VeepStakes '12a - Mannes in Politico: Thumbs Down for Marco Rubio

Although the GOP doesn't have a nominee yet, the 2012 veepstakes have begun. Politico's Arena asks if Marco Rubio is a viable VP candidate. The short answer is NO, the longer answer is:

Marco Rubio is not VP material yet and has probably missed his moment to be considered presidential material. Over the past 35 years Americans have preferred outsider, people with minimal Washington experience to be president (Carter, Reagan, Clinton, Bush 43 and Obama.) These outsider candidates (including the one losing outsider - Dukakis) have picked experienced D.C.-insiders, often to explicitly balance their own lack of experience.

With the exception of Gingrich and Ron Paul, all of the current Republican candidates are outsiders who would probably select an experienced D.C.-hand as their running mate. Rubio, with less then a year in the Senate is hardly experienced.

Young, telegenic and charming Rubio might have had a chance for the presidency. A few years in the Senate doesn't eliminate the "outsider" label. Obama did not complete his term in the Senate before becoming president. But it may take years for the current controversy \around Rubio to fade in which case he will no longer be an outsider. But, like Biden who wrecked a presidential run with a minor controversy decades ago - Rubio could become a respected insider and become VP material around 2028.

THe Washington Post also takes a skeptical look at Rubio, noting that as a Cuban-American he does not resonate with the vast majority of Latino voters. Probably true, but I take a structural look. While candidates certainly choose based on politics, outsider candidates have had a strong record of picking experienced "presidential" running mates.

Was Killing al-Awlaki a Strategic Error?

The execution of radical cleric (and US citizen) Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen at the beginning of this month may have been an error – not necessarily a legal or moral mistake, but an error of policy.

In the wake of the Awlaqi assassination, Christopher Hitchens asks the most salient question which is that while he shares concerns of those who opposed the action because of “the horrible idea that our government claims the right to add its own citizens to a death list that is compiled by methods and standards unknown” – those opposed are obligated to explain what their alternative policy would be.

In a follow-up column Hitchens provides a justification/precedent/potential policy to address this situation in the future.

In short, while the use of targeted killings is a disturbing policy and the methods by which its use are justified could easily become a slippery slope – there are also legitimate justifications for such a policy in the instance of an American citizen who is involved with dangerous plots against the country and who places himself beyond the reach of the law.

But that is not my problem. Al-Awlaki was first and foremost a media figure (although policy-makers re-defined him as an operational commander.) Applying America’s formidable intelligence and military capabilities to strike him down seems out of proportion and could appear to send the message that the US is an overweening bully quick to squash those who stand up against it. In effect, Awlaki was too rhetorically strong, so we turned to brute force.

I am NOT arguing the morality or targeting al-Awlaki – I am arguing the prudence of the decision. True, his rhetoric had a corrosive effect on our civil society and discourse. But, ten years into our confrontation with Islamic extremism we should be able to counter a two-bit sophist like al-Awlaki, tie him into rhetorical knots, and make him such an easy punching bag that Muslims worldwide start to wonder if he is really a CIA plant!

Instead, in killing him we effectively reinforce his narrative of the Muslim world being subjected by cruel American power. Additionally, the fact that we cannot counter this rhetoric tells Muslim radicals that there is something hollow in our strength – that it is all technological but not based on beliefs.

Let me reiterate, I’m NOT saying this is true, only that it can be perceived this way!

It is true that al-Awlaki was not merely a spokesman. He was linked to active plots. But tactically, targeting him may have been a mistake. He could have become an involuntary honey pot. Contact with him should have been the trigger to investigate Nidal Hassan more carefully.

There are two important counter-arguments. David Ignatius wrote that the strike told radical leaders around that world that targeting the US was not wise but that otherwise we don’t want to get involved in internal matters and “potential increase anti-U.S. sentiment.” It is a fair, but sadly limited argument.

First, the resources the United States is focusing on preventing attacks here is out of proportion to the danger. The real danger is state collapse and increased radicalism across the greater Middle East. Yemen, Egypt, and Pakistan are all poor countries with fast-growing populations, strategic locations, and very negative social trends. The corrosive ideology of radical Islam only further exacerbates these problems. Drones have limited utility in addressing these problems, whereas an ideological counter-campaign is absolutely needed.

The second argument is more difficult. Al-Awlaki’s great success was radicalizing Nidal Hassan who went on to murder 13 fellow soldiers. In targeting him, the message was being sent to American men and women in uniform that these casualties were being avenged – that someone linked to killing American soldiers at a base in the US where they should have been safe – would not be permitted to escape. This is a fair argument. Societies at war demand a great deal of their armed forces and sometimes policies that support them are necessary. Israel’s lopsided deal for the release of Gilad Shalit falls in the same category. Israel is a society of citizen-soldiers and the message that the state will do everything possible to retrieve a captured soldier is necessary to maintain morale and the complex bonds between those who serve, the population at large, and the political leadership.

The drones are amazing technological achievements that serve a valuable role in the battle against Islamic extremism. But, they also call to mind that when one holds a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.

Assessing Iran's Hollywood Style Terror Plot

There has been lots of speculation about the recent strange Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to Washington. Iran is a world champion at long-distance strategic terror – as I’ve written before about the assassination campaign in Europe and the terrible 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires.

But this one seems strange. Wire transfers and cell-phone calls can be monitored and it was not done through a complex chain of cutout. The hallmark of previous Iranian terror is excellent tradecraft, and the reports so far do not show much sign of that.

Also, the idea of hiring a Mexican cartel to carry out an assassination is good Hollywood fodder. The Secretary of State is wrong when she says, “You can’t make this stuff up.” In fact it is the stock and trade of a decent screenwriter. But outsourcing terror is not an easy thing to do. First, why would a Mexican cartel want to get involved in something like this, they could easily makes millions a month on drug-trafficking – so why bother with a far-fetched plot for only $1.5 million? Further, a plot like this could potentially bring enormous, negative attention on them. On the Iranian side, they must know that criminals can be umm… unreliable.

Also, criminal gangs, just like terrorist groups, know that they are subject to infiltration and consequently are careful in whom they do business with and how they do it.

In the past I’ve speculated that Iran may have lost its long-range terror capability, which is one reason they haven’t avenged the death of Hezbollah operations chief Imad Mughniyeh.

An attempt to hire a Mexican cartel would further support this hypothesis, but I did not argue that they had lost their long-range terror abilities because they were stupid.

One possibility is that this “plot” was something of a rogue operation designed by one Iranian faction to embarrass another – possibly linked to efforts to improve relations to the US and/or Saudi Arabia. Under this scenario, even the plot’s failure is a success because now any quiet negotiations are quashed in their infancy. But I can’t speculate on who in Iran would be up to this – Iranian politics is a bit of a black box and, to paraphrase Teddy Roosevelt (discussing looking after his daughter Alice), “I can follow Iranian politics or I can have a life. I can’t do both.”

Schelling on Nuclear Terrorism

On Nobel Laureates
Nobel Laureates are the true aristocracy of the meritocracy. I've wondered, why did the Nobel Price became the great international standard of achievement? Other countries issue prizes, why did the Nordic prize become the most prestigious? It would make an interesting PhD thesis, although it won't be mine.

The other interesting thing, at least in the United States, is how accessible they are. Living in Boston I ran into Eli Weisel. I have an uncle in Boston who is a retired school teacher, for fun he takes extension classes at BU. He has taken courses with both Weisel and Saul Bellow. I joked with him, "Isn't America a great country? Anyone can plunk down $75 and hang out with a Nobel Laureate!"

My uncle, a New Englander to the core, grinned, "I get seniah discount, I only paid $55!"

A Nobel on Nukes
Those thoughts were in the back of my mind when I attended a lecture by Nobel Laureate in Economics and University of Maryland Professor Thomas Schelling. Uppermost in my mind however, was the topic of his talk - what happened to nuclear terrorism.

Back in 1982 Schelling wrote an article stating that sooner rather then later a non-state armed group would acquire a nuclear weapon. This became conventional wisdom, gathering steam particularly after 9/11 when we had an all too frightening demonstration of how capable and creative terrorist groups can be.

Schelling, as a towering intellectual figure, has the presence of mind to admit that it hasn't happened and wonder why. Much of the focus on nuclear terrorism is in stealing fissile material and then constructing a weapon. This is not as easy as it seems. He compared it to stealing a Picasso - all respectable figures in the art community would be on the lookout for it so, as valuable as it is in theory, it is very difficult to sell it.

Moving fissile material out of a country, say an FSU state, to a terrorist haven in Pakistan or Yemen requires traveling long distances across many borders and languages. These barriers present multiple opportunities for the nuclear terrorists to be detected. It is an added factor that the people one is likely to interact with are extremely nasty (criminals, murderers etc.)

Schelling went on to speculate, suppose they can get the stuff, a terrorist group would need a highly skilled team to build the device including metallurgists and engineers. There are a limited number of loyal terrorists with needed skills and hiring people would be difficult. People with the requisite skills usually can earn money legitimately, might turn them in after they are approached, and probably wouldn’t want to join the project since they might just be murdered after it was complete.

Schelling’s analysis, tracks with my own analysis that counter-terror is the application of Murphy’s Law, which emphasizes the logistics of terrorism – always good to be on the same page as a Nobel Laureate! (The difficulties Aum Shinrikyo faced in developed chemical and biological weapons provides a telling example of the logistics of WMD terror.) I would add, that trucking in nuclear material across borders might bring the group under additional intelligence

Schelling then asks what would a group do with a nuclear weapon, simply blowing up a city would be a waste – it makes more sense for the group to seek influence. Presumably any organization sophisticated enough to build a weapon is also capable of strategic thought. I am not as certain of this, some terrorist groups are very strategic in their thinking but others are eschatological. For that matter, for some strategy and eschatology are tightly linked! Further, humiliation and revenge are key motives for many terrorists so that simply inflicting pain and destruction may be its own end.

Schelling also discussed the difficulties in proving the possession of a weapon. Detonating one is the best proof, but a terrorist group might only possess one. Another option is showing to experts (perhaps kidnapping them.) This is possible but difficult.

Schelling dismisses the possibility of an insider handing a complete nuke to a group, since it would be impossible to be certain the device was a nuclear bomb that would work without dismantling it – which would render it inoperable.

Finally, Schelling argued that a group that did possess a bomb would be wise to secrete it in an American city – tell the government it was in one of several cities and threaten to detonate it. This would create an enormous panic. But ultimately, such a terrorist group would, Schelling argues, seek to acquire influence and a seat at the table. Schelling doesn’t mention that transporting and secreting a nuke also has logistical challenges. It would probably be easier then acquiring the materials, but there would still be numerous opportunities for things to go wrong. For a related comparison, see my analysis one why a Mumbai style attack in the US would be difficult to undertake.

This summary is pretty dry, Schelling is very funny and – having been deeply engaged in these issues for decades – has some illuminating anecdotes about these issues.

Finally, unaddressed was the question of a nuclear state being taken over by terrorists or a state with nuclear weapons supporting terrorism. These are different issues. Schelling examines the nightmare scenario of an unaccountable terrorist group acquiring nukes and finds it unlikely. There are many potential nuclear dangers in the world, but this one in particular, while it cannot be dismissed, does not need to be the focus of enormous government resources.

9/11s Past

With 9/11’s tenth anniversary approaching, I thought I’d quickly re-post my past anniversary posts. I’ll write something longer soon – although I keep thinking of Zhou Enlai, saying it is too soon to assess the impact.

Here is a link to what I wrote on 9/11 that was published in NRO. It was entitled Freedom First and argued that promoting freedom through active diplomacy was in our national security interest. It noted the mad ideologies and conspiracy theories that prevailed throughout the greater Middle East and how they were propagated by the region’s dictatorships. I concluded writing:

These are just a few of the options available to the United States to promote freedom — there are many other programs. These important programs are relatively inexpensive — budgets are in the tens of millions of dollars. None of them will bring quick results, but given time they can — combined with a robust and assertive U.S. diplomacy supporting human rights — ameliorate some of the prevailing anti-American ideologies. The war against terrorism promises to be a long one, and expanding freedom is an essential strategy that will undercut terrorism's base of support. While it cannot replace the necessary military response, an offensive for freedom is a deadly weapon against tyranny and the terrorism it spawns.

Two years ago, on 9/11 I wrote an analysis arguing that we have had tremendous counter-terror success at preventing major attacks in the west. The fact that national security experts were so worried about “lone wolves” shows the relative decline of the threat. But the danger of terrorism destabilizing important countries like Pakistan or Saudi Arabia (for starters) and that this could have important repercussions geopolitically (as well as sparking civil conflicts that could take thousands of lives.) I finish, echoing my first response to 9/11:

Sending troops to all of these hotspots is both unfeasible and would probably only make things worse. Developing the levers to maintain stability and ameliorate some of the underlying conditions that create the instability is a tall order. That is the hard part.

Where I Was on 9/11 in NRO

National Review Online is running a series of posts of 9/11 memories. You can read mine here, but check out the others. The feelings from that day are still raw.

Here is what I remember:

On the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, my wife and I were sleeping in a hotel room in Los Angeles during one of our regular family visits. My mother-in-law called and told us to put on the TV: “Some planes have crashed into some buildings.”

We watched, first in our room and then downstairs at the breakfast bar. Talk was muted, everyone was stunned. We decamped at my in-laws’ where, like everyone in America, we watched the television. I plugged my laptop into the phone to monitor news online and check in with friends, particularly those working at the Pentagon. Back at home on the East Coast, friends were rushing home. In L.A., my in-laws live on a flight path where the drone of jets and the buzz of helicopters are so frequent that the noise passes unnoticed. But that day, the city was silent.

Months later, during the Super Bowl half-time ceremony, I realized we had also taken a cross-country flight from one of the airports the hijackers had used. But we had carefully scheduled our flights so that we would be home in time for the Jewish new year.

In the months and years that followed, I heard from friends who had happened to be visiting New York that day. They talked about helping to organize on-site blood drives. Another friend, who raises rescue dogs, volunteered in the weeks afterwards and commuted up to New York.

On 9/11, I wrote. It was a short article for NRO, calling for countering terror with a diplomatic offensive for freedom and human rights. It wasn’t much (although the article holds up), but in a small way I felt as though I could do something besides watch.

What stays with me, exemplifying the divide between pre- and post-9/11, is what I told my wife when she relayed her mother’s words to me: “Tell your mom to turn off the cartoon channel.”

Cheney's Legacy

Yesterday morning (while sitting at LAX waiting for a flight) I posted in Politico's Arena on the question: Will memoir improve Dick Cheney's image?



I haven't seen the memoir yet, just the excerpts discussed in The New York Times, but that doesn't stop a pundit for punditing...



Seriously, as a student of the vice presidency, I had to jump on this one. But, rather then comment on the specifics, I tried to place the memoir in historical perspective and relate it to the evolution of the office. My response was:

It is difficult to imagine Cheney's memoirs changing many minds in the short-term. He is a polarizing figure who is loved (occasionally) and hated (quite often.) In the long-run it is difficult to say what his legacy will be. Hopefully, the seeds of a new Middle East are emerging - but the region has an infinite ability to disappoint.



A fascinating aspect to this is the relevance of the vice presidential memoir. Long considered historical footnotes, vice presidential memoirs were minor niche publications. Calvin Coolidge's VP Charles Dawes kept a diary which is available online. Dawes was, prior to the vice presidency, an enormously accomplished man (Nobel laureate, best-selling song-writer, WWI general, and founder of the Budget Office). His memoirs only confirm the office as a constitutional appendix (Arthur Schlesinger's term.)



Nixon's memoir of his vice presidency, Six Crises, kept him in the public eye and helped propel him to the presidency. Still, the attention paid to Cheney's memoirs shows how the office has emerged as a major power center within administrations.



Additionally, since obtaining influence (in the Carter-Mondale administration) vice presidents have been very cautious about getting involved in the public aspects of policy fights. Cheney broke from this tradition as well and his writing a score-settling memoir - while understandable - indicates the vice presidency is evolving into just another presidential advisor.

Some additional notes, the figure of Charles Dawes is fascinating. His accomplishments were legion and his public service continued after the vice presidency. His diary of that period, perhaps the least accomplished in his incredible life emphasizes what a backwater the vice presidency was.



Part of this was self-inflicted, Dawes feuded with Coolidge. He refused to attend cabinet meetings and mismanaged the Presidents affairs at the Senate). He also attempted to actually run the Senate, and lectured Senators on the need to reform antiquated procedures. Students of Senate history will not be surprised to learn that this went poorly.

Still, Dawes was one of the most active, well-known, and popular vice presidents until recently. He was an active campaigner for Coolidge in 1924.



Dawes had some similarities to Cheney. He made a fortune in business (although Dawes did this before his public service) and like Cheney had held several key executive positions. Unlike Cheney, Dawes' first elected office was the vice presidency, whereas Cheney served in the House. But, unlike Cheney, Dawes eschewed any executive responsibility as VP. His refusal to attend cabinet meetings is particularly interesting. Coolidge had attended Harding cabinet meetings as VP and this was considered an enormous advancement in the vice president's status. But Dawes told Coolidge that he was happy to give the president advice and would personally like to attend the meetings, but felt it was a dangerous precedent. The cabinet consisted of the President's confidants, and it was possible that a future vice president who was not loyal to the president would betray this confidence.



It was also Dawes who, as Budget chief called the cabinet the president's natural enemy, because each department head was effectively a vice president of spending.



Much to think about there.