with an unfamiliar culture and a complex local power dynamics. It is also a world center for smuggling. Maybe the US should have been helping to mitigate Russia's heavy-handed tactics there over a decade ago - but that is water under the bridge now. That also raises another point, which anything big we want to do vis-a-vis Chechnya involves Russia. What are we prepared to give them and what issue are we prepared to drop from the agenda if we add Chechen issues?
Intelligence Options
It appears one of the perpetrators was into Islamist videos. Could the radicalization process have been detected beforehand? Maybe, but that would involve a pretty deep intelligence apparatus monitoring a great deal of activity, followed up by investigations. Such work yields lots of false positives which are very expensive (financially and also socially - people's lives can be ruined.) DO we want that kind of monitoring - lots of people watch disturbing videos online, do we want a government monitoring this?
There may be some inside baseball moves. Intelligence assets will be re-deployed, hopefully some targets will be hardened, and lessons will be learned. But I for one am leery of a major national initiative because that would involve the President. The things that reach the President's desk should be problems that only POTUS can address. Right now the appropriate agencies are responding appropriately. We should take some pride and comfort in that - plenty of countries don't have that luxury.
Tipping Points
As awful as the Boston Marathon Bombing was, and it was a tragedy, a handful of serious terror attacks on US soil over the past decade may be an indication that things are going pretty well. Annually the US loses 15000 people to homicide, 30000 to auto accidents, and another 30000 to suicide.
Deaths from terrorist attacks are not the same those in accidents. Terrorists seek to undermine legitimate authority and terrorist violence has a particular resonance. But the level of terrorist violence seen in the US since 9/11 is not remotely close to undermining our society. By comparison on the day of the Marathon bombing, 32 people were killed in Iraq.
There is a point at which large scale reactions are needed - after 9/11 or after Oklahoma City for example. But right now Americans can take comfort in the fact that while every single bad thing is not preventable we are blessed with trained capable professionals who can mitigate the damage and track down the perpetrators and a civilian population that readily supports their professionals in every way possible.
If the Marathon Bombing was the first in a wave, stronger responses may be necessary. But for now, I'll sign off by citing my friend BJ Tucker who cites the ultimate slogan for resiliency: Keep Calm and Carry On.
Tuesday, March 5, 2013
Adios Presidente: On the Passing of Hugo Chavez
I used to write a bit about the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. I moved on, there are only so many world affairs one analyst can follow. Here is a link to past blog-posts about him. Better, visit the fantastic Caracas Chronicles for serious analytical work on Venezuela under Chavez (and buy their book!).
In retrospect, as far as dictators of the last century go he was a piker. He was a bully, he expropriated property, and was pretty tough on his opposition. He tried to export his "revolution" across the region, but without much real success. While he wrecked Venezuela's economy and marginalized independent media. During his rule, Venezuela became a drug-trafficking haven and the murder capital of the world. But, there were no forced labor camps and no mass murders.
It cannot be ignored that Chavez did not arise in a vacuum. Venezuela is blessed (or cursed) with vast oil wealth. But Venezuela's elites had failed to govern effectively and the country remained - on the whole - poor. Chavez appealed to that popular frustration, although unfortunately long-term his policies will only handicap the country further.
Ultimately Chavez was seen as an international buffoon. He ran the country through his TV talk show Alo Presidente where off-the-cuff pronouncements became policies. But for all of his zaniness, there were very nasty ideas embedded in his rhetoric. Below is an article I wrote about his Christmas Eve speech of 2005. (Side-note, my wife translated it for me - if translating the rambling ravings of Hugo Chavez isn't love, I don't know what is!)
Nasser was also seen as a buffoon, but he destroyed much of the modern human capital of Egypt (from which the country has never recovered) and started several awful wars - including a much forgotten war in Yemen in which he used poison gas. Chavez wasn't that bad. Is it because he wasn't quite that much of a villain, or because liberal democracy is more firmly rooted in Latin American than in the Middle East and his ideas could only go so far?
It is an interesting question, but hopefully Latin Americans will not see many further experiments along these lines.
Published on The Weekly Standard (http://www.weeklystandard.com)
Blast From the Past
Hugo Chávez veers into anti-Semitism while explaining how to create a workers' paradise.
Aaron Mannes
January 11, 2006 11:00 PM
ON CHRISTMAS EVE, Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez's Christian-socialist cant drifted into anti-Semitism. "The world is for all of us," he said, "then, but it so happens that a minority, the descendents of the same ones that crucified Christ, the descendents of the same ones that kicked Bolivar out of here and also crucified him in their own way over there in Santa Marta, in Colombia. A minority has taken possession all of the wealth of the world . . . "
These sentiments were not new and Chávez, for his part, has long associated with anti-Semitic figures. One of Chávez's early mentors was the Holocaust-denying Argentine social scientist Norberto Ceresole. Shortly after ascending to the presidency, Chávez wrote to the imprisoned terrorist known as Carlos (who is a Venezuelan national) calling him a distinguished compatriot. In 2000 Chávez became the first head of state to meet with Saddam since the first Gulf War; he even received a Human Rights Award from Libya's Moammar Gadhafi. In December, Chávez hosted a meeting of the U.N. Committee for the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.
But most seriously, Chávez has established an alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has long been the leading state sponsor of terrorism internationally and against Israel. When then Iranian President Mohammed Khatami visited Caracas in March 2005, Chávez voiced his support for Iran's nuclear program and awarded Khatami Venezuela's highest honor, the Order of the Liberator. (There is a Simon Bolivar Street in Tehran.) During this visit the two countries signed 20 agreements to cooperate on economic development projects. These warm relationshave continued under the new Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has explicitly called for Israel's destruction.
Chávez's anti-Semitism is not restricted to rhetorical support for others, though. In late 2004, after a state prosecutor (and Chávez ally), was assassinated in a car bombing, the state-run television darkly referred to Mossad links to the killing. Venezuelan security forces raided a Jewish private school in Caracas as the school day was beginning. No evidence of any connection to the car bombing was found. It surely cannot be a coincidence that the raid occurred while Chávez was visiting Iran.
Carlos Blanco, writing in the leading Caracas daily, El Universal, noted that, "When a Jew is attacked for being such, we enter a zone of total and absolute risk for the free thinking and existence of all, Jews and non Jews alike." His fears have been borne out.
SINCE CHAVEZ'S FIRST ELECTION IN 1998, Venezuela's ranking in the Freedom House survey of World Freedom has dropped from Free to Partly Free. The report states that in 2004, "Chávez devoted considerable attention during the year to advancing his influence over the judicial system, media, and other institutions of civil society." Chávez's measures include media laws that could be used to imprison reporters for insulting public authorities and institutions and packing the Supreme Court by expanding its membership from 20 to 32 justices. The Chávez government has also undermined property rights by imposing price controls on staples (leading to the predictable shortages) and seizing "underused" ranches without compensation.
Chávez also expanded on these broader ambitions in his Christmas Eve address. According to Chávez, Jesus was "the first socialist of our era . . . and for that they crucified him." He exhorted Venezuelans to be ready "to sacrifice ourselves for others, for the country, for the collective . . . that is how we will save our country and we will help save the world from here."
Most tellingly, he called for the building of a utopian paradise on earth:
THE LANGUAGE AND SENTIMENTS are distressingly familiar. But Chávez appears determined to initiate his Utopian revolution and buoyed by record oil prices, he has the resources to pursue this vision in Venezuela and to export his revolution throughout the region. Within Venezuela he has launched numerous initiatives. Some, such as building new medical facilities throughout the country, seem laudable (although Fidel Castro provides the medical staffs). Other initiatives are eccentric, such as the government's printing and free distribution of 1 million copies of the classic novels Don Quixote and Les Miserables. Some programs expand Chavez's authority, such as the establishment of Bolivarian Circles. These armed citizen militias were ostensibly formed to defend the country against a U.S. invasion, but have been deployed for violent confrontations with anti-Chávez protestors.
Regionally, Chávez funds radical groups and buys allies with cash and subsidized oil. He has sticks to accompany these carrots. Chávez is funding a regional satellite TV network--a Latin Al Jazeera--to broadcast his vision. Chávez also provides safe havens for Latin America's largest terrorist organization, FARC. His rhetoric and interference in other nations' internal affairs have sparked several high-profile spats with other Latin American nations, most recently with Mexico and Peru.
Internationally Chávez is seen as a populist loudmouth and while his anti-Semitism is condemned, much of his rhetoric is ignored as braggadocio. But his forays into anti-Semitism are merely symptoms of a broader, dysfunctional worldview. Chávez appears intent on replaying the most disastrous political projects of the last century.
These sentiments were not new and Chávez, for his part, has long associated with anti-Semitic figures. One of Chávez's early mentors was the Holocaust-denying Argentine social scientist Norberto Ceresole. Shortly after ascending to the presidency, Chávez wrote to the imprisoned terrorist known as Carlos (who is a Venezuelan national) calling him a distinguished compatriot. In 2000 Chávez became the first head of state to meet with Saddam since the first Gulf War; he even received a Human Rights Award from Libya's Moammar Gadhafi. In December, Chávez hosted a meeting of the U.N. Committee for the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.
But most seriously, Chávez has established an alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has long been the leading state sponsor of terrorism internationally and against Israel. When then Iranian President Mohammed Khatami visited Caracas in March 2005, Chávez voiced his support for Iran's nuclear program and awarded Khatami Venezuela's highest honor, the Order of the Liberator. (There is a Simon Bolivar Street in Tehran.) During this visit the two countries signed 20 agreements to cooperate on economic development projects. These warm relationshave continued under the new Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has explicitly called for Israel's destruction.
Chávez's anti-Semitism is not restricted to rhetorical support for others, though. In late 2004, after a state prosecutor (and Chávez ally), was assassinated in a car bombing, the state-run television darkly referred to Mossad links to the killing. Venezuelan security forces raided a Jewish private school in Caracas as the school day was beginning. No evidence of any connection to the car bombing was found. It surely cannot be a coincidence that the raid occurred while Chávez was visiting Iran.
Carlos Blanco, writing in the leading Caracas daily, El Universal, noted that, "When a Jew is attacked for being such, we enter a zone of total and absolute risk for the free thinking and existence of all, Jews and non Jews alike." His fears have been borne out.
SINCE CHAVEZ'S FIRST ELECTION IN 1998, Venezuela's ranking in the Freedom House survey of World Freedom has dropped from Free to Partly Free. The report states that in 2004, "Chávez devoted considerable attention during the year to advancing his influence over the judicial system, media, and other institutions of civil society." Chávez's measures include media laws that could be used to imprison reporters for insulting public authorities and institutions and packing the Supreme Court by expanding its membership from 20 to 32 justices. The Chávez government has also undermined property rights by imposing price controls on staples (leading to the predictable shortages) and seizing "underused" ranches without compensation.
Chávez also expanded on these broader ambitions in his Christmas Eve address. According to Chávez, Jesus was "the first socialist of our era . . . and for that they crucified him." He exhorted Venezuelans to be ready "to sacrifice ourselves for others, for the country, for the collective . . . that is how we will save our country and we will help save the world from here."
Most tellingly, he called for the building of a utopian paradise on earth:
To leave the room of poverty is to arrive at a life of dignity, where there is no misery, nor poverty is the Kingdom of God that Christ came to tell us, the Kingdom of Equality, of love, of justice. We have to build that kingdom here, because it is totally false that this Kingdom is in the clouds and that one goes there when one dies. Lie! . . . No, heaven and hell are here among us.
THE LANGUAGE AND SENTIMENTS are distressingly familiar. But Chávez appears determined to initiate his Utopian revolution and buoyed by record oil prices, he has the resources to pursue this vision in Venezuela and to export his revolution throughout the region. Within Venezuela he has launched numerous initiatives. Some, such as building new medical facilities throughout the country, seem laudable (although Fidel Castro provides the medical staffs). Other initiatives are eccentric, such as the government's printing and free distribution of 1 million copies of the classic novels Don Quixote and Les Miserables. Some programs expand Chavez's authority, such as the establishment of Bolivarian Circles. These armed citizen militias were ostensibly formed to defend the country against a U.S. invasion, but have been deployed for violent confrontations with anti-Chávez protestors.
Regionally, Chávez funds radical groups and buys allies with cash and subsidized oil. He has sticks to accompany these carrots. Chávez is funding a regional satellite TV network--a Latin Al Jazeera--to broadcast his vision. Chávez also provides safe havens for Latin America's largest terrorist organization, FARC. His rhetoric and interference in other nations' internal affairs have sparked several high-profile spats with other Latin American nations, most recently with Mexico and Peru.
Internationally Chávez is seen as a populist loudmouth and while his anti-Semitism is condemned, much of his rhetoric is ignored as braggadocio. But his forays into anti-Semitism are merely symptoms of a broader, dysfunctional worldview. Chávez appears intent on replaying the most disastrous political projects of the last century.
Tuesday, February 5, 2013
Al Gore Redux?
Sunday morning I caught Al Gore on Fareed Zakaria GPS hawking his new book - The Future: Six Drivers of Global Change.
He will be 68 years old in 2016 - he could make another run for the Presidency.
I don't think he will. He is having a good time writing books (his first career, before politics was as a journalist) and making lots of money. Being a politician is not all its cracked up to be, the truth is being a journalist is more fun. His split from Tipper and the sale of Current TV to al-Jazeera might be fodder for the opposition.
Plus, campaigning is hard work and by most accounts Gore did not love it - not the way Clinton did. And running brings with it the risk of losing - one can easily imagine that Gore is not ready to go through that again.
Finally, politics can be like TV - the people want a new face. This goes for many leading political figures. Gore has been on the national stage since his first run for the Presidency in 1988 (25 years ago). This also applies to some other likely candidates. Hillary, in this regard, suffers from her association with her husband - we've now had 20 years of Clintons on the national stage. Biden first entered the Senate in 1973 and ran for President in 1988. Jeb Bush, on the Republican side, suffers similarly. After two Presidents Bush and a Bush in national office for 20 of the past 32 years there is no particular hunger for another President Bush.
The irony is that these well-established figures often have the resources needed to win the nomination, but then can't win the general election against a fresh face. None of this by the way is a comment on the merits of a any of these figures as a potential President. But still, it is an intriguing possibility. If, for whatever reason, Hillary and Biden opt out and none of the Democratic party's 2nd team gets traction in the 2016 primaries, is a draft Gore initiative out of the question? He remains and impressive, engaging figure who brings up issues that resonate with much of the party's base. And Gore has the intriguing quality of "what might have been" had things in 2000 gone just a little differently.
It makes me think of the end of Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises:
He will be 68 years old in 2016 - he could make another run for the Presidency.
I don't think he will. He is having a good time writing books (his first career, before politics was as a journalist) and making lots of money. Being a politician is not all its cracked up to be, the truth is being a journalist is more fun. His split from Tipper and the sale of Current TV to al-Jazeera might be fodder for the opposition.
Plus, campaigning is hard work and by most accounts Gore did not love it - not the way Clinton did. And running brings with it the risk of losing - one can easily imagine that Gore is not ready to go through that again.
Finally, politics can be like TV - the people want a new face. This goes for many leading political figures. Gore has been on the national stage since his first run for the Presidency in 1988 (25 years ago). This also applies to some other likely candidates. Hillary, in this regard, suffers from her association with her husband - we've now had 20 years of Clintons on the national stage. Biden first entered the Senate in 1973 and ran for President in 1988. Jeb Bush, on the Republican side, suffers similarly. After two Presidents Bush and a Bush in national office for 20 of the past 32 years there is no particular hunger for another President Bush.
The irony is that these well-established figures often have the resources needed to win the nomination, but then can't win the general election against a fresh face. None of this by the way is a comment on the merits of a any of these figures as a potential President. But still, it is an intriguing possibility. If, for whatever reason, Hillary and Biden opt out and none of the Democratic party's 2nd team gets traction in the 2016 primaries, is a draft Gore initiative out of the question? He remains and impressive, engaging figure who brings up issues that resonate with much of the party's base. And Gore has the intriguing quality of "what might have been" had things in 2000 gone just a little differently.
It makes me think of the end of Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises:
“Oh Jake," Brett said, "We could have had such a damned good time together."
Ahead was a mounted policeman in khaki directing traffic. He raised his baton. The car slowed suddenly, pressing Brett against me.
"Yes," I said. "Isn't it pretty to think so?”
Wednesday, January 30, 2013
Earl Weaver: A Man in Full
He was best known for his frequent altercations with umpires. But this was merely a surface, beneath which his keen strategic intelligence operated. Now, in the era of Moneyball, everyone knows about the applications of statistical analysis to baseball. But time and again, analysts have found truths that Earl Weaver discovered on his own. He famously kept files of statistics of every batter he had against every pitcher they faced and every pitcher he had against every batter they had faced. He carefully designed his line-ups to maximize his advantages - while keeping his options open. Baseball is ultimately a game of percentages. A batter has roughly a 30% chance of doing something effective. Weaver would do everything and anything he could to increase that likelihood because over a 162 game season increasing that chance to 31% would pay off. So he would keep players like Benny Ayala around. Ayala was not a great fielder and wasn't fast, but he could hit a certain class of pitcher. Other managers would focus on what Ayala couldn't do - but Weaver saw what he could do and determine if he needed those particular skills enough to keep him around.
One example, summarized from his terrific Weaver on Strategy gives a sense of how he thought things through (but bear in mind he did this about everything):
In 1981 I wrote Steve Stone into my lineup every day as the designated hitter. Stone is a pitcher, and I naturally did not expect him to hit. In fact, the first time I did it, Stone wasn't even with the club-he had flown ahead to the next city on the road trip... During this season I often platooned Benny Ayala and Terry Crowley as my designated hitters. Let's the Orioles were playing Cleveland and Len Barker was staring for the Indians. I'd have Terry Crowley in the lineup against the right-handed Barker. But suppose the first five hitters get to Barker and knock him out. The Indians bring in Rick Waits, a lefty. I wouldn't want to use Crowley against Waits, so I would have to bat Ayala for Crowley. In the process, I've lost Crowley without him making an appearance. That's wasting a player. Or what if the pitcher takes the mound, throws to a couple of hitters, and the leaves because his arm hurts. It may only happen twice a season, but there is no reason to waste a player if it can be avoided. By listing a pitcher such as Stone as the DH, I have the option of sending up Crowley or Ayala.People have observed that Weaver won because he had great pitchers. True, but... Besides Palmer, none of the Oriole pitchers were all-time greats and many of them were only great under Weaver. One element was that Weaver combined quantitative and qualitative analysis of baseball - he had a very shrewd eye for baseball talent. He could look at a capable journeyman pitcher and see how much better he would be in Memorial Stadium with Weaver's defense around him (Weaver was big into defense.) Also, Weaver - again long before this was analyzed systematically - had a great sense of when a pitcher had had enough. He stayed with a four-man rotation till the end, when almost everyone else had turned to the five-man rotation. He believed - and it has since been validated - that as long as you don't force a pitcher to throw too many pitches in a game he didn't need the extra day of rest (and if you did push a pitcher's arm past its limit the extra day of rest wouldn't help anyway.) He describes in detail the signs that a pitcher is really tiring and I read somewhere that he was one of the first managers to systematically use radar guns during the game because he knew when a pitcher was losing velocity he was done.
All of this came at a cost. To run a time this way, Weaver had to be tough with the players. He had to be ready to cut them from the team when they weren't useful and he didn't dare get close to them. It was an attitude he forged in the minor leagues when he had to cut hopeful kids and "look every one in the eye and kick their dreams in the [butt] and say, 'Kid, there's no way you can make my ballclub.'"
Weaver continued, "If you say it mean enough, maybe they do themselves a favor and don't waste years learning what you can see in a day. They don't have what it takes to make the majors. Just like I never had it."
In a beautiful column about Weaver after his recent death renowned Washington Post sportswriter Thomas Boswell wrote about the toll this took on Weaver and how exhausting Weaver found it to always be "the grown-up." On Brooks Robinson Day (honoring the beloved Oriole 3rd baseman, Weaver said, "I'd like to be like Brooks, the guy who never said no to nobody, the ones that everybody loves because they deserve to be loved ... those are my heroes."
Weaver knew himself and learned that truth illustrated in novels that shapes our lives, that within each of us, beneath the surface lies the opposite. Nothing exists without its contrary and we must each come to terms with that.
Weaver retired early, he was only 52 (he made a brief, unsuccessful comeback a few years later.) He gardened, walked on the beach, took his wife out to dinner, and went to Hialeah to play the ponies.
Did Earl Weaver, the "sorest loser that every lived," a man who exerted every iota of a rather formidable genius for tiny advantages, find peace at the track knowing full well that, "all horseplayers die broke?"
Sunday, January 20, 2013
Penny for your Thoughts: Mali & COIN Light
Now that France has boots on the ground and is doing real shooting everyone is an expert on Mali. I'm not, I won't claim any familiarity with the dynamics of that corner of the world. But from a superficial standpoint it looks like Afghanistan. There are enormous differences in the specifics (cultural, ethnic, linguistic, geographic, historical - I get it, they are totally different countries.) I also have nothing insightful to say about the terrible - and possibly related - events in Algeria.
The big similarity is that Mali, like Afghanistan, is in a difficult to reach place, is large, poor, and in real danger of being taken over by Islamists. The failed state in danger of being taken over by Islamists is a danger in many other places and the big question is what are realistic policy options.
From the experience of Afghanistan, dropping hundreds of billions of dollars and tens of thousands of troops is problematic. It is very, very expensive, it may have limited efficacy, it will distort local politics and economics, and the intervening power may not be willing to sustain it. The troops and resources needed to intervene in Mali on that scale don't exist anyway so what else is in the playbook?
Plan Colombia as a Counter-Example
In the 1990s the Colombian government was in real trouble. The whole country was insecure and the drug-financed FARC was an existential threat to the state itself. The United States engaged in a long-term capacity building program which provided technical assistance, training, money, and intelligence to the Colombian government. There were limited US personnel involved. Overall, the program was a success. Solving the fundamental social problems of Colombia was probably not in the cards, but the country's economy is growing while the FARC has been pushed to the margins and the security situation has been vastly improved.
Plan Colombia is a model program that required a substantial, but not overwhelming US commitment. Unfortunately, its applicability is limited. There was a lower level counter-terror capacity building program to Mali, but it was tiny, subject to bureaucratic differences, and ultimately de-railed by a coup that was not recognized by the US.
Capacity building won't work well when there is very little initial capacity. At its worst moments the Colombian government and security forces were a model of effectiveness compared to the truly failed states. In particular, the Colombian military was a professional force that needed support to adapt to its internal counter-insurgency role. Colombia also benefitted from exceptional political leadership that had the vision and capability to support the military.
None of these things exist in Mali, Somalia or other likely candidates for failed state status. But this lower level capacity building commitment at least provides a useful counter-point to the massive COIN commitment present in Afghanistan (a yin-yang thing.)
Just Right Policy
First, even weak, inept national governments can be useful. Handling things on the international stage requires an address - otherwise where can you send mail/aid/weapons etc. Waiting until that inept government is overthrown and letting Islamists (or other bad guys) run the country is a much less advantageous position.
Some troops are needed, enough to take out the bad guys and make sure they cannot mass forces. In Mali, it is looking like France's brigade with airpower (and US support) may be able to do the job. Naturally augmenting a core Western force with local or regional forces (ie Malian army and African peace-keepers) is useful. But regardless the forces needed to fully secure the country are not available (and might not succeed in any regard.)
However, if a nation is going to commit to stabilizing a country like Mali it means this kind of force will have to stick around for a long-time. To use that force effectively (and also to deliver economic aid and manage relations with sub-national actors - such as local warlords) will require the slow and painful accumulation of highly specific knowledge about that country. Developing that kind of knowledge means that governments have to be prepared to invest in personnel - effectively guaranteeing a number of people across agencies that they can have careers (ie several decades focusing on one area) as "Mali hands" or "Somalia hands" or whatever other area comes up on the national radar screen. This is not the old British civil service in India with tens of thousands - but rather a few hundred. They will need to be structured so that they work across a swath of agencies and continue to harbor a diversity of opinions.
(Caveat: I am not writing that this is what the French are doing! They probably want to get out ASAP. But this is the sort of thing they should do if they want to take a stab at ensuring they don't have an endless cycle of crises. The US should also look into building these kinds of capabilities to deploy in other dangerous areas of the world.)
This requires a broader institutional capacity to build this capacity. It will also require political patience with very long-term approaches and a tolerance for limited results and - quite frankly - deals with some really awful people.
The situation is not hopeless, these abilities exist in a limited form already.
Still, if failed states are going to continue to viewed as an international security problem than the proper tools are needed to address them.
The big similarity is that Mali, like Afghanistan, is in a difficult to reach place, is large, poor, and in real danger of being taken over by Islamists. The failed state in danger of being taken over by Islamists is a danger in many other places and the big question is what are realistic policy options.
From the experience of Afghanistan, dropping hundreds of billions of dollars and tens of thousands of troops is problematic. It is very, very expensive, it may have limited efficacy, it will distort local politics and economics, and the intervening power may not be willing to sustain it. The troops and resources needed to intervene in Mali on that scale don't exist anyway so what else is in the playbook?
Plan Colombia as a Counter-Example
In the 1990s the Colombian government was in real trouble. The whole country was insecure and the drug-financed FARC was an existential threat to the state itself. The United States engaged in a long-term capacity building program which provided technical assistance, training, money, and intelligence to the Colombian government. There were limited US personnel involved. Overall, the program was a success. Solving the fundamental social problems of Colombia was probably not in the cards, but the country's economy is growing while the FARC has been pushed to the margins and the security situation has been vastly improved.
Plan Colombia is a model program that required a substantial, but not overwhelming US commitment. Unfortunately, its applicability is limited. There was a lower level counter-terror capacity building program to Mali, but it was tiny, subject to bureaucratic differences, and ultimately de-railed by a coup that was not recognized by the US.
Capacity building won't work well when there is very little initial capacity. At its worst moments the Colombian government and security forces were a model of effectiveness compared to the truly failed states. In particular, the Colombian military was a professional force that needed support to adapt to its internal counter-insurgency role. Colombia also benefitted from exceptional political leadership that had the vision and capability to support the military.
None of these things exist in Mali, Somalia or other likely candidates for failed state status. But this lower level capacity building commitment at least provides a useful counter-point to the massive COIN commitment present in Afghanistan (a yin-yang thing.)
Just Right Policy
First, even weak, inept national governments can be useful. Handling things on the international stage requires an address - otherwise where can you send mail/aid/weapons etc. Waiting until that inept government is overthrown and letting Islamists (or other bad guys) run the country is a much less advantageous position.
Some troops are needed, enough to take out the bad guys and make sure they cannot mass forces. In Mali, it is looking like France's brigade with airpower (and US support) may be able to do the job. Naturally augmenting a core Western force with local or regional forces (ie Malian army and African peace-keepers) is useful. But regardless the forces needed to fully secure the country are not available (and might not succeed in any regard.)
However, if a nation is going to commit to stabilizing a country like Mali it means this kind of force will have to stick around for a long-time. To use that force effectively (and also to deliver economic aid and manage relations with sub-national actors - such as local warlords) will require the slow and painful accumulation of highly specific knowledge about that country. Developing that kind of knowledge means that governments have to be prepared to invest in personnel - effectively guaranteeing a number of people across agencies that they can have careers (ie several decades focusing on one area) as "Mali hands" or "Somalia hands" or whatever other area comes up on the national radar screen. This is not the old British civil service in India with tens of thousands - but rather a few hundred. They will need to be structured so that they work across a swath of agencies and continue to harbor a diversity of opinions.
(Caveat: I am not writing that this is what the French are doing! They probably want to get out ASAP. But this is the sort of thing they should do if they want to take a stab at ensuring they don't have an endless cycle of crises. The US should also look into building these kinds of capabilities to deploy in other dangerous areas of the world.)
This requires a broader institutional capacity to build this capacity. It will also require political patience with very long-term approaches and a tolerance for limited results and - quite frankly - deals with some really awful people.
The situation is not hopeless, these abilities exist in a limited form already.
Still, if failed states are going to continue to viewed as an international security problem than the proper tools are needed to address them.
Sunday, January 6, 2013
Surprising Influence? The Age of Biden
The last week with the dramatic fiscal cliff negotiations should have been case study gold for this vice president obsessed PhD candidate.
Biden, as all but those sensible enough to turn off the news, must know negotiated a settlement with Republican Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell to avoid going headfirst over the fiscal cliff.
Many, many articles touted Vice President Biden as "the most powerful" or "the most influential" vice president in history (or at least the 2nd most powerful - tough to rival Cheney). This one, in the Atlantic.com pretty much hits the tone. There was so much of this sort of thing that in The New Republic, Timothy Noah wrote:
On many other issues, it appears that Biden has been influential, but as important as his role was, I'm not sure if it is necessarily influence.
Brother or Uncle
I have observed before that age may be an indicator in President-VP relationships. The strongest relationships were between virtual contemporaries. Carter is four years older than Mondale, while Clinton is two years older than Gore. Reagan, on the other hand, was 13 years older than Bush, while Bush was 23 years older than Quayle. I am working on some analytical methods of rating vice presidential influence, but eyeballing it would make it appear that the closer the President and Vice President are in age, the more likely the vice president is to exercise influence. Mondale and Gore were pretty influential, Bush Sr. less so, and Quayle's influence was limited.
But what about a case in which the VP is older? Cheney is five years older than Bush 43 and Biden is 19 years older than Obama. These two figures are also towards the top of the scale in vice presidential influence.
Of course there are other variables. Obama was one of the least experienced President's in modern history. Bush 43 was much more experienced and had very little background in foreign affairs, which quickly became central to his administration. Bush Sr, while younger than Reagan, was extremely experienced but faced internal opposition from Reagan loyalists. There are obviously other factors determining vice presidential influence. But still, the trend is intriging.
Biden, as all but those sensible enough to turn off the news, must know negotiated a settlement with Republican Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell to avoid going headfirst over the fiscal cliff.
Many, many articles touted Vice President Biden as "the most powerful" or "the most influential" vice president in history (or at least the 2nd most powerful - tough to rival Cheney). This one, in the Atlantic.com pretty much hits the tone. There was so much of this sort of thing that in The New Republic, Timothy Noah wrote:
What we can say with some confidence is that the vice presidency has always been worth a good deal more than a bucket of warm piss, and that at least since Harry Truman became president in 1945 it’s been a pretty reliable steppingstone to the presidency. In the modern era vice presidents have tended to be powerful even when they didn’t become president, probably because their selection has been based less on party loyalty or geographic, demographic, or ideological balance and more on perceived aptitude and compatibility with the chief executive....Powerful veeps aren't news. Time to stop pretending that they are.A few fussy points (if I'm going to be an academic, I have to learn to be fussy.) My dissertation is about the question of influence, when the vice president effectively makes policy. Is that what happened here? Biden managed the negotiations with McConnell and reached an agreement, but was that influential or more a matter of carrying-out a difficult task? This is not to downplay Biden's role, and it is a role other VPs have played in the past. Gore negotiated all kinds of difficult issues with Russia, Ukraine, and South Africa - but he was effectively carrying out policy, not making (there were cases where he pushed for policies within the White House and he was often successful.) Mondale handled sensitive issues with the Senate on Carter's behalf, most notably the Panama Canal Treaty. But the Treaty was Carter's idea, Mondale just helped make it happen.
On many other issues, it appears that Biden has been influential, but as important as his role was, I'm not sure if it is necessarily influence.
Brother or Uncle
I have observed before that age may be an indicator in President-VP relationships. The strongest relationships were between virtual contemporaries. Carter is four years older than Mondale, while Clinton is two years older than Gore. Reagan, on the other hand, was 13 years older than Bush, while Bush was 23 years older than Quayle. I am working on some analytical methods of rating vice presidential influence, but eyeballing it would make it appear that the closer the President and Vice President are in age, the more likely the vice president is to exercise influence. Mondale and Gore were pretty influential, Bush Sr. less so, and Quayle's influence was limited.
But what about a case in which the VP is older? Cheney is five years older than Bush 43 and Biden is 19 years older than Obama. These two figures are also towards the top of the scale in vice presidential influence.
Of course there are other variables. Obama was one of the least experienced President's in modern history. Bush 43 was much more experienced and had very little background in foreign affairs, which quickly became central to his administration. Bush Sr, while younger than Reagan, was extremely experienced but faced internal opposition from Reagan loyalists. There are obviously other factors determining vice presidential influence. But still, the trend is intriging.
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